Shular v. United StatesShular v. United States
*1 OCTOBER TERM, 2019 (Slip Opinion)
Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See
United States
v.
Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,
Syllabus v . UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 18–6662. Argued January 21, 2020 —Decided February 26, 2020 The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) mandates a 15-year minimum
sentence for a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a
firearm who has at least three convictions for “serious drug offense[s].”
To determine whether an offender’s prior convictions qualify for ACCA enhancement, this Court has used a “categorical approach,” looking “only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses.” Taylor v. , 495 U. S. 575, 600. Under some statutes, a court employing a categorical approach must come up with a “generic” ver- sion of a crime—that is, the elements of the offense as commonly un- derstood. The court then determines whether the elements of the of- fense of conviction match those of the generic crime. Other statutes, which ask the court to determine whether the conviction meets some other criterion, require no such generic-offense analysis.
Shular pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and
received a 15-year sentence, the mandatory minimum under ACCA.
In imposing this sentence, the District Court held that Shular’s six
prior cocaine-related convictions under Florida law qualified as “seri-
ous drug offense[s]” triggering ACCA enhancement. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit affirmed, concluding that
only that the state offense involve the conduct specified in the statute; it does not require that the state offense match certain generic of- fenses. Pp. 5–11.
Syllabus
(a) The parties agree that
(b) The statutory text and context show that
(c) Shular argues that Congress meant to capture the drug offenses
generally existing in state laws at the time of
(d) Rejecting a generic-offense approach, Shular contends, would subject defendants to ACCA enhancement based on outlier state laws. He emphasizes that the Florida drug offenses of which he was convicted do not require, as an element, knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance. But Shular overstates the extent to which Florida law is idiosyncratic, for if a defendant asserts that he was unaware of the substance’s illicit nature, the jury must find knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. In any event, Shular’s interpretation is scarcely the only one that promotes consistency. Congress intended consistent application of ACCA to all offenders who engaged— according to the elements of their prior convictions—in certain conduct. Pp. 9–10.
(e) The rule of lenity has no application here, for after consulting traditional canons of interpretation there remains no ambiguity for the
Syllabus
rule of lenity to resolve. Pp. 10–11.
G INSBURG , J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. K AV - ANAUGH , J., filed a concurring opinion. *4 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________ No. 18–6662 _________________ EDDIE LEE SHULAR, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[February 26, 2020]
J USTICE G INSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA),
While the parties agree that a court should look to the
state offense’s elements, they disagree over what the court
should measure those elements against. In the Govern-
ment’s view, the court should ask whether those elements
involve the conduct identified in
Under the approach he advances, Shular argues, his sen-
tence is not subject to ACCA enhancement. The generic of-
fenses named in
The question presented: Does
I
Ordinarily, a defendant convicted of being a felon in pos-
session of a firearm, in violation of §922(g)(1), faces a max-
imum sentence of ten years.
To determine whether an offender’s prior convictions
qualify for ACCA enhancement, we have used a “categorical
approach,” under which we look “only to the statutory defi-
nitions of the prior offenses.”
Taylor
v.
United States
, 495
U. S. 575, 600 (1990). Under this approach, we consider
neither “the particular facts underlying the prior convic-
tions” nor “the label a State assigns to [the] crime[s].”
Mathis
v.
United States
,
Under some statutes, using a categorical approach re-
quires the court to come up with a “generic” version of a
crime—that is, the elements of “the offense as commonly
understood,”
id.
, at ___ (slip op., at 1).
[1]
We have required
that step when the statute refers generally to an offense
without specifying its elements. In that situation, the court
must define the offense so that it can compare elements, not
labels. For example, in
Taylor
, confronted with ACCA’s un-
adorned reference to “burglary,” we identified the elements
of “generic burglary” based on the “sense in which the term
is now used in the criminal codes of most States.” 495 U. S.,
at 598–599;
In contrast, other statutes calling for a categorical ap-
proach ask the court to determine not whether the prior
conviction was for a certain offense, but whether the convic-
tion meets some other criterion. For example, in
Ka-
washima
v.
Holder
,
[1] We have also used the term “generic crime” to mean the crime “in
general” as opposed to “the specific acts in which an offender engaged on
a specific occasion.”
Nijhawan
v.
Holder
, 557 U. S. 29, 33–34 (2009).
That is not the sense in which we use “generic” in this opinion.
*7
deceitful
conduct
.”
Id.
, at 484 (emphasis added). Conse-
quently, no identification of generic offense elements was
necessary; we simply asked whether the prior convictions
before us met that measure.
Id.
, at 483–485. See also,
e.g.
,
Stokeling
v. , 586 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019)
(slip op., at 12–13) (determining whether an offense “has as
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another,”
This case invites us to decide which of the two categorical methodologies just described applies in determining whether a state offense is a “serious drug offense” under ACCA. ACCA defines that term to include:
“an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in sec- tion 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U. S. C. [§]802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.”18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(A)(ii) .
II
Shular pleaded guilty in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida to possessing a firearm
after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of
§922(g)(1), and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine
and cocaine base, in violation of
In imposing that enhanced sentence, the District Court
took account of Shular’s prior convictions under Florida
law. In 2012, Shular pleaded guilty to five counts of selling
cocaine and one count of possessing cocaine with intent to
sell, all in violation of
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the sentence.
Courts of Appeals have divided on whether
III
A
The parties here agree that
They differ, however,
on what
comparison
This methodological dispute is occasioned by an interpre-
tive disagreement over
B
The Government’s reading, we are convinced, correctly
interprets the statutory text and context. Two features of
First, the terms in
Contrast
Second, by speaking of activities a state-law drug offense
“involv[es],”
To refer to offenses as Shular urges, it would have been
far more natural for the drafter to follow the enumerated-
offense clause in using “is,” not “involving.” See
C
Shular principally urges that at the time of
Shular points out that the word “involving” can
accommodate a generic-offense approach. Cf.
Scheidler
v.
National Organization for Women, Inc.
,
Endeavoring to explain why Congress might have chosen
“involving” over “is” in
Shular asserts that to describe conduct rather than
offenses, Congress would have used the language of the
elements clause of the “violent felony” definition, which
captures a crime that “
has as an element
the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
of another.”
Nor does the other clause of the “serious drug offense”
definition shed light on the question before us.
D
Shular expresses concern that rejecting a generic-offense
approach would yield an anomalous result. Unlike other
drug laws, Shular contends, the Florida law under which
he was previously convicted does not require that the
defendant know the substance is illicit. Unless
[2]
As an initial matter, Shular overstates Florida’s
disregard for
mens rea
. Charged under
In any event, both parties’ interpretations of
E
Shular urges us to apply the rule of lenity in determining
whether
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is
Affirmed. ——————
[3] Shular argues in the alternative that even if
K AVANAUGH , J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________ No. 18–6662 _________________ EDDIE LEE SHULAR, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[February 26, 2020]
J USTICE K AVANAUGH , concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion in full. In Part III–E of the opin- ion, the Court rejects Shular’s argument for applying the rule of lenity. I write separately to elaborate on why the rule of lenity does not apply here.
This Court’s longstanding precedents establish that the rule of lenity applies when two conditions are met.
First , as the Court today says and as the Court has re- peatedly held, a court may invoke the rule of lenity only “ ‘after consulting traditional canons of statutory construc- tion.’ ” Ante, at 10 (quoting United States v. Shabani , 513 U. S. 10, 17 (1994)). [1] In other words, a court must first em- ploy all of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, ——————
[1] See also,
e.g., Ocasio
v.
United States
,
K AVANAUGH , J., concurring
and a court may resort to the rule of lenity only “ ‘after seiz-
ing everything from which aid can be derived.’ ”
Ocasio
v.
United States
,
Second , this Court has repeatedly explained that the rule of lenity applies only in cases of “ ‘grievous’ ” ambiguity— where the court, even after applying all of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, “ ‘can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.’ ” Ocasio , 578 U. S., at ___, n. 8 (slip op., at 13, n. 8) (quoting Muscarello , 524 U. S., at 138–139). The Court has stated that the “simple existence of some statutory ambiguity” is “not sufficient to warrant application of that rule, for most statutes are am- biguous to some degree.” Id ., at 138. To be sure, as Justice Scalia rightly noted, the term “ ‘grievous ambiguity’ ” pro- vides “ ‘little more than atmospherics, since it leaves open the crucial question—almost invariably present—of how much ambiguousness constitutes an ambiguity.’ ” Reading Law, at 299 (quoting v. Hansen , 772 F. 2d 940, 948 (CADC 1985) (Scalia, J., for the court)); see also Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. ——————
and deferring to an agency’s reasonable interpretation). *17 3
K AVANAUGH , J., concurring
L. Rev. 2118 (2016). That said, atmospherics can matter. Although the Court has not always been perfectly con- sistent in its formulations, the Court has repeatedly em- phasized that a court must find not just ambiguity but “grievous ambiguity” before resorting to the rule of lenity.
To sum up: Under this Court’s longstanding precedents, the rule of lenity applies when a court employs all of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation and, after doing so, concludes that the statute still remains grievously am- biguous, meaning that the court can make no more than a guess as to what the statute means.
Because the Court correctly concludes that the rule of len- ity does not apply in this case, I join the Court’s opinion in full.
——————
[2] See,
e.g., Shaw
v.
United States
,