Patchak v. Zinke
583 U.S. 244
SCOTUS2018Background
- Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band sought to have a 147-acre parcel (the Bradley Property) taken into trust by the Secretary of the Interior to operate a casino; Secretary initiated trust action in 2005 and the Band opened a casino in 2011.
- Neighbor David Patchak sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), alleging the Secretary lacked statutory authority to take the Bradley Property into trust; Supreme Court in Patchak I held the APA waived sovereign immunity and that Patchak had standing, and remanded so the suit "may proceed."
- While Patchak’s suit was pending, Congress enacted the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act (2014). §2(a) ratified the trust status of the Bradley Property; §2(b) provided that any action "relating to" the land "shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed," and applied to pending suits.
- District Court dismissed Patchak’s suit for lack of jurisdiction under §2(b); the D.C. Circuit affirmed, concluding §2(b) stripped federal jurisdiction over suits relating to the Bradley Property and did not violate Article III.
- Supreme Court affirmed. The plurality (Thomas, joined by Breyer, Alito, Kagan) held §2(b) is a valid jurisdiction-stripping law that changes the law rather than commands judicial findings; Ginsburg (joined by Sotomayor) and Sotomayor separately concurred in the judgment, reading §2(b) as effectively restoring sovereign immunity; Roberts (joined by Kennedy and Gorsuch) dissented, arguing §2(b) targeted and resolved a single pending case and thus impermissibly usurped judicial power.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Patchak) | Defendant's Argument (Govt/Band/Congress) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §2(b) of the Gun Lake Act violates Article III by directing dismissal of Patchak’s pending suit | §2(b) unlawfully intrudes on the judicial power by effectively dictating the result of the pending case and preventing courts from applying law | §2(b) is a jurisdiction-stripping statute that validly changes the law and withdraws federal jurisdiction over suits "relating to" the Bradley Property | §2(b) is constitutional as a jurisdiction-stripping statute; it changes the law and does not violate Article III |
| Whether §2(b) is impermissibly similar to Klein (i.e., directs results under old law) | §2(b) is like Klein because it mandates dismissal without allowing courts to apply legal standards, thus prescribing the result | §2(b) supplies new law (jurisdictional withdrawal) for suits relating to the Bradley Property; unlike Klein it does not attempt to change the effect of an executive power or prescribe rules of decision under old law | Court: §2(b) differs from Klein; it changes law rather than compelling judicial findings under preexisting law, so it's permissible |
| Whether §2(b) improperly interferes with this Court’s prior decision in Patchak I (i.e., commands reopening or nullifying judicial action) | §2(b) nullifies the Court’s instruction that "Patchak’s suit may proceed" and retroactively defeats that ruling | §2(b) is a new legislative change that applies to pending (nonfinal) suits and Congress may enact laws that govern pending civil cases | Court: No Article III violation—Patchak I did not produce a final judgment, and Congress may enact laws that govern pending cases |
| Whether §2(b) should be read as restoring sovereign immunity (alternative grounds) | Patchak: restoration of immunity cannot be assumed without unequivocal expression; §2(b) does not say it withdraws consent to suit | Respondents/Court concurring: §2(b) can be read to reinstate sovereign immunity for suits relating to Bradley Property, a valid exercise of Congress’s power to grant/withdraw consent to suit | Concurrences: Ginsburg (joined by Sotomayor) and Sotomayor read §2(b) as restoring sovereign immunity and would affirm on that ground; plurality did not rely on that reading |
Key Cases Cited
- Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (Congress may not retroactively command courts to reopen final judgments; distinguishes changing law from directing judicial findings)
- Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012) (Patchak I) (held APA waived sovereign immunity and Patchak had prudential standing; remanded)
- Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429 (1992) (Congress violates Article III when it compels findings or results under old law)
- Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869) (Congress may withdraw jurisdiction over a class of cases; jurisdictional withdrawal does not necessarily exercise judicial power)
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (jurisdiction is a threshold requirement that springs from the judicial power)
- Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U.S. 145 (2013) (statutes need not use the word "jurisdiction" to be jurisdictional; clear-statement principles discussed)
- Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012) (example of jurisdictional language and interpretation)
- United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1872) (Congress cannot prescribe rules of decision that change the effect of executive acts or direct outcomes under old law)
- Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (retroactive legislation governing pending civil cases is permissible in many contexts)