Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission

CENTRAL HUDSON &GAS ELECTRIC CORP. PUB-

LIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF NEW YORK Argued No. 79-565. March 1980 Decided June J., opinion Court, J., BurgeR, delivered the of the in which C. Powell, JJ., joined. BreNNAN, J., and and filed Stewart, White, Marshall, post, J., post, opinion concurring judgment, p. an in the 572. Blackmutst, p. 573, post, p. 579, opinions concurring J., and filed in the SteveNS, joined. J., judgment, J., in which filed a dissent- BreNNAN, Rehnquist, ing opinion, post, p. 583. Taylor argued appellant. the cause for With him

Telford Bossert, Jr., on the A. Davison briefs were Walter and W. Grant. argued appellee.

Peter H. cause for him the With Schiff on the brief was Howard J. Read.* opinion delivered Court. the Justice Powell

Me. presents This question case whether a of the Public Service Commission of of New York violates the State completely First Fourteenth because it Amendments promotional advertising by bans an utility. electrical In December Commission, appellee here, ordered electric utilities in all New York State to cease “promot[es] electricity.” App. use of Juris. by urging

*Briefs of amici curiae filed Cameron reversal were F. Mac- Institute; by Robert Bae and L. Baum for the Electric Burt Edison Nen- Co.; Myrna Long Lighting horne for Island Edward H. Dowd and P. Legal ah; Field for the Mid-Atlantic et Foundation Edwin P. Corp. Rome H. and William Roberts for Mobil Commission’s on the The was based 31a. order Statement York utility system in New “the interconnected finding supply or sources fuel stocks does not have sufficient State 1973- for the demands furnishing all customer continue Id., at 26a. 1974 winter.” shortage eased, the fuel had years

Three when later, pro- on its from the requested comments Commission advertising. Cen- on posal continue the ban case, in this appellant & Electric Corp., tral Hudson Gas A10. App. grounds. on Amendment opposed the ban First ex- the Commission reviewing public comments, After issued Policy in a Statement prohibition tended February 1977. “into advertising expenses Policy divided Statement intended to categories: promotional advertising

two broad — institutional utility of purchase services—and stimulate advertis- all category inclusive a broad informational, to App. Juris. sales.” clearly promote intended to ing not all declared The Commission 35a. Statement conserving policy of contrary national to the advertising ve- perfect is not a that the ban acknowledged It energy. For the Commission’s energy. example, conserving hicle for consump- advertising develop to prohibits promotional order By electricity for is low. demand during periods when tion limits the ban “off-peak” consumption, limiting growth of more growth terms effects” such the “beneficial side Id., And since at 37a. existing powerplants. use efficient jurisdiction and are not under the Commission’s oil dealers Policy to dissenting opinion attempts to construe the Statement The energy savings” even advertising result “in a net that would authorize electricity. Post, encouraged consumption additional advertising if Policy fails, however, attempted since The construction at 604-605. pur only advertising promotes “the in terms of that phrased Statement electricity. Plainly, the Com utility and “sales” of services” chase of energy permit enhance net to would did not intend mission increasing consumption of electrical services. efficiency by thus free to advertise, remain recognized was the ban can only achieve “piecemeal conservationism” Still, adopted Commission the restriction because it was deemed likely to “result dampening unnecessary some growth” in energy consumption. Ibid.

The Commission’s order explicitly permitted “informa- tional” advertising designed encourage consump- “shifts peak tion” from periods electricity demand times to of low Ibid, (emphasis demand. in orginal). Informational adver- tising would seek to aggregate increase but consumption, would throughout invite a of demand 24- leveling any given period. agency hour “specific The offered to proposals review companies [advertising] specifically pro- for described grams Id., that meet these criteria.” at 38a. rejected rehearing Policy

When it requests for on the State- ment, supplemented the Commission its rationale agency advertising ban. The that additional elec- observed tricity probably produce would more than expensive existing output. electricity Because rates New York were marginal not then based on cost,2 the Commission feared power priced additional would be cost of below the actual generation. electricity The additional would be subsidized through Id., all consumers higher rates. at 57a-58a. generally agency thought promotional advertising state also signals” “misleading public by would give appearing consumption when encourage energy time conservation is Id., at needed. 59a.

Appellant challenged the order in court, arguing state the Commission had speech restrained commercial in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.3 The Commis-

2 “Marginal the “extra cost” has been defined as incremental cost extra unit output.” (19th producing Samuelson, an P. 463 Economics (emphasis 1976) original). ed. 3 alleged Hudson also Central Commission’s order reaches be yond agency’s statutory powers. argument rejected This was

561 upheld by sion’s order was the trial and at the interme- court appellate diate level.4 The New York Court of Appeals advertising affirmed. It found little value non- “the competitive market which electric corporations operate.” Consolidated Comm’n, Edison Co. v. Public Y. Service 47 N. 94, 110, 2d 390 749, (1979). E. 757 Since consumers N. 2d “have choice regarding no power,” source their electric the court “promotional electricity denied that might society’s contribute to interest in ‘informed and re- liable’ economic decisionmaking.” Ibid. The also court observed that encouraging consumption, promotional ad- vertising only would exacerbate energy the current situation. Id., at 390 N. E. 110, 2d, at 758. The court concluded governmental interest prohibition outweighed the limited constitutional value of the commercial issue. probable noted We 444 962 jurisdiction, (1979), U. S. and now reverse.

The only Commission’s order speech, restricts commercial expression is, solely related to the economic interests speaker and its Virginia audience. Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Council, Citizens Consumer 425 748, U. S. 762 (1976); Arizona, Bates v. State Bar 350, 433 363-364 (1977); Friedman Rogers, v. 1, 440 U. S.

First applied Amendment, to the States through the Four- teenth protects Amendment, from unwar- ranted governmental regulation. Board, Virginia Pharmacy 425 U. S., expression at 761-762. Commercial only serves the economic interest of the but also assists speaker, con- sumers and furthers the societal interest in possible the fullest York Appeals, New Court of Consolidated Edison Co. Public Service Comm’n, 94, 2d 102-104, 749, N. Y. (1979), N. E. 2d argued was not to this Court. 4 Consolidated Edison Co. Comm’n, v. Public Service App. Div. 2d (1978); 407 N. 2d App. Y. S. (N. to Juris. Statement 22a Y. 1978). Sup. Ct., Feb. information. In applying dissemination of the First Amend- rejected area, “highly paternalistic” to this we have ment power suppress has government complete view that to regulate speech. “[P]eople perceive commercial will their only they own if are enough informed, best interests well . . the best open . means that end the channels than rather close . . .” communication, Id., at them. Associates, 770; see Linmark Willingboro, Inc. v. 431 U. S. 85, 92 Even when advertising only communicates an incomplete version of the facts, relevant First Amendment presumes that some accurate information is better than no information Arizona, at Bates v. supra, all. State Bar of at 374. our

Nevertheless, recognized decisions have ‘common "the sense’ distinction speech between proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other of speech.” varieties Ohra lik v. Ohio State Assn., Bar (1978); 455-456 see Arizona, Bates State Bar at supra, 381; see also Jackson Jeffries, & Speech: Commercial Due Economic Process and the First Amendment, (1979).5 Ya. L. The Rev. opinion In an concurring judgment, sug Mr. Justice SteveNS gests beyond Commission's order reaches commercial suppress expression that protection entitled to the full First of the post, Amendment. See support 580-581. findWe no for this claim in the record of Policy this case. The “in Commission’s excluded Statement stitutional and messages informational” advertising ban, from the which was restricted advertising “clearly to all promote App. intended to sales.” to Juris. Statement complaint only 35a. alleged “prohibition that the promotional advertising by Petitioner is not reasonable speech. Petitioner’s Id., commercial Moreover, . . .” at 70a. the state- opinions arguments court and the parties of the before this Court also litigation involving only viewed this speech. Nevertheless, concurring opinion of Me. Justice SteveNS views the Commission’s suppressing order as more than commercial because it would out law, example, advertising promoted electricity consumption by touting the post, environmental benefits of Ap- such uses. See at 581. a protection Constitution therefore accords lesser to commer speech constitutionally than guaranteed expres cial to other for sion. 436 available 456, protection U. at 457. The S., particular expression commercial on the nature both turns expression its governmental by the and of the interests served regulation.

The speech First Amendment’s concern for commercial advertising. based on First the informational function of See Bellotti, (1978). National Bank U. 783 765, Boston v. 435 S. can Consequently, objection there be no constitutional to the suppression accurately messages commercial that do not public activity. inform the government about lawful may ban forms of likely communication more to deceive the public to Rogers, than inform Friedman it, supra, v. at 13, 15-16; Assn., Ohralik v. Ohio Bar or supra, State 46A-465, at parently opinion the protection would accord full First all Amendment to promotional advertising questions “relating fre- includes claims to . .. quently by political discussed and debated our Ibid. leaders.”

Although approach responds this the surrounding to our serious issues energy policy national raised in think case, as we it would blur further sought speech line the Court to has draw commercial cases. It would grant protection any advertising broad prod- constitutional a that links public uct to a current many, most, products debate. But be if public tied to energy, policy, concerns environment, with the economic safety. today individual health and rule Edison Co. We in Consolidated Comm’n, ante, 530, v. Public p. enjoy panoply Service that utilities full protections of First Amendment for their direct comments issues. There providing is no reason protection for similar when constitutional only such statements are made in the context commercial transactions. context, example, In that power State retains to “insur[e] freely.” stream cleanly of commercial information well as flow[s] Virginia Pharmacy Virginia Council, Board Citizens Consumer U. S. 425 expression This Court’s decisions have on commercial premise speech, although protection, on the that such meriting rested some speech. less other is of constitutional moment than forms of As we stated Ohralik, distinguish failure between noncommer- commercial and dilution, simply by leveling “could invite process, cial the force guarantee Amendment’s respect with to the latter kind of [First] S., speech.” U. 456. illegal activity, Pittsburgh

commercial related to Press Comm’n, v.Co. Human Relations (1973).6 If misleading neither nor communication is related to government’s power unlawful is more activity, circum- scribed. The State must assert substantial interest to be achieved restrictions on speech. Moreover, the regulatory must technique proportion be interest. expression designed The limitation on must carefully Compliance achieve the goal. requirement State’s with this may be measured two criteria. the restriction must First, directly state involved; advance the the regulation interest may if it provides not be sustained only ineffective or remote support for government’s purpose. the Second, govern- if the by mental interest be could served as well more limited restriction on commercial excessive restrictions speech, cannot survive.

Under criterion, the first uphold Court has declined to regulations only indirectly that advance state interest Virginia In Pharmacy Board, involved. both Bates and Court concluded an advertising that ban could not be im- protect posed the ethical or performance standards of a profession. The Court noted in Virginia Pharmacy Board advertising that ban directly does not profes- “[t]he affect way sional standards one or the other.” 425 U. at S., 769. Bates, In the Court overturned an prohibition advertising designed that was to protect “quality” of lawyer’s work. 6 contexts, In most other prohibits the First Amendment message. based on the content of Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Comm’n, ante, Service at 537-540. Two of features commercial permit regulation of First, speakers its content. commercial have extensive knowledge of both the market and products. Thus, they their are well accuracy messages situated evaluate the of their and the lawfulness underlying activity. Arizona, Bates v. State Bar 350, 433 addition, In speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, hardy expression is a breed of is not “particularly susceptible being regulation.” crushed overbroad Ibid.

“Restraints . . an way . are ineffective shoddy work.” deterring 433 U. at S., 378.7 The second criterion recognizes the First Amendment mandates that restrictions In “narrowly be drawn.” Primus, re 412, (1978).8 U. regulatory tech- S. nique extend as far only as the interest it serves. The regulate speech State cannot poses no as- danger to the serted state interest, First National see Bank Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 794-795, nor can it completely suppress information when narrower expression restrictions on would serve its interest as For well. example, Bates the Court explicitly did not possibility “foreclose the that some limited supplementation, way warning or disclaimer or the might like, required” in promotional S., materials. 433 U. at 384. Virginia Pharmacy Board, See supra, 773. And in Carey v. Population International, Services 431 U. S. 701-702 (1977), we held that “arguments the State’s do ... justify total suppression of advertising concerning contraceptives.” This holding open possibility left Associates, In Linmark Willingboro, Inc. v. (1977), 431 U. S. we observed that there was no township’s definite connection between the goal integrated housing and signs its ban on the use of “For Sale” front of houses. 8 analysis This application is not an of the “overbreadth” doctrine. theory permits The latter regulations the invalidation of on First grounds Amendment litigant challenging regulation even when the the has engaged constitutionally protected activity. in no g., E. Kunz v. York, New (1951). 340 U. S. 290 The overbreadth doctrine derives from recognition the expression may that unconstitutional restriction of deter protected speech by parties thereby escape judicial before the court and Oklahoma, 601, review. Broadrick v. (1973); 612-613 see Note, Doctrine, The First Amendment Overbreadth L. Rev. Harv. likely expression This is less restraint where the linked is well-being” to “commercial easily and therefore is not deterred “over- regulation.” Arizona, supra, broad Bates v. State Bar at 381. prohibition case, In the directly against this acts Commission’s Hudson, activities Central and to the extent the limitations unnecessary interest, they are to serve State’s are invalid. implement carefully could State more drawn restrictions. id., J., concurring part See at in in judg- and (Powell, ment) id., ; concurring part at 716-717 and in J., (Stevens, judgment).9

In speech analysis commercial cases, four-part has then, developed. At the outset, we must determine whether is expression protected by the For com- First Amendment. mercial speech come within it at least must provision, concern activity lawful misleading. not be we ask Next, whether the asserted If governmental interest substantial. yield both inquiries positive answers, we must determine whether directly advances the governmental asserted, interest whether is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

Ill apply We now four-step analysis speech for commercial to the arguments Commission’s support pro- of its ban motional advertising.

A The Commission claim expression does not that the at issue either is inaccurate activity. or relates to unlawful Yet York Appeals New questioned whether Central advertising protected Hudson’s commercial Be- speech. appellant cause holds a monopoly electricity over sale of in its area, service the state court suggested Com- no speech any mission’s order restricts worth. court stated that in a "noncompetitive market” special with regulations We review entirely care suppress com speech mercial pursue order nonspeech-related policy. In those circumstances, a ban on could from screen view under Virginia Pharmacy Board, lying governmental policy. See S., 425 U. J., concurring). n. 8 years Indeed, (Stewart, recent this Court approved has not a blanket ban on commercial expres unless the sion way, itself flawed in was some either because it deceptive was or activity. related to unlawful could not improve the decisionmaking of consumers. 47 N. Y. 2d, at 110, 390 N. E. 2d, at 757. The court no saw consti- tutional problem with barring commercial that viewed as conveying little useful information. reasoning

This falls short of establishing appellant’s advertising is not speech protected commercial by the First Amendment. Monopoly over the supply product pro- of a vides no protection from competition with substitutes for product. Electric compete suppliers utilities with fuel oil gas and natural in several such as markets, those for home heating and power. industrial This Court noted existence of years ago, see West Ohio competition interfuel Gas Public Co. v. Comm’n, Utilities Each energy peculiar source continues to offer advantages and disadvantages may influence consumer choice. For in those competitive consumers advertising by utili- markets, just ties is advertising by valuable as unregulated firms.10 Even in monopoly markets, suppression reduces the information for available consumer decisions and thereby purpose defeats First Amendment. New York argument court’s appears to assume that providers monopoly of a product willing service or are pay wholly advertising. ineffective Most businesses— regulated even monopolies unlikely pro- underwrite —are motional advertising that of no or use to consumers. interest Indeed, monopoly enterprise legitimately may in- wish to form developed that it has or new services terms doing business. A consumer need information to aid his decision whether or the monopoly use service all, how much he purchase. service should In the absence of factors would distort the decision advertise, we Several enterprises subject decisions have involved g., Rogers, regulation. E. Friedman v. to extensive state 440 U. S. Arizona, (1979) Bates State Bar (optometrists); v. 433 U. S. 350 Virginia Pharmacy Virginia (1977) Board (lawyers); Citizens Con Council, supra, sumer (pharmacists). at 750-752 promote a business willingness of to may assume that interested in that consumers are reflects belief products its extraordinary have such conditions advertising.11 no Since position does appellant’s monopoly case, been identified in this commer- protection for its alter First Amendment’s not speech. cial

B justifications offers two The Commission state interests advertising. concerns for the ban on The first promotional electricity— Any for energy conservation. increase demand consumption during peak off-peak periods greater —means York, and the New court energy. argues, The Commission energy is conserving suffi- agreed, the State’s interest in- support advertising designed to to suppression cient country’s In consumption electricity. view of our crease on our no dependence beyond control, one energy resources importance energy Plainly, can doubt conservation. therefore, the state interest asserted is substantial. argues promotional advertising

The Commission also aggravate inequities will caused the failure to base the argued utilities’ rates The utilities marginal on cost. they promote electricity if Commission that could the use of they improve periods demand, low would their utiliza- capacity. of generating responded tion The Commission con- off-peak consumption also would increase promotion periods. sumption during peak peak rise, If were demand of marginal the absence cost rates would mean that the rates power additional would reflect the true charged expanding production. Instead, costs of costs would extra greater utility There be a incentive for a if it to advertise can promotional expenses determining return, rate of use its rather than solely pass practice, however, those costs on shareholders. That hardly Unregulated distorts the economic decision whether to advertise. consumers, pass costs and this Court ex businesses practice for pressly approved the utilities in West Ohio Gas v. Public Co. Comrn’n, 294 U. S. Utilities be borne all consumers through higher overall rates. Withqut promotional advertising, the Commission stated, inequitable turn of events would be likely less to occur. The choice among rate structures involves difficult and important questions of economic supply and distributional fairness.12 The State’s concern that rates be fair and represents efficient a clear and substantial governmental interest.

C Next, we focus on the relationship between the State’s interests and the advertising ban. Under this criterion, Commission’s laudable concern over equity efficiency and appellant’s of provide constitutionally rates does not ade- quate reason for restricting protected speech. link between the prohibition advertising and appellant’s rate struc- ture is, at tenuous. The most, impact promotional adver- tising the equity appellant’s highly speculative. rates is Advertising to off-peak increase usage would have to increase peak usage, while other directly factors that affect the fairness efficiency and of appellant’s rates remained constant. Such conditional and remote eventualities simply justify cannot silencing appellant’s promotional advertising.

In contrast, the State’s energy interest conservation is directly advanced the Commission order issue here. There is an immediate connection between advertising and for electricity. demand Central Hudson would not contest advertising ban unless it promotion believed that would increase its sales. we find Thus, link direct between the state interest conservation and the Commission’s order.

D finally inquiry We come to the critical in this case: whether complete suppression ordinarily the Commission’s protected the First Amendment is no more extensive than Jones, Regulated (2d 1976). Industries 191-287 See W. ed. necessary energy conservation. to further the State’s interest advertising, promotional The Commission’s order reaches all on overall regardless impact service the touted energy energy use. as im- rationale, But conservation justify information about portant is, suppressing cannot no increase electric devices or services would cause net energy showing been made total In no has use. addition, a more limited restriction on the content interests. adequately would not serve the State’s that but it would advertise Appellant ban, insists for the efficiently. These products energy services use acknowledge parties the “heat pump,” include which both major improvement to be a in electric heating, as a heat “backup” use of electric heat solar and other questioned effi- Although sources. the Commission has Com- ciency heating of electric neither the Court, before this rehearing nor order Policy denying mission’s Statement its findings In of on this issue. absence made authoritative findings to we the realm contrary, credit as within must claim can efficient possibility of that electric heat be an alternative some circumstances. prevents order appellant promoting

The Commission’s from use energy by diverting that would electric services reduce from that demand less efficient would consume sources, roughly energy the same of as do alternative sources. amount utility’s In neither endan- advertising situation would the public. conservation or mislead that ger the extent To. suppresses speech way that in no im- the Commission’s order in energy interest the Commis- pairs the State’s conservation, Fourteenth Amendments order the First and sion’s violates Boston See First National Bank be invalidated. and must Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 v. interest has not demonstrated that its also

The Commission lim- protected adequately by cannot more in conservation expression. To fur- appellant’s ited policy ther its of conservation, attempt the Commission could to restrict the format and content Central Hudson’s adver tising. for might, example, require It the advertise efficiency ments include information about the relative expense of the offered both under conditions service, current FCC, for foreseeable future. Cf. Banzhaf sub nom. App. (1968), D. C. 2d 1082 cert. denied F. Institute, FCC, (1969).13 Tobacco Inc. v. In 396 U. S. 842 showing speech regulation of a limited absence that more sup approve complete would be we ineffective, cannot pression of advertising.14 Central Hudson’s

IV inter today way disparages decision in no the national Our accept without reservation energy est conservation. We development argument as well as the conservation, imperative goal. is an national energy alternative sources, regulate utilities empowered Administrative bodies electric authority duty appropriate have indeed the take —and —-to action in however, action further such goal. When, system might previewing also adver Commission consider they policy. tising campaigns will not defeat conservation to insure program approving “informational” It has instituted such a Policy supra, challenged at 560. under the Statement in this case. See sturdy ex speech is brand of have observed that commercial such a We pression prior apply to it. traditional restraint doctrine Virginia Pharmacy Virginia Council, S., Board v. Citizens Consumer 425 U. 771-772, speech regulation, And in such n. 24. other areas pass prescreening arrangement can obscenity, recognized that a we have adequate safeguards. Freed procedural if it constitutional muster includes Maryland, man v. U. S. 51 advertising policy In conclusion that the Commission’s view of our Amendments, appel we do not reach First and Fourteenth violates the Equal agency’s Protection that order also lant’s claims violated Amendment, and it is both overbroad Clause of the Fourteenth vague. the First and Fourteenth suppression

volves speech, restriction be no more extensive require Amendments that the In this necessary case, than is to serve state interest. ban on promo record before us to show that the total fails advertising requirement.15 meets tional York Accordingly, judgment of the New Appeals is

Reversed. judgment. in the concurring Brennan, Justice Mr. proper in is the major of the difficulties this case One I Policy characterization of the Commission’s Statement. present on the record whether impossible find it determine “promotional” all in advertising, ban on the Commission’s advertising, and informational” see contrast to “institutional ante, encompass more than “commercial 559, is intended to think speech.” am inclined to I Justice Stevens Mr. order more prohibits is correct that the Commission’s than in certain proposals engage mere kinds commercial trans- I agree and therefore with conclusion that his actions, surely and Fourteenth ban violates the First Amendments. assumption But even on the the Court is correct that only the Commission’s order reaches commercial speech, agree with differences that “[n]o Blackmun Justice Mr. protected speech justify between commercial and other suppression of commercial order to influence manipulation availability of the of informa- through conduct Post, tion.” at 578.

Accordingly, qualifications implicit pre- with the in the promulgated response The Commission order at issue here was not emergency Although advertising initially to an ban situation. was prompted by shortage critical fuel the Commission no claim makes emergency powers that an now exists. We do consider the the State utility might emergency See State have over circumstances. Co., v. Oklahoma & Electric Oas (Okla. 1975). 536 P. 2d ceding join I paragraph, opinions of Mr. Black- Justice mun and concurring judgment. Mr. Justice Stevens in the

Mr. Justice Brennan with whom Justice Blackmun, Mr. joins, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Public Commis- Court Service sion’s ban on advertising electricity by public utilities is with Amend- inconsistent the First and Fourteenth I ments. only however, concur judgment, the Court’s I because applied the test now and believe evolved Court not prior is consistent with our cases does provide adequate protection nonmisleading, for non- truthful, speech. coercive commercial ante,

The Court asserts, four-part analysis that “a developed” has from our concerning decisions commercial speech. Under four-part this test a on commercial restraint “communication is neither nor misleading related to [that] activity” subject unlawful is to an of scru- intermediate level tiny, suppression permitted is ad- “directly whenever it governmental vances” a “substantial” is “not interest and necessary more than is extensive interest.” serve that Ante, agree I at 564 and 566. with the level Court that appropriate intermediate for a restraint on com- scrutiny speech designed mercial to protect misleading consumers from speech, coercive or a place, related to the time, or manner of speech. agree, do not how- ever, four-part proper the Court’s test one applied suppress when State seeks to information about a product manipulate order to decision private economic regulated .cannot or State has not or outlawed directly. citing Court, empirical

Since the without or other data finds a “direct link” between and en- authority, open leaves ergy consumption, possibility that the State may suppress advertising electricity in order to lessen de- agree electricity. I, mand course, that, with .574 today’s energy world, goal conservation is a of paramount

national and local importance. I disagree with the Court, however, says when suppression speech may it abe permissible means to achieve goal. Mr. Justice Stevens appropriately justification “The notes: for regulation nothing more than expressed may fear that the audience utility’s find the persuasive. message Without aid of any coercion, or truthful com- deception, misinformation, munication persuade some citizens to consume more electricity than they Post, otherwise would.” at 581.

The Court recognizes that we have never held that commer- cial speech may suppressed in order to further the State’s interest in discouraging purchases of underlying product that is Ante, advertised. 566, n. 9. at Permissible restraints on speech have been limited to designed measures to protect consumers from fraudulent, misleading, or coercive sales techniques.1 designed deprive Those consumers of information about products or services legally that are offered consistently sale have been invalidated.2

I seriously doubt whether suppression of information con- the availability cerning price aof legally product offered is ever a permissible way for the “dampen” State to demand for or use of the product. Even though “commercial” speech is involved, such a regulatory measure strikes at the heart the First Amendment. This is because is a attempt covert 1See Rogers, Friedman v. 1, (1979) (Court 440 U. upheld S. 10 a ban practice on optometry under a trade permissible requirement name as a “ that commercial 'appear information in such a form ... neces [is] sary prevent being its deceptive,'” quoting Virginia Pharmacy from Virginia Board Council, v. Consumer 748, 772, 425 (1976)); U. S. 24 n. Ohralik v. Ohio State Assn., (1978). Bar 436 U. S. 447 2 See Bates v. State Bar Arizona, (1977); Carey 433 U. S. 350 v. Population International, 678, Services (1977); 431 U. S. Lin Associates, mark WUlingboro, Inc. v. (1977); Virginia 431 85 Pharmacy Virginia Board Council, v. Consumer (1976); 425 U. S. Bigelow Virginia, U. S. by manipulate citizens, State choices of its persuasion direct but regulation, by depriving the of the As the information needed make a free choice. are insulated from recognizes, policy the State’s choices visibility scrutiny would entail direct and the of citizens conduct is molded information that Ante, government (“We chooses to re give them. n. 9 special view entirely with care com regulations suppress mercial pursue policy. order to a nonspeech-related In those could from ban screen circumstances, public view the underlying governmental policy”). See Ro The Commercial tunda, Speech Supreme Doctrine Court, Law U. Forum 1080-1083. Ill.

If the First guarantee means anything, Amendment means clear government absent has that, present danger, and power no to expression restrict because of the effect its mes- sage likely to have on the public. generally Comment, See First Amendment Protection for Advertising: Commercial The New Constitutional Chi. Doctrine, 205, U. L. Rev. ap- Our cases indicate this that guarantee Virginia plies Pharmacy even to In speech. commercial Virginia Board v. Consumer Council, U. (1976), S. 748 we held that Virginia pursue goal encourag- could not of its ing public patronize the the “professional pharmacist” (one provided who a pharma- individual attention and stable cist-customer relationship) by public igno- “keeping entirely rance of the lawful competing pharmacists terms that Id., are offering.” at 770. We noted that our decision left pursue State free to its of goal maintaining high stand- among ards pharmacists “requiring] pro- its whatever Ibid. pharmacists.” fessional standards it wishes its of Virginia Pharmacy Board to discuss the We went on in types regulation speech that, commercial to the due “commonsense differences” between form and this may constitutionally other permissible. are or forms, We government may impose indicated reasonable “time, with it can deal and that restrictions, and manner” place, noted speech. We and false, deceptive, misleading and illegal transactions question were broadcast media problems of the electronic special presented. not type of

Concluding of the restraint a restatement with is at issue is whether we said: “What permitted, is not of con- suppress the dissemination completely State activity, entirely cededly information about lawful truthful its disseminators upon information’s effect fearful of that this recipients. conclude that answer its . . . [W]e Id., at 773. negative.” is in [question] analyze inter- the State’s Virginia Pharmacy Board did not Obvi- they whether were “substantial.” ests determine quality and low professional dereliction ously, preventing “substantial,” legitimate, important care state health are opinion analyze Nor ban goals. did the 569, “directly [d],” ante, determine whether it advance at did not whether “more limited goals. inquire these We also ante, expression,” . commercial at would .. adequately Rather, serve the State’s interests. we held “may [pursue by keeping its goals] State ignorance.” (Emphasis supplied.) U. 770. S., principle governed. has In Linmark Until today, Associates, Willingboro, Inc. 431 U. we con- (1977), S. a could “For signs sidered whether town ban Sale” on resi- property goal promoting stable, dential to further its racially housing. did note record integrated We the not establish ordinance necessary did the was to enable goal. to Linmark, the achieve its The holding State how- was much broader.3 We stated: ever,

“The constitutional defect in this however, ordinance, view, my today holdings Virginia In the misconstrues the of both Pharmacy Linmark by Board and implying Associates those deci fact that closely enough were based on the the sions restraints were not far Township is more basic. The like Council here, Virginia the Assembly Virginia Pharmacy Bd., acted prevent to its from obtaining residents certain informa- tion pertains activity Willing- . . . which to sales sought boro. Council restrict free . . has the . to flow of data home- these because it fears that otherwise owners will make inimical decisions to what the Council as the corporate views homeowners’ and the self-interest interest of the township: they will town. choose to leave The Council’s concern, then, any was not with commer- aspect cial of “For signs Sale” offerors communicat- —with ing offers offerees —but the with the substance of information Id., communicated to Willingboro citizens.” at 96.

The Court in Linmark beyond resolved all doubt that strict standard of applies review in- suppression of commercial formation, purpose where the the restaint to influence by behavior depriving citizens of information. The Court followed strong explicit adop- statement above with an tion standard advocated Justice Brandéis Mr. concurring opinion his v. Whitney California, 274 U. S. “If (1927): be expose through there time discus- sion falsehood and avert evil fallacies, processes of remedy education, applied to be more speech, not enforced silence. an Only emergency justify can repression.” 431 U. at 97. S.,

Carey Population International, Services (1977), also applied to content-based restraints standard of ap- same review we have plied speech. to other varieties of There the Court held that ban on of contraceptives could not justified governmental related to the ante, interests 564-565, asserted. See Although n. 7. the Court noted the lack of relationship substantial be- governmental tween the restraint interest in each cases, of those holding clearly of each rested on a much principle. broader “ by the State’s interest of illicit 'legitimation’ avoiding sexual behavior” because advertisements could not “ characterized as or inciting producing 'directed imminent . . likely produce lawless action and . to incite ac- such ” id., tion,’ quoting at Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 701, 444, “ ” Our prior references to the differences’ 'commonsense " speech between commercial speech 'suggest and other that degree different of protection necessary insure flow of truthful legitimate commercial information ” unimpaired.’ Associates, Limnark quoting U. atS., 98, Virginia Board, Pharmacy 425 U. at n. 24. S., We 771-772, have not suggested the “commonsense differences” be- tween speech commercial speech and other justify relaxed (cid:127) scrutiny of restraints suppress nondeceptive, truthful, speech. noneoercive commercial The differences articulated ante, the Court, see n. at permissive a more justify approach to regulation of the manner speech commercial purpose of protecting consumers from deception or coer- cion, and explain why these differences designed to doctrines prevent “chilling” protected speech are inapplicable to speech. No differences between commercial protected and other speech justify suppression of com- mercial in order to through influence conduct manipulation of the availability information. The Court stated in Carey Population Services International:

“Appellants suggest no distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech would render these dis- arguments credited meritorious when justify offered to prohibitions on commercial speech. On contrary, such arguments clearly are directed not any at commer- cial aspect prohibited of the advertising but ideas conveyed form of expression core First —the Amendment values.” 431 U. S., at 701, 28 (emphasis n. added).

It appears that the Court would permit the ban all State to direct advertising of air conditioning, assuming a more limited restriction on such effectively would not deter the public from In cooling my its homes.. view, our cases do support not type suppression. this of If govern- mental unit believes that use or overuse of air conditioning is a serious problem, it problem must attack that directly, by prohibiting air or regulating thermostat conditioning levels. Just as the Virginia may Commonwealth of promote professionalism of pharmacists directly, may so too New York not promote energy “by conservation the keeping ignorance.” Virginia Pharmacy Board, at 770. S.,U. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Beennan

Me. Me. joins, concurring in judgment. the speech”

Because “commercial is less constitutional afforded protection than other it important forms is speech,1 the speech concept broadly commercial not be defined too lest speech deserving greater protection constitutional be inad- vertently suppressed. The issue case is whether New prohibition York’s on promotion electricity use of through advertising is a on but nothing ban speech.

In my judgment one the two definitions Court uses addressing issue is too broad and the other somewhat too narrow. The first describes commercial speech “expression solely related to the economic interests Ante, speaker of the its Although audience.” at 561. it entirely subject clear whether this definition uses matter of the speaker the motivation of the as the limiting clear to factor, encompasses speech seems me that it protection maximum is entitled afforded First Neither a Amendment. labor leader’s exhortation to Assn., v. Ohio State Bar 447, 456, quoted ante, See Ohralik 436 U. S. States, (Stevens, J., 5. Smith v. United n. Cf. 431 U. S. dissenting). nor

strike, money supply, an economist’s dissertation any protection subject should receive lesser because the mat- only ter concerns the economic interests the audience. Nor speaker should the economic motivation of a qualify his constitutional protection; Shakespeare may even been have prospect pecuniary motivated reward. Thus, Court’s first definition unquestionably of commercial too broad.2 “ ‘speech Court’s second refers to definition proposing ” Ante, commercial transaction.’ at A 562. saleman’s solici- tation, a broker’s and a manufacturer’s offer, publication aof price or warranty list the of his standard would unques- terms tionably fit within concept.3 the definition Presumably, is encompass intended to advertising possible that advises buyers availability of the specific products specific prices of and the advantages purchasing describes such items. Per- haps it also extends to other communications that do little more than product make the name of or a service more general familiar to the public. precise Whatever the contours perhaps early and it is concept, too to an enunciate exact I formulation, persuaded am that it should include range the entire of communication that embraced is within the “promotional term advertising.”

This governmental regulation case involves a that com- pletely bans by utility. an electric This ban encompasses great proposals deal more than mere engage in certain kinds It of commercial transactions. prohibits all advocacy of the immediate or of elec- future use Farber, Speech See Theory, Commercial and First Amendment 74 Nw. (1979): U. L. Rev. “Economic motivation could disqualifying not be made a factor [from protection]

maximum damage without enormous to the first amendment. purpose Little would be served pro- a first amendment which failed newspapers, paid public tect speakers, political partially candidates with professional (Footnotes economic motives and omitted.) authors.” id., See at 386-387. tricity. It curtails expression by an informed and interested group persons point their questions view on relating production and consumption of electrical energy ques- — tions frequently discussed and political debated our leaders. For an example, company’s electric advocacy of the use of electric for heat reasons, opposed environmental wood-burning stoves, would seem squarely to fall within New York’s promotional advertising ban also within bounds of maximum protection. First Amendment The breadth of the ban thus exceeds the boundaries of the com- mercial speech however concept may be defined.4 concept, justification nothing more than expressed fear that may utility’s audience find the mes- sage persuasive. Without any deception, coercion, aid or misinformation, truthful may persuade communication some citizens to electricity they consume more than otherwise would. assume consequence such a would be undesir- government able and that prohibit punish therefore unnecessary electricity. per- excessive use of ifBut ceived harm greater usage associated with not suf- electrical ficiently justify serious to surely does'not regulation, direct it danger justify constitute the kind of clear and can present suppression speech. the utility’s complaint The characterization of the Commission’s ban in its involving clearly speech bind does not this Court’s considera evolving

tion of the First Amendment issues in this new and area of constitutional law. suppress

Nor does the Commission’s intention not to and “institutional speech only speech” sup- informational” insure that “commercial bewill pressed. blurry categories speech line between the two has practical requiring speech effect utilities either refrain from line, that is close to the or seek advice from the Public Service Commission. necessary possess expertise dealing does not in But the Commission speech questions; and, any event, ordinarily with these sensitive free in may protection entitled to maximum First Amendment not be procedure subjected prior government with agency. to a clearance Although they in were written a different context, the words used Mr. Justice Brandéis in concurring opinion his Whitney California, explain U. 357, 376-377, my S. reaction to prohibition against advocacy involved case:

“But even advocacy of reprehensible however violation, morally, justification is for denying free where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there noth- is ing to advocacy indicate that would be immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and incitement, preparation between between attempt, assembling and conspiracy, In must be borne mind. order support a finding of present danger clear and it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to expected be or was advocated, past conduct furnished reason to believe advocacy that such was then contemplated.

“Those who won independence our by revolution were They not cowards. political did not fear change. They did not exalt order liberty. the cost of To courageous, self-reliant with men, power confidence in the free reasoning applied fearless through processes pop- ular government, danger flowing no from speech can be deemed present, clear and unless the incidence of the evil apprehended so imminent is befall before opportunity there is for full discussion. If time there be to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, processes to avert the evil education, remedy applied to be speech, is more not enforced Only silence. emergency an justify repression. can Such must be the authority rule if reconciled with freedom. Such, my opinion, the command of the Constitution.” omitted.)5 (Footnote

5 quoted King Mr. Justice Brandeis Lord Justice Scrutton’s comment in v. 361, 382: Secretary “ 'You State really believe in Home Affairs freedom of speech, ex parte O’Brien, if you ^[1923] are willing 2 K. B.

In I sum, concur in the I result because do consider to be a “commercial speech” case. see need Accordingly, no ante, four-part to decide whether the 566, analysis, Court’s at adequately protects properly defined— —as in the face ban of a blanket the sort involved this case.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting. today The by an New invalidates order issued York Public designed Service Commission promote policy that has been declared to of critical national concern. by order response was issued the Commission in 1973 in embargo the Mideastern oil cor- prohibits crisis. It electric promoting “from porations electricity through the use of subsidy use of advertising, payments employee in- , ... centives.” State New York Public Commission, Service (Dec. Case No. 26532 App. to 31a 5, 1973), Juris. Statement added). (emphasis Although the immediate crisis created embargo the oil subsided, has the ban on adver- tising remains in effect. The was re-examined the New York Public Service Commission 1977. con- Its stitutionality upheld by was subsequently York the New Court of Appeals, which concluded the paramount na- energy justified tional interest conservation its retention.1 you it to men opinions wrong danger- alow whose seem and even S., 377, . ous. . .’” U. n. 4. Young Inc., Theatres, See (opin- also American Mini S.U. J.).

ion of Stevens, Appeals The New York Court of stated: light any exigencies, policies “In current one of the service legislation irreplaceable must be the of our conservation vital and re- recently Legislature sources. The imposed upon has but the commission duty corporations encourage persons all 'to ... to formulate and carry programs preservation long-range out . . . of environ- [for] (Public mental values and conservation of natural resources’ Service Law, 2). Implicit recogni- legislative subd. this amendment is a § tion of the serious situation which confronts our State and Nation. More important, legislative has conservation resources become an avowed 584 justification for

The Court’s asserted the New invalidating York law is the interest discerned the Court to underlie the First Amendment in free of commercial the flow Virginia information. Prior in this Court’s recent decision Pharmacy Virginia Council, Board v. Citizens Consumer 425 U. 748 (1976), however, speech S. was afforded no protection under the See, First Amendment whatsoever. g.¡ Alexandria, e. Breard v. 341 (1951); U. Valentine S. Chrestensen, v. U. S. 52 (1942). Given what seems to me recognition Virginia Pharmacy full of the holding of Board speech that commercial degree is entitled some of I First Amendment think protection, the Court is nonetheless incorrect in invalidating carefully considered ban state promotional light pressing national energy state needs. analysis my wrong Court’s is view in several re-

spects. disagree I with Initially, the Court’s conclusion that of a state-created monopoly, subject which comprehensive regulatory scheme, protec- is entitled to tion under the First Amendment. also think that the Court errs here in failing to recognize that state law most accurately viewed as an economic and that it (if involved falls within scope of the First all) occupies Amendment at a significantly more subordinate position hierarchy in the of First Amendment than values today. Court gives Finally, Court in its reaching deci- improperly sion substitutes its judgment own for that of the State how a deciding proper ban on advertis- ing should drafted. With regard to this latter point, the final adopts part as its of a four-part a “no test more policy (see enabling embodied the commission's Matter also, act New York State Council Retail Merchants Public Serv. Comm. v. Y., State N. 661, 673-674).” 2d Consolidated Edison Co. 45 N. Y. Comm’n, Public Service 2d 94, 102-103, N. Y. 390 N. 2dE. unduly impair analysis that will necessary” than

extensive reasonably de- adopt ability legislation legislature’s a state always rightly been that have promote interests signed importance to State. thought great to be of con- appellant’s In concluding that by speech reasons that the Court protected stitutes speech, decide who must is consumers electric utilities valuable alternative to an service turn monopoly use the whether to much how they if decide to use the service energy and source, doing in so Ante, The Court at 567. purchase. toit its promote of a business willingness “assume the [s] in the consumers are interested belief that products reflects a the analysis ignores Ante, at 568. The Court’s advertising.” and sub- entirely is state-created monopoly here fact that the from which regulatory scheme an state ject to extensive as as well burdens. derives benefits speech] “capacity has stated [of While this identity depend upon does not public for informing Bellotti, 435 Bank Boston v. National of its First source,” nevertheless speech of the 777 source 765, (1978), U. S. message determining given whether may be relevant the source Amendment.2 When under First protected monopoly this, such as tradi- is a state-created at they play if come into concerns, tional Amendment First role the broad interventionist certainly justify do not all, In Consolidated Edison today. adopted by the Court Co. 2 recently (1980), example, we Glines, 444 348 for In Brown v. free imposed on the upheld regulations that restrictions Air Force Levy, g., Parker v. personnel. also, e. petition rights of Air Force See and pub (commissioned may prohibited from (1974) officer be 417 S. 733 U. might disobey send them into licly personnel to orders urging enlisted (1980) (employees of Snepp States, combat); v. United 444 U. S. 507 relating required publications submit intelligence agency agency). activity prepublication review agency 586 ante, Black- Comm’n, 549-550, Mr.

Public Service Justice mun observed: See, utility monopoly.

“A state-created g., (McKinney Jones, Y. Law § N. Pub. Serv. 1955); e. Origins the Certificate of Public Convenience 1870-1920, Necessity; Developments the States (1979); Comment, L. Rev. 458-461 Util- Colum. ity Pub- Rates, Consumers, and New York State Commission, lic L. Albany Service Rev. Although monopolies against are generally

public policies of the United and of the State States e. York, g., (McKin- New N. Y. Law see, § Gen. Bus. ney Supp. per- . are 1979-1980), . utilities . operate mitted to monopolies because of a determina- tion the State the public is better served interest by protecting them from 2 A. competition. Kahn, See The Regulation Economics of exceptional

“This grant power private enterprises of to justifies extensive oversight part on the of the State to protect the ratepayers exploitation from of monopoly power through excessive rates and other of over- forms reaching. . . . New York gives law its Public Service Commission plenary supervisory powers property, over all real and personal, 'used or to be used for or in connection with or to facilitate the . . . or furnishing sale of elec- tricity for light, or power.’ heat N. Y. Pub. Law Serv. 2 (12) (1) §§ and 66 (McKinney 1955).” although Thus, First National Bank Bellotti, Boston v. of supra, holds that of a corporation is entitled to some First Amendment protection, by no means follows that a utility monopoly with power by conferred a is State also entitled protection. to such monopoly state-created a utility status of arises from

the unique characteristics of the services utility that a pro- recognized vides. As in Cantor v. Co., Detroit Edison “public 595-596 (1976), utility regulation typically the private monopoly assumes that firm is a natural and that public controls are necessary protect from the consumer exploitation.” The consequences monopoly this of natural my much justify supervision view more wide-ranging control of a utility under the Amendment than this First held in Bellotti Court regard ordi- permissible with nary corporations. Corporate is generally status conferred as a a result of corporate State’s determination that char- entity.” acteristics “enhance its an efficiency economic Bellotti, First National Bank supra, Boston at 825- J., dissenting). A ful- utility, (Rehnqtjist, contrast, a fills function special public that serves interests as a result of the natural monopoly provided. Indeed, the service governing extensive regulations by public util- decisionmaking suggest ities purposes that for analysis, First Amendment utility a far enterprise closer to a state-controlled than an ordinary corporation.3 a has Accordingly, think State broad discretion in determining utility the statements that may make in entity that such statements from emanate created provide important unique State to And regulatory body charged services. a state with the over- sight types these im- reasonably services decide to pose utility special on the duty to conform its conduct regard Appeals In this the New York stated: utilities, days regulated “Public from the earliest State, have been policy and franchised to serve the commonweal. Our is ‘to withdraw the right competition corporations unrestricted occupying between . . . public streets . supplying public products the . . and or the with their nigh which are (People utilities well necessities’ ex rel. New York Edison Willcox, v. 99; Co. Y. 86, N. Matter New York Lines Elec. 321). Co., 201 N. Y. The realities of the situation all but dictate utility granted monopoly (see People status Elec. ex rel. New York Squire, Lines Co. v. 107 N. 603-605). Y. protect against To abuse superior position of this economic governmental regulation extensive has necessary (see deemed People been coordinate ex rel. New York Edison supra, pp. Willcox, 93-94).” at 109-110, 47 Y. 2d, Co. N. at N. E. 2d, at 757. I Thus think public interest. conception of the agency’s

the promo- for to decide that constitutionally permissible it public with the interest is inconsistent advertising tional on such energy think New York’s ban also conservation. regula- scope permissible state falls within the advertising entity an that could not activity an tion of economic status, say nothing enjoy monopoly corporate exist form, for laws of New York.4 were it not the

II recognized although com- previously This Court has protec- may be entitled to First Amendment mercial as as that accorded protection is not extensive to tion, advocacy of we stated Ohralik v. Ohio Thus, ideas. Assn., (1978): State Bar 436 U. S.

“Expression concerning purely transactions protec- Amendment’s has come within the ambit of the promotional grounded advertising are The Commission’s restrictions obligation in its concern that electric utilities fulfill their under New “adequate” provide “just York Public service at and rea Service Law (1) (McKinney 1955). The sonable” rates. N. Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 65 Commission, law, required under to set reasonable Y. state rates. N. (2) (McKinney 1955); (12) (McKin Pub. Serv. Law 66 and 72 §§ § ney 1979). Supp. legis The Commission has also been authorized prescribe improvements lature to “such reasonable electric utilities’ [in practices] promote public And in will best interest. ...” 66§ required performance “encourage of its duties the Commission is all subject jurisdiction carry persons corporations and to its to formulate and long-range individually cooperatively, programs, perform out responsibilities economy, efficiency, ance of their service with public safety, preservation values, care for the of environmental (2) the conservation of natural resources.” N. Y. Pub. Serv. Law 5§ 1979). quite (McKinney Supp. I think Here it was reasonable for the Public Service Commission to conclude that the ban on State necessary using prevent was utilities from their state- broad promote monopoly power well-being their conferred own economic energy expense interest in state conservation—an interest reasonably promotion greater could be found to be inconsistent with the profits for utilities. only recently.

tion In rejecting the notion that such speech 'is wholly outside protection the First Virginia Pharmacy, supra, at we were Amendment/ careful to hold wholly 'that it is undifferentiable from other forms’ speech. 24. 425 U. We S., n. have not discarded be- the 'common-sense’ distinction tween a proposing which transaction, traditionally subject reg- occurs an area government and other ulation, speech. varieties of Ibid. To require parity protection constitutional for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could sim- dilution, invite ply by a leveling process, the force of Amend- guarantee ment’s respect with latter kind of speech. Rather subject than Amendment First such a we devitalization, instead have afforded commer- cial a limited measure of commen- protection, surate position with its subordinate in the scale of First allowing Amendment modes of values, while might impermissible in the realm of noncommer- expression.” (Footnote omitted.) cial today Court’s decision fails to due deference to give position subordinate speech. of commercial The Court York, so doing bygone returns era of Lochner Newv. U. S. 45 which it practice was common for this (1905), regulations to strike down economic adopted by a State based on the Court’s own appropriate notions of the most means for the to implement policies. State its considered thought by had had now it become well established that regula- State has broad discretion in economic imposing tions. As this Court York, stated Nebbia v. New 291 U. S. 502, 537 (1934): can be no doubt upon proper occasion and

''[T]here by appropriate may regulate measures the a busi- state in any aspects. ness of its . . . is process concerned, the of due requirement far as

“So a restriction, and in absence of other constitutional the rea- adopt policy may economic state free to whatever is and sonably promote public welfare, deemed to purpose. its policy by legislation adapted enforce authority declare are either to such courts without legislature, it is to over- policy, or, when declared a passed ride If the are seen reasonable it. laws to have proper legislative relation are neither to a and purpose, discriminatory, due arbitrary requirements nor process satisfied, judicial determination to that are effect renders a court does ... not [I]t officio. functus lie with the courts to determine that is the rule unwise.” writing And Mr. for the Black, Court, Justice observed more recently in Ferguson Skrupa, (1963): v. U. S. process

“The doctrine . .. that due authorizes courts to they legis- hold laws unconstitutional when believe the unwisely lature has acted since discarded. long been —has We original have returned to proposi- constitutional tion that courts do substitute not their social eco- nomic for legislative beliefs judgment bodies, who pass are elected to laws.”

The State of New York has determined here that economic require grant realities of monopoly status util ities in order efficiently to distribute they pro services and in vide, granting such utilities status it has made them subject to an extensive regulatory scheme. When the State adopted this scheme and when its Public Service Commission issued its ban initial

commercial speech had not been held scope to fall within the of the First Virginia Amendment at all. Pharmacy Board Virginia Citizens Council, Consumer (1976), however, subsequently accorded commercial a limited measure of protection. First Amendment today

The Court only holds is not that commercial entitled to First Amendment when protection, but also that protected it is regulate a State its reason unless so doing governmental amounts to “substantial” inter- est, regulation “directly its advances” that and its interest, manner of “not necessary” more extensive than Ante, to serve the interest. adopted at 566. The test Court thus protection elevates accorded speech that within scope falls the First Amendment virtually level from indistinguishable noncommercial speech. think the doing so has effectively accomplished the “devitalization” of the First Amendment it counseled I against Ohralik. think it by has also, labeling regulation economic con- of business duct as a on restraint “free speech,” gone far resurrect the discredited Tyson doctrine of cases such as Lochner and & Brother Banton, v. (1927). 273 U. S. 418 New York’s order my here is in view an more akin to economic virtually which complete deference should be accorded this Court.

I any doubt there question would be as to the constitution ality of New York’s conservation if the Public effort Service Commission had chosen to the price see, raise of electricity, g., e. Sunshine Adkins, Anthracite Coal v. 310 U. 381 Co. S. (1940); Distributing Old Dearborn v. Seagram-Distillers Co. Cory., 299 U. S. its (1936), specified condition sale on terms, see, g., e. York, supra, Nebbia v. New 527-528, at to restrict production, g., Filburn, its e. see, Wickard v. S. 111 (1942). U. In I terms constitutional values, think that such virtually controls are from indistinguishable ban State’s advertising. justification

An ostensible for striking York’s down New ban on promotional advertising is pre- Court has viously “rejected 'highly paternalistic’ view that govern- power ment has complete to suppress or regulate speech. '[PJeople will perceive their own best interests if best informed and . . . the means only they enough are well communication, rather open to that end is to channels ” Ante, at Whatever the merits to close ..’ 562. than them. . far logic has carried its too view, of this think the Court here. apparently frequent from the view derives Court’s deemed “marketplace ideas,”

reference to the which was analogous to the commercial market in which a laissez-faire decisionmaking would economic under policy optimum lead to e. Adam g., guidance Smith, of the “invisible hand.” See, (1776). expressed by of Nations notion Wealth This was in Abrams opinion Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting States, United he (1919), wherein stated power that “the best thought test of truth of the get itself accepted competition in the of the market. . . .” Comm’n, g., e. Consolidated Edison v. Public Service See also, ante, Milton, 534; Mill, Liberty (1858); J. On J. Areo- Speech for pagitica, Liberty Printing A of Unlicensed While it is true an important objective of the First Amendment to foster the free information, flow of identi- fication of protection falls within its is not aided metaphorical reference to a “marketplace of ideas.” There is no reason for believing ideas marketplace that the is free from imperfections any market more than is there to believe that the invisible hand will always optimum lead to economic g., See, decisions e. commercial market. Baker, Scope the First Amendment, Speech, Freedom of 25 L. Indeed, UCLA Rev. many types speech have been held to fall scope outside the of the First Amendment, thereby subject governmental to regula- marketplace tion, despite this Court’s references to a of ideas. g., e. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, See, (1942) 315 U. S. 568 words); Beauharnais v. Illinois. (fighting S. (1952) 343 U. 250 (group libel); Roth States, v. United (1957) U. S. 476 (obscenity). It also has been held government has greater

a regulating interest in types protected some speech g., Foundation, than others. See, e. FCC v. U. S. Pacifica (1978) (indecent Virginia Pharmacy speech); Board v. Virginia Council, Citizens Consumer supra (commercial speech). And Welch, Court stated in Robert Gertz v. Inc., U. 323, 344, S. 9 (1974): course, oppor n. “Of an tunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to harm of undo a [the] defamatory falsehood. Indeed the law defamation is experience rooted in our rarely that the truth catches up with a lie.” The similarly recognized has false and misleading is not entitled any First protection. ante, Amendment See, e. g., at 566. examples above illustrate that in a number of in-

stances government may constitutionally decide that societal justify interests imposition of restrictions on the free flow of information. When question given is whether a com- message mercial I do protected, think this Court’s determination that the information will “assist” consumers justifies judicial reasonably invalidation of a drafted state restriction on such when designed the restriction is promote concededly I substantial state interest. con- sequently disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the soci- etal interest in the dissemination of commercial information justify sufficient to authority restriction on the State’s regulate promotional advertising by utilities; indeed, of a regulated case it is difficult me monopoly, for to dis- tinguish “society” from legislature the state and the Public Service Commission. Nor do I think any there is basis for concluding that individual citizens recognize of the will State promote energy need and act to conservation government only extent if deems chan- appropriate, nels of open.5 communication are left if were even Thus,

5Although great importance the Constitution attaches to freedom of speech under the Amendment First so individuals will be better in thoughts uninhibited, formed and their and ideas will be it does not follow perceive “people they will their own best interests,” or if do to some First speech is entitled agree to that commercial I would hold here that the State’s protection, Amendment sub- light in of the promotional advertising, to ban decision constitutionally permissible is a stake, stantial state interest at promote to power adopt regulations designed of its exercise citizens. the interests of its highlights opinions filed this case plethora decisions difficulties that from this Court’s emerge

doctrinal speech. granting protection First Amendment My Mr. Brandeis Whit Stevens, quoting Brother Justice California, 357, (1927), includes ney v. won our in Mr. Brandéis’ statement who Justice “[t]hose They did-not dependence by revolution were not cowards. cost political change. They fear did exalt order at the not Blackmun, Ante, his liberty.” at 582. Justice Mr. only separate opinion, joins in the because judgment Court’s opinion provide he believes that the Court’s “does ade truthful, quate protection for com nonmisleading, noncoercive Ante, speech.” mercial at 573. Both Mr. Justice Stevens, ante, ante, 577, at and Mr. Justice at would Blackmun, apply the following formulation Brandéis of Mr. Justice the clear-and-present-danger regulation test to the at issue in this case: expose

“If there be time to through discussion the false- they promote respect policies governmental will act to them. With immediate, tangible that do not offer which benefits the success of depends society, on incremental contributions all members of such as would energy conservation, strong argument seem to be the case with policy may can be longrun made while a interest of all society, perceive members of rational some individuals will it to their advantage own shortrun policy. to not act in accordance with that issue, When the of commercial think this is a government may properly consideration that take into account. As Yeomans, was (1937), observed in Townsend “the IT. S. legislature, acting sphere, presumed within its to know the needs people my of the applicable State.” This observation in view is the determination of the State Public Service Commission here.

hood and to of fallacies, by processes avert the evil the remedy education, the to be is more applied speech, not Only enforced an emergency justify repres- silence. can Whitney sion.” California, v. supra, (concurring at 377 opinion).

Although today the Court does far go adopt not so as to this its reasons for position, pro- York’s invalidating New ban on motional advertising make quite legislature it difficult for a to draft a statute regulating advertising that will satisfy the Amendment requirements by First the established in this context. III, See Part infra.

Two ideas are here at war with one and their another, although be on resolution, judicial it a battlefield, will be very difficult “advocacy” one. of of Mr. sort which Jus- tice spoke Brandéis was not advocacy part of a utility to use more product. of its I Nor do think those who our declining won while independence, “exalt order at the to liberty,” of cost would have viewed merchant’s unfettered freedom in “liberty” to advertise as a hawking his wares subject to extensive in light government’s of the attaining substantial interest “order” in the economic sphere. I government

While that when the agree attempts regu of speech expressing late public those views on issues, protected by Amendment presents First unless present “a clear danger” of a substantive evil government has a right g., to prohibit, see, e. Schenck v. States, United important think it 47, (1919), recognize this test is appropriate political con of light importance text the central such to our system Valeo, As self-government. Buckley observed in (1976): U. S. “Discussion issues and qualifica- debate on the integral tions of candidates are the operation of the system government established our Constitution. The First protection Amendment affords the broadest un- ‘to assure order expression [the] political such about bringing ideas interchange of fettered ” people/ changes desired social political (1964), Louisiana, 379 U. S. And in Garrison v. is more affairs concerning public “speech Court stated self-government.” self-expression; it is essence than always require a does not Amendment, however, The First government present before the present danger and to be clear protection Amendment speech. Although First may regulate public issues, “exposition to ideas” is not limited the York, (1948)— 510 507, New 333 U. S. g., e. Winters v. see, and enter informing line between the the both because the may and the like art, literature, is elusive and because taining interests of the important to First contribute Amendment established that in freedom of is well individual —it obscenity though its does may regulate even government the Paris g., e. present present danger. Compare, not a clear and Slaton, (1973), Adult Theatre 413 with 49, v. U. S. Ohio, Brandenburg (1969). 447 Indecent 444, v. 395 U. S. may at over the also speech, least when broadcast airwaves, regulated present type a clear and of the danger absent by by described this required Mr. Justice Brandéis Court Foundation, in FCC Brandenburg. v. 438 726 U. S. Pacifica (1978). And in a slightly different context Court de apply clear-and-present-danger clined to the a con test spiracy among press members of in the violation of the so “degrade” Sherman Act because to do would that doctrine. States, Associated Press v. United 326 U. 7 Nor 1,S. today apply does the Court the clear-and-present-danger test in invalidating promotional advertising. New York’s ban on As noted in these and above, other contexts has clearly rejected notion that there must be a free “market place of ideas.” complaint

If the of those who feel opinion the Court’s does not far go enough “only is that the test truth ability is its accepted in get marketplace itself of ideas” —the test inaugural his address,

advocated Thomas Jefferson first States, and Mr. Holmes in Abrams v. Justice United (1919) (dissenting opinion) no rea- —there protection son whatsoever limit accorded commercial “truthful, speech. noncoercive” See nonmisleading, ante, at If J., concurring judgment). (Blackmun, speech” “commercial is in misleading, “marketplace fact ideas” will time reveal that fact. It reveal it sufficiently soon to avoid harm to but if people, numerous reasoning applied of Brandéis and Holmes is in this context, that was one of the in protecting we took free speech risks society. a democratic

Unfortunately, although “marketplace of ideas” has a historically sensibly defined context in world polit- ical virtually it has none in the realm business speech, transactions. Even so staunch a defender of the First Amend- ment as Justice in his Black, Mr. dissent in Breará Alexan- dria, S., U. n., stated:

“Of course present believe that ordinance could constitutionally be a applied goes 'merchant’ who from ” door to door 'selling pots.’ And yet, the change with in solicitation and advertising tech- the line between what Central niques, Hudson did here and the peddler selling pots in generation Alexandria a ago if difficult, impossible not to fix. why Doubtless that was Mr. joined Justice Black of opinion unanimous the Court in Valentine Chrestensen, 316 U. in S., 54, which the Court stated:

“This court has unequivocally held the streets are proper places of exercise of the freedom commu- information and nicating disseminating opinion that, though states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege they in the may not interest, unduly or proscribe burden its employment these pub- Consti- equally clear that thoroughfares. We are lie as re- imposes government tution no such restraint on advertising. and to Whether, spects purely occu- or a extent, may promote pursue gainful what one activity shall what extent such pation streets, public right user, of the of are derogation adjudged added.) judgment.” (Emphasis legislative matters for I remain unlocked a Pandora’s of view that the Court of speech Box when it “elevated” commercial to the level tra- Amendment political speech according ditional First it protection Virginia Pharmacy Virginia Citizens Board v. Council, Consumer S. 748 The line between U. speech,” “commercial kind of and the those who drafted the not be a mind, First Amendment had intellectually easy surely one to but technically draw, produced problems development far fewer than of has the judicial Virginia Pharmacy doctrine in this area since Board. For in the world of political advocacy marketplace and its ideas, there is no thing such as a “fraudulent” idea: there may be proposals, useless schemes, unworkable totally as well very proposals sound imprimatur that will receive the the “marketplace through majoritarian system ideas” our of election representative government. free flow important information is in this context because it will lead, to discovery any objective “truth,” but because it system is essential to self-government. our The notion that more remedy expose is the false- hood and wholly fallacies is of place out in the commercial bazaar, where if applied logically remedy of one who was merely defrauded would be statement, available upon re- reciting the Latin maxim quest, emptor.” “caveat But since speech” in “fraudulent this area is to be remediable under Board, Virginia Pharmacy supra, the remedy of one defrauded agency is a lawsuit an or proceeding based on common-law notions of fraud separated by that are a world of difference legal

from the realm of politics government. time, and What decisions, widely severed, and common I de- sense have so Board, join Virginia Pharmacy regret clined to in now to in a reaping see Court the seeds that it there sowed. For political, the economic democracy, is subordinate to the long our our lesson that ancestors learned and that ago, many descendants will undoubtedly years have to relearn hence.

Ill The Court con- energy concedes that the state interest ante, plainly substantial, servation is as is the State’s Ante, concern It that its rates be fair and efficient. at 569. also concedes there that is a direct link between Commis- promotional ban sion’s on and the interest advertising State’s Ibid. The Court nonetheless strikes down in conservation. ban on because the Commission has failed to part under the final demonstrate, the Court’s four-part test, no that more than its extensive Ante, necessary to serve the State’s at 569-571. interest. In reaching this conclusion, conjures up potential a utility might conceivably advertisements make that would result in net savings. The energy Court does indicate that the New York Public has Service Commission in fact construed its ban “promotional” advertising pre- on clude the clearly dissemination of information would net energy result nor savings, suggest does it even Commission has been confronted with rejected such advertising proposal.6 an part The final Court’s test appellee Indeed brief its states: any either party attempt Central Hudson nor other before “[N] made an argue specific the Commission to demonstrate advertising strategy for a that would avoid the difficulties Commission found inherent utility promotional advertising. Commission, therefore, electric con- promotion tinued to enforce its ban which it had instituted in 1973.” Appellee Brief 15. attempt

The Court makes no to address statement, explain why, or to many hypothetical ways room for “better” thus leaves so lawyer surely seize on one them se- any ingenious will actually agency the invalidation of what the state did. cure in Illinois Elections Bd. As Mr. observed Justice Blackmun Party, Workers v. Socialist (1979) (concurring opinion): judge unimaginative

“A° would be indeed if he could not up something come with a little ‘drastic’ or a little less any less situation, thereby ‘restrictive’ almost legislation enable himself to vote to strike down.” Here the concludes State’s in energy interest justify conservation cannot ban on promotional blanket ad- In vertising. its statement of the facts, the Court observes ban on Commission’s perfect “a for conserving energy.” vehicle It states: prohibits promotional Commission’s order ad-

“[T]he develop consumption vertising during periods when electricity demand for By is low. limiting growth ‘off-peak’ ban consumption, limits ‘beneficial side growth effects’ of such in terms of more use of efficient existing powerplants. [App. to Juris. 37a.” Statement] Ante, at 559. analysis

The Court’s in this is in regard my view fundamen- tally misguided because it fails to recognize that the beneficial side effects of “more efficient use” be inconsistent with the goal of energy Indeed, conservation. the Commission explicitly found promotion of off-peak consumption impair would conservation efforts.7 The Commission stated: off-peak “Increased . generation, . conferring . while body when no state issue, has addressed the the Court should nonetheless by invalidating resolve it regulation. the state 7 making finding, In distinguished Commission pro “between advertising designed motional existing to shift consumption peak from off-peak advertising designed promote hours and consump- additional valuable some beneficial side also consumes effects, sales, increased energy resources if it is the result of and, necessarily pollution air and thermal creates incremental waterways. increase discharges any More important, generation major in com- off-peak from most of the panies producing electricity not, in would this State resources, be from coal or nuclear produced time, generating but use of facil- require would oil-fired oil ities. The increased for fuel to serve the requirement off-peak by promotional incremental load created adver- unacceptably tising aggravate already would the nation’s high dependence foreign supply on level sources rather than would, addition, encourage and frustrate 37a.8 App. conservation efforts.” to Juris. Statement acknowledged, The Court also as the Commission observes, only ban on can achieve advertising “piecemeal conservationism” because oil dealers are not under they the Commission’s and remain to adver- jurisdiction, free I Until mar- engineering have mastered electrical and tise. prepared my judi- am not to contradict virtue of keting, cial office those who assume the ban will be successful efforts. making a substantial contribution to conservation during off-peak 58a, pro- It App. tion hours.” Juris. Statement n. 2. only the Ibid. scribed latter. appellant’s petition denying rehearing, the Commission And in again stated: heating, promotion off-peak usage, particularly space electric

“While off-peak usage might increase is touted some as desirable because it thereby company’s factor, improve summer-peaking load we are imperfectly off-peak promotion, in the context of especially convinced that interest, rates, if even structured electric inconsistent with is usage public mind from electric promoting it could divorced Policy Statement, gen- generally. pointed increases in As we out our time, requires burning off-peak generation, at this eration, even requirement aggravates for fuel oil oil resources. This increased scarce foreign already high dependence sup- sources of level nation’s omitted). Id., (footnotes ply.” at 58a any

IAnd doubt that of this Court’s First Amendment deci- justify sions striking down the Commission’s order because steps more toward conservation could have been made This especially true when, as here, the Commission lacks author- ity over oil dealers.

The Court concludes that the promo- Commission’s ban on tional must be struck down because it is more extensive than necessary: may it result in suppression advertising by promotes utilities that the use of electrical devices services that cause no net increase in energy total use. The Court’s reasoning in this however, highly regard, speculative. provides The Court examples two claims support its conclusion. It first states that parties both ac- knowledge that the “heat pump” will be “a major improve- ment in electric heating,” that but for the ban the utilities would advertise type of “energy efficien[t]” product.9 The New York Public Service Commission, how- ever, considered the merits of the pump heat and concluded it that would likely most result in an overall increase in elec- tric energy consumption. The Commission stated: of a pump

“[Installation heat means also installation of central air-conditioning. To this promotion extent, off-peak of space electric heating promotion involves on-peak summer air-conditioning as well on-peak usage previously discussed, As however, it does not follow that because a product “energy efficient” it is also consistent goal energy with the Thus, regard conservation. with pump, the heat appellees counsel argument oral stated at says “Central Hudson there some are [heat pumps] conditioning, without air they but . . . have never advised us of Arg. that.” Tr. of Oral 32-33. The pump, electric heat continued, he “normally with it air conditioning carr[ies] summer, and the com mission found that this would result in air conditioning that would not Id., happen.” otherwise at 33. This but example one of the veritable Sargasso nonlegal Sea difficult issues that we wade into adopting a requires judges rule that highly to evaluate complex and often controver questions arising quite sial disciplines foreign to ours. electricity price for water And of elec- heating. fully

tricity to most in the does not now consumers State higher marginal on-peak reflect much costs of con- sumption In circum- peaking summer markets. these consumption would subsidization of stances, there be a all con- on-peak, higher rates for consequently, App. sumers.” Juris. 58a. Statement peak may encourage Subsidization of consumption only during peak periods, use of scarce but energy resources may larger also lead generating capacity require- Preserve ments for the State. heating backup Court next asserts as a that electric

to solar and energy other heat be an efficient alternative Ante, source. however, to establish, at 570. The Court fails an advertising pre proposal properly this sort was sented to the Commission. concession Indeed, the Court’s findings sug the Commission did on this not make issue that the Commission did consider it. Nor does gests not even rely on any support for its assertion other than appellant. Rather, the assertion of speculates it that “[i]n the absence of authoritative we findings contrary, must possibility credit as within the realm of the claim electric can be an heat efficient alternative some circumstances.” Ibid10

Ordinarily is the role Public Com- State Service mission concerning to make factual determinations whether service will savings device or result in a net if energy and, whether and to what so, permits state law dissemina- extent tion of information about the device or Otherwise, service. assuming speculation correct, Even the Court’s is it has shown too truly to necessary,” little. For the be “no more than extensive energy only be established that a more it must efficient source serve as a will saving energy, rather than as an means for inducement to consume more energy energy using the cost has prod because decreased or because other conjunction in ucts be used with the efficient will more one. no factual basis its assertions. Court will have here,

as opportunity an to consider the And the will never have State its manner and thus to construe law in a consistent with issue Jackson, Federal As stated Barrows v. Constitution. (1953): 249, 346 U. S. be undesirable for this con-

“It would indeed Court to every might possibly sider conceivable situation which application complex arise in the and comprehensive ready Nor are we so to legislation. frustrate the ex- pressed Congress legislatures. will of or that of the state Gallagher, Cf. Southern Co. v. S. 172.” U. Pacific I think would the Court do well to heed the admonition Barrows here. The terms the order of the New York Pub my lic Service Commission view that advertising indicate designed promote savings to net in energy use fall does not scope within the ban. prohibits The order electric corporations “from promoting electricity the use through the use of advertising, subsidy payments , employee ... App. incentives.” (emphasis Juris. Statement added). 31a is It not clear to me advertising likely result savings energy net advertising “promot[es] the use of electricity,” nor point does the Court any language in the Commission order that has suggests adopted this con struction. Rather, it would seem more accurate to character ize such advertising designed to “discourage” the use of electricity.11 Indeed, think quite it is likely that the Com

11This supported by characterization is the reasoning of the New York Appeals, Court of which stated: “[P]romotional . . . seeks encourage ... the increased con- sumption electricity, during peak whether off-peak hours or hours.

Thus, only such does any communication lack beneficial informative content, but it affirmatively society. detrimental to the . . . Con- serving diminishing resources is a matter of vital State concern and in- creased energy use of electrical is inimical to our interests. Promotional advertising, permitted, if only would serve to exacerbate the crisis.” 47 2d, 2d, N. Y. N. E. at 757-758. clearly in advertising would result

mission would view objectives of its as with the energy in consistent savings net for ex Commission, permissible.12 therefore order and information the dissemination of has authorized ample, thereby energy demand, in in electrical result would shifts Id., periods. electricity during peak reducing the demand for at to consider willingness has also indicated at 37a.13 It “specific proposals” submitted types least some other informa permits Id., clearly 37a-38a. And it utilities. at of informa dissemination opposed promotional tional as ulti Id., if the Commission were 43a-46a. Even tion. at its ban on mately reject the view that in net advertising results advertising include does not be I think should at least the Commission energy savings, opportunity an to consider it. given for Court to invalidate my inappropriate It is in view on its advertising here, based on commercial the State’s ban may result cases speculation that some and in cases in savings energy use, a net electrical utility from energy savings a net would result which it is clear its apply Commission would advertising, the Public Service argument appellant conceded that the ban would At oral counsel for electricity. utility advertising promoting apply the nonuse Indeed, Arg. Oral 6. counsel stated: “If the use reduces Tr. of electricity used, promotional ban not within the ban. The amount of is might expected of elec anything which to increase use is defined only appellee thing that tricity.” Ibid. And for stated that “the counsel by advertising usage.” Id., promotion electric here is the is involved promotion going showing be made that fact “And if a can at 30. appellee continued, never energy,” counsel for “which . . . has to conserve says ready our us, order we are to relax the commission’s been made to banning think banning the sake of it. interested in We ban, we’re not basically idea, gas, can In have been a bad if we avoid it. we Id., gas has become available.” at 40. relaxing it as more discussed, previously the Public Service Commission By contrast, as Supra, off-peak promotion consumption alone. permit does not 600-601, and n. 8. as to proscribe ban so such Even advertising. assuming that speculation the Court’s I think correct, do it follows facial invalidation the ban appropriate is the course. stated in Levy, As Parker v. 417 U. 760 (1974), S. “even there marginal applications if are in which a statute would infringe on First Amendment facial values, invalidation is inappropriate if the 'remainder of the . statute . . covers a range of easily whole identifiable and constitutionally pre- scribable . . . . .’ conduct. . CSC Letter Carriers, U. S. 548, (1973).” clearly This is the case here.

For the foregoing reasons, would affirm the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals.

Case Details

Case Name: Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Jun 20, 1980

Citation: 447 U.S. 557

Docket Number: 79-565

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS