Block v. North Dakota Ex Rel. Board of University & School Lands

BLOCK, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, et al. NORTH DAKOTA ex rel. BOARD OF UNIVERSITY

AND SCHOOL LANDS No. 81-2337. Argued February 23, May 2, 1983 Decided 1983* *Together with No. North Dakota ex rel. Board University and School Block, Lands v. Secretary Agriculture, al., et also on certio rari same court. J., Burger, C. Court, in which J., opinion of the White, delivered the Rehnquist, and Ste- Powell, Blackmun, Marshall, Brennan, and opinion, post, p. dissenting O’Connor, J., filed a vens, JJ., joined. argued for the cause Deputy Claiborne Solicitor General were him on the brief petitioners in 81-2337. No. With Attorney Dinkins, Assistant General Lee, Solicitor General Jacques Edward J. Shawaker. Gelin, B. Attorney Dakota, of North General Wefald,

Robert 0. him respondents With in No. 81-2337. argued cause † L. Anderson. Owen the brief was the State were filed for urging affirmance † Briefs amici curiae Howe, Dep- General, MacFarlane, Attorney Charles G. by D. J. Colorado delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice White Under the Quiet Title Act of 1972 (QTA),1 the United States, subject to certain exceptions, has waived its sover- uty Attorney General, Joel Cantrick, W. General, Solicitor L. Janet Miller, First Attorney Assistant General, Bowers, and Kathleen M. As- sistant Attorney General; and for the State of California et al. George Deukmejian, Attorney General of California, Gregory N.. Taylor, Assist- Attorney ant General, Dennis Eagan, M. Bruce S. Flushman, and Joseph Barbieri, Deputy Attorneys General; Graddick, Charles A. Attorney Gen- eral Alabama; Norman C. Gorsuch, Attorney General of Alaska, and Michael W. Sewright, Assistant Attorney General; K. Robert Corbin, At- torney of Arizona, General Anthony Ching, General; Solicitor John Clark, Steven Attorney General Arkansas; Richard S. Gebelein, Attor- ney General of Delaware, and J. Calvin Williams, Deputy Attorney Gen- J, eral; Jim Smith, Attorney General of Florida; Michael Bowers, Attor- ney General of Georgia; Tany Hong, S. Attorney General of Hawaii; David H. Leroy, Attorney General of Idaho; Tyrone Fahner, C. Attorney Gen- Illinois; eral of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General Iowa; William J. of Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, Gary Keyser, L. and Assistant Attorney General; Frank Kelley, J. Attorney General of Michigan, and Louis Caruso, J. General; Solicitor Warren Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota; Greely, Michael T. Attorney General Montana; of Richard Bryan, H. Attorney General Nevada; of Irwin I. Kimmelman, Attorney General of Robert Abrams, Attorney General Jersey; New York; of New Jan Carturright, Eric Attorney of Oklahoma; Dave Frohnmayer, General Attorney Oregon; General of LeRoy Zimmerman, S. Attorney General of Pennsylvania; Dennis II, J. Robetts Attorney General of Island; Rhode Daniel McLeod, R. Attorney General of Carolina; South Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General of Dakota, South Giedd, Roxanne As- sistant Attorney General; Easton, John J. Jr., Attorney General of Ver- mont, and John H. Chase, Assistant Attorney General; Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Attorney General Washington; of and A. G. McClintock, At- torney General Wyoming. of 1Act 25, of Oct. 1972, Pub. L. 1176, 86 Stat. codified at 28 § 2409a, U. C. § 28 U. 1346(f), S. C. 1402(d). and 28 § U. S. C. provision The relevant present to the case, 28 U. 2409a, S. C. states: “(a) The may United States be named as a party defendant in a civil ac- tion under this adjudicate section to a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest, other a security than interest rights. or water This section does not apply to trust or restricted Indian lands, apply nor does it to or affect actions may which be or could have it as name plaintiffs to permitted immunity eign disputes in- adjudicate title actions in civil party defendant an claims States United the property in which volving real concern- separate issues present two cases These interest. the Congress intended is whether first ing The QTA. the by claimant which procedure provide the exclusive toQTA real States United the of challenge the judicially can title, sections of this or 2410 1346, 1347, 1491, sections brought under been (26 1954, as amended Code of Internal Revenue the of 7425, or 7426 (43 10, 1952 July Act of 7426), or section 7425, and C.S.U. 666). C. of control or possession in disturbed shall “(b) United States The final pending a section under in action involved property any real sixty therefrom, and any appeal decree, conclusion of or judgment United adverse shall be determination final if the days; and or control of possession may such retain nevertheless the United elect, payment upon may itas thereof any part ofor property real upon such which an amount thereto entitled to be determined person com- just to be determine shall action the same court in the district election control. or possession such pensation the nature particularity set forth shall “(c) complaint property, the real claims plaintiff which title, interest or right, title, or interest right, acquired, and it was which circumstances claimed in- the real interest all disclaims “(d) If com- the actual prior to any time plaintiff adverse therein terest court, order is confirmed trial, disclaimer which mencement jurisdiction it has unless cease shall district court jurisdiction of the author- independent than and other ground on or suit action civil 1346(f) title. of this by section ity conferred shall section this under United against the “(e) civil action A jury. without court tried com- it is unless be barred shall section “(f) action Any civil ac- Such it accrued. upon which date years of the twelve within menced prede- or his plaintiff date the on accrued to have be deemed tion shall the United the claim have known or should knew in interest cessor suits permit be construed shall section Nothing in this “(g) possession.” adverse upon based property. 12-year QTA's The second is whether the statute 2409a(f), applicable limitations, § 28 U. S. C. in instances plaintiff respondent State, where the is a such as North QTA Dakota. We conclude that the forecloses the other urged by State, bases for relief and that the limitations provision fully applicable is as to North Dakota as it is to all QTA. others who sue under the

I undisputed equal-footing It is that underthe doctrine Hagan, firstset (1845), forthin Pollard'sLesseev. How.212 Dakota, North like other becamethe ownerof navigable upon the bedsof streams in the State agreed admission Union. It is also that underthe lawof riparian Dakota, ownerhas titleto the centerof the bed nonnavigable ofa stream.SeeN. D. Cent. Code HighwayDept., 47-01-15 AmocoOil Co.v. State 262N. W. (N. 1978). differing 726, 2d 728 D. Because viewsof naviga-bility,the UnitedStatesand North Dakotaassert competing portions claimsto titleto certain of the bedof the Little Mis- souri River within North Dakota.The United States con- tendsthatthe riveris not nowand neverhas been navigable, disputed andit claimsmostof area basedon its riparian Dakota, statusas landowner.2North on the other navigable hand, 1889, assertsthat the riverwas October statehood, the date North Dakota attained therefore disputed that titleto the bed vestedin it underthe equal-footing doctrineon that date. Sinceat least issuing gas Stateshas been private riverbedoil and leasesto Seeking dispute ownership entities. resolvethis as to riverbed, North Dakotafiledthis suitin the District parts disputedarea, 2 Court `In some United States'claimto the riparian bedis foundedon reasonsotherthanits statusas landowner. Tr. 38-48. complaint re The State’s officials.3 federal against several directing defend the relief mandamus and injunctive quested otherwise developing] or desist and to “cease ants Little the of bed ownership upon the of exercising privileges and Dakota,” North of State the within River Missouri “[declaring Little the declaratory judgment sought a further purpose of the for navigable river abe River Missouri juris App. As the 9. ownership bed.” determining S. C. U. invoked Dakota North suit, its basis dictional (mandamus); 28 §1361 C. 28 U. (federal question); S. §1331 re further (declaratory judgment and §§ 2201-2202 C.S.U. provi (the judicial review §§701-706 C. lief); 5 U. and Act). App. 6. North Procedure Administrative theof sions How QTA. the mention complaint not did original Dakota’s com to amend required State the Court District ever, in for Cert. App. Pet. thereunder. a claim plaint recite complied filed and The State pp. A-14—A-16. 81-2337, No. App. 13-16.4 complaint. amended an Dakota North to trial. proceeded thereafter matter The was river claim support itsof evidence introduced defend- The federal statehood.5 of date navigable on on evidence presented no navigability, denying ants, while Interior, Secretary defendants as named complaint The Land Bureau States the United Director Agriculture, Secretary of 6. App. Service. Forest States the United Chief Management, agencies authority” over “final alleged to have were defendants sovereign lands ownership over asserting unlawfully “presently were Id., 7. Dakota.” of North the State aas States name complaint did amended Dakota’s North only to be appears though the defendant, even party 2409a(a). Gen The Solicitor S. C. 28 U. defendant proper defend or the the United objection waived expressly eral has No. for Petitioners Brief point. as to have might ants 31, n. p. travel of canoe documentary evidence consisted case Dakota’s shortly river logs down to float statehood, an effort prior river small traffic, other canoe recreational statehood, present-day after years. usage over craft

279 point;6 their evidence was showing, limited to for statute purposes, limitations that the State had notice years States’ claim prior more 12 than to the com- mencement of the suit.

After trial, the District judgment Court rendered North Dakota. The court first concludedthat the Little Mis souri navigable River was in 1889 and that North Dakota attained title to bed at statehood under equal-footing doctrine Submerged and the Lands Act of 1953, 43 U. S. C. 1311(a). § Supp. (ND 1981). F. 619, 622-624 ap Then, plying what it accepted deemed to be an rule of construction that statutes of apply limitations do sovereigns not unless contrary legislative clearly intention is evident from the ex press language of the statute or rejected otherwise, the court the defendants’ claim that North Dakota’s suit was barred by 12-year the QTA’s statute of limitations, 28 U. S. C. §2409a(f). Supp., 506 F. at 625-626.7 The District Court accordingly judgment quieting entered North Dakota’s title to the bed App. of the river. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 81- pp. 2337, A-29—A-30.8 Appeals The Court of affirmed in all respects. (CA8 1982). 671 F. 2d 271 6The federal defendants position took the that the State’s evidence of navigability was so weak that it actually supported the view that river was nonnavigable. 7To support further this conclusion, stated, court albeit without elaboration, that the legislative history QTA showed intended statute of limitations “to apply exclusively persons, they private private citizens or corporations.” 506 F. Supp., at 625. The court also commented federal position defendants’ was con trary express of Congress, will as by indicated the Submerged Act, 1311(a). Lands 43 U. S. C. 506 F. Supp., at 626. The argued defendants also in the District Court that the United States acquired had title to by the bed possession, adverse that, event, the suit was barred laches. The rejected District Court both of these id,., contentions, 624-626, and the defendants pursue not did them further. judgment The portions excluded those of the bed in which the Three Affiliated Tribes the Fort Berthold Reservation had an interest. The granted, which we certiorari, petition for defendants’ Appeals’ only Court challenged (1982), inappli- is statute QTA’s conclusion cross- conditional filed Dakota to States. cable suit if its asserting even petition, No. still cor- is judgment §2409a(f), below barred isQTA suit remedy exclusive QTA because rect wholly aside maintainable is still officers Appeals Court the submission, which This QTA. the from urged the is also address, necessary to find did ground affirm- for a 81-2337, as respondent in No. as State, Newv. States United favor. See its judgment in ing the Dayton (1977); n. 8 166, 159, 434 U. S. Telephone Co., York (1977). 419 406, S. 433 U. Brinkman, v. Education Board of re- heretofore cross-petition, which grant the nowWe presented question address first pending, we and mained by it. n are barred entities, other all like Union, States suing States United immunity sovereign

by federal immunity Con- express of this waiver anof absence in 59, 61-62 S.U. 440 Arizona, v. gress. California (1939);Kan- 387 382, S. States, 305 U. v. United Minnesota (1907). Only upon 342 204 U. United v. sas immunity waive States United did passage QTA Prior to involving to land. title respect suits with by asserting claimed land title to all others States obtaining resolu- a means only limited had United attempt induce the dispute they could title tion — they against them, action quiet file discretionary for Executive Congress or petition could 1887, those inAct Tucker passage of since Also, relief. damages than monetary rather willing to settle claimants con- suit, the court to the State’s parties as not named were Tribes Id., at judgment. by the unaffected left rights should their cluded

281 disputed title to the land in could sue the Court of Claims and attempt just to make compensa- out constitutional claim for tion. See U. C.S. 1491;Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. (1962). n. 643, 647,

Enterprising pressed claimants also the so-called “officer’s possible suit” obtaining as another means of relief a title dispute with the Federal typical Government. In the offi- involving dispute, cer’s suit a title pro- the claimant would against ceed charged supervision the federal officials disputed area, rather than ejectment The suit would inbe injunction or, as here, for an or a forbidding writ of mandamus the defendant officials to interfere with rights. the claimant’s As a circumventing device for sovereign immunity disputes, land title ultimately officer’s suit did not prove to be appeared successful. accept This Court early device in cases. See United States v. Lee, (1882);Meigs M‘Clung’s Lessee, Cranch 11 Later cases, however, were inconsistent; some held such by sovereign immunity, suits were barred while others did say not, and “it completely is fair to to reconcile all the decisions of the Court in field . . . would be a Procrus- supra, tean task.” v. Compare, Malone Bowdoin, at 646. g., e. the cases cited 369 U. S., at n. 6, with those cited id., at 646, n. 7. through Malone, tangle previ- Court cut applied disputes

ous decisions and to land the rule announced Foreign in (1949): Larson v. Corp., Domestic & 337 U. S. 682 “[T]he action of a affecting federal officer by plaintiff claimed a can be made the basis of a suit for specific against relief only the officer as an individual if the officer’s action is statutory ‘not within the officer’s powers powers, only if or, within those powers, if or particular in their constitutionally exercise case, are supra, void.’” (quoting Malone, at supra, 647 Larson, 702). 282 for a difficult it more plainly made test Larson-Malone

The a vehicle as officers employ suit a plaintiff to in Thus, dispute United resolving title disputes having with the claimants Malone, after decade success little property met with real over courts.9 most passed and Congress considered background, Against this hearing the officer’s-suit bill, on the At a inQTA Congress.10 The the attention to called possibility was asserting title citizens was however, view, predominant by the United claimed lands possession of right to be- courts,” a recourse benefit “without States were immunity.11 sovereign of the doctrine cause origi- rectify of affairs. sought this state was QTA, became bill version of nal provided for no provision simple. Its substantive short entirety: “The in its It stated qualifications whatsoever. party action civil may be named United brought by the quiet claimed to lands title any person (1971). The Executive Cong. 46380 Rec. 117 States.” proposed, 216 and original S.of opposed version Branch 9 (CA9 1971); Anderson, 439 F. 2d 764 County Bonner v. g., See, e. denied, 393 U. S. 968 (CA5), cert. Vinson, F. 2d 732 394 Simons v. Udall, Co. v. (CA5 1968); Switzerland Harris, 391 F. 2d 885 v. Gardner One Court 914 denied, 380 (CA4 1964), cert. F. 56 2d Udall, Armstrong v. narrowly. See Malone however, construed Appeals, (CA9 70, 73-74 F. 2d Rupp, (CA9 1970); Andros 38, 42 F. 2d has record plaintiff where inapplicable 1970) to be (holding Malone land). disputed Public Lands on the Subcommittee et al. before Hearing on S. Cong., Affairs, 1st 92d Insular Interior Committee Senate (letter id., Steadman); at 81 (statement (1971) of Prof. J. Sess., 64 Esq.). Gendron, L. 92-1559, Rep. No. H. R. also 92-575, 1 See p. Rep. No. 11 S. supra General); Hearing, Attorney (letter from id., at 9 p. 6 Solicitor, Dept. of the (M. Melich, Church); id., at 2, 19 (Sen. 10, at 8 n. (T. McKnight); id., Hansen); at 55 (letter from Sen. id., Interior); at Cavanaugh). (statement of T. id., at 77 Reynolds); (letter R. id., 74at in its stead, a more elaborate reprinted bill, in Rep. S. No. pp. (1971), 92-575, guards 7-8 providing “appropriate several safe- protection for the of the interest.”12

This proposal, Executive made the Justice Department, limited the waiver of sovereign immunity in impor several respects. tant First, it excluded Indian lands scope from the of the waiver. The Executive Branch felt that a waiver of immunity in this area would not be “specific consistent with commitments” it had made to the through Indians treaties agreements.13 and other Second, order to insure that the waiver would not “serve to disrupt costly ongoing Federal programs that disputed involve the proposal lands,” the al lowed the United option States the paying money damages instead of surrendering if it lost a case on the merits.14 Third, the Department Justice proposal provided legislation that the prospective would have only; effect is, it apply would not to claims that prior accrued to the date of enactment. This was deemed necessary so that the work load of the Department Justice and the courts develop could at a rate which could be absorbed.15 Fourth, to insure that stale claims opened would not be up litigation,16 pro posed bill 6-year included a statute of limitations.17 accepted Senate Department’s Justice proposal, with the exception notable provision that would have 12Hearing, supra (S. 10, n. at Kashiwa, Assistant Attorney General); id., see (J. at 32 McGuire, Dept. of Agriculture). 13 Id., (M. at 19 Melich, Solicitor, Dept. of Interior). 14 Ibid. id., (views also of Dept. of Agriculture); Rep. No. pp. (1971) (letter 5-6 from the Attorney General). 15 Id., at 7 (letter from the Attorney General). 16H. R. Rep. No. 92-1559, p. (1972) (letter from the Deputy Attorney General). 17 The Department Justice proposal other, contained relatively minor limitations on the waiver. For example, it expressly stated that no one could claim against the United adverse possession, pro and it vided for exclusive jurisdiction. All of these changes were ulti mately included in legislation. 284 Senate-passed only. The effect prospective

given bill the that clause” “grandfather contained bill the of version years for two asserted to be old claims allowed have would law.18 became the after bill the Executive clause, grandfather Primarily theof because of Department The accept the bill. still could Branch litiga- of flood “a cause could argued this clause

Justice already submitted been many had which of claims, old tion on putting thereby “an undue rejected,” Congress and compro- As a courts.”19 the Department and the on burden on up insistence give proposed to Department the mise, accept increase an language only” and “prospective exchange for elimination years, in to 12 limitations statute the effect had proposal This grandfather clause.20 of the period. House 12-year The for making retroactive the bill passed bill of the version compromise in the this included law became acquiesced the bill and the Senate it, language intact. compromise detained history, not be need we legislative light of this avoid it can contention Dakota’s long North by the restrictions and other limitations statute QTA’s position were Dakota’s If suit. officer’s of an device QTA provisions of carefully crafted correct, all in- the national protection of necessary for deemed action an unless barred that an action stated provision This or within accrues relief first claim years after six begun “within was later.” Act, whichever this date years two effective after added). (1971) (emphasis Rec. 46380 Cong. Attorney Deputy (letter (1972) 92-1559, p. 7 Rep. No. R.H. General). provision ato objected also of Justice Department The Id., at 7-8. period begin made that would have version Senate-passed knowledge actual plaintiff obtained date only on the to run pe the limitations contended Department claim. United States’ have known should knew the claimant the date begin run riod should change. agreed ibid., Congress claim, see States’ of the United terest could be averted. require “It would suspension disbelief to ascribe to design to allow its careful thorough remedial scheme to be circumvented artful pleading.” Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820, 833

If we were to allow try claimants to the Federal Govern- ment’s title to land under an theory, officer’s-suit the Indian exception lands to the QTA would be nugatory. rendered The United States could dispossessed also be disputed being without option afforded the paying dam- ages, thereby thwarting congressional intent to avoid disruptions costly federal Finally, activities. and most present relevant to the 12-year cases, the QTA’s statute of point limitations, the one on which the Executive Branch was most insistent, could be contrary avoided, and, to the wish of Congress, an unlimited number of involving suits stale claims might be instituted. supra, Brown v. GSA, is instructive here. case, we held that Rights 717 of the Civil Act of 42 1964, S.U. C. §2000e-16, was the remedy exclusive employ for federal ment discrimination. There, as “problematic” here, it was any judicial whether relief at prior all was pas available sage of the Act; prevailing congressional view was that there was none. 425 U. S., at 826-828. There, as here, the completeness, “balance, integrity” structural of the stat ute belied the designed contention that it “was merely sup plement putative judicial other relief.” Id., at 832. Thus, applied we precisely rule that a drawn, detailed statute pre-empts general more remedies. 7d., at 834.21 That rule equally applicable present in the context. Accordingly, we need question reach whether, prior to 1972, Larson v. Foreign Domestic & Corp., 337 21 Great American also Savings Federal & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 366, 375-377 (1979); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 488- United States v. Demko, 385 U. 490 151-152 (1966); 1A Sands, C. Statutes and Statutory (4th §23.16 Construction 1972). ed. 286 S.U. Bowdoin, Malone (1949), and S.U. main- to be suit officer’s an permitted have (1962), that Con- hold We circumstances.22 present

tained means exclusive to provide QTA intended gress States’ challenge could claimants adverse which property.23 to real pre-empted QTA that, if even claim Dakota's reject alsoWe rem supplemental a new created remedies alternative L. Pub. § with C.S. 5 U. it amended when later years edy four suits immunity for sovereign federal waived statute That 90 Stac. money than other relief seeks plaintiff in which officers if other relief grant “authority to no confers specifically damages, but the relief forbids impliedly expressly suit consent grants statute is because, if a suit statute,” an “other is such QTA The sought.” which which relief” “forbids expressly QTA QTA, the untimely under (1976) 94-1656, p. 13 Rep. No. H. R. § See 702. sought under be in dealt Congress “when relief authority grant to (§ no provides 702 remedy to be specified intended [has] a claim particularity remedy”). exclusive to to foreclose intended Congress clear that history is legislative The prior effec years than more accrued on claims any suit tally statutes however, requires Constitution, QTA. of the date tive “ for effect they take time after a reasonable ‘allow must of limitations ” Texaco, Inc. v. of action.’ existing causes upon of suits commencement Iseminger, v. Wilson (1982) (quoting 527, n. 21 Short, available was suit” Therefore, an “officer’s (1902)). 55, 62-63 if S.U. was a suit such for period laches 1972, and prior if points), these on either opinion (and no express we years than 12 longer extinguished it extent to the unconstitutional §2409a(f) was arguably Her passage. of its time at the brought been have that could claims (1906); Sohn v. 96, 102 Co., 200 U. & Cattle Land Boquillas rick v. raised has not Dakota (1873). North 596, 599 Waterson, 17 Wall. QTA was because, although successfully, so not do could issue, long However until suit bring this did not State passed years. six clearly need be, it must period time” the “reasonable suit bring right a constitutional had Dakota if North Hence, even years so six do could not QTA, it enactment after short time within “rea requisite for the provide QTA’sfailure solely virtue later time.” sonable

I I I agree We also cannot with North Dakota’s submission, accepted which was by the District Court and the Court of Appeals, that the subject States are not operation 2409a(f). purely This issue is statutory one of interpreta tion, support and we find no position North Dakota’s plain statutory either the language legislative or the history. The basic rule sovereign of federal immunity is that United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of Congress. necessary A corollary of this rule is that when Congress legislation attaches conditions to waiving the sover eign immunity of the United States, those conditions must be strictly exceptions observed, and thereto are lightly not to be implied. g., e. See, Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, (1981); 160-161 United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, (1979); 117-118 Honda v. Clark, 386 U. (1967); S. 484, 501 Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270 United States Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 591 When legis waiver lation contains a statute of provi limitations, the limitations sion constitutes a condition on the sovereign waiver of immu nity. Accordingly, although we should not construe such a provision unduly time-bar restrictively, we must be careful interpret not to beyond init a manner that would “extend the waiver

that which intended.” United States v. supra, Kubrick, (citing at 117-118 Soriano v. United supra; Towing Indian Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61 (1955)). Accordingly, finding before that intended exempt here to the States from satisfying the time-bar condi tion on its immunity, waiver of we should insist on some clear indication of such an intention. Proceeding in accordance with these prin- well-established

ciples, §2409a(f) we observe expressly that any states that civil action is time-barred unless years filed within 12 after date statutory accrued. The language makes no ex- ception by for civil actions States. any Nor is there evidence Congress intended history suggesting that legislative in the im- to attached the condition exempt from the States to ap- light of our in the alone, facts munity These waiver.24 compel appear to immunity sovereign cases, proach to exemption to an not entitled are that States the conclusion 2409a(f). §of strictures from the canon of on well-known relies however, State, are not “[statutes of limitation

statutory that construction desig- expressly is unless she State, embrace to . . . held mischiefs necessarily the nature included or nated, Comm’rs, Harbor v. Board Weber remedied.” to be of Guaranty Trust Co. United Accord, Wall. §2409a(f) (1938). Because 132-133 304 U. S. urges, State, Dakota expressly North include does not not barred Appeals was the State held, that of and the Court by immunity recognizing waivers While statute. carefully of the Court construed, be are to States the United given to the precedence be should Appeals concluded statutory statutes construction competing canon of leg- express apply absent to not should limitations 275-276. 2d, F. at inclusion. islative fashioning sovereign-immunity agree. doWe exempt the certainly free to Congress is legislation, waiver any condition other a statute asser- Dakota’s no merit North But there the waiver. congressional waiver on a that a condition tion inapplicable regarded immunity as sovereign should position, history supports legislative express no Recognizing that Ap the Court of As did silence. congressional relies Dakota North (CA8 the refer 1982), Dakota notes 271, 274-275 2dF. peals, 671 (1972), to 92-1559 Rep. R. No. H. Report, Committee the House ences in ref citizens,” the absence “citizens,” and “individual “persons,” language general such However, the extent to “States.” erences “plaintiff[s],” “owners refers all, Report also any relevance that can terms “claimants” —all owner[s],” and “land property,” adjacent (1971) (using simi Rep. No. 92-575 also S. encompass easily terms). lar in the absence of intent express to the contrary. This

Court has never sanctioned such a rule. Quite in contrary, United States v. Louisiana, 127 U. 182 (1888), the Court held that a general statute of limitations, one that did not expressly mention States, barred a State’s claim against Federal Government. in And Minnesota v. United States,

305 U. S., at 388-389, where the United States had waived on the immunity condition that suit ágainst it had to in a brought federal court, we concluded without hesita- tion that plaintiff State’s suit should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, because it had been filed in state even court, though the federal-court condition did not ex- pressly apply Thus, neither nor Congress the de- cisions of this Court have suggested that the States are pre- sumed to be exempt the conditions satisfying placed by its immunity waivers; in and, of our light Con- stitution, which makes the federal law ultimately supreme, these should holdings not have been surprising.25 25Contrary contention, to Justice post, at this Court has O’Connor’s never “recognized sovereign prerogatives of governmental other units as bars to by asserted support defenses In States.” of this novel proposition, Justice O’Connor’s relies dissent on New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662 fact, to the extent that appo case is at all site, supports contrary The case dispute view. a title involved be tween the United States and the municipal corporation. New Orleans The contended, National alia, Government inter that certain officialfederal ac disputed tions regarding property, “some of which by were induced special application corporation, of the evidence, affordfed] strong . . . not only right of the question, but that right fully recognized Id., such corporation.” was at 735. The Court found that these facts constituted an city “admission” that the title, Federal Government had city’s acts, and that the unexplained, if left “strengthen[ed] would have the argument up by set claim city.” Ibid. The Court ultimately regard did not preju this evidence as dicing claim, city’s however, primarily city because the authorities ignorance were found to rights, have acted of their foreign to their due language habits, background, their civil law and their lack of familiar ity with our Government and the principles jurisprudence. Id., of our city 735-736. Court also assumed that the did authorities not have appli- generally importance the of the discount do not We by upon the Court statutory relied construction of rule cable sovereign is a judicially rule that created Appeals. The of generally operation of a worded exempt normally the from vigor it serves because has retained limitations of statute rights, revenues, public preserving the policy public of the public negligence by of injury the loss, and supra, at States, Guaranty v. United Co. Trust officers. inter- the further the rule would cases, in these Thus, affording by some them Dakota, of North citizens ests protection failing in to negligence officials against of state the limitations. applicable of statute comply the otherwise with in assuming, rule has relevance however, that Even congressionally a applicability of construing the including expressly the imposed statute fol- apparent Congress we must will of here the States, history Part II above legislative outlined it. As low §2409a(f) agreed Executive Congress with the shows, public interests. necessary national protection of was affects United States general, a State a suit to recognized interests national congressionally entity. by private Therefore, degree as a suit does same protect designed interests of judge-created rule yield in the face particular must State one citizens national Congress that the has determined evidence contrary convinced are requires rule. We interest exempting from com- the States Congress no intention had applied 2409a(f). § must be pliance That section “necessarily nature they included are States because Board Harbor v.Weber to be remedied.” of mischiefs must supra, thus conclude 70. We at Comm’rs, 2409a(f) suing requirements when fully adhere to the QTA. States under city of divest the by the United relied on by the acts power, way in no decision was The Court’s property. in the interest a vested “estoppel rule that on the suggests, post, n. based, dissent as the sovereign.” against a asserted not be could f—I <1 finally Dakota argues that, even if in- §2409a(f) tended apply to it, and even if ap- valid when plied in relating suits to other kinds of land, the section is unconstitutional under the equal-footing doctrine and the Tenth Amendment insofar purports as it to bar claims to lands constitutionally vested the State. We are unable to agree. probably State is correct stating in could not, making without provision payment of com- pensation, pass a depriving law a State of by land in vested the Constitution. Such a law would not run afoul of the equal-footing doctrine or the Tenth as Amendment, asserted by North Dakota, but it would taking constitute a State’s just without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.26 2409a(f), Section however, does not purport strip to anyone State, or else for that .matter, of any property rights. The statute limits the in time which a quiet title suit the United States can be filed; un- but, an possession like adverse provision, §2409a(f) pur- does not port to effectuate a transfer of title. If a claimant has title to disputed tract of land, he retains title even if his suit to quiet his title is deemed 2409a(f). § time-barred under A dis- pursuant missal §2409a(f) to quiet does prop- title to the erty in the United dispute The title remains unre- solved.27 Nothing prevents the claimant continuing to 26The United can, course, exercise its power eminent domain to take title to state property. Oklahoma ex rel. Guy Phillips v. F. Atkin Co., son 313 U. 508, S. (1941). See also United States v. Carmack, 329 U. (1946). 236-242 27This discussion also answers the argument that our holding conflicts with the Submerged Lands Act § 43 U. S. C. 1311, which con firmed in the States title to lands beneath navigable waters within their boundaries. If the river is navigable, the land in question belongs to North Dakota, in accordance with the Constitution and the Submerged Act, Lands regardless of whether North Dakota’s suit to quiet its title is § time-barred 2409a(f). file inducing hope of in title, his

assert finally be the matter in which suit, quiet title own merits.28 put rest §2409a(f). A infirmity constitutional no see Thus, we any other just as time-barred become can claim constitutional Tomanio, Regents v. g., Board e. See, can. claim States, 352 Soriano S.U. requires otherwise. Nothing the Constitution

V appeal- anwith us before Admittedly, Dakota comes North Missouri Little held courts lower Both ing case. disputed title obtained the State navigable and not asked have defendants The federal statehood. land substantive these correctness review Court this are determinations these to submit than holdings other submission. agree with We the QTA.29 time-barred may dispute be, merits of Whatever is barred suit Dakota’s If correct: are defendants into inquire jurisdiction no 2409a(f), had courts below merits. Ap- of Court judgment of foregoing, the view In if at may proceed, action Dakota’s North reversed. is peals ever would States it, United by suit of a 28 Whether, in the absence of status present would, under area disputed good acquire Rep. No. H. R. law. state strictly a matter of law, be prop real of (“The law General) State Attorney (letter from the (1972) 10p. by Federal not covered questions all apply to decide course of erty would eventually presumably instances, many law”). In by virtue purely so, would but, it if possession, by adverse land take is disputed land that Here, asserts Dakota North law. state possession by adverse ever be taken cannot that land trust law. Dakota disputes the still that stress defendants 29 The They navigable. River Little Missouri that conclusion courts’ lower only be Court finding in this seek review they did state purely this Court this to burden inappropriate it they deemed cause Rule Court’s Arg. 10. See this of Oral Tr. issue. factual only all, under the If QTA. the State’s suit was filed more years than 12 after its action accrued, by the suit is barred 2409a(f). Since the lower findings courts made no as to the date on which North Dakota’s suit accrued, the cases must be remanded for proceedings further consistent with this opinion.

So ordered. Justice O’Connor, dissenting. agree

I with the Court that remedy the sole available to North Dakota is an action under the Quiet Title Act. Hav- ing Congress concluded that permitted such suits, though, I reject would not the usual rule that statutes of limi- tation do not sovereign, bar a a rule especially that is ap- propriate in the context of these Consequently, cases. I dissent.

Since the Quiet Act is the Title sole relief available to North Dakota, we question confront the whether intended the statute of bar actions question Court resolves the principle invocation of the sovereign waivers immunity strictly are to be con- strued. See ante, question at 287.1 The simple. is not that

Although it is indeed true that the Court construes waivers sovereign immunity strictly, principle statutory construction is no more than an aid task determining congressional intent. may help close case, the Court 1 The Court’s reliance on principle is surprising, since it expressly declines to decide whether, Quiet without the Act, Title sovereign immu nity would bar Ante, this action. Thus, 285-286. as far as the Court is concerned, Quiet Title may Act not in fact abe waiver of sovereign immunity, and these cases then present would not the predicate for the application of principle the that waivers are narrowly. construed Since I believe, for the suggested reasons Court, ante, the that the Quiet Act Title necessary was to permit action, this in my princi view the ple of strict construction inform, does although it control, does not our in quiry congressional into intent.

294 can It plausible constructions. equally two between choose judicially authority narrow to grant Court the however, not, v. States United intended. that waiver the v. Towing Co. (1979); Indian 118 111, S.U. 444

Kubrick, observa mere (1955). The 69 61, S.U. 350 States, cannot immunity, then, sovereign waives statute that tion con must still Court The construction. of questions resolve Considering the all intent. congressional of indicia all sider evidence, conclusion Court’s agree the I cannot limita of a statute to subject Congress intended held to lands of assertion their prevent tions public. for trust “nullum principle accepted long has law common The limita of statutes nor laches regi” tempus occurrit —neither Holdsworth, g., 10 W. sovereign. See, e. bar will tions Treatise A Gibbons, (1938);D. 355 Law English History of A (1835). The 62 Prescription and Limitation of Law on English from principle accepted the country of courts 18 Comm’rs, Harbor v. Board g., Weber e. See, law. 720, 9 Kirkpatrick, Wheat. v. (1873); 57Wall. 422 418, Ala. Dubose, Robinson (1824); & Iverson gen (1803);see 4 Mass. Baker, Stoughton v. 1869). (5th ed. 29-30 Angell Limitations on May, erally J. acceptance complete has been “So observed: Court thisAs ‘sovereign,’ state immunity domestic implied exception an universally be deemed been national, or state government, where statutes local Guaranty Co. Trust expressly included.” not national, country, (1938). In this S.U. v. United “impec theory an not rule, adopted the courts because laches, but guilty sovereign could cable” public inter doctrine. policies served public injury and rights preserving est public officers negligence attributable loss special justified a act, public must through whom agents, sovereign. rule policies

These apex reach their in the case of lands held in public. trust for the The interests sovereign, of the so wide- spread and varied, hinder init the exercise vigilance protecting rights require that we private parties. Yet the public must not rights lose its because of the constraints on sovereign. contrary “If a rule were sanctioned, it only be nec- essary for upon intruders public lands to maintain possessions, their until the statute of limitations shall run; they and then would become invested with the title against government, persons and all claiming under it. way public domain would appro- soon be priated by adventurers. Indeed it utterly would be im- practicable, by power use of within the reach of the government, prevent this result. only It is neces- sary, therefore, to state the case, in order to show the wisdom propriety of the rule that the statute never operates against government.” Lindsey v. Lessee of Miller, 6 Pet. 666, 673 Guaranty Accord, Trust Co. v. United supra, at 132; Weber v. Board Harbor supra, Comm’rs, at 68, 70; United Knight,

States v. 14 Pet. 301, 314 May, J. supra, at 29.2 The lands in controversy here are held in trust for public by North App. Dakota, see to Pet. for Cert. in No. p. 81-2337, A-6; United Plainsmen v. North Dakota State

2The case for protecting the sovereign from the running of time is weaker when the lands are held other than as trust lands. When, for instance, a sovereign holds lands in its proprietary capacity, as the United States would hold the title that it asserts to lands, these ante, 277, time may run the sovereign. See Weber v. Board Harbor Comm’rs, (“Where Wall., at lands are held the State simply for sale or other disposition, and not as sovereign in trust for the public, there is some reason in requiring the assertion of her rights within a limited period .”) (dictum). . . 1976). (N. D. 2d N. 247 W. Comm’n, Conservation

Water underlying policies implicates core therefore, ease, This reject extremely reluctant be should we doctrine, sovereign. not bar will time that rule usual apparently on rule, this dismisses however, Court, sover- two apply between in actions theory not it does that proposition is authority for that it cites that eigns. But S.U. Louisiana, 127 v. States best. weak dispute to money a than rather for (1888), claima involved parties important, the More lands. public trust over time does that the rule application of argued for the never Ap- Brief for Appellant and sovereign. Brief bar 1388. No. T. Louisiana, O. v. pellee in United States serve as cannot therefore case in that decision The Court’s here, situation is the when, as rejecting the rule authority for 305 U. S. v. United Minnesota does Nor is raised. it sought to sue a State There, (1939),support the Court. Construing the waiver court. in state narrowly, the United that held immunity we sovereign fed- immunity suits as to only waived had against the State. applied condition we court, and eral suit a sovereign maintain permits a general rule no Since noth- holding reflects Minnesota any chooses, the forum waivers construe reluctance usual ing than more any counter- broadly absence immunity in the sovereign vailing considerations. time principle reject precedents do not our Thus, sovereigns. sovereign between in conflicts not bar does sovereign can suggest precedents contrary, our theOn sovereign. In Rhode against another principle invoke (1841), Court de Pet. Massachusetts, 15

Island dispute be in a ordinary rule of apply the clined “[I]t Taney observed: Justice sovereign Chief tween adopt justice to semblance impossible with here two For us. before in the case limitation rule of such act who cannot concerned, are political communities same promptness as . individuals . . Id., at par ticular, when lands held in trust for the are at stake, the Court recognized sovereign prerogatives of other governmental units as bars to defenses asserted United States. See New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. (1836).3 Consequently, disagree I with the Court’s con clusion that principle that time will not bar the sovereign application has no in these cases.

Turning to the statute at issue here, the circumstances of its enactment indicate did not intend to bar ac- tions general States. As background, we know that Con- gress was aware of the rule that, to affect the government, an enactment imposing a burden or a limitation must ex- pressly include the sovereign. g., e. See, Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 (1979). U. S. 653, 667 particular inci- spurred dent that Congress pass to the Quiet Title Act was a dispute private between landowners and the Federal Govern- ment. Hearings See on S. 216 et al. before the Subcommit- tee on Public Lands of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Cong., Affairs, 92d 1st (1971)(affidavit Sess., 83-85 of Robinson). A. L. The statements in the hearings reflect a focus disputes on private between citizens and the Fed- eral Government. g., (statement See, e. id., at 20 of Shiro 3In New Orleans v. United States, the United argued the city of New Orleans was estopped to assert title to certain lands held for public. the At time, the estoppel could not be asserted against a sover eign, see, e. g., Filor v. United States, 45, Wall. 49 (1870), and the Court declined to estop city, largely on the ground that the lands were held in trust for and, since the sovereign could not by act convey them, the sovereign’s acts could not estop it from asserting that they were not conveyed. Although the protection against estoppel has since largely dis sipated, see generally Note, Equitable Estoppel: Does Governmental Im munity Mean Never Having Say to You’re Sorry? 56 St. John’s L. Rev. 114 (1981); K. Davis, Administrative Law § Seventies 17.01 (1976), application of protection in New Orleans contradicts the of view the majority that in controversies between the United States and another sov ereign, only the United States can rely on sovereign attributes. citizens”); id., “private (referring Kashiwa) to claims “private (observing that McKnight) (statement E. of T. Government). also right to sue no had landowners” inequity of (recognizing (1971) pp. 92-575, Rep. No. bill explaining “private citizen” denying action Finally, court). day in his have “citizen” enable Quiet in the provision explained Report House amount certain “persons” a give designed to asAct Title p. 5 Rep. No. R.H. to sue. time upon to conform already called been this Court Indeed, Congress Act—enacted Title Quiet provisions requirements special mind—to private citizens Arizona, In involving States. litigation California Arizona sought sue (1979), California 59S.U. defendants both in which action quiet title ain States, this Constitution, Under parties. indispensable were Ari against claim over jurisdiction original had Court Congress conferred had §2, and III, Art. Const., S.U. zona, 1251(a)(1). §C.S. 28 U. Court. this jurisdiction exclusive only be however, could the United against The claim exclusive vested which Act, Title the Quiet maintained 1346(f). C. courts. district jurisdiction in quiet actions placing all language general spite concluded courts, we district in the the United juris its Court divest intend did States clearly intended Congress while Thus, diction. provi procedural actions, quiet title maintain able ap not be need in mind private citizen with drafted sions to States.4 literalness slavish plied with lands special nature ignore the Finally, cannot we pass navigable waters beds case. in this issue constitutional they statehood achieve when (rule that (1979) 653, 667 Tribe, Indian v. Omaha Cf. Wilson “where applicable particularly sovereign is include expressly must statute confer distinguished limitation, as or a burden imposes the statute advantage”). ring benefit equal footing doctrine, as an incident of sovereignty. Mon tana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544, 551 Pollard’s Lessee Hagan, 3 How. 212 And the lands are of importance critical to North Dakota, which holds them in its sovereign capacity in trust for its Congress citizens.5 recognized special importance of these lands in the Sub merged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 30, 43 U. S. C. 1301 seq.6 et today, Until the Court too special has shown sensitivity to importance of these lands, recognizing the strongest pre sumption Congress will not act to convey the lands rather preserve than to them for the State. Montana v. supra, at 552. Given that solicitude for the State’s ownership of these lands, it extremely becomes diffi cult to believe deny intended to States domin ion over these lands silently extinguishing right their quiet title. I would judgment affirm the below. 5 Cf. United States v. Oregon, 295 U. 1,S. (1935) (“Dominion over navigable waters and property in the soil under them are so identified with the sovereign power government that a presumption against sepa their ration from sovereignty must be indulged, in construing grants either the sovereign of the lands to be private held in ownership or transfer sovereignty itself.... For that reason, upon the admission of a State to the Union, the title of the United States to lands underlying navigable waters within the passes it, as incident to the transfer to the State of local sovereignty, and is subject only paramount power of the United States to control such waters for purposes navigation in interstate and foreign commerce”). 3(a) §In of the Act, 60 Stat. 43 U. S. §C. 1311(a), Congress provided: “It is determined and declared to inbe the public (1) interest that title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective States, and the natural resources within such lands and (2) waters, and the right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said lands and natural resources all in accordance appli- be, cable law State and they are, subject to the provisions hereof, recog- nized, confirmed, established, and vested in assigned to the respective States . . . .”

Case Details

Case Name: Block v. North Dakota Ex Rel. Board of University & School Lands

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: May 2, 1983

Citation: 461 U.S. 273

Docket Number: 81-2337

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS