THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MONICA MARIE MARTINEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
H046164 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C1518585)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Filed 12/30/20
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
We find that section 2076 is not unconstitutionally vague on its face. We further conclude that the section, which we determine is content-based and regulates protected speech, fails to survive even an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny. Therefore, it is facially invalid. Given our conclusion, we find it unnecessary to reach defendant‘s First Amendment overbreadth claim.
Since section 2076 is facially unconstitutional, defendant‘s judgment of conviction must be reversed.
I
Procedural History
A felony complaint, filed August 25, 2015, alleged that on seven different dates in 2014, defendant committed a felony under
Defendant and Jose Luna, who was charged in a different case—both of whom were associated with Luna Bail Bonds—demurred to their complaints on multiple grounds, including that (1) the complaint failed to state facts that constituted a public offense and (2)
A hearing was held on the demurrer on August 23, 2016. The parties’ discussion included, among other things, whether section 2076 was unconstitutionally vague and whether a defendant could complain about vagueness when the defendant‘s conduct was clearly proscribed. The parties did not discuss whether section 2076 was unconstitutionally overbroad or failed to pass the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated that it would be preparing a written order.
On September 20, 2016, the trial court orally overruled the demurrer. The court indicated that a written order would be forthcoming. The clerk‘s transcript does not contain such a written order. Neither party suggests that such an order exists.
Defendant signed and initialed an “ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS, WAIVER, AND PLEA FORM” for a felony, indicating that she was pleading no contest to one count of violating
On May 18, 2018, the trial court placed defendant on formal probation for three years, ordered her to serve 120 days—to be served by working every Saturday and Sunday until completed—and ordered her to begin serving the term on August 4, 2018.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal. The notice indicated that defendant was challenging the “denial” of a demurrer. The trial court granted defendant‘s request fоr a certificate of probable cause.
Discussion
A. Regulation of Bail Licensees
Under
The California Insurance Commissioner has issued regulations governing the conduct of bail licensees, which include the following prohibitions. “No bail licensee shall directly or indirectly permit any person on his behalf to solicit or negotiate undertakings of bail or bail bonds or to effect undertakings of bail or to issue or deliver bail bonds unless such person is properly licensed by the commissioner to perform such acts, even though such person acts in a purely mechanical or ministerial manner or renders his services gratuitously.” (§ 2068, italics added.) “Except as provided in
Section 2079 specifies: “No bail licensee shall solicit bail except in accordance with [s]ection 2079.1 and from: [¶] (a) An arrestee; [¶] (b) The arrestee‘s attorney; [¶] (c) An adult member of the arrestee‘s immediate family; or [¶] (d) Such other person as the arrestee shall specifically designate in writing. Such designation shall be signed by the arrestee before the solicitation, unless prohibited by the rules, regulations or ordinances governing the place of imprisonment. If so prohibited, it may be signed after release of the arrested to ratify a previous oral designation made by him.” (§ 2079, italics added.)
Section 2079.1 states: “Any solicitation of an arrestee himself pursuant to Section 2079 (a) shall be only after a bona fide request for bail services has been received from the arrestee or from a person specified in Section 2079 (b) [(arrestee‘s attorney)] or (c) [(adult member of the arrestee‘s immediate family)]. Any solicitation of a person specified in Section 2079 (c) or (d) shall be only between the hours of 7 o‘clock a.m., and 11 o‘clock p.m., unless the bаil licensee is directly and specifically authorized in writing by the arrestee or the arrestee‘s attorney to make such solicitation at some other specific time.” (Italics added.)
Section 2080 establishes: “No bail licensee shall negotiate concerning bail, except with: [¶] (a) A person specified in Section 2079; [¶] (b) Any other person who without previous solicitation on the part of the bail licensee has requested his services.” (Italics added.)
The regulations also prohibit gifts: “No bail licensee shall give, directly or indirectly, any gift of any kind to any public official or employee of any governmental agency who has duties, functions or responsibilities in respect to the administration of justice or a place wherein detention of persons charged with crime may occur, or to a prisoner in any jail or place of detention.”7 (§ 2078.)
B. Challenge to Trial Court‘s Order Overruling Demurrer
As relevant here, a “defendant may demur to the accusatory pleading at any time prior to the entry of a plea, when it appears upon the face thereof either: [¶] 1. . . . the court has no jurisdiction of the offense charged [in an information or complaint]; [¶] . . . [¶] 4. That the facts stated do not constitute a public offense; [¶] 5. That it contains matter which, if true, would constitute a legal justification or excuse of the offense charged, or other legal bar to the prosecution.” (
The California Supreme Court has assumed that “if a statute under which a defendant is charged with a crime is invalid, the complaint is subject to demurrer under subdivisions 1, 4 and 5 of
“The legal grounds for demurrer to an accusatory pleading are limited to those specifically enumerated in
An order overruling a defendant‘s demurrer is not appealable. (See
C. Section 2076 is Not Unconstitutionally Vague on Its Face
Defendant asserts that section 2076 is unconstitutionally vague on its face. “[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair warning.’ [Citation.] The rule of fair warning consists of ‘the due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing adequate notice to potential offenders’
“A conviction fails to comport with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement. [Citations.]” (United States v. Williams (2008) 553 U.S. 285, 304 (Williams).) “[A] law that is ‘void for vagueness’ not only fails to provide adequate notice to those who must observe its strictures, but also ‘impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.’ (Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, 408 U.S at pp. 108-109, fn. omitted.)” (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1116 (Acuna).)
Ordinarily, however, a person “who has received fair warning of the criminality of his own conduct from the statute in question is [not] entitled to attack it because the language would not give similar fair warning with respect to other conduct which might be within its broad and literal ambit. One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.” (Parker v. Levy (1974) 417 U.S. 733, 756 (Parker).) The California Supreme Court has likewise indicated that if a law “clearly applies to a criminal defendant‘s conduct, the defendant may not challenge it on grounds of vagueness. [Citations.]” (Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) Ordinarily, at least outside the First Amendment context, “vagueness challenges to statutes . . . must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand. [Citation.]” (United States v. Mazurie (1975) 419 U.S. 544, 550; see Maynard v. Cartwright (1988) 486 U.S. 356, 361 [“Objections to vagueness under the Due Process Clause . . . may be overcome in any specific case where reasonable persons would know that their conduct is at risk.“].)
While vagueness doctrine is not “an outgrowth . . . of the First Amendment” (Williams, supra, 553 U.S. at p. 304), greater clarity may be required where a law may affect protected speech. (See Smith v. Goguen (1974) 415 U.S. 566, 573 [“[w]here a statute‘s literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [due process doctrine of vagueness] demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts. [Fn. omitted.]“]; see also Villagе of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. (1982) 455 U.S. 489, 499 [if “the law interferes with the right of free speech . . . , a more stringent vagueness test should apply“]; see also Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1109.)
More recently, the United States Supreme Court has stated: “[E]ven to the extent a heightened vagueness standard applies, a [person] whose speech is clearly proscribed cannot raise a successful vagueness claim under the Due Process Clause of the
Moreover, insofar as defendant is arguing that section 2076 is constitutionally invalid on its face due to pervasive vagueness, her claim lacks merit. “[P]erfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (‘Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty in our language‘); see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 79 (1949) (rejecting vagueness challenge to city ordinance forbidding ‘loud and raucous’ sound amplification) (opinion of Reed, J.).” (Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989) 491 U.S. 781, 794.) “[N]o more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded.” (Acuna, supra, 14 Cal.4th p. 1117.)
Defendant asserts that the words “understanding” and “arrangement” are unconstitutionally vague. Her argument is that “[t]he usual and ordinary meaning of these terms” indicates “an informal agreement of any kind or an informal mutual agreement.” She claims that “[t]he problem with the language of the statute then is that it does not prohibit a formal contract, only an informal one” and that it is “not sufficiently precise to inform one of the acts that are proscribed.” This argument fails to persuade us.
The word “[u]nderstanding” means “a mutual agreement not formally entered into but in some degree binding on each side.” (Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dict. <https://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/understanding> [as of Dec. 30, 2020], archived at <http://perma.cc/2HLK-MRYF>.) It has also been defined as “[a]n informal or unspoken agreement or arrangement.” (Lexico Online Dict. <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/understanding> [as of Dec. 30, 2020], archived at <http://perma.cc/3JL8-EGRJ>.) The word “arrangement” means “[a]n agreement with
An agreement can be “a contract duly executed and legally binding on the parties entering into it” or “an arrangement (as between two or more parties) as to a course of action.” (Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dict. <https://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/agreement> [as of Dec. 30, 2020], archived at <http://perma.cc/T3PRMY00>.) Thus, the words “arrangement” and “understanding” suggest at least mutuality and assent regardless of the degree of informality, and they include a legally binding contract in addition to informal or tacit agreements between persons.8 We do not agree with defendant that a formal agreement or contract is outside the purview of section 2076‘s prohibition.
Defendant also asserts that the phrases “for any purpose,” “directly or indirectly,” and “with any other persons” in section 2076 are vague. They are not. The language makes clear that the section‘s prohibition extends as broadly as possible to any prohibited arrangement or understanding, regardless of the identity of the other party, regardless of the purpose, and regardless whether it is entered or carried out through intermediaries. Contrary to defendant‘s assertion, the breadth of the prohibition and its inclusivity do not render it vague.
The practical difficulties of proving an informal agreement or tacit understanding to inform or notify a bail licensee of information pertaining to an arrest, criminal comрlaint, or “persons involved therein” do not mean that section 2076 is
Defendant further argues that “the phrase ‘or any other persons’ is unconstitutionally vague since the plain language severely restricts a bail licensee‘s right to freedom of expression and association.” She also contends that the regulation‘s language, which includes the phrase “for any purpose,” “prohibit[s] a tremendous amount of conduct and speech.” These arguments do not demonstrate unconstitutional vagueness. They may relate to whether section 2076 is narrowly tailored or unconstitutionally overbroad. ” ‘A clear and precise enactment may nevertheless be “overbroad” if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.’ (Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972) 408 U.S. 104, 114, fn. omitted.)” (Acuna, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1115.)
We reject defendant‘s contention that section 2076 is facially invalid beсause it is unconstitutionally vague.
D. Section 2076 is Facially Unconstitutional under Scrutiny Analysis
1. Introduction
The parties agree that section 2076 regulates speech, but they disagree as to the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny and whether the section survives such scrutiny. A law that restricts speech may be constitutionally invalid on its face if it fails to pass the requisite judicial scrutiny. (See, e.g., Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass‘n (2011) 564 U.S. 786, 799-800 [state restrictions on violent video games failed to pass strict scrutiny]; R.A.V. v. St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 391-396 [city‘s bias-motivated
2. Intermediate Level of Scrutiny that Applies to Commercial Speech
The People argue that we should use the less rigorous, intermediate level of scrutiny that applies to commercial speech in evaluating the facial validity of section 2076.9
In the seminal case of Central Hudson, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he First Amendment, as applied to the States through the
The United States Supreme Court has explained that “the government‘s legitimate interest in protecting consumers from ‘commercial harms’ explains ‘why commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial speech.’ [Citations.]” (Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. (2011) 564 U.S. 552, 579 (Sorrell).) For example, ” ‘a State may choose to regulate price advertising in one industry but not in others, because the risk of fraud . . . is in its view greater there.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 579.)
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court established a framework, “a four-part analysis,” for analyzing restrictions on commercial speech.10 (Central Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. at 566.) The Supreme Court stated: “At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
Under this mid-level scrutiny, “[t]he regulatory technique may extend only as far as the interest it serves.” (Central Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 565.) However, the fit between the Legislature‘s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends is not required to be perfect. (Board of Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox (1989) 492 U.S. 469, 480.) The means employed need not be the “single best disposition” or “the least restrictive means” so long as the means are “narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.” (Ibid.; see Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. (1995) 515 U.S. 618, 632 (Went For It) [“the ‘least restrictive means’ test has no role in the commercial speech context. [Citation.]“].)
3. Strict Scrutiny
In contrast, defendant urges us to apply strict scrutiny to section 2076. She asserts that since section 2076 “seeks tо regulate speech based on its content,” the strict scrutiny standard applies. She argues that even if the state has “a compelling interest, the regulation is not even remotely sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.”
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has stressed that content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny. The court has stated that its “precedents distinguish between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech.” (National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [138 S.Ct. 2361, 2371] (Becerra).) The court explained: “Content-based regulations ‘target speech based on its communicative content.’ Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. [155, 163], 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015). As a general matter, such laws ‘are
In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., supra, 576 U.S. 155 (Reed), the court explained that “strict scrutiny applies either when a law is content based on its face or when the purpose and justification for the law are content based.” (Id. at p. 166.) “A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government‘s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech. [Citatiоn.]” (Id. at p. 165.) In Hill v. Colorado (2000) 530 U.S. 703, the United States Supreme Court made clear that “[r]egulation of the subject matter of messages, though not as obnoxious as viewpoint-based regulation, is also an objectionable form of content-based regulation. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 723.)
Accordingly, “[t]he Government may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.” (Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C. (1989) 492 U.S. 115, 126 (Sable).) “It is not enough to show that the Government‘s ends are compelling; the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.” (Ibid.) “If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government‘s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative. [Citations.] To do otherwise would be to restrict speech without an adequate justification, a course the First Amendment does not permit.” (United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. (2000) 529 U.S. 803, 813.)
“When plaintiffs challenge a content-based speech restriction, the burden is on the Government to prove that the proposed alternatives will not be as effective as the challenged statute. [Citation.]” (Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (2004) 542
4. Section 2076 is a Content-Based Regulation
The People maintain that section 2076 is not a content-based regulation but rather a content-neutral regulation of the conduct of bail licensees.
” ‘[T]he First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech,’ Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011), and professionals are no exception to this rule [citation]. . . . While drawing the line between speech and conduct can be difficult, this Court‘s precedents have long drawn it [citations].” (Becerra, supra, ___U.S. at p. ___ [138 S.Ct. at p. 2373].) The First Amendment‘s incidental burden doctrine “is why a ban on race-based hiring may require employers to remove ’ “White Applicants Only” ’ signs, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006); why ‘an ordinance against outdoor fires’ might forbid ‘burning a flag,’ [R.A.V. v. St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377,] 385; and why antitrust laws can prohibit ‘agreements in restraint of trade,’ Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).”11 (Sorrell, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 567.)
However, section 2076 must be regarded as a content-based regulation on its faсe because it targets a bail licensee‘s arrangement or understanding with another to pass specified information to any bail licensee. (See Sorrell, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 570 [“the creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment“].) Our conclusion that section 2076 is a content-based regulation does not, however, automatically make the section subject to strict scrutiny.
Long before Reed, the Supreme Court stated that “[i]f commercial speech is to be distinguished, it ‘must be distinguished by its content.’ [Citation.]” (Bates v. State Bar of Arizona (1977) 433 U.S. 350, 363, italics added; see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn. (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 423, fn. 4 (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.) [U.S. Supreme Court has “long upheld regulations of commercial speech based on subject matter“].) In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court explained: “In most other contexts, the First Amendment prohibits regulation based on the content of the message. [Citation.] Two features of commercial speech permit regulation of its content. First, commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both the market and their products. Thus, they are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of their messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity. [Citation.] In addition, commercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression that is not ‘particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.’ [Citation.]” (Central Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 564, fn. 6.)
Defendant cites Sable, supra, 492 U.S. 115 for the proposition that a regulation that “regulates speech based on its content must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government interest.” The provision of the
Sable did not, however, characterize the challenged dial-a-porn provision as a restriction on “commercial speech,” as that term has been defined by the United States Supreme Court. Neither did the court repudiate the Central Hudson analysis that has been applied to commercial speech.
5. Defendant‘s Claim that Section 2076 Regulates Noncommercial Speech
Although a basic question is whether section 2076, as we have construed it, regulates noncommercial speech, the answer is not clear. “[T]he precise bounds of the category of expression that may be termed commercial speech” are uncertain. (Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio (1985) 471 U.S. 626, 637
Without a doubt, “advertising pure and simple . . . falls within th[e] bounds [of commercial speech].” (Zauderer, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 637.) Similarly, solicitation of potential clients by licensed professionals is clearly commercial speech. (See, e.g., Went For It, Inc., supra, 515 U.S. at pp. 620, 635 [state bar rule that barred targeted direct-mail solicitation of accident victims and their relatives for 30 days following an accident or disaster withstood scrutiny under Central Hudson]; Edenfield, supra, 507 U.S. at pp. 767-771 [blanket ban on direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation by certified public accountants determined to be unconstitutional under Central Hudson]; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass‘n (1978) 436 U.S. 447, 454 (Ohralik) [upholding as constitutional the application of state bar disciplinary rules to a lawyer‘s personal solicitation of accident victims].)
But commercial speech has been described more broadly as “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience” (Central Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 561) and as speech proposing a commercial transaction. (Id. at p. 562.) The Supreme Court has explained that commercial speech is ” ‘linked inextricably’ with the commercial arrangement that it proposes [citation], so the State‘s interest in regulating the underlying transaction may give it a concomitant interest in the expression itself. [Citation.]” (Edenfield, supra, 507 U.S at p. 767.)
Without explanation, the People assume that section 2076, like section 2079.1, regulates commercial speech. Obviously, the provision does not directly regulate quintessential commercial speech, such as advertising or a licensed professional‘s solicitation of potential clients. However, it might be argued that section 2076 regulates the commercial speech of bail licensees, who are likely to be animated by the profit motive to seek information that can be exploited to conduct bail solicitations—which are undisputedly commercial speech. (See Liquormart, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 499 [noting that
Defendant accepts that the speech regulated by seсtion 2079.1—solicitation for bail services—“can only be characterized as commercial speech.” But defendant asserts that section 2076 reaches noncommercial speech. She argues that section 2076 restricts “speech by ‘any other persons,’ not just licensees” and the regulation “prevents [those persons] from notifying a licensee about the existence of a criminal complaint, the fact of an arrest or impending arrest, or ‘any information pertaining to [an arrest or impending arrest] or the persons involved therein.’ ”
Defendant misreads section 2076. The section is aimed at preventing a bail licensee from entering an arrangement or understanding with another to have such information channeled to any licensee. Contrary to defendant‘s assertion, section 2076 does not directly prohibit bail licensees from merely asking “about newsworthy arrests or complaints out of simple curiosity.” Section 2076 does not prohibit a bail licensee from receiving information pertaining to a prior or upcoming arrest, an existing criminal complaint, or the persons involved therein, provided the information is not being conveyed pursuant to a prohibited arrangement or understanding. Section 2076 certainly does not, as defendant claims, impose a blanket prohibition that prevents a bail licensee “from asking аnyone about anything relating to criminal complaints, arrests, or ‘any information pertaining’ to them.”
Defendant argues that section 2076 might subject to criminal prosecution any licensee who arranges for an employee of the local police department to notify the licensee of the arrest of the licensee‘s “missing child” or other family member. Under section 2076, a bail licensee remains free to report a missing child to law enforcement and seek updated information on the results of any official search for the child. A bail license can also seek information about an arrested family member through ordinary
Defendant also claims that the section could conceivably cover a bail licensee‘s conversation with “a currently incarcerated defendant” in which the licensee informs the incarcerated defendant that the licensee “cannot post bail for him but that [the licensee] can provide [the defendant] with a list of other bail licеnsees who might be able to do so.” We find this imagined scenario farfetched. In any case, we see nothing in the language of section 2076 that precludes a bail licensee who is lawfully responding to a bona fide request for bail services from merely providing contact information enabling an arrestee to make a separate bona fide request for bail services from other bail licensees. Further, contrary to defendant‘s suggestion, section 2076 itself does not make it unlawful for a bail licensee to merely ask a bail customer with whom she is permissibly dealing to recommend her to others needing bail services. However, a bail licensee clearly cannot “directly or indirectly permit any person on his [or her] behalf to solicit or negotiate undertakings of bail or bail bonds or to effect undertakings of bail or to issue or deliver bail bonds unless such person is properly licensed . . . to perform such acts . . . .” (§ 2068.) Obviously, “any person” in this context includes a jail inmate.
As to non-licensees, section 2076 does not bar them from answering a bail licensee‘s question or inquiry or from providing information to a licensee. Neither does the section, in conjunction with
Nevertheless, defendant argues that because section 2076 precludes a bail licensee from entering into a prohibited agreement or understanding regardless of its underlying “purpose,” the regulation “goes far beyond commercial speech.” We ultimately find it
6. Section 2076 Does Not Survive Heightened Constitutional Scrutiny
Common sense tells us that section 2076 restricts or chills bail licensees’ speech where such speech evidences, or might be regarded by law enforcement as evidencing, an impermissible arrangement or understanding. Even if we assume for purposes of argument that the speech affected by section 2076 may be properly characterized as only commercial speech, the regulation does not survive judicial scrutiny. “Under a commercial speech inquiry, it is the State‘s burden to justify its content-based law as consistent with the First Amendment. [Citation.]” (Sorrell, supra, 564 U.S. at pp. 571-572, italics added.)
In this case, the People focus on the nature of the state‘s interests in regulating bail licensees and their bail solicitations.12 They suggest that the challenged regulation was promulgated “because the use of insider arrest information by bail agents creates an uneven playing field within the bail industry and promotes a coercive environment for arrestees within the criminal justice system.” They identify substantial state interests in (1) regulating bail agents, who are licensed professionals working in the criminal justice system, to ensure ” ‘they operate in a fair, honest and professional manner[]’ “; (2) “protecting ‘recent arrestees against harassment, intimidation, overreaching and annoyance or invasions of privacy by bail agents’ and by those acting on their behalf“; and (3) ” ‘protecting the orderly administration of justice.’ ”
Defendant asserts that “it is impossible to tell from the regulation whether there is a compelling interest at stake.” Of course, under the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson, the People must demonstrate that the regulation serves a substantial state
We begin with the basic understanding that “the business of insurance is sufficiently affected with a public intеrest to justify its regulation by the state [citation] . . . .” (Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd‘s of London (2005) 36 Cal.4th 495, 507.) “[T]he conduct of a bail bond business is such a business as is subject to reasonable regulation under the police power of the state. The legislature has properly determined that abuses have arisen or may arise which make it necessary or desirable that there be some public supervision of that business.” (McDonough v. Goodcell (1939) 13 Cal.2d 741, 746.)
In Dolezal, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th 167, which is heavily relied upon by the People, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of section 2079.1 after he was convicted for its violation under
The appellate court stated: “Each of the interests identified by respondent has been recognized as substantial in the context of First Amendment challenges to the regulation of commercial speech. In Edenfield v. Fane (1993) 507 U.S. 761, the court recognized that Florida had a substantial interest in protecting potential consumers from fraud, overreaching, intimidation, annoyance, harassment or invasions of privacy during direct personal solicitation. (Id. at pp. 768-769; see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn (1978) 436 U.S. 447, 462 [‘the State has a legitimate and indeed “compelling” interest in preventing those aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of “vexatious conduct.” ‘].) Edenfield also acknowledged
In Dolezal, the appellate court also explained: “Most people find being in jail to be a very stressful situation. For many arrestees, a bail agent is the only person who can secure their release. But an arrestee may also lack information about his or her court schedule or custody status and may not be able to fairly evaluate the terms offered by a particular bail agent, to decide whether to contact other agents or to wait until their court appearance to request release without bail. A bail agent who appears unsolicited in the jail visiting area with paperwork ready to be signed could impose pressure on an arrestee to make an immediate decision. There is little realistic opportunity for the arrestee to get objective advice or consider other options.” (Dolezal, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at pp. 175-176Id. at p. 176.) The court observed that advertisements for bail could reach arrestees through “print advertisements in telephone books, to which arrestees routinely ha[d] access, or advertisements in other forms of media such as radio, television or Web sites” (ibid.) and that bail agents could also “distribute flyers, business cards, pens or other items displaying their contact information.” (Ibid.)
In Dolezal, the appellate court determined that “[b]y prohibiting unsolicited contact between an arrestee and a bail agent, section 2079.1 directly advances [the state‘s] substantial interest in protecting arrestees from invasions of privacy and potentially intimidating, overreaching or fraudulent sales tactics by bail agents.” (Dolezal, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 176.) It concluded that section 2079.1 was
The appellate court in Dolezal further explained, “[d]irect solicitation of an arrestee by a bail agent poses the same ‘dangers of undue influence and overreaching that exist when a lawyer chases an ambulance . . . .’ (Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn. v. Brentwood Academy (2007) 551 U.S. 291, 298.)” (Dolezal, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 178.) The court found that “[n]o ‘empirical data’ [was] required to credit [the state‘s] ‘commonsense conclusion’ that hard sell tactics directed at arrestees by bail agents could result in invasions of privacy, intimidation, and other forms of overreaching, and could also encourage conduct by bail agents that interferes with the orderly administration of jails and other detention facilities. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The court concluded that “[s]ection 2079.1 [was] narrowly tailored to serve [the state‘s] substantial interest in protecting arrestees against harassment, intimidation, fraud and overreaching, and in protecting the orderly administration of jail facilities.” (Id. at p. 179.)
Relatedly, the
The State of California continues to grapple with systemic problems in the bail industry, including improper solicitation of arrestees.13 We have no doubt that the state
“The third step of Central Hudson concerns the relationship between the harm that underlies the State‘s interest and the means identified by the State to advance that interest.” (Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly (2001) 533 U.S. 525, 555 (Lorillard).) It “asks whether the speech restriction directly and materially advances the asserted governmental interest.” (Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass‘n, Inc. v. U.S. (1999) 527 U.S. 173, 188 (Greater New Orleans), italics added; see Went For It, supra, 515 U.S. at p. 624.) This “penultimate prong of the Central Hudson test requires that a regulation impinging upon commercial expression ‘directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government‘s purpose.’ Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U.S., at 564.” (Edenfield, supra, 507 U.S. at p. 770.)
The high court has ” ‘permitted litigants to justify speech restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether, or even, in a case applying strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and “simple common sense.” ’ [Citation.]” (Lorillard, supra, 533 U.S. at p. 555, quoting Went For It, Inc., supra, 515 U.S. at p. 628.) However, in this case, the People have made no attempt to show that section 2076 directly and materially advances the state‘s substantial interests.14 (Cf. Edenfield, supra, 507 U.S. at pp. 767, 770-771 [state board of
Although they articulate substantial state interests, the Pеople merely make the conclusory statements that section 2076 advances those interests and is “narrowly tailored.” But they utterly fail to tie section 2076 to the direct and material advancement of those interests. We assume that section 2076 might indirectly deter unlawful solicitation of arrestees, but an indirect effect is not enough to survive judicial scrutiny. We note that the information pertaining to arrests and criminal complaints and “the persons involved therein” (§ 2076) might also be useful in facilitating licensees’ lawful negotiations or solicitation of bail with permissible persons other than arrestees. (See §§ 2079, 2079.1, 2080.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Upon remand, the trial court shall permit defendant to withdraw her plea and dismiss the action.
ELIA, J.
I CONCUR:
PREMO, Acting P.J.
People v. Martinez
H046164
People v. Martinez
Grover, J., Dissenting
I agree with the majority that the regulation is not unconstitutionally vague on its face. But I respectfully disagree with the conclusion that respondent has failed to satisfy the test in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm‘n of N. Y. (1980) 447 U.S. 557 (Central Hudson) to determine whether government regulation of commercial speech unconstitutionally infringes on First Amendment rights. Applying Central Hudson here, I would find that the challenged regulation directly advances at least one substantial state interest and is not excessively restrictive. I would also find that the regulation is not facially overbroad, and conclude that it survives constitutional scrutiny.
Central Hudson sets forth a multi-part test for determining whether restrictions on commercial speech that is neither misleading nor related to an unlawful activity infringe on First Amendment rights: (1) the government must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by the restriction; (2) the restriction must directly advance the state interest
Respondent argues California has a substantial interest in regulating bail agents, including maintaining standards of ethical conduct. The court in People v. Dolezal (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 167 recognized California‘s substantial interest in regulating the work of bail agents, who are “licensed professionals” and “an integral part of the criminal justice system.” (Id. at p. 174.) Indeed, “[t]he state has an interest in regulating their work to make sure that they operate in a fair, honest and professional manner.” (Ibid.; see Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. (1995) 515 U.S. 618, 625 [recognizing a state‘s compelling interest in licensing and regulating the practice of professions]; Edenfield v. Fane (1993) 507 U.S. 761, 770 [acknowledging “the State‘s important interests in maintaining standards of ethical conduct in the licensed professions“].) Respondent also identifies the state‘s interest in ensuring the orderly administration of justice and in protecting recent arrestees from harassment, intimidation, annoyance, and invasion of privacy from bail agents or others acting on thеir behalf. Those interests have been recognized as substantial in the context of First Amendment challenges to commercial speech regulations. (Dolezal, at p. 174.) The substantial government interests identified by respondent thus satisfy the first prong of Central Hudson.
Respondent argues that by “prevent[ing] bail agents from obtaining arrest information from third parties inside the criminal justice system or who have ready access to arrestees,” the regulation “prevents bond agents who have these insider
I acknowledge that whether the regulation directly advances the orderly administration of justice is less clear than its advancement of the state‘s other identified interests. But advancing the orderly administration of justice is not necessary here because, in my view, the other government interests satisfy all prongs of the Central Hudson test.
Seeing no constitutional impediment to enforcing
GROVER, J.
Superior Court No.: C1518585
Trial Judge: Honorable Socrates Peter Manoukian
Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent THE PEOPLE: Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Rene A. Chacon, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Julia Y. Je, Deputy Attorney General
Counsel for Defendant and Appellant MONICA MARIE MARTINEZ: Lori A. Quick
People v. Martinez
H046164