*1 HEALTH, EDU- OF WEINBERGER, SECRETARY AND v. SALFI CATION, WELFARE, et al. et al. Argued June 19, 1975—Decided No. 74-214. March *3 Shapiro Harriet S. argued appellants. the cause Bork, On the brief were Solicitor General Assistant Attor- ney Hills, General Patton, William L. William Ranter. Rates, Jr.,
Don B. appellees. the cause for argued him on With the brief were Bruce N. Berwald and John Gant * Rehnquist
Mr. Justice opinion delivered the Court. *4 Department
Appellants, of Health, Education, and its Welfare, Secretary, Security the Social Administra- and of tion various its officials, appeal from a decision of the United States District Court for Northern Dis- of trict California invalidating duration-of-relationship *Briefs of amici urging by Ralph curiae affirmance were filed Santiago Abascal, Philip Goar, Jay and Rosen for the San Sanford Neighborhood Legal Foundation, Inc., ah, Francisco Assistance et Christopher by Clancy H. and and Legal Jonathan A. Weiss for Elderly Services for the Poor.
753 Security eligibility requirements surviving wives Social and of deceased stepchildren wage Supp. earners. 373 F. (1974). 961 jurisdiction
That court concluded it had of by eventually action virtue of 28 and 1331, § S. C. U. certified the case as class action. On the merits, concluded that nine-month requirements of 216 §§ (c) and (5) (e) (2) 49 Social Stat. Act, added, as and 42 U. Stat. as S. C. 620, 510, amended, (c)(5) (e)(2) (1970 §§416 con- Supp. Ill), ed. and stituted presumptions” which consti- “irrebuttable were tutionally authority invalid under the Cleveland Board LaFleur, Education v. 414 U. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 441 (1973); Stanley Illinois, U. S. (1972). U. S. 645 We hold that the District Court did jurisdiction have this action under U. S. C. and that while it 1331, jurisdiction had of the claims of appellees the named under provisions of 42 S. C. § 405 it had (g), jurisdiction no over the claims asserted on behalf of unnamed class members. We further decide the District Court was on wrong the merits question constitutional by appellees. tendered the named
I Appellee Salfi married deceased earner, wage May Londo L. on 1972. Salfi, Despite his alleged apparent good health at the time he marriage, suffered attack heart less than'a month and died later, on November 21, 1972, less than six months after the marriage. Appellee Salfi filed applications for mother’s insurance benefits for herself and child’s insurance bene- fits for her daughter previous marriage, appellee Do- reen applications Kalnins.1 These were denied the So- (1) (1970 (g) Ill) Title U. S. C. 402 ed. Supp. provides for benefits for the wage “widow” of an earner, regardless insured *5 754 initially
cial and on recon- Administration, both solely regional sideration at the on the basis of the level, duration-of-relationship requirements (c)(5) of §§416 and (e)(2), which define “widow” and “child.” The stepchildren definitions exclude wives and surviving who respective relationships had their to a deceased wage earner for prior less than nine months death.2 his age, wage her if she has her care a “child” of such earner who (d) entitled to child’s insurance benefits. Title 42 402 TJ. S. C. § (1970 Ill) Supp. provides ed. and for for the a benefits “child” of wage deceased insured dependent upon earner who him was at his death. (c) (1970 IV) Title 42 U. ed., Supp. provides S. C. in full: “(c) The term (except (i) ‘widow’ when used in section 402 title) surviving individual, (1) means the wife of an if but daughter, she is (2) legally adopted the mother or his son she daughter his son or while she was married him while such daughter age son or eighteen, (3) legally was under the he adopted daughter her son or while him she was married to daughter while age eighteen, (4) such son or under she was married to him at the time legally adopted both of them child a age eighteen, (5) under the period she him was married to for immediately prior day not less than nine months to the on which (6) prior he died, or in the month marriage to the month of her (A) him to, application she was entitled or on therefor and attain age prior 62 in to, ment of such month would have been entitled (b), (h) (e), benefits under subsection or of section 402 of this title, (B) age eighteen to, she had attained and was entitled or on application to, therefor would have been entitled benefits under (d) (subject, however, (s) subsection of such section section title), (C) to, of this upon application or she was entitled or there required age (if for and any) attainment of the would have been to, widow’s, (after 18), entitled age child’s attainment of par or annuity ent’s insurance under section 231a of Title 45.” undisputed appellee qualify It is Salfi cannot aas “widow” (2), satisfying (1), (3), (4), (6). condition (e) (1970 ed., Ill) Title 42 U. S. Supp. provides C. part: “(e) Child. (1) legally adopted “The term ‘child’ means the child or child individual, (2) stepchild
of an stepchild has been who such *6 filed this appellees principally The named then action, They relying jurisdiction. on 28 for C. step- to of “all and represent the class widows sought who are denied widow’s wage children deceased earners wage or benefits the children’s insurance because [sic] earner died nine the marriage within months his applicant (in stepchild) applicant’s or case of a the mother.” 8. App. They alleged partial at least ex- personal of remedies with regard haustion to their claims, but no similar allegations regard made to other They declaratory class members. relief sought against challenged injunctive relief statute, and restrain- appellants from ing mother’s child’s denying and benefits In on the basis of the attorneys’ statute. addition to and they fees also costs, sought “damages or sums due and owing equivalent amount of benefits to which plaintiffs became entitled as the date of said entitle- Id., ment.” 13. at
A three-judge District Court heard the case on cross-
summary
motions for
judgment, and granted substan-
tially all of the relief
prayed
by appellees. The
District Court
declaratory
rendered a
judgment holding
the challenged statute to be unconstitutional, certified a
class
“all
consisting
eligible
otherwise
surviving
spouses
stepchildren
.
.
.
disqualified
heretofore
from
..
receipt
by operation”
of .
benefits
of the duration-
of-relationship
enjoined
requirements,
appellants
from
on
denying benefits
the basis of those
requirements,
provide
ordered them to
such
“from
benefits
time of
year
immediately
not
less than
preceding
day
one
on
application
(if
for child's insurance benefits
is filed
the insured
deceased)
individual
pre-
less than nine
immediately
months
ceding
day
on which such
died
individual
. . ..”
required
Prior
relationship
duration
a full
year. The
accomplished
reduction
nine months was
L.
Pub.
90-248,
(a)
(b),
866.
Stat.
§§
F.
entitlement.”
966. We noted
original
Supp., from
probable jurisdiction
appeal
judgment.
(1974).
In addition to basic du- their contention ration-of-relationship requirements pass constitutional appellants present several muster, bearing contentions scope monetary on the relief Dis- awarded They trict Court. contend that the award is barred sovereign immunity insofar as it consists of retroactive *7 regardless immunity of benefits, sovereign invali- dation of duration-of-relationship requirements should be given prospective only, effect that the Dis- trict Court did not properly handle certain class-action issues. Because we conclude that the duration-of-rela- tionship requirements are constitutional, we have no occasion to reach retroactivity and class-action issues. We are by a however, question serious as confronted, whether the District had jurisdiction Court over this suit.
II The third of 42 sentence (h) provides U. S. C. 405§ part:
“No action against the United States, Secretary, any employee officer or thereof shall be brought seq.} under 1331 et [§ Title 28 to on recover any claim arising under II of the Social [Title Secu- rity Act].”3 face,
On its provision bars district court federal- question jurisdiction over suits, such as this which one, 3 wording The literal of this section bars actions under 28 S.U. C. (h) At enacted, time prior §41. to the § 28, recodification of Title grants contained all of that title’s § jurisdiction courts, to United States district special- save for several purpose jurisdictional grants of no constitutionality relevance to the Security of Social statutes.
seek to recover benefits. Yet it was Social successfully jurisdiction appellees which invoked pro- in the District Court. That court considered this vision, inapplicable but concluded that it was because no it amounted to than doc- more a codification trine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The (h) District Court's reading think, § 405 we en- was, tirely too narrow. (h)
That the third sentence of § 405 is more than a requirement codified of administrative exhaustion plain from its own which is language, sweeping and direct and which states that no action be brought shall under merely those actions shall be brought in which administrative remedies have been ex- hausted. if Moreover, the third sentence is construed to be more nothing than a requirement of administrative superfluous. would exhaustion, This is because the two first sentences of § 405 (h), appear in the margin,4 assure that administrative exhaustion will be required. they prevent Specifically, review decisions Secretary provided save as pro- the Act, which *8 vision is in made 405 (g).5 pre- The latter section
4 Title 42 (h) provides U. S. C. in full: §405 “Finality Secretary’s of decision. findings “The and Secretary hearing of the after decisions shall binding upon be all parties hearing. individuals who were such findings of Secretary No fact by or decision of the shall be reviewed any person, governmental tribunal, agency except or pro- as herein against vided. States, any No action the United the Secretary, or employee officer or brought shall thereof under section 41 of any arising Title 28 on to recover claim subchapter.” under this (g) provides: 5 Title 42 U. S. C. §405 “Judicial review. “Any individual, any after Secretary final decision of the made hearing irrespective
after a party, he was a of the amount controversy, may in obtain by a review such of decision a civil action sixty mailing days commenced within after the to him of notice of for review of matters before typical requirements scribes administrative ex- including an administrative agency, haustion.6 Thus the Court’s treatment of District Secretary may such decision or within such further time as the brought allow. Such action shall be in the district court of the judicial plaintiff resides, United in which States for the district business, or, principal place or has his if he does not reside or any judicial district, principal place have his of business within such in United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Secretary part copy As of his answer the file a certified shall transcript including upon of the record the evidence which the findings complained and decision of are based. court shall The enter, power upon pleadings transcript record, have and judgment affirming, reversing modifying, or the decision of the remanding Secretary, rehearing. with or without the cause for a findings Secretary any fact, supported by of the as to if sub- evidence, conclusive, stantial shall be and where a claim has been Secretary denied or a decision is rendered under subsection (b) of this section which is adverse to an individual who was a party hearing Secretary, to the before the because of failure of the conformity proof claimant or such individual to submit (a) any regulation prescribed section, under subsection of this only question conformity the court shall review with such regulations validity regulations. shall, and the of such The court Secretary answer, on motion of the made he before files re- his Secretary mand the to the case for further action the Secre- tary, any may, time, and good shown, on cause order addi- Secretary, tional evidence to be Secretary taken before the and the shall, remanded, hearing after the case is and after such additional ordered, modify if findings evidence so affirm or his of fact or its decision, both, any or and shall file with the court such additional findings decision, and fact transcript modified and a of the testimony upon modifying additional record which his action affirming findings was based. Such additional or modified of fact shall be provided decision reviewable to the' extent original findings review the judgment of fact and decision. The except subject shall be final court that it shall be to review judgment Any the same manner as a in other civil actions. *9 action instituted accordance with this shall subsection survive not- only ignored of that sen- (h) third sentence 405 plain relegated tence’s but also it to a function language, already performed by statutory provisions. which is other withstanding any change person occupying the of office Secre- tary any vacancy in such office.” argued (h) simply Nor can it be that the third of 405 sentence by prevent requirements filing bypass (g) serves to of-the 405§ complaint alleging prior applying a district court entitlement through benefits administrative channels. The entitlement sections filing specify application prerequisite of the Act of an as a entitlement, any aso court could not in event award benefits absent application. (a)-(h) (1970 an See IJ. S. C. ed. §§ III). filed, Supp. (j)(l). application See also Once the is §402 any approved, is either in which event suit for benefits would mooted, nonfinal, or it is denied. Even if it is still the denial Secretary” which, by “decision virtue of the second sen (h), may pursuant (g). tence of not be reviewed save §405 §405 post, heavily, 790-792, passage Our Brother Brennan relies at on a Attorney “Monograph from a Senate entitled document General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure.” S. Doc. No. Sess., Cong., pt. 3, p. (1941). 77th monograph 1st The basic “embodying investigations itself is described as the results of the by made the staff of said committee relative to the [administrative] practices procedures agencies of” several of the Government. Id., Following monograph “Appendix,” the text of the is the II. which in turn is described in a “Foreword” as follows: “This state- ment, developed report Old-Age from a the Bureau of and Sur- maldng vivors Insurance certain recommendations for Board’s consideration, hearing describes the essential features and review system which has been authorized designed the Board and which is requirements statutory to meet both purposes social old-age program. and survivors developed insurance It has been during leadership several months under the Ralph Fuchs, F. professor law, Washington University, Louis, Mo., St. a consultant Bureau, by report, whom the main, Bureau’s in the Id., written.” at 34. After the “Foreword” three-part follows a report type, in somewhat smaller parts the second of which Affecting entitled “Considerations Hearing System.” and Review part, appears Within this second language which Mr. Justice dissent characterizes as Brennan’s reading “the which the Social *10 third that the argument substantial A more somewhat Court deprive the District not (h) does §of sentence it fact that relies on the jurisdiction federal-question arising “any claim on to recover only affects actions Security argu- Act.7 The of the Social under II]” [Title action arises under the Constitu- present ment that the is course, II. It would, under Title tion and not which claim is one appellees’ that fruitless to contend their consti- the Constitution, arise under since does not complaint. But to their are critical arguments tutional this action does not argue to that just is as fruitless Security Act. For under the Social also arise appellees seek to re- Security benefits which is it Social Security provides Act which cover, but it is the Social into gave provision soon after it went Security itself to the Board Post, at effect.” 790. report a can be the consultant have some doubts that We “reading incorporating the
properly characterized as provision. Even if the Security gave” itself Social Board Board, “approved” to have been report as a whole is stated approval beyond report’s that such extends there is no indication hearing conceptualization of “the essential features of a broad-brush system.” any agree event, In we do not that an review statute, occurring agency’s general of a administrative discussion require it passage, after its and in a context which does not closely operative impact particular provision, on the of a focus intent, congressional important either an indicator of as the suggests, post, dissent or an authoritative source for Finally, proposition provision particular a serves function. Act, significance report reading even if an accurate its goes only (h) the third sentence of whether serves serves; possi- function in addition to that which we believe it bility interpretation Court’s renders the District third only largely superfluous totally sentence rather than so is not analysis sufficient to disturb our of the role of that sentence in this case. old-age, survivors, disability Title II contains the insurance programs seq. codified at 42 U. 401 et S. C. § standing both the substantive basis for the presentation of their constitutional Appel- contentions. lees and the sought, District Court granted, judgment Secretary directing pay Social benefits. *11 To contend that such an action does not arise under the Act whose benefits sought are is to ignore both the lan- guage and the substance of complaint and judgment. This being so, the third sentence of (h) precludes § 405 resort to federal-question jurisdiction for adjudication appellees’ constitutional contentions.
It has also been argued Robison, that Johnson v. supports U. S. 361 (1974), proposition appellees are seeking to recover aon claim arising under Title II. In that case we considered 38 U. 211 (a), S. C. § which provides: decisions of the
“[T]he Administrator [Veterans’] any on question of any law or fact under law ad- by ministered provid- Veterans’ Administration ing benefits for veterans . shall . . be final and con- clusive and no any other official or court of the United States shall power have or jurisdiction to any review such by decision an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.” We were required to resolve whether this pre- language cluded an attack on constitutionality statutory of a limitation. We concluded that it did not, basically be- cause such limitation was not a “decision” of the Ad- any ministrator “on question of law or fact”; indeed, the “decision” had been made Congress, not Administrator, and the issue was one which the Ad- ministrator considered to beyond be jurisdiction. his S., 415 U. at 367-368. Thus question sought to litigated was simply not within (a)’s §211 express lan- guage, and there was accordingly no basis for conclud-
ing Congress sought preclude review of the con- stitutionality legislation. veterans’ language (h) of 405 Its quite different. reach Secretary is not limited to decisions of the on issues of any law or fact. Rather, seeking extends to “action” any Security] “to on irrespec- recover [Social claim” — judicial processes tive of whether resort to is necessitated by discretionary Secretary decisions non- his discretionary application allegedly unconstitutional statutory restrictions. why
There is another reason Johnson v. Robison is in- apposite. It expressly least on the part, based, fact that if (a) §211 reached challenges constitutional statutory limitations, absolutely then judicial no con- sideration of the issue would be available. Not would such a restriction have been extraordinary, such *12 that “clear and convincing” evidence would required before we would ascribe such intent to Congress, S., 415 U. at 373, but it would have raised a serious constitutional question validity of the of the statute as so construed. Id., In present at 366-367. the as will case, be discussed below, the Security Social provides Act itself jurisdiction for challenges constitutional to its provisions. Thus the plain words of the third (h) sentence of 405 pre- § do not clude challenges. constitutional They simply require that they be brought jurisdictional under grants contained in Act, conformity thus with the same standards applicable are to nonconstitutional claims arising under the Act. The only result is not of unquestionable but constitutionality, it manifestly also reasonable, since it Secretary assures the the opportunity prior to constitutional litigation to ascertain, example, that the particular claims involved are neither invalid for other reasons nor allowable under provisions other Security Social Act. stated,
As has been Act Social itself pro- Secretary’s vides for district court review of the deter- minations. Title 42 U. C. 405 (g) provides “[a]ny individual, any final after decision the Secre- tary made a hearing after to which was a party, he irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a of such review decision a civil action commenced sixty days within after him of notice mailing of such decision ....” supra. See n. question with which we must now deal is provision whether this could serve jurisdictional as a basis for the District Court’s considera- of the present tion case. We provided conclude that jurisdiction as to the appellees named and not as to the unnamed members of the class.8 (g) specifies
Section 405 the following requirements for judicial review: (1) a final Secretary decision made after a hearing; (2) commencement of a civil days within 60 action after the mailing of notice of such (or decision within such further time Secretary as the (g) is Since 405 the basis for jurisdiction, district there court question authority enjoin is some as to oper whether it had requirements. duration-of-relationship ation (g) Section 405 authority accords to affirm, modify, or reverse a decision of the Sec retary. suggestion It reviewing contains no em court is powered injunctive an to enter operation decree whose reaches beyond particular applicants In before court. view our dispositions of the case, class-action and constitutional issues in this only significance problem goes jurisdiction. of this to our own *13 (g) empowered enjoin If a 405 operation court is not the of a § statute, three-judge federal a then required District Court was not case, 2282, jurisdiction to hear this 28 U. S. C. and we are without § However, three-judge under U. S. C. 1253. whether or not the § properly convened, court was did a that court hold federal statute in a agency unconstitutional civil action which a federal parties. appellate jurisdiction are officers We thus have direct under v. DeChamplain, 28 II. S. C. 1252. McLucas 421 U. S. 31-32 § (1975). may filing appro- of the action in an allow); (3) plaintiff’s of the priate court, general district that The second and principal place residence or of business. stat- requirements specify, respectively, third these they appropriate such, ute of limitations and venue. As by timely parties, having are waivable the and not been raised Fed. Rules below, (h)(1), see Civ. Proc. (c), re- interpret need not be considered here. We the first quirement, however, requisite grant to be central to the empowers dis- subject-matter jurisdiction statute —the particular type trict courts to review decision Secretary, that type being those which are “final” hearing.” and “made after a present
In
case,
complaint
seeks review of the
plain wording
denial of benefits based on the
of a statute
alleged
which is
to be unconstitutional.
That a denial
grounds,
beyond
on such
power
are
Secretary
affect,
is nonetheless a decision of the Secre-
tary for
purposes
these
has been heretofore established.
Flemming
Nestor,
(1960).
We have recognized that the doctrine of administrative exhaustion should be applied a re- gard particular for the administrative scheme at issue. Davidson, Parisi v. McKart 34 (1972); S. States, United 395 U. 185 (1969). Exhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes, so agency may function efficiently and may so that have an opportunity to correct own errors, parties its afford experience and the courts the benefit its and expertise, compile and to a record which is adequate judicial id., g., e. See, review. Plainly at 193-194. pur- these poses have Secretary been served once the has satisfied himself that issue is the constitutionality statutory a matter which is requirement, beyond his jurisdiction to determine, and that the claim is neither otherwise nor cognizable invalid under a different sec- tion of the Act. applicant Once a benefit presented has his or her claim a sufficiently high level of review satisfy Secretary’s administrative further needs, exhaustion not merely would be futile for applicant, *15 but would also be a commitment of administrative re- unsupported sources by any administrative or judicial interest. present
The case, significantly is different course, from McKart “final statutorily that a decision” is a specified jurisdictional prerequisite. requirement The is, previously as we have therefore, something noted, more than simply a codification judicially of the devel- oped doctrine of exhaustion, may and dispensed not be merely by a judicial futility conclusion of such as by that made the District Court here. But is equally true that requirement of a “final decision” contained in 405 (g) precisely is not analogous to the more classi- jurisdictional cal requirements contained such sections of Title 28 as 1331 and 1332. The term “final decision” only is not left undefined Act, meaning but its left to the Secretary to flesh out regulation.9 Section (l) accords Secretary complete authority to delegate his statutory duties to officers employees and Department of Health, and Welfare. Education, statutory scheme is thus one in which the Secre- tary may specify such requirements for exhaustion as he deems serve his own interests in effective and effi- cient administration. may While court not substitute its conclusion as futility for the contrary conclusion we Secretary, believe it would be inconsistent with the congressional scheme to bar Secretary from de-
9 Title (a): S. C. §405 Secretary “The power shall have full authority and to make regulations rules and and to procedures, establish not inconsistent provisions with the subchapter, of this necessary are appro- priate carry out such provisions, adopt and shall reasonable and proper regulations rules regulate and provide and for the nature proofs extent of the and evidence and the taking method of furnishing the same in order right to establish the to benefits hereunder.” particular cases that full exhaustion of in- termining procedures necessary for a ternal decision review “final” within the language (g). to be may Much the same be said re- statutory about Secretary’s be made quirement decision “after hearing.” hearing Not would a be futile Secretary has once the determined wasteful, only issue to be resolved is a matter of constitutional law concededly beyond his competence decide, but Secretary may, of award benefits without course, requir- hearing. We do ing not understand the statute to *16 prevent similarly him from in the determining favor of a applicant, without all issues hearing, regard for one a eligibility save as which he hearing considers to be useless.
In present Secretary the case any the does not raise sufficiency challenge to the of exhaus- allegations in appellees’ complaint. tion interpret We this to be a determination him purposes that for the liti- gation the reconsideration determination is “final.” The appellees named thus satisfy the requirements for 405§ judicial review, (g) proceed and we to the merits their claim.10 Ill
The District Court relied on congressional history for proposition duration-of-relationship require- prevent ment was intended to use of marriages sham to secure Security payments. Social As concluded such, requirement “the court, constitutes a presumption like marriages Mrs. Salfi’s, which precede did not 10 jurisdiction (g) Weinberger 405 Section Wiesenfeld, v. 420 (1975), similarly present. S. was In that case the Secre tary stipulated that futile, exhaustion would have been and he did any not make complied contentions that Wiesenfeld had not with the requirements (g). Id., of 405 at 641 n. 8. were months, death at least nine wage earner’s Security purpose securing entered into for the Social presumption at 965. The Supp., was, benefits.” 373 F. not conclusive, applicants because were afforded moreover, opportunity disprove presence of the illicit an purpose. The court held that under our decisions LaFleur, Cleveland Board Education v. 414 U. S. Kline, 412 441 (1973); Vlandis v. U. S. and Stan- (1974); Illinois, ley v. requirement 405 U. was (1972), presumed because fact unconstitutional, necessarily universally not true.
Our ultimate conclusion is that the District Court was wrong holding duration-of-relationship require- ment unconstitutional. Because we are aware that our various holdings in cases do all pre- related sound cisely the explain same we will ourselves at some note, length. validity
The standard for testing the of Congress’ Social clearly classification was in Flem- stated ming Nestor, atS.,U. 611:
“Particularly we when deal with withholding pro- noncontractual benefit under a social welfare gram such as Security], we must recognize [Social *17 that the Due Process Clause can thought to inter- pose a bar if the patently statute a manifests arbitrary utterly in classification, lacking rational justification.”
In
Belcher,
Richardson v.
“In the area welfare, economics and social State Equal does not violate the Protection Clause merely because made classifications its laws imperfect. are If the classification has ‘rea- some basis,’ sonable it not does offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is made nicety mathematical practice because in it results inequality.’ Lindsley some v. Natural Carbonic Co., Gas 220 U. S. 78. 61, problems ‘The of govern- ment are practical may ones and if do they justify, rough not require, may illogical, accommodations — be, and Metropolis unscientific.’ Theatre Co. City Chicago, 228 U. S. 69-70. . . . sure,
“To be many the cases cited, others enun- ciating this fundamental standard under Equal Protection Clause, have the main involved state regulation or industry. business The adminis- tration of public welfare assistance, contrast, in- volves most basic economic needs of impover- ished human beings. We recognize the dramatically real factual difference between the cited cases *18 this but we can find one, no basis applying different standard. is a stand- constitutional It ... consistently applied ard has legis- been state availability employment lation restricting Cleary, 464; Goesaert opportunities. 335 U. S. v. Kotch Board River Port Pilot Comm’rs, v. Nestor, Flemming U. S. 552. See also v. 363 U. S. 603. And prin- it is a is true standard ciple that the Fourteenth the fed- gives Amendment power upon eral courts no impose the States their views of what constitutes wise economic social Id., policy.” at 485-486. protection analysis relation between the equal
Dandridge analy- and the Fifth Amendment process due Flemming sis v. Nestor and Richardson v. Belcher was in the described latter case in language: this “A statutory classification in social the area of wel- fare Equal is consistent with the Protection Clause of the Fourteenth if 'rationally Amendment based free from invidious discrimination.’ Dand- ridge v. Williams, U. S. 487. While the present case, involving as it does a statute, federal implicate does not directly the Fourteenth Amend- Equal ment’s Protection Clause, a classification that meets the test in Dandridge articulated perforce process consistent with the due requirement of the Bolling Fifth Amendment. v. Cf. Sharpe, U. S. 497, 499.” 404 atS.,U. 81. quite
These plainly lay cases down the governing prin- ciple for disposing constitutional challenges classifi- type cations of social welfare legislation. The District Court, rely chose to on however, Cleveland Board LaFleur, Education v. supra; Kline, Vlandis supra; and Stanley supra. v. Illinois, It characterized this re- group cent of cases dealing as with “the appropriateness
771 evidentiary presumptions.” 373 F. Supp., conclusive at 965. v.
Stanley Illinois held that it was a denial of the equal Amendment for protection guaranteed Fourteenth an deny parental on unwed hearing State to fitness to hearing father when such a was to all other granted custody parents whose of their children was challenged. This fact Court referred to the to con- “rights ceive and to been raise one’s children have deemed ‘essen- Nebraska, v. tial,’ Meyer U. 399 390, 262 S. ‘basic (1923), man,’ civil Oklahoma, Skinner v. U. rights 535, 316 precious far (1942), ‘[r]ights more . . . than May Anderson, property rights,’ v. 528, U. S. (1953).” 405 U. at 651. S., Kline,
In Vlandis v. a statutory definition of “resi- purposes fixing dents” for paid tuition stu- dents in university system a state held invalid. The Court held that where purported Connecticut to be con- cerned with residency, might not at the same time deny to one seeking to meet its residency test of opportunity clearly to show factors bearing on that issue. U. 452. S.,
In LaFleur Court held on authority invalid, Stanley Vlandis, school board regulations requiring pregnant school teachers to take unpaid maternity leave commencing four to five months before expected birth. The Court its stated longstanding recognition “that free- dom of personal choice in family matters of marriage and life is one of the protected liberties by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” 414 S., at 639- “overly and that restrictive maternity regula- leave tions heavy can constitute a burden on the exercise protected these freedoms.” Id., at 640.
We hold that these cases are not controlling on the issue before us now. Unlike the claims involved in Stanley LaFleur, claim noncontractual to receive treasury constitutionally funds from public enjoys no protected Williams, status, Dandridge though supra, of course Congress may invidiously discriminate among such claimants congres on the basis of a “bare *20 sional harm politically unpopular desire to group,” U. Dept. Agriculture S. Moreno, 413 528, v. U. S. or on the (1973), basis of criteria bear no rational legitimate relation to a legislative goal. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. 628, (1974); S. U. S. Dept. of Agriculture Murry, 413 U. 508, (1973). 513-514 statutory Unlike Vlandis, scheme 412 U. S., at the Social Act purport speak does not to in terms of the bona fides of parties then marriage, but plainly make relevant evidence of such inad bona fides missible. Malkerson, As in Starns v. F. Supp. (Minn. 1970), summarily aff’d, 401 985 (1971), U. S. benefits here upon are available ob compliance with an jective criterion, one which Legislature considered to a sufficiently bear close nexus with underlying policy ob jectives to be used as for eligibility. the test Like the plaintiffs Starns, appellees completely are pre free to sent they evidence that specified meet the requirements ; failing in this effort, their constitutional claim is that they the test rationally cannot meet is not so to a related legitimate legislative objective can that it be used deprive them of benefits satisfy available to who those do that test. think
We that District Court’s extension Stanley, Vlandis, holdings of and LaFleur to the eligibility requirement in issue here would turn the doctrine of those cases into a virtual engine destruction for count- legislative judgments less which have been heretofore thought wholly consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to Constitution. For very example, the section of 42 which Title an action authorizes such as this, (g), §405 requires a claim be filed within 60 days after administrative remedies are exhausted. It is indisputable requirement that this places people who file their claims more than 60 days after exhaustion in a different people “class” from who file their claims within the time If limit. we were to follow the District Court’s analysis, try we first would the congressional ascertain “purpose” behind the provision, and probably would con- clude prevent was to stale claims from being asserted in court. We would then turn to the questions of whether such flat cutoff provision necessary protect Secretary from claims, stale whether it would possible be to make individualized determinations as to any prejudice Secretary suffered as the result of untimely an filing, whether or an individualized hearing on that issue should required each case. *21 This would represent degree judicial involvement in legislative the function which we have eschewed except in the most unusual circumstances, and which quite judicial Belcher, unlike role by Dandridge, mandated Nestor, by as well as a host of cases from arising legislative regulate private efforts to enterprises. business
In Co., Williamson v. Lee Optical 348 U. 483 (1955), the Court dealt with a claim Equal that Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated an opticians Oklahoma statute which subjected sys- to a tem regulation, exempted of detailed but which sellers ready-to-wear In glasses. sustaining the statute the Court said: problem legislative
“The classification is a peren- one, admitting nial of no doctrinaire definition. may Evils in field the same be different dimen- sions proportions, requiring different remedies. may Id., so legislature Or think.” at 489. More recently, Mourning Family v. Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356 the Court (1973), sustained constitutionality regulation of a promulgated under in Lending the Truth Act which made Act’s dis- provisions closure applicable whenever credit is offered “ 'for a consumer either finance is or charge may be imposed pursuant or which to an agreement, ” may payable Id., four more than installments.’ at 362. The regulation challenged because it was conclusively said to presume payments un- made der agreement an providing for more than four instal- necessarily ments included a finance charge, when in fact might not be the rejected case. The Court challenge constitutional language: this “The rule was intended as a prophylactic measure; presume it does not that all creditors who are within its ambit assess finance charges, but, rather, imposes requirement disclosure on all members a defined class in order to discourage evasion a substantial portion of that Id., class.” at 377.
If the Fifth and Fourteenth permit Amendments legislative latitude to decisions regulating private they surely sector economy, allow no less latitude in prescribing the conditions upon which funds shall be dispensed from public treasury. Dandridge Wil- liams, supra. With principles these in mind, we turn to statutory provisions consider which the District Court held invalid. (1970
Title 42 *22 U. S. C. 402 ed. Supp. Ill) is the basic congressional enactment defining eligibility for old- age and survivors benefit insurance and is payments, divided into 23 lettered subsections. Subsection is (g) entitled “Mother’s insurance primarily benefits,” gov- erns appellee the claim of Salfi. (d) Subsection governs eligibility for child’s benefits, insurance pro- and is the appellee vision under which makes her claim. Kalnins specify These along with others subsections, types protection provided of social risks for which is by basically statutory policy. what insurance
A similarly by defined system, different insurance but operated governmental statute and entity, was subject Aiello, Geduldig of our consideration (1974), S. 484 and our disposition that case instructive. We reversed the of a District judgment Court which held disability had that a California state insurance program invalid insofar as it failed to provide benefits for disabilities associated with normal pregnancy. opinion In our we said:
“The District Court that moderate suggested al- it terations what regarded as 'variables’ of the disability program insurance could be made to ac- commodate the expense required substantial to pregnancy program’s include normal pro- within tection. same said, can be however, respect expensive the other class of disabilities coverage are excluded from dis- —short-term If Equal abilities. Protection Clause were thought compel disability payments for normal why is hard pregnancy, perceive it would not compel payments also for short-term disabilities suf- fered participating employees. totally comprehensive
“It is evident that a pro- gram costly would more substantially than present program inevitably require would subsidy, higher employee state rate of contribu- tion, a lower scale of suffering benefits those disabilities, insured or some combination of these nothing measures. There is in the Constitution, requires however, State subordinate or legitimate solely its compromise interests to create *23 comprehensive program social insurance than a more Id., already has.” at 495-496. it present different, The case is somewhat since the Sec- duration-of-relationship retary principally defends the legislative not as decision requirement, a reasonable from in- particular type exclude a risk coverage, but payments as method of assuring stead are made only upon the occurrence of events the risk which is by the program.11 covered insurance Commercial insur- policies have traditionally upon pro- ance relied fixed, phylactic protect rules to against abuses which could liability expand beyond the risks which are within the general concept of For coverage. its life insur- example, policies ance often cover deaths but not suicide, those contemplated suicides which were policy when the purchased. Frequently the method chosen contain liability conceptual within these bounds is a strict rule that deaths only suicide are they covered if, if, period occur some fixed policy time after the is issued. e. See, g., 9 Couch, Cyclopedia G. of Insurance Law § 40.50 (2d 1962). ed. such a While limitation proves doubtless particular cases to be “under-inclusive” or “over- inclusive,” light presumed of its it is purpose, nonethe- a widely accepted response less legitimate interests in economy administrative and certainty of coverage for those who meet its terms. When the Government chooses to follow this tradition in its own social insurance programs, it does not come up against a constitutional stone wall. Rather, may rely on such so rules long as Secretary briefly argues also the duration-of-relation ship requirement rationally serves the providing interest benefits persons likely who are dependent have become upon wage Appellants earner. Brief for 11-12. In view of our con regard principal clusion with argument, to his need we not con justification. sider this *24 reason- legislative of standards comport with the
they Dandridge Williams in cases like enunciated ableness Belcher. Richardson v. and raised standards, question the
Under those those, out filters precisely statutory provision whether position factual are who the those, and stat- in the reflected concern congressional the generated provisions, prophylactic ban all rule would ute. Such a Mourn- contrary holding to our directly and would be provision the ing, question the whether supra. Nor is caused class which part out a of the filters substantial mem- or it filters out more whether congressional concern, question the than nonmembers. The bers of class reasonably been having its concern whether Congress, legiti- an abuse which possibility aroused rationally have concluded mately avoid, desired to could would qualification particular both that limitation expense that protect against its occurrence, justified of individual determinations other difficulties rule. We imprecision prophylactic of a the inherent duration-of-relationship meets this conclude test that constitutional standard. relationship danger persons entering a marriage enjoy
not to traditional but instead to enable its benefits, early spouse upon anticipated claim one benefits earner, wage recognized death of the has been from the very Security of the beginning program. Social While history early itself legislative specifically no addresses duration-of-relationship requirement for mother’s and there were child’s discussions benefits, analogous receipt of requirement for benefits (b). wife’s under 402§ (b) 42 (1970 Supp. ed., §C. IV), defining See “wife.” A. J. Chairman Dr. of the Altmeyer, Social Security five-year noted Board, requirement enough prevent “should be strict marriage anticipa- payments.” Hearings benefit on Social larger tion of the Security Ways on before House Committee p. (1939). 1st Means, Sess., 76th vol. Cong., Advisory : Similarly, Council on Social stated requirement “The the wives’ allowance be payable only to the prior where marital status existed husband’s age attainment is intended to serve protection against plan abuse through as solely contracting marriages purpose for the acquiring enhanced If benefits. the marriage takes place years any least old-age before benefits can *25 paid, a reasonable assumption exists that it was Id., contracted in good faith.” p. vol. 31. 1, Advisory Council also stated, with regard §to 402 (e) benefits widow’s like which, benefits, depend mother’s (c) on the definition of “widow”: “As in the case wives’ allowances, is believed desirable to protect provisions for widows’ bene- by fits against abuse requirement of minimum period of Id., marital status.” at 32.
Similar concerns were reflected in the House and Reports Senate on the 1946 amendment which reduced years to three required duration of a marriage for purposes of an eligible “wife.” It was stated: “The original provision was prevent intended to ex- ploitation of the fund claims for benefits from persons who married solely beneficiaries to get wife’s Experience benefits. has shown the require- is unnecessarily ment restrictive for purpose that, ain number of cases, wife is permanently barred from benefits even though the marriage was entered years into many before the wage earner a beneficiary. became The amendment, taken with provision in section 202 (b) that the wife be to be for eligible husband order living with her for the trust protection be sufficient benefits, should which now remedy situations fund and will seem likely marry persons New be- inequitable. are insurance receiving cause of modest prospect years.” payable not be until after 3 benefit which will Rep. 2526, Rep. H. R. No. 79th 2d Cong., Sess., 25; 2d Cong., 79th 33. Sess., No. to the Act been accompanied
Later amendments have duration-of-relationship require- discussions ments contained in the definitions “widow” and early “child.” history Like the of analogous require- ments, they congressional pos- reflect concern with the sibility relationships purpose entered for the of obtain- ing period benefits. In 1967, when durational was year reduced from to nine months, one the House Report stated:
“Your bill committee's would reduce duration- requirements of-relationship widows, widowers, stepchildren year deceased workers from 1 present 1-year months. The law contains a dura- tion-of-relationship requirement which adopted as a safeguard against payment of benefits where *26 was relationship entered into order to secure benefit While rights. present requirements the have generally worked out satisfactorily, situations have been called to the committee's attention in which payable benefits were not required because the rela- tionship had existed for year. somewhat less than 1 some Although duration-of-relationship requirement a less stringent requirement appropriate, would be adequate.” Rep. H. R. No. 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 56.
When in 1972 Congress provisions added the of 42 (1970 U. S. C. (k) (2) § 416 ed., Supp. Ill) (eliminating respect nine-month requirement remarriages persons of who previously had been married for more than Report House months), nine observed: “This dura- requirement tion-of-relationship is included in law as precaution against payment a general of benefits where the was benefit marriage undertaken secure H. rights." Rep. R. No. p. (1971). 92-231, Undoubtedly concerns reflected congres- involving they sional material are as do legitimate, of both integrity the Social Trust Fund relationship. marriage undoubtedly It is also true duration-of-relationship requirement that the operates to lessen the likelihood of through relationships abuse sham in contemplation entered of imminent death. We also Congress think that could rationally have concluded that any imprecision from which it suffer might justified certainty operation. its ease and of initially
We note requirement that the is effective within a narrow range somewhat lacking situations certain reasonably characteristics might thought to establish the genuineness of relationship a marital (and which involves children potential thus the benefits). mother’s child’s though Even surviving wife has not been married for period months nine immediately prior her death, husband’s she is nonethe- less within the definition if “widow” she meets one of disjunctive requirements the other If (c). §416 she is the mother of her late son husband’s or if daughter; she legally adopted his son or daughter while she was him married to and while such son daughter or was under age 18; if legally he adopted her son or daugh- ter under the same circumstances; or if during their marriage, however short, they legally adopted a child under age any 18—in of these circumstances the surviving may wife claim widow’s mother’s benefits *27 though
even she has not been married to her husband for nine full months.12 The common denominator of disjunctive these requirements appears to us to be the assumption responsibilities normally associated marriage, we think that treated them Congress has as alternative indicia of that marriage the fact entered into for a shortly reason other than the desire acquire benefits. marriages which the widow depend must on qualifying under the nine-month re- quirement are those which none of these other ob- jective assumption evidences of the responsi- of marital present. bilities are so, undoubtedly
Even 416 (c)(5) sur- excludes some wives viving who married with no anticipation shortly becoming widows, may and it be appellee Salfi among may them. It likewise true require- ment does not every filter out such if wage claimant, earner lingers longer than anticipated, or in the case illnesses which can be recognized as terminal more than prior nine months to death. But neither of these facts necessarily renders the statutory scheme unconstitutional.
While it possible to debate the wisdom excluding legitimate claimants in order to discourage sham' rela- tionships, on relying a rule which may not exclude obviously some sham arrangements, we think it clear that Congress could rationally adopt choose to such a course. Large people numbers of are eligible for these programs and are potentially subject to inquiry as to the validity of their relationships to wage earners. These people include not the classes which appellees repre- sent,13 but also claimants other programs for which
12Similarly, adopted the natural child wage of a deceased earner need not meet requirement. nine-month See U. S. C. (e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. III). §416 13According to the Social Administration, in calendar 125,000 applicants there were for mother’s benefits, 1,313,000 *28 782 Security imposes duration-of-relationship
the Social Act only requirements.14 prophylactic approach Not does the necessity thus obviate the large for numbers of individu- alized protects but also numbers determinations, large satisfy of claimants who the rule from the uncertainties and delays of inquiry administrative into the circum- stances of their marriages. Nor is it at all clear that individual could effectively determinations filter out sham arrangements, since neither intent, marital life expectancy, nor knowledge of terminal illness has been shown benefits, 403,000 for child’s for benefits. widow’s/widower’s figures large While these persons include qualify numbers of who on bases wage other than the relationship duration their with a earner, doubtlessly they persons also exclude apply who did even restriction, because thereby durational or were who dis- entering relationship. suaded from magnitude A feel for the potential case-by-case for developed determinations can also be reference Social Administration’s estimate that judgment appellees sought the class which the named repre- payments million, assuming sent would involve retroactivity $30 figure payments to 1967. This not reflect per- does behalf of objective sons who met the requirement, nine-month or who could applied not meet it and therefore either never or never entered the relationship. 14 (b), 42 (f), (g), defining See U. “wife,” S. C. “hus §§416 band,” and “widower.” These various impose definitions duration- of-relationship requirements regard benefits, 42 “wife’s” (1970 (b) Ill), Supp. TJ.S. ed. and benefits, C. “husband’s” (c), TJ. S. C. benefits, (f) and “widower’s” 42 TJ. S. C. §402 §402 (1970 Ill). Supp. addition, ed. and In benefits, “widow’s” 42 TJ. C.S. (e) (1970 Supp. Ill), only ed. and are available to those women satisfy §416(c)’s who benefits, definition of “widow.” “Parent’s” subject (h), objective TJ. S. C. are also an eligibility §402 re quirement which duration-of-relationship requirement. is similar to a (h)(3), stepparents Under adoptive parents may §402 receive respect benefits with to a deceased child providing who was at least support, half of marriage their but if creating adoption relationship prior their birthday. occurred to the child's 16th appellees reliably to be determinable.15 Finally, very possibility at a prevailing hearing reasonably could expected to encourage sham relationships.
15Appellees do not contend expectancy that marital intent or life reliably They can be argue, however, determined. that because a marriage could contemplation not be entered in of imminent death *29 wage unless the earner’s known, inquiry “terminal illness” was go need no farther parties than the issue of whether the to the marriage They knew of such an illness. applicants claim that could knowledge demonstrate by physicians’ the state of their affidavits or documentary medical not, evidence. These contentions are how ever, supported by any variety factual rebuttals of the diffi Congress culties which expect entitled to to be encountered. Maryland, See McGowan v. (1961). example, “knowledge For all evidence of of terminal illness” ordinarily would be applicants, suggests under the control of which they proof. that should bear the burden of But this burden could convincingly only respect wage be carried with to earners who happened physical shortly to have had examinations before their weddings; hand, awarding wage on the other benefits where the examination, earner had not had an and no medical evidence was available, encourage participants arrangements would in sham to adequate conceal their own adverse medical evidence. Even when easily medical evidence was available there could be difficulties determining wage physical whether a earner’s condition amounted to illness”; concept a “terminal if that were restricted to conditions virtually early death, which were certain to result in an benefits probably broadly available, certainty would be too since of im- high probability death minent rather than a mere it not prerequisite yet inquiries relationship; degree to a sham into very complex likelihood of death could become indeed. problems appellees’ proposed
Additional test arise because it, duration-of-relationship requirement, precisely like the is not objective denying sought related to benefits which are on the relationships. place, presumably In basis of sham the first would necessary requirement inquiries be to limit of terminal illness to specified period in which instances death occurred within a after marriage. appear necessary be It would also to an set outside length period expected limit on the within which death was (after disqualify applicants paraphrasing all, would Lord long expected die). Keynes, in run we are all Yet there will eligibility The administrative difficulties of individual determinations are without doubt matters which Con- may gress determining rely consider when whether on broadly which sweep rules more than evils with which they In sense, seek deal. the duration-of-rela- tionship requirement represents merely not a substantive policy determination that benefits should be awarded on marital genuine the basis but also a relationships, policy substantive determination limited resources spent would be making well individual determina- expression tions. an of Congress’ It policy choice that the Social and its system, millions of benefici- aries, would be best a prophylactic served rule which claims arising bars from the bulk of sham marriages which actually are entered, discourages such mar- always persons seriously on one side of such lines who are dis- advantaged persons vis-á-vis on basically, the other side. More appellees’ clearly persons test would wage exclude who knew of a *30 death, earner’s marriages imminent but who entered their for rea- entirely Security benefits, sons to unrelated Social such as to fulfill promises longstanding engagement. appellees’ pro- Thus posed subject exactly test would be to same constitutional at- they tacks which direct Congress toward the test on which chose rely. to Appellees point (k) (1970 out that 42 U. ed.,Supp. Ill) S. C. 416§ provides exceptions for limited to duration-of-relationship require- ment, Secretary unless the determines that the time of the mar- wage riage the reasonably expected earner “could not have been to argue They represents live for nine Congress’ months.” that recognition case-by-case that impose consideration would not an argument inordinate administrative burden. The is without merit. (k) Congress’ expresses willingness Section 416 accept case-by- inquiries regard case with particular to limited classes which bear (the genuineness indices of applicable section is in cases of accidental death, military duty, death remarriages persons the line of previously months). married says nothing for more than nine This feasibility making inquiries about such circumstances, other rationality choosing much less the not to do so. objective and which is also taking from ever place, riages easily administered. choices policy preclude not such does The Constitution distribution for the programs for price conducting as a Geduldig Aiello, Cf. v. insurance benefits. of social cus- or the prosecutions, criminal at 496. Unlike S.,U. Illinois, such Stanley tody proceedings at issue action not affirmative Government do involve programs cognizable liberties seriously important curtails our There is no basis thus under the Constitution. Congress determinations when individualized requiring rules are rationally generalized can conclude but also that concerns, appropriate purposes its outweigh determinations difficulties individual of con- effectuation precise in the increments marginal might expected they concern which gressional produce. District Court is judgment
The
Reversed. dissenting. Mr. Justice Douglas, I Brennan there with Mr. that because agree Justice clearly jurisdiction Court's extended discussion subject unwarranted. problem I the main merits, On the believe they presumptions created is that legislatively these Tot v. jury right invade the trial. See frequently States, J., con- (1943) (Black, United pay- to bar curring). present designed law pur- when the of certain benefits ment Social *31 was to obtain such benefits. pose marriage particular of a marriage this was aim Whether the jury ap- in an question to be decided the fact, I would remand propriate case. therefore vacate and her right that give the case Mrs. Salfi to show marriage did not offend statutory scheme, that it was not a sham.
Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Mar- Justice joins, dissenting. shall
The District Court did err, my not view, either in holding it jurisdiction by that had virtue 28 U. S. C. § 1331, holding or in that requirements nine-month of 42 U. S. C. §§416 (c)(5) (e)(2) (1970 ed. and Supp. constitutionally are Ill) invalid.
I
Jurisdiction jurisdictional The issue to which the Court devotes pages, jurisdiction conclude that there is indeed over the merits of this case both here and in the District Court, was raised in this Court parties before us nor argued, except most in the peripherally,1 briefs or appellants jurisdictional in their statement raised as one of questions presented sovereign immunity bars this “[w]hether security it seeks as retroactive [suit] social Juris insofar benefits.” 2 (emphasis added). dictional Statement argument Their was class, no retroactive benefits were available to the because 28 sovereign immunity, S. C. 1331 does not waive because 42 (h) seeking U. S. C. 405 bars a suit except retroactive benefits (g), under requirements because the exhaustion §405 §405 (g) met. Appellants were not Brief for 16-18. See also Tr. Arg. of Oral 7-8:
“Question: juris- ... the United States satisfied was [I]s there diction in the district court ? here jurisdiction Shapiro:
“Mrs. We are not satisfied there was required .. . extent that a class and retroactive identified ;payments added.) (Emphasis members class.” to all Thus, here appellants never claimed that the District Court they jurisdiction case, over merits of this con- without jurisdiction grant injunctive ceded, declaratory apparently, relief.
787 argument. question complicated involves at oral statutory questions legislative provision, intent and courts (h), 42 U. C. 405 which has baffled district § S. years other con- appeals and courts of this and always obliged inquire Of course, texts.2 this Court ques- there is jurisdiction, into its own when a substantial jurisdiction proper about either tion whether is, lower courts or in this Court. But since here there according Court, jurisdiction to the over the cause any I it the thought action in would have wiser event,3 2 seeking See, g., (g) (h) e. on the 405 on cases effect of §§ provision as of Title II of the Social to invalidate unconstitutional Ky. 1970), Bartley Supp. (ED Security Act, Finch, 311 F. 876 v. Bartley Richardson, summarily 404 aff’d on the merits sub v. nom. (Mass. Richardson, 16 (1971); Supp. U. 980 Gainville v. 319 F. S. (Md.), Richardson, summarily 1226 1970); Supp. 346 F. v. Griffin (1972); Weinberger, Supp. 1 aff’d, 409 S. 1069 Diaz v. 361 F. (NJ (SD 1973); Weinberger, Supp. 981 Fla. 367 F. v. Wiesenfeld aff’d, (1975); Weinberger, Supp. 1973), 420 U. 636 Kohr 378 F. v. (ED 1974) 74-5538). (appeal docketed, 1299 Pa. No.
Bartley holding Finch, supra, v. cases one of these (g) determining the constitu- 405 is the exclusive means of § tionality Security Act, provision and that there of a of the Social was, (g), jurisdiction. The noncompliance with no because of §405 This Court’s then went on to decide merits. District Court explicitly merits, must be taken to and thus affirmance was on the though (g) jurisdiction was not even 405 have held that there was complied with. (h) (g) in other grappled with have Other courts §§ (CA9 Celebrezze, g., 319 F. 2d See, Filice v. e.
contexts.
(CA2 1966),
Celebrezze,
12d
Cappadora v.
356 F.
1963); compare
banc).
1973) (en
(CA9
Weinberger,
Stuckey
Because the Court nonetheless treats the I obliged For, as well. at least insofar fully, am do so my consideration, unaided the as own research and help ordinarily by adversary consideration, is ade- offered quite wrong I Court is quate, am convinced that the (h), about the reach of 405 and that its con- § intended purpose contrary both Congress struction attributes may (g) may fairly us, have been before have entailed 405§ — today canvassing jurisdictional questions the Court discusses. the merits, the But since Court the the source of District the reverses on jurisdiction and, particularly, irrelevant it is Court’s is immaterial complaint. jurisdiction over the class whether or not there was question, ante, 764, can Court’s decision on the latter characterized as dictum. Weinberger, 74-6212, Dis appeal docketed, No.
4 In Norton v. portion Title II of trict did not declare the contested Court jurisdic unconstitutional, and we therefore lack Act Social Thus, exclusive (g) if 405 is the 28 U. C. 1252. tion under § § if, II, attacks on Title of constitutional route for determination question regarding ante, is a suggests, at 763 n. there as the Court injunction (g), we grant an under power court § in Norton be jurisdiction 28 U. S. C. 1253 under could be without § enjoin statute, court, power to three-judge without cause the Norton, Thus, un C. 2282. under 28 U. S. improperly convened § determination of appropriate vehicle for case, would be like this today. question jurisdictional decided all established notions of administrative exhaustion absolutely without clear support language history legislative Further, today’s statute. deci- Robison, sion is in conflict square with Johnson 361 (1974). finally, U. S. And if 405 (g) even exclusive for adjudicating seeking payment route actions I of a it claim, do see how can to the apply declara- tory and injunctive aspects of this suit.
A rejects The Court the District Court’s conclusion (h) no requirement more than a codified administrative exhaustion on the basis the third sen- tence of section, “sweep- characterizes as *34 ing [stating] and direct and that no action be shall brought 1331, merely § under not that those actions in brought shall be which have remedies administrative Ante, been exhausted.” at 757. But the does sentence say any action brought no kind shall be under general may grants § other which jurisdiction, in entitling result II someone benefits under Title Act; merely says that no brought action shall be seq. under 1331 et any arising § “to recover on claim under I (Emphasis added.) action, This [Title II].” believe, does not “arise under” II in Title the manner intended 405 (h), and it in is, § at least an part, not action to “recover” on B a claim. Parts C, See infra. I (h), believe, only bans,
Section 405 except under II (g), suits which arise under Title' in the sense they require application statute a set facts, and seek nothing than a more determi- eligibility nation of claimed to arise under Act. I Thus, basically agree with the District Court that 405§ (h), including sentence, merely its last codifies usual requirements of administrative exhaustion. The last in sentence, particular, provides plaintiff that a cannot avoid 405 (g) and the first two (h) sentences of 405§ by bringing an action under a general grant jurisdic- tion claiming that the Security Social Act provides itself him certain rights. Rather, on such plaintiff a claim a must exhaust administrative remedies, the District Court is limited to review of Secretary's in decision, prescribed manner (g). § 405
The Court suggests that this reading (h) of § 405 makes the last sentence redundant. But this is the read- ing which the Security Social gave Board itself to the provision soon after it went into effect. In a document prepared approved for and by the in January Board 1940 as an procedures outline of the to be followed under newly enacted Security Social Act Amendments of 1939,5 the interaction between 405 (g) §§ and (h) is de- scribed as follows: judicial
“The review section of the act, section (g)], provides for civil against [405 suits the Social Board the United States District Courts. may These by parties filed to hearings before the Board who are dissatisfied with final decisions of the Board. The review of the Board's actions these suits will consist of a review of the Board's records Thus, these cases. on hand, the one the Board is *35 against protected the possibility reversals its of of in separate decisions actions purpose the .... filed for Actions this kind are specifically by excluded sec- of tion (h)]. On the other judicial [405 hand, review 5 (h) (g) Sections 405 and part were of these amendments. See Security Social Act Amendments II, of §201, 1939. Tit. 53 that, Stat. 1362. Before the Security Social Act contained no explicit provisions concerning judicial review. R.-Rep. See H. No. 728, Cong., Sess., (1939). 76th 1st 43
on the basis of the Board’s in records the cases makes necessary it the record in each case in the be best so possible state as to if avoid difficulties a challenge in Security court occurs.” Federal Agency, Security Social Basic Board, Provisions Adopted the Board for Hear- Social the ing Old-Age and Review of and Insurance Suvivors Claims With a Discussion of Certain Administrative Problems Legal in At- (1940), Consideration torney General’s Committee on Pro- Administrative cedure, Administrative in Procedures Government Agencies, 10, S. Doc. No. 77th 1st Cong., Sess., pt. 3, p. (1941).
Since last of the sentence the of (h) part § is “specifically the any “action,” section exclude [s]” portion obviously italicized refers that sentence. agency responsible Thus, enforcement adopted II Title a construction gave of the statute which very the last sentence the meaning which the Court now rejects “superfluous” “already as other performed Ante, at provisions.” statutory As 757, n. 6. 759; in explained is not margin,6 sentence superfluous, argues, ante, The Court at 759 if n. the third sentence (h) merely bypass (g) separate a via forbids of 405 action § Secretary’s decision, as a superfluous framed review is application prerequisite because an is a to entitlement and “[o]nce application filed, approved denied,” it is either or it is ... resulting Secretary which, under decision of the second (h), pursuant sentence cannot reviewed “save §405 §405 (g).” analysis faulty respects. First, This several without (h), applicant might appli- an last sentence of 405 first file an then, upon all, before acted file a cation and it is suit for benefits Second, under II. true bene- Title it is not that all entitlement hinge upon filing application. instances, person an In fits some already receiving type applica- need not file a new one benefits g., See, category e. receive another benefits. tion order to
792 obviously
and Board regard did not it as such. Ad ministrative interpretations by agencies of statutes which they administer ordinarily are entitled great weight, see, g., Robison, e. v. Johnson 415 U. at 367- S., Tallman, Udall 368; 380 161, (1965). And in this instance, contemporary Security Social Board intimately involved the formulation the 1939 of amendments,7 presumed and thus must be to have had into the insight legislative intent.8 s. C. (1) (C) (1) (e) (ii) (f) (C) (1970 42 TJ. 402 ed., Supp. §§ Ill); (g) (1) (D). Finally, application if an even has been upon it, applicant try filed and decision might made file seeking suit review the administrative record a de novo but eligibility. question determination of This would raise the whether (g) the second sentence of 405 prescribe should be read way reviewed”; in which the administrative record “shall be dear, third sentence however, except makes that no action review of claiming eligibility administrative record is available suits under the statute. Report Board, Security Proposed Changes See Social Security Act, Cong., Social H. R. Doc. 1st No. 76th Sess. (1939); Hearings on before Social the House on Committee Ways Means, 1, 3, 45-69, 76th Sess., pp. 1st vols. 2163— Cong., (1939) (testimony Altmeyer, of Dr. Chairman of the Social Security Board). legislative Other interpre indices of intent and administrative tation, although sparse, suggest (h) (g) also were §§ interpreted nothing intended and as more than a codification of ordinary requirements, applicable administrative exhaustion to cases questions presenting interpretation fact and of the statute. Report The 1939 Security Board, of the Social 7, supra, sug see n. gested “[provision that the findings amendments include a fact and decisions of the Board in the allowance of shall be claims provision final and precedent conclusive. Such a would follow the legislation World War Veterans’ Act and other respect agencies similar large to the Board which handle number of Id., small claims.” 13. hearings At the amendments, on the Altmeyer explained Dr. [ing] recommendation as “follow
793 Indeed, to adopt the Court’s view of the last sentence (h) is, § 405 I as far as can determine, to assume that it was precisely inserted to cover the situation here —a suit attacking the constitutionality of a section of Title II and seeking to eligibility establish despite provi- the sions of the statute. Yet, the Court point is able to no evidence at all Congress was concerned with this kind of lawsuit when it formulated these and sections, I have not any been able to find either. any
Without clear evidence, any indeed without precedent laid acts, down in . . . other where there is a volume of claims, small findings and where a review the would lead of fact duplicate . to . . administration Hearings, 7, supra, law.’’ n. 3, p. vol. (Emphasis added.) 2288. Thus, inception at their provisions exhaustion (g) (h) clearly- became 405 and were §§ apply only intended to statutory run-of-the-mill claims under the provisions, in which paramount. factual determinations would be The Representatives says House of Report (g): of 405 "The § provisions of this subsection are similar to those made for re- many view of decisions of administrative Rep. bodies.” H. R. No. 728, Sess., Cong., (1939). 76th 1st 43 Report describes §405 (h) basically Id., in its own words. at 43-44. There is no indica- tion any way the latter section was intended in to alter the by quoted intent indicated legislate only ordinary sentence —to requirements. administrative exhaustion Finally, by Mitchell, a statement inserted Mr. Commissioner of Security, Social Hearings into the record of the 1959 on the Ad- Security Disability ministration of the Program Social Insurance before Subcommittee on the Administration of the Social Ways Laws of the House Committee Means, on 86th Sess., Cong., (1960), again 1st 977 reflects the view that (h) (g) together merely reiterate, even if a bit re- §§ dundantly, jurisdiction that “the of a court to review a determina- Secretary tion of the is limited to a review the record made before Secretary. amply This is made clear the second and third (g)] provisions (h)]. sentences of . . . [405 [§405 power hearing The court has no to hold a and determine the merits of the claim the statute makes it clear that because the determina- solely Secretary.” tion of claims is a function of the Court evidence, should not attribute to Con- gress through an intention filter (g) sort of “Adjudication constitutional attack. of the con- stitutionality congressional generally enactments has beyond jurisdiction thought been of administrative Bd., agencies.” Oestereich v. Service Selective (1968) U. S. (Harlan, concurring result); J., Robison, Johnson v. 415 U. 368.9 3 K. S., at See *38 Davis, (1958). Administrative Law §20.04 Treatise in Thus, such this one, case as in no are in which facts dispute and no other possibly sections of the Act are applicable, only question “the of exhaustion whether require to exhaustion of nonexistent administrative Id., remedies.” at 78. & Equip- See Diesel Aircraft Hirsch, ment Corp. v. 331 752, (1947). To assume, no basis in the legislative his- or in the clear statute, Congress words tory that require intended to exhaustion in kind case, is to impute Congress to requirement of futile exhaustion, only in which in issues are not discussed, case in which the actual are in no way clarified, issues which no factual findings are made, and in which there no agency expertise apply. I see no for im- basis puting intent, such an odd especially since, as discussed I below, import believe the clear of the wording of the statute is to the contrary. twice, At least attempted claimants who pursuant exhaust (g) on a constitutional attack on II Title have been met with holding
an administrative that beyond constitutional claims are competence agency. of the administrative In Ephram re See Nestor, Decision, 31, 1958, Referee’s Jan. Flemming at 9, Nestor, Tr. 1959, 54; O. T. In re Daniels, No. Lillian Judge’s Administrative Law Decision, 14, 1973, Nov. cited in Appellees’ Motion to Affirm Dismiss n. 34. This administrative determination and/or jurisdiction agency’s great due Robison, deference. Johnson v. 361, (1974). 415 U. S. 367-368
B I think it under” Title quite “arising clear that a claim II alleges grants is one which the Title some- rights. one certain This claim does not “arise under” if because, applied, the Title the statute itself were certainly Instead, Mrs. Salfi would lose. this case “arises under” the Constitution and seeks to hold invalid the would result which be reached under the statute itself. Robison, construing Johnson v. as supra, well as cases meaning “arising jurisdictional under” in other statutes,10 dictate this result. Johnson,
In construing language appears ante, we 415 U. at 367: S., said, prohibitions appear
“The would aimed at review of those decisions of law or fact administration Ad- arise the Veterans’ providing ministration of a statute benefits for vet- A erans. decision of law or fact 'under’ a statute interpretation is made the Administrator of a application particular provision of the stat- *39 a particular ute to set of facts. . . Thus, . ... '[t]he questions presented of law in these arise proceedings under the not Constitution, under the statute whose ” validity is challenged.’ (Citation omitted.) ante, at that this 761-762, suggests inter- Court, pretation precise turned on the of the statute wording Johnson, specifically construed in on the words “de- any question cisions ... on of law and fact.” as First, quotation above shows, Johnson in fact concentrated upon not what constitutes a “decision” of the admin- 10The (h), upon last sentence of Court relies so §405 heavily, expressly refers 28, to old of Title now 28 U. S. C. §41 seq. Thus, 1331 et appropriate “arising that § assume (h) under” in is used 405 in the same sense as it in is used general jurisdictional statutes. upon
istrator but what is decision “under” statute. But in Johnson significantly, more the statute construed had, and 1970, part: between 1957 read in any question the Administrator on
“[Decisions concerning or fact a claim or law benefits payments any under law administered the Vet- erans’ shall Administration be final and conclu- V) . .. .” 211 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. sive S. C. added). (emphasis Johnson,
See 415 U. at 9. S., n. The italicized 368-369, obviously language quite similar to that used (h). §405 opinion The Court’s in Johnson made clear that holding apply section does not constitutional attacks on veterans’ benefits legislation encompasses prior all versions of the and that section, the “claim for benefits” language way in no affected construction of the statute.11 Johnson, from
Aside our cases concerning meaning “arising jurisdictional under” statutes affirm this claim arises under not the Constitution and under the Social consistently Act. We have held controversy that a regarding title to land does “arise under” federal law “merely because one of the parties to it has derived his title under an act of Con- gress.” v. McDougal, Shulthis 225 U. S. (1912). See Oneida Oneida, Indian Nation County Johnson length why discusses the reasons “concerning payments” claim for language benefits was eliminated. S.,U. at 371-373. These nothing had reasons to do with prob lem of presented constitutional attacks Johnson presented here. The Court “Nothing concluded: legislative whatever in the *40 history predecessor amendment, dames, 1970 no-review suggests any congressional preclude judicial intent cognizance challenges constitutional Id., to veterans’ legislation.” benefits at 373. (Emphasis added.)
797 suit to Rather, 11 “a (1974). n. 676, 414 661, in the laws the origin which takes its right enforce under arising necessarily one is not United States Co. Mining Shoshone United States.” the ... laws Indian Na- Rutter, Oneida 505, (1900); 177 507 v. U. S. Unless concurring). tion, J., supra, at 683 (Rehnquist, con- resolution, a decision dispute requires, for its under federal does not arise cerning law, federal the case be ho there would statute, but a federal if, law even 569; at McDougal, supra, right at all. Shulthis v. Nation, supra, at 677. Oneida Indian jurisdictional in under” is term art Thus, “arising , body of law to the part statutes at least referring, necessary rights in order to determine the to consider applica question. dispute is no about Here, there controversy Security Act; only tion of Social permits concerns whether the result Constitution require. Therefore, which the Social Act would under” arising this case does concern a “claim Title not precluded by (h) and is sentence of 405 II, § last from consideration under 28 U. S. C. 1331.
C arising Not does this case not concern a “claim is, under” Title but not an II, part, least “ac- any added.) recover (Emphasis tion ... on claim.” A three-judge District Court with the “recover on dealt Richardson, aspect (h) claim” of 405 in Gainville v. [a] (Mass. 1970).12 Wyzanski Supp. 16, Judge F. wrote the effect of the last sentence of concerning (h): § 405 present plaintiff
“In
action,
per-
while
does,
Court,
(1972), summarily
This
798
haps improperly, complaint seek his also damages, prayers declaratory has for a 203 judgment § (f) (3) Act, the Social 42 U. C.S. injunction (f)(3) for an unconstitutional, and restraining defendant from section. applying that If to respect he were be successful to with those prayers, plaintiff would not, the language any ‘recover on claim’ for For statute, benefits. recovery of benefits he would still to need to resort process. administrative The effect of declaratory judgment injunction by or court would be to preclude Secretary from making the challenged deduction.” F. at 18. Supp., This holding eminently seems sensible to me. The legislative history and interpretation administrative § 405 (h), supra, at 790-792, and n. 8, reveal no basis supposing that the section to apply to suits which did not request payment immediate part a claim as of the relief. To construe the statute to cover all actions which may later, administrative re- consideration, after sult in eligibility II under Title is to mutilate the stat- utory language.
The holding Gainville, supra, applies squarely this case. complaint The sought declaratory injunc- tive with respect relief to both the plaintiffs named the class, as well as retroactive benefits. App. 12-13. injunction sought was either provide an order to opportunity benefits “an for hearing on genuine- ness their status, plaintiffs and all similarly [for] those Id., situated.” at 13. Thus, even if (h) pre- granting cludes retroactive except benefits under 405§ not, it would (g), under Gainville, rationale of supra, preclude any declaratory granting and injunctive relief class, since the relief requested would not neces- sarily recovery tantamount on a claim. Indeed, appellants seem have as much in this conceded argued since it case, (g) (h) here that §§ were preclusive only regard to retroactive n. benefits, see 1, supra.
The Court concludes that jurisdiction there was over the claim plaintiffs for retroactive benefits for the named (g). (But under Part D, infra.) §405 see Under the rationale, jurisdiction Gainville there would be under 1331 over the declaratory § claims for class injunc- tive relief. And if there jurisdiction was juris- under one part dictional statute or another for action, each surely jurisdiction was there over the whole.13
D I Finally, even if could I agree, and do not, § (g) is the exclusive route for consideration of this kind I case, would dissent from the Court’s treatment ante, the exhaustion requirement of 405 (g), § at 764-767. 13Although argued this case was if here as the District Court granted class, retroactive benefits to I am not sure this is so. injunction benefits, Secretary provide issued ordered the “to original entitlement, they from the plaintiffs time to and the class provided plaintiffs eligi represent, fully said and class are otherwise 961, (ND 1974). ble to Supp. said 373 F. receive Cal. benefits.” added.) (Emphasis out, ante, 6, points instances, As the Court at 759 n. in most see n. supra, person “eligible” a appli- not for benefits until he files an Further, obviously contemplates cation. the order administrative proceedings persons in order determine to whether “such are other- fully Finally, eligible.” indeed, wise if (g) exhaustion of 405 § holds, always prerequisite as Court a eligibility, per- then a fully son would be eligible” not “otherwise unless and until he (g). Thus, exhausts I believe that the order can be read § only require not mandate retroactive but benefits that claims of the class members treated if as the nine-month marriage re- quirement did not exist. Such an order does not constitute recov- ery and, my on a claim view, proper under U. S. C. 1331. ante,
The Court admits, at 765, that the purposes of administrative exhaustion “have been served once the Secretary has satisfied himself that issue is constitutionality statutory requirement, matter beyond which is jurisdiction his determine, and the claim is neither cognizable otherwise invalid nor un- der different section Act.” Nonetheless, Court construes statute so as to permit Secretary “the specify requirements such he [to] exhaustion as deems his own serve interests effective and efficient administration. . . . may court its substitute [A] conclusion to futility contrary as for the conclusion Secretary.” Ante, (Emphasis supplied.) at 766.
If, as finality hearing the Court holds, require- ments of 405 (g) jurisdictional,14 are not then ibid., *43 I why it Secretary fail see is left to the to deter- point mine futility when the reached, power exercised, regard Secretary’s apparently, only to the needs without account taking of the claimants’ interest exhausting remedies,15 futile in ob-
14 ignore language The plain Court has to the order statute in requiring to avoid the absurd result of full all claims exhaustion on one, point futility such as this even after the reached. says judicial only can be hearing,” statute that review had “after a (g), apparent hearing 405 and it is contemplated full, that the ais § evidentiary hearing, (b). see Rather avoiding than stat the utory language holding Secretary that the can nonetheless dis pense hearing, with a the would recognize Court do better to that patent the inapplicability statutory language the to this kind of suggests case the that statute never apply was intended to all to beyond Secretary's constitutional competence. attacks the 15Indeed, in some cases one, similar to this ex administrative functionally impossible. haustion is example, Weinberger For Wiesenfeld, (1975), 420 U. applicant ineligible for man, obviously benefits because he was a a fact apparent soon as appeared he at the Social as office. Not surprisingly, he been unconstitu- have benefits which taining promptly way open the Court leaves tionally Further, denied. since Secre- power, of this application lawless court, assert once the case is tary evidently, can 405 (g), requirements the full exhaustion not assert pleases. as he flagrantly distorts significantly,
Moreover, and Secretary waived say in this case to record their recognizing (g), requirements §of exhaustion lack of here claim a Secretary does not futility. True, the claim, the individual on jurisdiction for failure to exhaust move Court, in the District did, But 1, supra. see n. he subject-matter for lack of dismiss the entire action or for to Dismiss Notice and Motion jurisdiction. See Secretary 114-117. The Summary at Record Judgment, (h): referring (g) said, §§ it is clear provisions, the above “From any on to an individual permitted civil action II Act is an action Title arising under claim Secretary made ‘final decision of to review complaint, however, hearing . .’ The . after . under section allege jurisdiction [405 does not de- been no there has Moreover, .... (g)] ‘final com- herein Secretary on the matters by the cision’ mas application for benefits. to file an opportunity even refused an different, Mrs. Salfi was slightly since Id., 6. This case is at 640 n. *44 sex, by a fact which of her but the obvious fact precluded not application— filled out appear until she did not presumably suggests long enough. Yet, the Court married had not been that she stipulation of a because jurisdiction had that we Wiesenfeld Ante, at 767 n. 10. Does futile. would have been exhaustion that Secretary refused to waive ex- could have intimate (g) jurisdiction, 405 even thereby have eliminated haustion possibly complied with the could not have though Wiesenfeld application from the clerk wrestling an and some- without statute forcing to file it? him how
plained .. . and plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies. The exhaustion of any available administrative remedies is a condition precedent plaintiffs bringing this action [sic] against defendants,’ and the issue is one of sub- ject jurisdiction.” matter Defendants’ Memoran- Opposition dum in to the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (First at Record 65. em- phasis added.)
In the face of this statement, the Court’s conclusion that Secretary purposes determined “that for the of this ” litigation the reconsideration determination ‘final,’ is ante, patently indefensible.
II very briefly. The merits of this can dealt case I believe, apparent For it on face of the is, Court’s opinion today’s holding flatly contrary to several specifically recent Kline, Vlandis v. 412 U. S. decisions, Dept. Agriculture Murry, U. S. (1973); v. U. (1973); Weinberger, S. 508 and Jimenez v. 417 U. S. (1974). Vlandis,
In
we
said,
U.
at 446:
S.,
“[Permanent
presumptions
long
irrebuttable
have
been disfavored
under the Due Process
of the .
Fourteenth
. .
[Clause]
today
The Court
distinguishes Stanley
[Amendment].”
Illinois,
(1972),
Similarly, Murry, supra, supra, both dealt setting in statutes presumptions with conclusive contained The criteria for benefits. eligibility out Government “cri- in which the distinguishes Court them cases as legitimate legisla- . to a teria . . bear no rational relation Ante, presumptions if the goal.” tive at 772. But Murry presumption Jimenez were irrational, been presented have case is more irrational. We even of collusive mar- problem no all that the evidence at very fact Indeed, is at riages one which exists all. continually back the amount Congress that has moved ante, presumption, required avoid the irrebuttable time period set, that for each time 778-780, suggests found, with- people benefits depriving deserving it was problem real of collusion. There any alleviating out period any nine-month believe no reason to likely proportion of collusive high to discard more one-year three-year, than the marriages five-year, employed periods earlier. “The says: administrative difficulties Court determinations are without doubt eligibility
individual *46 may Congress determining matters which consider when rely sweep broadly whether to on rules which more than they the evils with which seek deal.” at Ante, to 784. Illinois, Stanley in But, supra: as we said recognizes higher Constitution values than “[T]he efficiency. fairly speed Indeed, might one say of Bill of Rights in Due general, Process Clause in particular, they that designed were protect fragile values citizenry of vulnerable from the overbearing efficiency concern and effi- cacy may that characterize praiseworthy government no less, officials and perhaps more, than mediocre S., ones.” 405 U. at 656. say,
This is not to nor has the Court ever that held, statutory all provisions assumptions based on about underlying facts per are se unconstitutional unless hearings individual are provided. case, But in this as in the others in which we have stricken down conclusive presumptions, possible specify it is those which, if proved factors disprove in a hearing, would presumption. Vlandis, rebuttable See, g., e. S.,U. at 452. For example, persuasive good health evidence of at of marriage time I would be sufficient, think, should disprove that the marriage was collusive. in Also, in case, as Stanley, 405 S.,U. and La- Fleur, S., 414 U. at 643, the presumption, insofar as it precludes people toas whom presumed fact is untrue from so runs counter proving, to the general legislative policy here, providing true widows and children with —
survivors’ benefits. And finally, presumption here, Vlandis, Murry, like Jimenez, that involves meas- opprobrium; ure of social the assumption is that purposely individual has undertaken to legitimate evade requirements. When these factors are I present, believe efficiency must be sur- interests the Government’s proving interest the individual’s rendered to him. true as are presumed facts Court. District judgment I affirm would