SEBELIUS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. AUBURN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER ET AL.
No. 11-1231
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Argued December 4, 2012—Decided January 22, 2013
568 U.S. 145
John F. Manning, by invitation of the Court, 567 U. S. 955, argued the cause as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the briefs was Kevin B. Huff.
Robert L. Roth argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were John R. Hellow, Patricia A. Millett, Ruthanne M. Deutsch, and Hyland Hunt.*
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the time within whiсh health care providers may file an administrative appeal from the initial determination of the reimbursement due them for inpatient services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries. Government contractors, called fiscal intermediaries, receive cost reports annually from care providers and notify them of the reimbursement amount for which they qualify. A provider dissatisfied with the fiscal intermediary‘s determination may appeal to an administrative body named the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB or Board). The governing statute,
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Hospital Association by Catherine E. Stetson and Dominic F. Perella; for Quality Reimbursement Services, Inc., by Jeffrey A. Lovitky; and for Southwest Consulting Associates, LP, by John M. Faust.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Tax Clinic by Carlton M. Smith; and for Scott Dodson by Mr. Dodson, pro se.
The providers in this case are hospitals who aрpealed to the PRRB more than ten years after expiration of the 180-day statutory deadline. They assert that the Secretary‘s failure to disclose information that made the fiscal intermediary‘s reimbursement calculation incorrect prevented them from earlier appealing to the Board. Three positions have been briefed and argued regarding the time for providers’ appeals to the PRRB. First, a Court-appointed amicus curiae has urged that the 180-day limitation is “jurisdictional,” and therefore cannot be enlarged at all by agency or court. Second, the Government mаintains that the Secretary has the prerogative to set an outer limit of three years for appeals to the Board. And third, the hospitals argue that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies, stopping the 180-day clock during the time the Secretary concealed the information that made the fiscal intermediary‘s reimbursement determinations incorrect.
We hold that the statutory 180-day limitation is not “jurisdictional,” and that the Secretary reasonably construed the statute to permit a regulation extending the time for a provider‘s appeal to the PRRB to three years. We further hold that the presumption in favor of equitable tolling does not apply to administrative appeals of the kind here at issue.
I
The Medicare program covers certain inpatient services that hospitals provide to Medicare beneficiaries. Providers are reimbursed at a fixed amount per patient, regardless of the actual operating costs they incur in rendering these services. But the total reimbursement amount is adjusted up-
At the end of each year, providers participating in Medicarе submit cost reports to contractors acting on behalf of HHS known as fiscal intermediaries. Also at year end, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) calculates the SSI fraction for each eligible hospital and submits that number to the intermediary for that hospital. Using these numbers to determine the total payment due, the intermediary issues a Notice of Program Reimbursement (NPR) informing the provider how much it will be paid for the year.
If a provider is dissatisfied with the intermediary‘s reimbursement determination, the statute gives it the right to file a request for a hearing before the PRRB within 180 days of reсeiving the NPR.
The methodological errors revealed by the Board‘s Baystate decision would have yielded similarly reduced payments to all providеrs for which CMS had calculated an SSI fraction. In March 2006, the Board‘s decision in the Baystate case was made public. Within 180 days, the hospitals in this case filed a complaint with the Board seeking to challenge their disproportionate share adjustments for the years 1987 through 1994. The hospitals acknowledged that their challenges, unlike Baystate‘s timely contest, were more than a decade out of time. But equitable tolling of the limitations period was in order, they urged, due to CMS‘s failure to inform the hospitals that their SSI fractions had been based on faulty data.
The PRRB held that it lacked jurisdiction over the hospitals’ complaint, reasoning that it had no equitable powers save those legislation or regulation might confer, and that
The Court of Appeals reversed. 642 F. 3d 1145 (CADC 2011). It relied on the presumption that statutory limitations periods are generally subject to equitable tolling and reasoned that “‘the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States.‘” Id., at 1148 (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95-96 (1990)). The presumption applies to the 180-day time limit for provider appeals from reimbursement determinations, the Court of Appeals held, finding nothing in the statutory provision for PRRB review indicating that Congress intended to disallow equitable tolling. 642 F. 3d, at 1149-1151.
We granted the Secretary‘s petition for certiorari, 567 U. S. 933 (2012), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals over whether the 180-day time limit in
II
A
Characterizing a rule as jurisdictional renders it unique in our adversarial system. Objections to a tribunal‘s jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even by a party that once conceded the tribunal‘s subject-matter jurisdiction over the controversy. Tardy jurisdictional objections can therefore result in a waste of adjudicatory resources and can disturbingly disarm litigants. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 434 (2011); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514 (2006). With these untoward consequences in mind, “we have tried in recent cases to bring some discipline to the use” of the term “jurisdiction.” Henderson, 562 U. S., at 435; see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 90 (1998) (jurisdiction has been a “word of many, too many, meanings” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
To ward off profligate use of the term “jurisdiction,” we have adopted a “readily administrable bright line” for determining whether to classify a statutory limitation as jurisdictional. Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 516. We inquire whether Congress has “clearly state[d]” that the rule is jurisdictional; absent such a clear statement, we have cаutioned, “courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” Id., at 515-516; see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U. S. 134, 137 (2012); Henderson, 562 U. S., at 435-436. This is not to say that Congress must incant magic words in order to speak clearly. We consider “context, including this Court‘s
We reiterate what it would mean were we to type the governing statute,
The language Congress used hardly reveals a design to preclude any regulatory extension. Section 1395oo(a)(3) instructs that a provider of services “may obtain a hearing” by the Board regarding its reimbursement amount if “such provider files a request for a hearing within 180 days after notice of the intermediary‘s final determination.” This provision “does not speak in jurisdictional terms.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 394 (1982). Indeed, it is less “jurisdictional” in tone than the provision we held to be nonjurisdictional in Henderson. There, the statute provided that a veteran seeking Veterans Court review of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ determination of disability benefits “shall file a notice of appeal ... within 120 days.” 562 U. S., at 438 (quoting
Key to our decision, we have repeatedly held that filing deadlines ordinarily are not jurisdictional; indeed, we havе described them as “quintessential claim-processing rules.” Henderson, 562 U. S., at 435; see also Scarborough v. Prin-cipi, 541 U. S. 401, 414 (2004) (filing deadline for fee applications under Equal Access to Justice Act); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 454 (2004) (filing deadlines for objecting to debtor‘s discharge in bankruptcy); Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484, 498 (1967) (filing deadline for claims under the Trading with the Enemy Act). This case is scarcely the exceptional one in which a “century‘s worth of precedent and practice in American courts” rank a time limit as jurisdictional. Bowles, 551 U. S., at 209, n. 2; cf. Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 454 (a time limitation may be emphatic, yet not jurisdictional).
B
Amicus urges that the three requirements in
Last Term, we rejected a similar proximity-based argument. A requirement we would otherwise classify as non-jurisdictional, we held, does not become jurisdictional simply because it is placed in a section of a statute that also contains jurisdictional provisions. Gonzalez, 565 U. S., at 146-147; see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 763-764 (1975) (statutory provision at issue contained three requirements for judicial review, only one of which was jurisdictional).
Amicus also argues that the 180-day time limit for provider appeals to the PRRB should be viewed as jurisdictional because Congress could have expressly made the provision nonjurisdictional, and indeed did so for other time limits in the Medicare Act. Amicus notes particularly that when Medicare beneficiaries request the Secretary to reconsider a benefits determination, the statute gives them a time limit of 180 days or “such additional time as the Secretary may allow.”
But the interpretive guide just identified, like other canons of construction, is “no more than [a] rul[e] of thumb” that can tip the scales when a statute could be read in multiple ways. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992). For the reasons earlier stated, see supra, at 153-155, we are persuaded that the time limitation in
III
We turn now to the question whether
A
Congress vested in the Secretary large rulemaking authority to administer the Medicare program. The PRRB may adopt rules and procedures only if “not inconsistent” with the Medicare Act or “regulations of the Secretary.”
“A request for a Board hearing filed after [the 180-day time limit] shall be dismissed by the Board, except that for good cause shown, the time limit may be extended. However, no such extension shall be granted by the Board if such request is filed more than 3 years after the date the notice of the intermediary‘s determination is mailed to the provider.”
42 CFR § 405.1841(b) (2007).
The Secretary allowed only a distinctly limited extension of time to appeal to thе PRRB, cognizant that “the Board is burdened by an immense caseload,” and that “procedural rules requiring timely filings are indispensable devices for keeping the machinery of the reimbursement appeals process running smoothly.” High Country Home Health, Inc. v. Thompson, 359 F. 3d 1307, 1310 (CA10 2004). Imposing equitable tolling to permit appeals barred by the Secretary‘s regulation would essentially gut the Secretary‘s requirement that an appeal to the Board “shall be dismissed” if filed more than 180 days after the NPR, unless the provider shows “good cause” and requests an extension no later than three years after the NPR. A court lacks authority to undermine the regime established by the Secretary unless her regulation is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844 (1984).
The Secretary‘s regulation, we are satisfied, survives inspection under that deferential standard. As HHS has explained, “[i]t is in the interest of providers and the program that, at some point, intermediary determinations and the resulting amount of program payment due the provider or the program become no longer open to correction.” CMS, Medicare: Provider Reimbursement Manual, pt. 1, ch. 29, §2930, p. 29-73 (rev. no. 372, 2011); cf. Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U. S. 638, 644 (1992) (“Deadlines may lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt parties to act and produce finality.“). The Secretary brought to bear practical experience in superintending the huge program generally, and the
B
Rejecting the Secretary‘s position, the Court of Appeals relied principally оn this Court‘s decision in Irwin, 498 U. S., at 95-96. Irwin concerned the then 30-day time period for filing suit against a federal agency under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
This case is of a different order. We have never applied the Irwin presumption to an agency‘s internal appeal dead-
The presumption of equitable tolling was adopted in part on the premise that “[s]uch a principle is likely to be a realistic assessment of legislative intent.” Irwin, 498 U. S., at 95. But that premise is inapt in the context of providers’ administrative appeals under the Medicare Act. The Act, until 1972, provided no avenue for providers to obtain administrative or judicial review. When Congress first directed the Secretary to establish the PRRB, Congress simultaneously imposed the 180-day deadline, with no statutory exceptions. For nearly 40 years the Secretary has prohibited the Board from extending that deadline, except as provided by regulation. And until the D. C. Circuit‘s decision in this case, no court had ever read equitable tolling into
We note, furthermore, that unlike the remedial statutes at issue in many of this Court‘s equitable-tolling decisions, see
The hospitals ultimately argue that the Secretary‘s regulations fail to adhere to the “fundamentals of fair play.” FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 143 (1940). They point, particularly, to
We considered a similar alleged inequity in Your Home and explained that it was justified by the “administrative realities” of the provider reimbursement appeal system. 525 U. S., at 455. There are only a few dozen fiscal intermediaries and they are charged with issuing tens of thousands of NPRs, while each provider can concentrate on a single NPR, its own. Id., at 456. The Secretary, Your Home concluded, could reasonably believe that this asymmetry justifies giving the intermediaries more time to discover overpayments than the providers have to discover underpay-
*
*
*
We hold, in sum, that the 180-day statutory deadline for administrative appeals to the PRRB, contained in
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring.
The Court holds that the presumption in favor of equitable tolling that we adopted in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95-96 (1990), does not apply to
The Court is correct that our equitable tolling cases have typically involved deadlines to bring suit in federal court. Ante, at 158. But we have never suggested that the presumption in favor of equitable tolling is generally inapplicable to administrative deadlines. Cf. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 442, n. 4 (2011) (noting that the Government did not dispute whether the statutory filing deadline in the Article I Veterans Court was subject to equitable tolling if the deadline was nonjurisdictional); United States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 350-353 (1997) (assuming without deciding that the Irwin presumption applied to administrative tax refund claims but finding based on statutory text, structure, and the underlying subject matter that tolling was unavailable); see also ante, at 159 (discussing Brockamp). And we have previously applied the Irwin presumption outside the context of filing deadlines in Article III courts. See Young v. United States, 535 U. S. 43, 49-53 (2002) (applying the presumption to a limitations period in bankruptcy proceedings); cf. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 392-398 (1982) (holding that the statutory time limit for filing charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Cоmmission was “not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling“).
In administrative settings other than the one presented here, I believe the “background principle” that limitations periods “are customarily subject to equitable tolling,” Young, 535 U. S., at 49-50 (internal quotation marks omitted), may limit an agency‘s discretion to make filing deadlines abso-
In this case, given the nature of the statutory scheme, which “applies to ‘sophisticated’ institutional providers” who are “repeat players” in the Medicare system, and the statute‘s history, I agree that it would distort congressional intent to presume that the PRRB‘s administrative deadline should be subject to equitable tolling. Ante, at 159-160 (quoting Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U. S. 449, 456 (1999)). By contrast, with respect to remedial statutes designed to protect the rights of unsophisticated claimants, see ante, at 159-160, agencies (and reviewing courts) may best honor congressional intent by presuming that statutory deadlines for administrative appeals are subject to equitable tolling, just as courts presume comparable judicial deadlines under such statutes may be tolled. Because claimants must generally pursue administrative relief before seeking judicial review, see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U. S. 81, 88-91 (2006), a contrary approach could have odd practical consequences and would attribute a strange intent to Congress: to protect a claimant‘s ability to seek judicial review of an agency‘s decision by making equitable tolling available, while leaving to the agency‘s discretion whether the same claimant may invoke equitable tolling in order to seek an administrative remedy in thе first place.
Even in cases where the governing statute clearly delegates to an agency the discretion to adopt rules that limit the scope of equitable exceptions to administrative deadlines, I believe “cases may arise where the equities in favor of tolling the limitations period are ‘so great that deference to the agency‘s judgment is inappropriate.‘” Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467, 480 (1986) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 330 (1976)). In particular, efforts by an agency to enforce tight filing deadlines in cases where
While the providers in this case allege that the agency‘s failure to disclose information about how it calculated the Supplemental Security Income fraction prevented them from bringing timely challenges to reimbursement determinations, I am satisfied that the Secretary‘s 3-year good-cause exception is a reasоnable accommodation of the competing interests in administrative efficiency and fairness. We would face a different case if the Secretary‘s regulation did not recognize an exception for good cause or defined good cause so narrowly as to exclude cases of fraudulent concealment and equitable estoppel. See ante, at 150, n. 2 (explaining that the Secretary‘s amended regulation limiting the scope of “good cause,” 73 Fed. Reg. 30250 (2008) (codified in
With these observations, I join the Court‘s opinion in full.