PATCHAK v. ZINKE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.
No. 16-498
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Argued November 7, 2017—Decided February 27, 2018
583 U. S. ____ (2018)
(Slip Opinion)
OCTOBER TERM, 2017
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PATCHAK v. ZINKE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Petitioner David Patchak filed suit challenging the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to invoke the Indian Reorganization Act,
Held: The judgment is affirmed.
828 F. 3d 995, affirmed.
JUSTICE THOMAS, joined by JUSTICE BREYER, JUSTICE ALITO, and JUSTICE KAGAN, concluded that §2(b) of the Gun Lake Act does not violate Article III of the Constitution. Pp. 4–16.
(a) Congress may not exercise the judicial power, see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 218, but the legislative power permits Congress to make laws that apply retroactively to pending lawsuits, even when it effectively ensures that one side will win, Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U. S. ___. Permissible exercises of the legislative power and impermissible infringements of the judicial power are distinguished by the following rule: Congress vio-lates Article III when it “compel[s] . . . findings or results under old law,” Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U. S. 429, 438, but not when it “changes the law,” Plaut, supra, at 218. Pp. 4–6.
(b) By stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over actions “relating to” the Bradley Property, §2(b) changes the law. Pp. 6–10.
(1) Section 2(b) is best read as a jurisdiction-stripping statute. It uses jurisdictional language, imposes jurisdictional consequences, and applies “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” including the general grant of federal-question jurisdiction,
(2) When Congress strips federal courts of jurisdiction, it exercises a valid legislative power. This Court has held that Congress generally does not violate Article III when it strips federal jurisdiction over a class of cases, see Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514, and has reaffirmed these principles on many occasions, see, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 94–95. Pp. 7–10.
(b) Patchak‘s two arguments for why §2(b) violates Article III even if it does strip jurisdiction—that the provision flatly directs federal courts to dismiss lawsuits without allowing them to interpret or apply any new law, and that it attempts to interfere with this Court‘s decision in Patchak I that his suit “may proceed,” 567 U. S., at 212—are unpersuasive. Pp. 10–15.
JUSTICE GINSBURG, joined by JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concluded that Congress’ authority to forgo or retain the Government‘s sovereign immunity from suit suffices to decide this case. With Patchak I in mind, Congress acted effectively to displace the Administrative Procedure Act‘s waiver of immunity for suits against the United States—which enabled Patchak to launch this litigation—with a contrary command applicable to the Bradley Property. Pp. 1–2.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR concluded that §2(b) of the Gun Lake Act is most naturally read as having restored the Federal Government‘s sovereign immunity from Patchak‘s suit challenging the trust status of the Bradley Property. Pp. 1–2.
THOMAS, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion. GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 16-498
DAVID PATCHAK, PETITIONER v. RYAN ZINKE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[February 27, 2018]
JUSTICE THOMAS announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which JUSTICE BREYER, JUSTICE ALITO, and JUSTICE KAGAN join.
Petitioner, David Patchak, sued the Secretary of the Interior for taking land into trust on behalf of an Indian Tribe. While his suit was pending in the District Court, Congress enacted the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act (Gun Lake Act or Act), Pub. L. 113–179, 128 Stat. 1913, which
I
The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians (Band) resides in southwestern Michigan, near the township of Wayland. The Band traces its relationship with the United States back hundreds of years, point-ing to treaties it negotiated with the Federal Government as early as 1795. But the Secretary of the Interior did not formally recognize the Band until 1999. See 63 Fed. Reg. 56936 (1998); 65 Fed. Reg. 13298 (2000).
After obtaining formal recognition, the Band identified a 147-acre parcel of land in Wayland, known as the Bradley Property, where it wanted to build a casino. The Band asked the Secretary to invoke the Indian Reorganization Act, §5, 48 Stat. 985,
The Michigan Gambling Opposition (MichGO) sued, alleging that the Secretary‘s decision violated federal environmental and gaming laws. After several years of litigation, the D. C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of MichGo‘s claims, and this Court denied certiorari. Michigan Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525 F. 3d 23 (2008), cert. denied, 555 U. S. 1137 (2009). In January 2009, the Secretary formally took the Bradley Property into trust. And in February 2011, the Band opened its casino.
Before the Secretary formally took the land into trust, a nearby landowner, David Patchak, filed another lawsuit challenging the Secretary‘s decision. Invoking the Administrative Procedure Act,
jurisdiction when the statute was enacted in 1934. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U. S. 379, 382–383 (2009). The Band was not federally recognized until 1999, which Patchak argued was more than 65 years too late. Based on this alleged statutory violation, Patchak sought to reverse the Secretary‘s decision to take the Bradley Property into trust.
The Secretary raised preliminary objections to Patchak‘s suit, contending that it was barred by sovereign immunity and that Patchak lacked prudential standing to bring it. The District Court granted the Secretary‘s motion to dismiss, but the D. C. Circuit reversed. Patchak v. Salazar, 646 F. Supp. 2d 72 (DC 2009), rev‘d, 632 F. 3d 702 (2011). This Court granted certiorari and affirmed the D. C. Circuit. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U. S. 209 (2012) (Patchak I). This Court‘s decision in Patchak I held
In September 2014, while Patchak‘s suit was back in the District Court, Congress enacted the Gun Lake Act, 128 Stat. 1913. Section 2(a) of the Act states that the Bradley Property “is reaffirmed as trust land, and the actions of the Secretary of the Interior in taking that land into trust are ratified and confirmed.” Section 2(b) then provides the following:
“NO CLAIMS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action (including an action pending in a Federal court as of the date of enactment of this Act) re-lating to the land described in subsection (a) shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.”
Based on §2(b), the District Court entered summary judgment against Patchak and dismissed his suit for lack of jurisdiction. 109 F. Supp. 3d 152 (DC 2015).
The D. C. Circuit affirmed. Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F. 3d 995 (2016). It held that “[t]he language of the Gun Lake Act makes plain that Congress has stripped federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction” over suits, like Patchak‘s, that relate to the Bradley Property. Id., at 1001. The D. C. Circuit rejected Patchak‘s argument that §2(b) violates Article III of the Constitution. Id., at 1001–1003. Article III prohibits Congress from “direct[ing] the result of pending litigation,” the D. C. Circuit reasoned, but it does not prohibit Congress from “supply[ing] new law.” Id., at 1002 (quoting Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U. S. 429, 439 (1992)). Section 2(b) supplies new law: “[I]f an action relates to the Bradley Property, it must promptly be dismissed.” 828 F. 3d, at 1003.
We granted certiorari to review whether §2(b) violates Article III of the Constitution.2 See 581 U. S. ___ (2017). Because it does not, we now affirm.
II
A
The Constitution creates three branches of Government and vests each branch with a different type of power. See
judiciary the duty of interpreting and applying them in cases properly brought before the courts.” Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923); see also Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 46 (1825) (Marshall, C. J.) (“[T]he legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law“). By vesting each branch with an exclusive form of power, the Framers kept those powers separate. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 946 (1983). Each branch “exercise[s] . . . the powers appropriate to its own department,” and no branch can “encroach upon the powers confided to the
The separation of powers, among other things, prevents Congress from exercising the judicial power. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 218 (1995). One way that Congress can cross the line from legislative power to judicial power is by “usurp[ing] a court‘s power to interpret and apply the law to the [circumstances] before it.” Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U. S. ___ (2016) (slip op., at 12). The simplest example would be a statute that says, “In Smith v. Jones, Smith wins.” See id., at ___, n. 17 (slip op., at 12–13, n. 17). At the same time, the legislative power is the power to make law, and Congress can make laws that apply retroactively to pending lawsuits, even when it effectively ensures that one side wins. See id., at ___-___ (slip op., at 15–19).
To distinguish between permissible exercises of the legislative power and impermissible infringements of the judicial power, this Court‘s precedents establish the following rule: Congress violates Article III when it “com-pel[s] . . . findings or results under old law,” Seattle Audubon, supra, at 438. But Congress does not violate Article III when it “changes the law.” Plaut, supra, at 218.
B
Section 2(b) changes the law. Specifically, it strips federal courts of jurisdiction over actions “relating to” the Bradley Property. Before the Gun Lake Act, federal courts had jurisdiction to hear these actions. See
1
Section 2(b) strips federal jurisdiction over suits relating to the Bradley Property. The statute uses jurisdictional language. It states that an “action” relating to the Bradley Property “shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court.” It imposes jurisdictional consequences: Actions relating to the Bradley Property “shall be promptly dismissed.” See Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869) (“[W]hen [jurisdiction] ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause“). Section 2(b) has no exceptions. Cf. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 165 (2010). And it applies “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” including the general grant of federal-question jurisdiction,
Our conclusion that §2(b) is jurisdictional is bolstered by the fact that it cannot plausibly be read as anything else. Section 2(b) is not one of the nonjurisdictional rules that this Court‘s precedents have identified as “important and mandatory” but not governing “a court‘s adjudicatory capacity.” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435 (2011). Section 2(b) does not identify an “element of [the] plaintiff‘s claim for relief” or otherwise define its “substantive adequacy.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 516, 504 (2006). Nor is it a “claim-processing rule,” like a filing deadline or an exhaustion requirement, that requires the parties to “take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.” Henderson, supra, at 435. Instead, §2(b) completely prohibits actions relating to the Bradley Property. Because §2(b) addresses “a court‘s competence to adjudicate a particular category of cases,” Wachovia Bank, N. A. v. Schmidt, 546 U. S. 303, 316 (2006), it is best read as a jurisdiction-stripping statute.
2
Statutes that strip jurisdiction “chang[e] the law” for the purpose of Article III, Plaut, supra, at 218, just as much as other exercises of Congress’ legislative authority.
Indeed, this Court has held that Congress generally does not violate Article III when it strips federal jurisdiction over a class of cases.3 Shortly after
is the “power to declare the law” in the first place, “judicial duty is not less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising firmly that which the Constitution and the laws confer.” Id., at 514–515.4
This Court has reaffirmed these principles on many occasions. Congress generally does not infringe the judicial power when it strips jurisdiction because, with limited exceptions, a congressional grant of jurisdiction is a prerequisite to the exercise of judicial power. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (“The requirement that jurisdiction be established
as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States‘” (quoting Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382 (1884))); Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245 (1845) (“[T]he judicial power of the United States . . . is (except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this court) dependent . . . entirely upon the action of Congress“); Hudson, supra, at 33 (similar). “To deny this position” would undermine the separation of powers by “elevat[ing] the judicial over the legislative branch.” Cary, supra, at 245. Congress’ power over federal jurisdiction is “an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects.” Steel Co., supra, at 101.
In
III
Patchak does not dispute Congress’ power to withdraw jurisdiction from the federal courts. He instead raises two arguments why §2(b) violates Article III, even if it does strip jurisdiction. First, relying on United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872), Patchak argues that §2(b) flatly directs federal courts to dismiss lawsuits without allowing them to interpret or apply any new law. Second, relying on Plaut, 514 U. S. 211, Patchak argues that §2(b) attempts to interfere with this Court‘s decision in Patchak I—specifically, its conclusion that his suit “may proceed,” 567 U. S., at 212. We reject both arguments.
A
Section 2(b) does not flatly direct federal courts to dismiss lawsuits under old law. It creates new law for suits relating to the Bradley Property, and the District Court interpreted and applied that new law in Patchak‘s suit. Section 2(b)‘s “relating to” standard effectively guaranteed that Patchak‘s suit would be dismissed. But “a statute does not impinge on judicial power when it directs courts to apply a new legal standard to undisputed facts.” Bank Markazi, 578 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17). “[I]t is not any the less a case or controversy upon which a court possessing the federal judicial power may rightly give judgment” when the arguments before the court are “uncontested or incontestable.” Pope v. United States, 323 U. S. 1, 11 (1944).
Patchak argues that the last four words of §2(b)—“shall be promptly dismissed“—direct courts to reach a particular outcome. But a statute does not violate Article III merely because it uses mandatory language. See Seattle Audubon, 503 U. S., at 439. Instead of directing outcomes, the mandatory language in §2(b) “simply imposes the consequences” of a court‘s determination that it lacks jurisdiction because a suit relates to the Bradley Property. Miller v. French, 530 U. S. 327, 349 (2000); see McCardle, 7 Wall., at 514.5
Patchak compares §2(b) to the statute this Court held unconstitutional in Klein. In that case, the administrator
of the estate of V. F. Wilson, a former Confederate soldier, sued to recover the value of some cotton that the Government had seized during the war. 13 Wall., at 132. The relevant statute required claimants to prove their loyalty in order to reclaim their property. Ch. 120, §3, 12 Stat. 820. Wilson had received a pardon before he died, 13 Wall., at 132, and this Court had held that pardons conclusively prove loyalty under the statute, see United States v. Padelford, 9 Wall. 531, 543 (1870). But after Wilson‘s administrator secured a judgment in his favor, 13 Wall., at 132, Congress passed a statute making pardons proof of disloyalty and declaring
This Court has since explained that “the statute in Klein infringed the judicial power, not because it left too little for courts to do, but because it attempted to direct the result without altering the legal standards governing the effect of a pardon—standards Congress was powerless to prescribe.” Bank Markazi, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 15). Congress had no authority to declare that pardons are not evidence of loyalty, so it could not achieve the same result by stripping jurisdiction whenever claimants cited pardons as evidence of loyalty. See Klein, 13 Wall., at 147–148. Nor could Congress confer jurisdiction to a federal court but then strip jurisdiction from that same court once thecourt concluded that a pardoned claimant should prevail under the statute. See id., at 146–147.
Patchak‘s attempts to compare §2(b) to the statute in Klein are unpersuasive. Section 2(b) does not attempt to exercise a power that the Constitution vests in another branch. And unlike the selective jurisdiction-stripping statute in Klein, §2(b) strips jurisdiction over every suit relating to the Bradley Property. Indeed, Klein itself explained that statutes that do “nothing more than strip jurisdiction over “a particular class of cases” are constitutional. Id., at 145. That is precisely what §2(b) does.
B
Section 2(b) does not unconstitutionally interfere with this Court‘s decision in Patchak I.
Because §2(b) expressly references “pending” cases, it applies to Patchak‘s suit. And because Patchak‘s suit is not final, applying §2(b) here does not offend Article III.6
But the question in this case is “[n]ot favoritism, nor even corruption, but power.” Plaut, supra, at 228; see also McCardle, 7 Wall., at 514 (“We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution“). Under this Court‘s precedents, Congress has the power to “apply newly enacted, outcome-altering legislation in pending civil cases,” Bank Markazi, 578 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 16), even when the legislation “govern[s] one or a very small number of specific subjects,” id., at ___ (slip op., at 21). For example, this Court has upheld narrow statutes that identified specific cases by caption and docket number in their text. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 19); Seattle Audubon, 503 U. S., at 440. And this Court has approvingly cited a D. C. Circuit decision, which upheld a statute that retroactively stripped jurisdiction over suits challenging “a single memorial.” Bank Markazi, supra, at ___ (slip
op., at 22) (citing National Coalition To Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F. 3d 1092 (2001)). If these targeted statutes did not cross the line from legislative to judicial power, then §2(b) does not either.
IV
The dissent offers a different theory for why §2(b) violates Article III. A statute impermissibly exercises the judicial power, the dissent contends, when it “targets” a particular suit and “manipulates” jurisdiction to direct the outcome, “practical[ly] operat[es]” to affect only one suit, and announces a legal standard that does not “imply some measure of generality” or “preserv[e] . . . an adjudicative role for the courts.” Post, at 8, 11.
We doubt that the constitutional line separating the legislative and judicial powers turns on factors such as a court‘s doubts about Congress’ unexpressed motives, the number of “cases [that] were pending when the provision was enacted,” or the time left on the statute of limitations. Post, at 8. But even if it did, we disagree with the dissent‘s characterization of §2(b). Nothing on the face of §2(b) is limited to Patchak‘s case, or even to his challenge under the Indian Reorganization Act. Instead, the text extends to all suits “relating to” the Bradley Property. Thus, §2(b) survives even under the dissent‘s theory: It “prospectively govern[s] an open-ended class of disputes,” post, at 6, and its “relating to” standard “preserv[es] . . . an adjudicative role for the courts,” post, at 11. While §2(b)‘s “relating to” standard is not difficult to interpret or apply, this Court‘s precedents encourage Congress to draft jurisdictional statutes in this manner. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U. S. 77, 94 (2010) (“[A]dministrative
*
*
*
We conclude that §2(b) of the Gun Lake Act does not violate Article III of the Constitution. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018)
BREYER, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 16-498
DAVID PATCHAK, PETITIONER v. RYAN ZINKE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[February 27, 2018]
JUSTICE BREYER, concurring.
The statutory context makes clear that this is not simply a case in which Congress has said, “In Smith v. Jones, Smith wins.” See post, at 1, 11–12 (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting). In 2005, the Secretary of the Interior announced her decision to take the Bradley Property into trust for an Indian Tribe, the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians. See 70 Fed. Reg. 25596 (2005). The petitioner brought suit, claiming that the Secretary lacked the statutory authority to do so. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U. S. 379, 382 (2009) (the Indian Reorganization Act gives the Secretary authority to take land into trust only for a tribe under federal jurisdiction in 1934).
Congress then enacted the law here at issue. Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. 113–179, 128 Stat. 1913. (I have placed the full text of that law in the Appendix, infra.) The first part “reaffirm[s],” “ratifie[s],” and “confirm[s]” the Secretary‘s “actions in taking” the Bradley Property “into trust,” as well as the status of the Bradley Property “as trust land.” §2(a). The second part says that actions “relating to” the Bradley Property “shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.” §2(b). Read together, Congress first made certain that federal statutes gave the Secretary the authority to take the Bradley Property into trust, andsecond tried to dot all the i‘s by adding that federal courts shall not hear cases challenging the land‘s trust status. The second part, the jurisdictional part, perhaps gilds the lily, perhaps simplifies judicial decisionmaking (the judge need only determine whether a lawsuit relates to the Bradley Property), but, read in context, it does no more than provide an alternative legal standard for courts to apply that seeks the same real-world result as does the first part: The Bradley Property shall remain in trust.
The petitioner does not argue that Congress acted unconstitutionally by ratifying the Secretary‘s actions and the land‘s trust status, and I am aware of no substantial argument to that effect. See United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U. S. 370, 382–383, 387 (1907) (Congress may retroactively ratify Government action that was unauthorized when taken); Brief for Federal Courts and Federal Indian Law Scholars as Amici Curiae 6–11 (citing numerous examples of tribe-specific Indian-land bills). The jurisdictional part of the statute therefore need not be read to do more than eliminate the cost of litigating a lawsuit that will inevitably uphold the land‘s trust status.
This case is consequently unlike United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872), where this Court held unconstitutional
Appendix to opinion of BREYER, J.
APPENDIX
Public Law 113-179
“SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
“This Act may be cited as the
“SEC. 2. REAFFIRMATION OF INDIAN TRUST LAND.
“(a) IN GENERAL.—The land taken into trust by the United States for the benefit of the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians and described in the final Notice of Determination of the Department of the Interior (70 Fed. Reg. 25596 (May 13, 2005)) is reaffirmed as trust land, and the actions of the Secretary of the Interior in taking that land into trust are ratified and confirmed.
“(b) NO CLAIMS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action (including an action pending in a Federal court as of the date of enactment of this Act) relating to the land described in subsection (a) shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.
“(c) RETENTION OF FUTURE RIGHTS.—Nothing in this Act alters or diminishes the right of the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians from seeking to have any additional land taken into trust by the United States for the benefit of the Band.”
JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins, concurring in the judgment.
What Congress grants, it may retract. That is undoubtedly true of the Legislature‘s authority to forgo or retain the Government‘s sovereign immunity from suit. The Court need venture no further to decide this case.
Patchak sought relief from the Secretary of the Interior “other than money damages,”
Just as it is Congress’ prerogative to consent to suit, so too is it within Congress’ authority to withdraw consent once
In short, Congress acted effectively to displace the APA‘s waiver of immunity for suits against the United States with a contrary command applicable to the Bradley Property: No action concerning the trust status of that property is currently attended by the sovereign‘s consent to suit. For that reason, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upholding the District Court‘s dismissal of Patchak‘s case.*
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the dissent that Congress may not achieve through jurisdiction stripping what it cannot permissibly achieve outright, namely, directing entry of judgment for a particular party. I also agree that an Act that merely deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over a single proceeding is not enough to be considered a change in the law and that any statute that portends to do so should be viewed with great skepticism. See post, at 11-12 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). I differ with the dissent‘s ultimate conclusion only because, as JUSTICE GINSBURG explains, the
In the Court‘s first decision in this case, Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U. S. 209 (2012), the sole issue of disagreement between the majority and the dissent was whether the United States had waived its sovereign immunity from Patchak‘s lawsuit. The majority held that Congress had done so in the Administrative Procedure
In addition to the reasons set forth by JUSTICE GINSBURG, ante, at 2, given this context, §2(b) of the Gun Lake Act is most naturally read as having restored the Federal Government‘s sovereign immunity from Patchak‘s suit challenging the trust status of the Bradley Property. That conclusion avoids the separation-of-powers concerns raised here about jurisdiction stripping. On this basis alone, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY and JUSTICE GORSUCH join, dissenting.
Two Terms ago, this Court unanimously agreed that Congress could not pass a law directing that, in the hypothetical pending case of Smith v. Jones, “Smith wins.” Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U. S. ___, ___, n. 17 (2016) (slip op., at 13, n. 17). Today, the plurality refuses to enforce even that limited principle in the face of a very real statute that dictates the disposition of a single pending case. Contrary to the plurality, I would not cede unqualified authority to the Legislature to decide the outcome of such a case. Article III of the Constitution vests that responsibility in the Judiciary alone.
I
A
The Framers’ decision to establish a judiciary “truly distinct from both the legislature and the executive,” The Federalist No. 78, p. 466 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton), was born of their experience with legislatures “extending the sphere of [their] activity and drawing all power into [their] impetuous vortex,” id., No. 48, at 309 (J. Madison). Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, colonial legislatures routinely functioned as courts of equity, “grant[ing] exemptions from standing law, prescrib[ing] the law to be applied to particular controversies, and even decid[ing]
Given the “disarray” produced by this “system of legisla-tive equity,” the Framers resolved to take the innovative step of creating an independent judiciary. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 221 (1995). They recognized that such a structural limitation on the power of the legislative and executive branches was necessary to secure individual freedom. As James Madison put it, “[w]ere the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control.” The Federalist No. 47, at 303 (citing 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws).
The Constitution‘s division of power thus reflects the “concern that a legislature should not be able unilaterally to impose a substantial deprivation on one person.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 962 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). The Framers protected against that threat, both in “specific provisions, such as the
Congress violates this arrangement when it arrogates the judicial power to itself and decides a particular case. We first enforced that rule in United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872), when the Radical Republican Congress passed a law targeting suits by pardoned Confederates. Although this Court had held that a pardon was proof of loyalty and entitled claimants to damages for property seized by the Union, see United States v. Padelford, 9 Wall. 531, 543 (1870), Congress sought to block Confederate supporters from receiving such compensation. It therefore enacted a statute barring rebels from using a pardon as evidence of loyalty, instead requiring the courts to dismiss for want of jurisdiction any suit based on a pardon. This Court declared the law unconstitutional. Congress, in addition to impairing the President‘s pardon power, had “prescribe[d] rules of decision to the Judicial Department ... in cases pending before it.” Klein, 13 Wall., at 146. The Court accordingly held that the statute “passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power.” Id., at 147.
B
As the plurality acknowledges, ante, at 14, the facts of this case are stark. The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians (Band) sought land on which to build a casino. The Band identified a 147-acre tract of land in rural southwestern Michigan (called the Bradley Property), and in 2005 the Secretary of the Interior announced a final decision to take the property into trust on behalf of the Band. See 70 Fed. Reg. 25596 (2005).
Fearing an “irreversibl[e] change [to] the rural character of the area,” David Patchak, a neighboring landowner, filed a lawsuit challenging the transfer. Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F. 3d 995, 1000 (CADC 2016). The suit alleged that the Secretary lacked statutory authority to take the Bradley Property into trust. The Secretary asserted several grounds for dismissing the case, but this Court ultimately granted review and determined that “Patchak‘s suit may proceed.” Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U. S. 209, 212 (2012) (Patchak I).
Following remand, while summary judgment briefing was underway in the District Court, the Band persuaded Congress to enact a standalone statute, the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act (Gun Lake Act), to terminate the suit.
“NO CLAIMS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action (including an action pending in a Federal court as of the date of enactment of this Act) relating to the land described in subsection (a) shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.”
When Congress passed the Act in 2014, no other suits relating to the Bradley Property were pending, and the six-year statute of limitations on challenges to the Secretary‘s action under the Administrative Procedure
Recognizing that the “clear intent” of Congress was “to moot this litigation,” the District Court dismissed Patchak‘s case against the Secretary. Patchak v. Jewell, 109 F. Supp. 3d 152, 159 (DC 2015). The D. C. Circuit affirmed, also based on the “plain” directive of §2(b). 828 F. 3d, at 1001.
II
Congress has previously approached the boundary between legislative and judicial power, but it has never gone so far as to target a single party for adverse treatment and direct the precise disposition of his pending case. Section 2(b)—remarkably—does just that.
The plurality cites a smattering of “narrow statutes” that this Court has previously upheld. Ante, at 14. Yet none is as brazen as §2(b), either in terms of dictating a particular outcome or in singling out a particular party. Indeed, the bulk of those cases involved statutes that prospectively governed an open-ended class of disputes and left the courts to apply any new legal standard in the first instance. In Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421 (1856), for example, we addressed an enactment that permanently altered the legal status of a public bridge going forward by reclassifying it as a postal road. That provision, we later said, did not prescribe an “arbitrary rule of decision” but instead “left [the court] to apply its ordinary rules” to determine whether the redesignation of the structure meant that it was an obstruction of interstate commerce. Klein, 13 Wall., at 146-147. And in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U. S. 429 (1992), the statute at issue made reference to specific cases only as a shorthand for identifying preexisting environmental law requirements. Id., at 440. The statute applied generally—“replac[ing] the legal standards” for timber harvesting across 13 national forests—and explicitly reserved for judicial determination whether pending and future timber sales complied with the new standards. Id., at 437.
Even Bank Markazi, which disclaimed a number of limits on Congress‘s authority to intervene in ongoing litigation, did not suggest that Congress could dictate the result in a pending case. There, Congress inserted itself into a long-running dispute over whether terrorist victims could satisfy their judgments against Iran‘s central bank, enacting a statute that eliminated certain legal impediments to obtaining the bank‘s assets. We upheld the law because it “establish[ed] new substantive standards” and entrusted “application of those standards” to the court. 578 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18).
But the Court in Bank Markazi did not have before it anything like §2(b), which prevents the court from applying any new legal standards and explicitly dictates the dismissal of a pending proceeding. The Court instead stressed that the judicial findings contemplated by the statute in Bank Markazi left “plenty” for the court “to adjudicate” before ruling that the bank was liable. Id., at ___, n. 20 (slip op., at 17, n. 20). The law, for instance, did not define the terms “beneficial interest” and “equitable title.” The District Court needed to resolve the scope of those phrases. Nor did it decide whether the assets were owned by the bank. That issue was also assigned to the court. And lastly, the
In addition, the Court in Bank Markazi repeatedly emphasized that the law was not a “one-case-only regime.” 578 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1). The law instead governed a category of postjudgment execution claims filed by over a thousand plaintiffs who, in 16 different actions, had obtained judgments against Iran in excess of $1.75 billion—facts suggesting more generality than is true of many Acts of Congress.
By contrast, §2(b) targets a single pending case. Although the formal language of the provision—reaching any action “relating to” the Bradley Property—could theoretically suggest a broader application, its practical operation unequivocally confirms that it concerns solely Patchak‘s suit. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n v. Schor, 478 U. S. 833, 851 (1986) (explaining that the Court “review[s] Article III challenges ... with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary“). In an effort to identify a set of disputes to which §2(b) might apply, the plurality asserts that the provision extends to any action relating to the trust status of the property. Ante, at 15. Yet as the D. C. Circuit recognized, no other cases were pending when the provision was enacted; §2(b) affected “only ... Patchak‘s lawsuit.” 828 F. 3d, at 1003.
And as the Band concedes, no additional suits challenging the transfer could have been filed under the APA—or any other statute of which we are aware—due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Brief for Respondent Band 6. The plurality thus is simply incorrect when it asserts that the Act applies to a broad “class of cases.” Ante, at 8, 15. What are those cases?
This is not a question of probing Congress‘s “unexpressed motives.” Ante, at 15. The text and operation of the provision instead make clear that the range of potential applications is a class of one. Congress, in crafting a law tailored to Patchak‘s suit, has pronounced the equivalent of “Smith wins.”
III
The plurality refuses to “jealously guard[]” against such a basic intrusion on judicial independence. Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 60. It instead focuses on general tenets of jurisdiction stripping. In its view, §2(b) falls comfortably within Congress‘s power to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and accordingly does not constitute an exercise of judicial power.
But nothing in §2(b) specifies that the statute is jurisdictional. That has special significance: To rein in “profligate use of the term ‘jurisdiction,‘” this Court in recent cases has adopted a “bright line” rule treating statutory limitations as nonjurisdictional unless Congress “clearly states”
Compare
After stretching to read §2(b) as jurisdictional, the plurality dedicates considerable effort to defending Congress‘s broad authority over the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Ante, at 7-10. That background principle is undoubtedly correct—and undoubtedly irrelevant for the purposes of evaluating §2(b). For while the greater power to create inferior federal courts generally includes the power to strip those courts of jurisdiction, at a certain point that lesser exercise of authority invades the judicial function. “Congress has the power (within limits) to tell the courts what classes of cases they may decide, but not to prescribe or superintend how they decide those cases.” Arlington v. FCC, 569 U. S. 290, 297 (2013) (majority opinion of Scalia, J.) (emphasis added; citations omitted). In other words, Congress cannot, under the guise of altering federal jurisdiction, dictate the result of a pending proceeding.
Klein, after all, drew precisely the same distinction when it considered the provision stripping jurisdiction
over any suit based on a pardon. Chief Justice Chase‘s opinion for the Court explained that if the statute had “simply” removed jurisdiction over “a particular class of cases,” it would be regarded as “an exercise of the acknowledged power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the appellate power.” 13 Wall., at 145, 146. But because the withdrawal of jurisdiction was a “means to an end,” founded “solely on the application of a rule of decision,” the Court held that the law violated the separation of powers. Ibid.; see R. Fallon, J. Manning, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler‘s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 324 (7th ed. 2015) (recognizing that “not every congressional attempt to influence the outcome of cases, even if phrased in jurisdictional language, can be justified as a valid exercise of a power over jurisdiction“).
Contrary to the plurality, I would hold that Congress exercises the judicial power
Over and over, the plurality intones that §2(b) does not impinge on the judicial power because the provision “changes the law.” See ante, at 6-7, 10-14. But all that §2(b) does is deprive the court of jurisdiction in a single proceeding. If that is sufficient to change the law, the plurality‘s rule “provides no limiting principle” on Congress‘s ability to assume the role of judge and decide the outcome of pending cases. Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 73.
In my view, the concept of “changing the law” must imply some measure of generality or preservation of an adjudicative role for the courts. The weight of our jurisdiction stripping precedent bears this out. Almost all of the examples the plurality cites, see ante, at 10, 13, contemplated the wholesale repeal of a generally applicable jurisdictional provision. See Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U. S. 506, 508 (1916) (“The [provision] applies with the same force to all cases and was embodied in a statute that no doubt was intended to apply to all.“); Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245 (1845); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 274 (1994); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U. S. 226, 234 (1922). The Court, to date, has never sustained a law that withdraws jurisdiction over a particular lawsuit.
The closest analogue is of course Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869), which the plurality nonchalantly cites as one of its leading authorities. McCardle arose amid a pitched national debate over Reconstruction of the former Confederacy. William McCardle, an unreconstructed newspaper editor, was being held in military custody for inciting insurrection. After unsuccessfully applying for federal habeas relief in the circuit court, McCardle appealed to the Supreme Court, raising a broad challenge to the constitutionality of Reconstruction. The Court heard argument on his habeas appeal over the course of four days in March 1868. Before the Court could render its decision, however, the Radical Republican Congress—in an acknowledged effort to sweep the case from the docket—enacted a statute withdrawing the Supreme Court‘s appellate jurisdiction in habeas cases. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 229, 239-241 (1973).
The Court unanimously dismissed McCardle‘s appeal. In a brief opinion, Chief Justice Chase sidestepped any consideration of Congress‘s attempt to preclude a decision in the case. Faced with a “plain[] instance of positive exception,” the Court held that it lacked power to review McCardle‘s claims. 7 Wall., at 514.
The Court‘s decision in McCardle has been alternatively described as “caving to the political dominance” of the Radical Republicans or “acceding to Congress‘s effort to silence the Court.” Meltzer, The Story of Ex parte McCardle, in Federal Courts Stories 73 (V. Jackson & J. Resnick eds. 2010). Read for all it is worth, the decision is also inconsistent with the approach the Court took just three years later in Klein, where Chief Justice Chase (a dominant character in this drama) stressed that “[i]t is of vital importance” that the legislative and judicial powers “be kept distinct.” 13 Wall., at 147.
The facts of McCardle, however, can support a more limited understanding of Congress‘s power to divest the courts of jurisdiction. For starters, the repealer provision covered more than a single pending dispute; it applied to a class of cases, barring anyone from invoking the Supreme Court‘s appellate jurisdiction in habeas cases for the next two decades. In addition, the Court‘s decision did not foreclose all avenues for judicial review of McCardle‘s complaint. As Chase made clear in the penultimate paragraph of the opinion—and confirmed later that year in his opinion for the Court in Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85 (1869)—the statute did not deny “the whole appellate power of the Court.” 7 Wall., at 515. McCardle, by taking a different procedural route and filing an original habeas action, could have had his case heard on the merits.3
Section 2(b), on the other hand, has neither saving grace. It ends Patchak‘s suit for good. His federal case is dismissed, and he has no alternative means of review anywhere else. See
Indeed, although the stakes of this particular dispute may seem insignificant, the principle that the plurality would enshrine is of historic consequence. In no uncertain terms, the plurality disavows any limitations on Congress‘s power to determine judicial results, conferring on the Legislature a colonial-era authority to pick winners and losers in pending litigation as it pleases. The Court in Bank Markazi said it was holding the line against this sort of legislative usurpation. See 578 U. S., at ___, and n. 17 (slip op., at 12-13, and n. 17, 18). The plurality would yield even that last ditch.
IV
While the plurality reaches to read the Gun Lake Act as stripping jurisdiction, JUSTICE GINSBURG‘s concurrence, joined by JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, strains further to construe §2(b) as restoring the Government‘s sovereign immunity from suit. To reinstate sovereign immunity after it has been waived, Congress must express “an unambiguous intention to withdraw” a remedy. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1019 (1984). Congress has not made that showing here. Section 2(b)—which provides that “an action ... relating to the [Bradley Property] ... shall be promptly dismissed“—bears none of the unmistakable hallmarks of a provision
The concurrence first relies on a hunch, based on the Court‘s earlier determination that Patchak‘s suit was not barred by sovereign immunity. See Patchak I, 567 U. S., at 224. But hunches do not make for an unambiguous expression of intent. Nor, of course, does one lone reference to “immunity” in the legislative history. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 37 (1992) (“[T]he ‘unequivocal expression’ of elimination of sovereign immunity that we insist upon ... cannot be supplied by a committee report.“).
Saving the text for last, the concurrence fails to identify a single instance where the Court has treated a statute that does not mention “immunity,” “consent to be sued,” or even the “United States” as restoring sovereign immunity. The only basis for its interpretation is the purported similarity between the language of the Gun Lake Act and the waiver of immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act. In drawing this comparison, however, JUSTICE GINSBURG leaves out the critical element of that waiver. See ante, at 2 (opinion concurring in judgment). In full, the APA provision states that a suit “shall not be dismissed ... on the ground that it is against the United States.”
As for JUSTICE BREYER‘s concurrence, “dot[ting] all the i‘s,” “simplif[ying] judicial decisionmaking,” and “eliminat[ing] the cost of litigating a lawsuit” are nothing but cavalier euphemisms for exercising the judicial power. Ante, at 2. JUSTICE BREYER assumes that §2(a) is constitutionally unobjectionable, and that §2(b) seeks the same “real-world result.” Ibid. But if §2(a) is constitutional, it is because the provision establishes new substantive standards and leaves the court to apply those standards in the first instance. That is the rule set forth plainly in Bank Markazi. And if that is so, §2(b) does not simply supplement §2(a)—it short-circuits the requisite adjudicative process and decides the suit outright. The proper allocation of authority under the Constitution is very much part of the “real world.” Pursuant to that basic equilibrium, Congress cannot “gild the lily” by relieving the Judiciary of its job—applying the law to the case before it.
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The Framers saw this case coming. They knew that if Congress exercised the judicial power, it would be impossible “to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from serious oppressions.” The Federalist No. 78, at 469 (A. Hamilton). Patchak thought his rights were violated, and went to court. He expected to have his case decided by judges whose independence from political pressure was ensured by the safeguards of Article III—life tenure and salary protection. It was instead decided by Congress, in favor of the litigant it preferred, under a law adopted just for the occasion. But it is our responsibility under the Constitution to decide cases and controversies according to law. It is our responsibility to, as the judicial oath provides, “administer justice without respect to persons.”
I respectfully dissent.