*1 CARCIERI, OF ISLAND, GOVERNOR RHODE et al. v. SALAZAR, INTERIOR, SECRETARY OF THE et al. Argued
No. 07-526. February 24, November 2008 Decided *2 J., Court, J.,C. opinion of the in which Roberts, delivered the Thomas, Alito, JJ., J., joined. Breyer, Breyer, and filed Scalia, Kennedy, and J., opinion concurring concurring post, p. 396. filed an Souter, opinion, part, J., joined, post, p. Ginsburg, part dissenting in which 400. J., opinion, p. 401. dissenting post, filed a Stevens, petitioners. argued With B. the cause for Theodore Olson petitioner Carcieri, Governor Rhode him on the briefs Tayrani, D. Island, McGill, were Matthew Amir C. Lynch, Attorney J. Richards. Patrick Claire C. General Kelly, Attorney Island, of Rhode and Neil F. X. Assistant petitioner General, filed briefs for State of Rhode Island. Joseph petitioner Larisa, Jr., filed briefs for Town Charlestown, Rhode Island. Maynard argued respondents. E.
Deanne the cause for With her on the brief were former Garre, Solicitor General Attorney Tenpas, Deputy Assistant General Solicitor Gen Kneedler, Lazarus, eral William B. and Elizabeth Ann Peterson.* opinion Thomas delivered the of the Court.
Justice *3 (IRA Act) Reorganization The Indian Act authorizes Secretary respondent of the Interior, a case, in this to acquire purpose land and in providing hold it trust “for the of
*Briefs of urging amici curiae reversal were for the filed State of Ala- et by Blumenthal, bama al. Attorney Richard Connecticut, General of Deichert, General, and Robert J. Attorney Assistant by the Attorneys and respective General for their States Troy King Alabama, as follows: of Colberg Alaska, Talis J. Arkansas, of of Dustin McDaniel Bill McCollum Florida, Illinois, of Madigan Iowa, Lisa of Stephen Tom Miller of N. Six Kansas, Louisiana, of D. Coakley James Caldwell of Martha of Massachu- setts, Missouri, Jim Hood of Mississippi, (Jay)W. of Jeremiah Nixon Jon Nebraska, Bruning Milgram C. of Jersey, Wayne Stenehjem Anne of New Dakota, Nancy Ohio, of Rogers North H. of W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Corbett, Jr., Thomas W. of Pennsylvania, Long E. Lawrence of Dakota, Greg Texas, Utah; South Abbott of and Mark L. of for Shurtleff Equal Rights by Benjamin Citizens Foundation et al. John Carroll Goodsell; and Bruce N. and for the of Council State Governments et al. by Richard Ruda and Dan M. Kahan.
Briefs of urging amici curiae affirmance were filed for Law Professors Specializing Guest, by Routel, Federal Indian Law A. Richard Colette Anderson, se; pro and T. Narragansett by Robert Indian Tribe Goldstein, Millett, Jr.; C. Killoy, Thomas Patricia A. F. and John for the by Gershengorn, National American Indians Ian Heath Sam Hirsch, Riyaz Kanji; and A. for the Standing by Rock Sioux Tribe et al. Douglas Perry; B. L. Endreson William R. and for Frederick E. by Goldberg Hoxie et al. David T. H. Sean Donahue. §465. The U. C. 48 Stat. §5,
land for Indians.” persons of In- all to “include IRA defines the term “Indian” recognized Indian descent who are members dian §479. jurisdiction.” The Secre- under Federal tribe now tary Island, petitioners its of Rhode Gov- notified State —the he Island—that Charlestown, and the town of Rhode ernor, accept parcel for use of land to in trust intended his claimed accordance with Tribe in proceedings authority the In- before In under the statute. (IBIA), Court, Appeals the District terior of Indian Board petitioners Appeals Circuit, for the First and the Court challenged unsuccessfully take parcel into trust. Appeals, reviewing of the Court In the determination phrase statutory interpret “now under we are asked §479. jurisdiction” that the Petitioners contend Federal enactment, and to the time of the statute’s term “now” refers permits for members to take land into trust jurisdiction” recognized tribes that were “under Federal ambig- argue Respondents is an the word “now” 1934. reasonably to authorize be construed uous term that can members of tribes into trust for take land jurisdiction” the land at the time that are Federal “under *4 accepted into trust. purposes agree petitioners of for that, and hold
We with jurisdiction” to phrase refers “now under Federal 479, the jurisdiction the time of at the under federal a tribe that was §479 limits the Secre- result, As a statute’s enactment. purpose tary’s taking of authority the into trust for land providing under federal of a tribe that was to members land Be- 1934. jurisdiction enacted in June IRA was when the that the Narra- in establishes this case cause the record jurisdiction when gansett under federal Tribe was not authority have the does not enacted, the IRA was parcel judg- to take the at issue into trust. We reverse the Appeals. ment of the of Court
I Narragansett At the time of colonialsettlement, the Indian indigenous occupant Tribe was the of of much what is now the State of Rhode Island. Final Determination See Acknowledgement Narragansett Federal of Indian Tribe of (1983) (hereinafter Reg. Island, Rhode 48 Fed. Final Determination). settlers, Initial relations between colonial Narragansett Tribe, and the other Indian tribes region peaceful, were but relations deteriorated in late century. peaked 17th hostilities 1675 and 1676 dur- ing 2-year King Philip’s armed conflict known as War. Hundreds colonists and thousands Indians died. See Tougias, King Philip’s E. Schultz & M. 5War Narragansett having placed Tribe, decimated, been was guardianship by Colony under formal of Rhode Island in Reg. 6177, 1709. 48 Fed. 6178.1 quite
Not later, two centuries of Rhode State Narragansett relinquish Island convinced the Tribe to its part tribal an effort mem- to assimilate tribal population. Narragansett bers into the local See Indian Gaming Tribe v. National Comm’n, 158 F. 3d (CADC 1998). agreed The Tribe also to sell all but remaining two $5,000. acres its reservation land for Ibid. immediately, regretted Almost the Tribe its decisions and campaign regain on embarked its land and tribal status. early century, Ibid. In the 20th members Tribe sought support economic and other assistance from the Fed- Narragansett recognized today
1 The Tribe is the successor two tribes, predecessor Tribes. The two Niantic territory European Tribes shared time and cultural traditions at the effectively merged King Philip’s settlement and in the aftermath of War. Determination, See Final Reg. 48 Fed. 6178.
384 spanning correspondence 10- But, in
eral Government. their period officials declined year to federal from 1927 always noting been, request, and had was, the Tribe England jurisdiction States, rather of the New under the than the Federal Government. recognition gain
Having from the or assistance failed to the Tribe Island, of Rhode or from State United States claiming land, ancestral to recover its filed in 1970’s suit territory misappropriated in violation its that the State had § The 25 U. C. 177.2 Act, the Indian S. Non-Intercourse by in the Rhode Is- enactment of claims were resolved 92 Stat. U. S. C. Act, land Indian Claims Settlement by § agreement seq. codified Settle- et Under in 1,800 ment the Tribe received title to acres land Act, exchange relinquishing its Charlestown, Island, Rhode aboriginal past and future claims land based on title. agreed 1,800 Tribe that the acres of land received under also subject to civil crim- the Settlement Act “shall be and jurisdiction inal of Rhode Island.” laws the State 1712(a). § 1708(a);see also ongoing gain recogni- Tribe’s efforts finally tion from the United States Government succeeded Reg. granting recognition, 1983. 48 Fed. 6177. In formal (BIA) “the the Bureau of Indian Affairs determined that Narragansett community predecessors its have existed autonomously despite many undergoing contact, first since Id., modifications.” at 6178. The BIA referred to history dating from noted “documented 1614” and Tribe’s membership able that “all of the current are believed be membership at to trace to least one ancestor on the lists Narragansett community prepared after the 1880 Rhode pertinent part, provides, purchase, that “[n]o Title 25 U. C. thereto, lease, conveyance lands, any claim grant, or or of title or other Indians, any validity in law from or tribe of shall be of nation into equity, treaty or convention entered unless the same be made pursuant to the Constitution.”
385 obtaining Island ‘detribalization’ act.” Ibid. After federal recognition, began urging Secretary accept the Tribe to conveyed a deed of trust 1,800 to the acres to it under the § Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act. 25 CFR 83.2 (2008) (providing recognition that federal is needed before may protection, an Indian tribe seek “the services, and bene- government”). Secretary of the fits Federal The to acceded request the Tribe’s in 1988. See Charlestown v. Eastern (1989).3 Director, Area Bur. 67,69 Indian 18 IBIA Affairs, of housing authority purchased In 1991,the Tribe’s an addi- adjacent tional 31 acres of land in the town of Charlestown to the 1,800 Tribe’s acres of settlement lands. Soon thereaf- dispute planned ter, a arose about whether the Tribe’s con- housing parcel comply struction of on to with had local regulations. Narragansett Narragansett Indian Tribe v. (CA1 1996). pri- Co., Elec. F. 89 3d 911-912 The Tribe’s mary argument noncompliance ownership its of the —that parcel “dependent community” made it a Indian and thus country” § ultimately “Indian under 18 U. C.S. failed. 1151— litigation pending, 89 F. at 3d, But, 913-922. while the was sought the Tribe an alternative solution to free itself from compliance regulations: with local It asked the accept parcel pursuant the 31-acre into trust for the Tribe § By 25 U. S. C. 465. letter dated 6, 1998, March Secre- tary petitioners acceptance notified his the Tribe’s land appealed Secretary’s into trust. Petitioners decision upheld IBIA, to the which decision. See Director, Charlestown v. Eastern Area Bureau Indian 35 IBIA 93 Affairs, sought pursuant Petitioners review of the IBIA decision Administrative U. Act, Procedure S. C. 702. Tribe, town, Secretary previously re litigated and the issues lating 1,800 acres, Secretary’s acceptance to the these and that matter Charlestown, presently generally is not before this Court. 18 IBIA See (CA1 1994); Tribe, Narragansett 67; Rhode Island v. Indian 19 F. 3d 685 Island, (CA1 2006). v. Rhode F. Tribe 3d 16 favor judgment granted summary
District Court officials. As of Interior and other Department the plain determined here, the District Court relevant to include mem- defines “Indian” 25 U. C. 479 language but does not require existence of all tribes in bers on that date. federally recognized have been a tribe to Norton, 2003). (RI Carcieri v. 2d 179-181 F. Supp. *7 it Court, District because is currently to the According the at the time of en- and “existed “federally-recognized” Tribe “as IRA,” the the Narragansett qualifies actment of Id., §479.” of at 181. tribe’ within the meaning an ‘Indian § under 465 result, As a “the secretary possesses for the benefit of the to lands into trust accept Narragan- Ibid. setts.” affirmed, for the First Circuit first
The Court of Appeals Norton, Carcieri v. (2005), F. 45 decision, in a 3d panel F. the banc, then en 3d 15 sitting Although an of that have acknowledged “[o]ne Court Appeals might initial to read the word ‘now’ ... mean [in 479] instinct the statute, 18,1934,” the date of enactment of June the [the] was as to court concluded that there whether “ambiguity the view term ... at the moment Congress operating Id., the enacted it or at the moment invokes it.” at 26. The Court of noted that has used Congress Appeals “now” in other to refer to the time of the the word statutes Id., not at statute’s its enactment. 26-27. The application, the also found that statutory Court Appeals particular of “now.” §479 context of did not the On clarify meaning noted that hand, provi- one the Court another Appeals “now or IRA, sion within U. S. C. uses term “now,” that hereafter,” which supports petitioners’ argument refer But the other itself, does not to future events. on by §479 contains date hand, particular application if wanted to 1934,” had suggesting “June enactment, could have so more to the date of it done refer specifically. Appeals 3d, 497 F. at 27. Court further interpretations supported reasoned both of “now” are policy explanations, reasonable id., at 27-28, and found legislative history “clearly that the failed to resolve id., at issue,” 28.
Having ambiguous, Appeals found the statute the Court of applied principles set forth in Chevron U S. A. Inc. v. Council, Natural Resources Inc., 467 U. Defense (1984), Secretary’s deferred construction provision. rejected petitioners’ 3d, 497 F. at 30. The court arguments Secretary’s interpretation imper- that the was an missible construction of the Id., statute. at It also 30-34. petitioners held that had failed to demonstrate that the Sec- retary’s interpretation prac- was with inconsistent earlier Department tices of the Furthermore, Interior. court interpretation determined that even if the were a de- parture Department’s prior practices, from the the decision expla- should be affirmed on based “reasoned interpretation.” nation for his Id., at 34. *8 granted (2008),
We certiorari, 552 U. S. now 1229 and reverse.
II requires apply principles This case us to statu- settled of tory construction under which we first must determine statutory plain unambiguous. whether text and (1997). United Gonzales, States v. 1, is, 520 U. S. 4 If it we apply according g., must See, statute e. its terms. (2005); States, Dodd v. United 353, 545 v. U. 359 Lamie (2004); Trustee, United States 540 S. 526, U. 534 Hartford A., Underwriters Bank, Ins. Co. v. Union Planters N. 530 (2000); U. S. 61, States, Caminetti v. United 242 S. 470, U. (1917). 485 may accept only “the land into trust §465.
purpose providing 25 land for Indians.” U. S. C. “Indian” is defined statute as follows: all Act shall include used in this term ‘Indian’ as “The any persons are members rec- descent who of Indian jurisdiction, ognized under Federal tribe now Indian persons members who are descendants such all pres- residing within were, 1, 1934, on who June any reservation, and shall ent boundaries of Indian persons or more In- other of one-half further include all ‘tribe’ wherever used this . . The term dian blood. . tribe, or- construed to refer Act shall be residing ganized pueblo, or the on one band, Indians added). (emphasis 479 ...” reservation. agreement, parties we, are in as are that the Secre- question tary’s authority parcel in into trust to take the de- Narragansetts pends whether the are members of “rec- on jurisdiction.” ognized Ibid. Indian Tribe now under Federal question, requires turn, That us to decide whether jurisdiction” to 1998, word “now under Federal refers when Secretary accepted parcel trust, the 31-acre into or Congress enacted the IRA. when ordinary meaning begin “now,” We with the word Director, when the IRA was enacted. as understood Office Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collier- Workers’ (1994); States, Moskal v. ies, U. S. United primary time, At that defini- U. S. 108-109 present “[a]t moment; of “now” was at this at time; tion speaking.” New International Dic- the time tionary Webster’s (2d 1934); Dictionary see also Black’s Law ed. (3d 1933)(defining “[a]t time, ed. “now” to mean this “ noting present ‘[n]ow’ used in moment,” at taking ordinarily a statute refers to the date of its effect ” *9 added)). (emphasis is with . . This definition consistent . by interpretations given Court, to this both the word “now” respect passage its use IRA, after of the with to before and g., States, 216 See, e. Franklin v. United in other statutes. (1910) (interpreting a criminal federal U. S. 568-569 punishment “adopted laws of the statute to have such
389
place
provide
in
for
State
which such
situated now
(1832);
(citing
Paul,
like offense”
United
v.
but omits intentionally purposely acts that Congress presumed (internal exclusion” quotation inclusion or in the disparate omitted)). marks at current is
Furthermore, interpretation the Secretary’s of this Branch’s construction pro- with the Executive odds In with of enactment. correspondence at the time vision IRA, him who would assist implementing those Affairs, Collier, of Indian John explained: Commissioner Act of June 19 the Indian Reorganization “Section of (48 988), effect, L., 18, provides, 1934 Stat. (1) all term ‘Indian’ as used therein shall per- include — members of any Indian descent who are recog- sons of jurisdiction at was under Federal nized tribe date the Act Collier, . . .” from Com- . Letter John (Mar. missioner, 7,1936), to Lodging Superintendents added).5 Respondents (emphasis do defer to Collier’s Thus, we not Commissioner although see Estate statute, of this unambiguous interpretation 5 Affairs, serving In to as Commissioner of Indian John Collier addition Mitchell, principal “a v. 463 S. [IRA].” was author of United States U. 221, And, note, 206, parties appears n. he to have been 21 both jurisdiction” “now Federal responsible for insertion the words under Hearings 25 C. See on S. 2755 et al.: A Bill into what now U. S. 479. Orga to Living Tutelage to to Indians Under Federal the Freedom Grant Enterprise, be Purposes nize for Local Self-Government Economic Affairs, Sess., Cong., pt. the Senate Committee on Indian 73d 2d fore (1934). Also, p. the record contains a 1937letter from Commissioner IRA, which, he passage Collier in even after the stated that any jurisdiction over the Federal Government still lacked App. responsibilities Tribe. 23a-24a. Commissioner Collier’s related unusually persuasive make him an source as to the implementing the IRA statutory meaning language of the relevant and the Tribe’s status under (2000) County, (explain it. U. S. See Christensen v. Harris statutory interpretation that the force an Branch lacks ing that Executive interpretations respect... to the that those of law is “entitled extent ” omitted)). (some persuade’ quotation marks ‘power internal have (1992), Drilling Co., Cowart v. Nicklos 505 U. we agree with his that the “now” in conclusion word 479 limits *11 of “Indian,” the definition and therefore limits the exercise § authority trust under 465 to those mem- jurisdiction that bers tribes were under federal at the time the IRA was enacted. Secretary arguments support makes two other in § ambig-
his contention that the term in “now” as used 479 is reject Secretary argues We First, uous. them both. although “use ‘now’can refer to the time of enact- ment” “it abstract, can also to refer the time of the application.” Respondents statute’s Brief for 18. But the susceptibility of meanings the word “now” to alternative “does not render the word . . . whenever it used, is am- biguous,” particularly meanings where “all but one ordinarily by eliminated States, context.” Deal v. United (1993). statutory U. S. 129, Here, 131-132 context makes clear that “now” not does mean “now or hereafter” application.” Congress or “at the time of Had intended to legislate explicitly, definition, such it could have done so as §§468 did and or it could have omitted the word altogether. Congress by “now” Instead, limited the statute obliged give the word pos- “now” and “we are effect, to if every Congress sible, word used.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., U. S. § argues gap
Second, that 479 left a for the by agency using phrase to fill “shall include” in its intro- ductory Respondents for clause. Brief 26-27. The Secre- tary, permissibly by gap turn, claims to have filled that defining “‘Tribe’” and “‘Individual Indian’” without refer- (citing ence the date of the Id., statute’s enactment. at 28 (c)(1) (2008)). §§ 151.2(b), explained above, CFR But, § Congress gap agency left no in 25 U. C. 479 for the to fill. explicitly comprehensively Rather, it defined term only including “[1] three discrete definitions: members of any recognized jurisdiction, Indian tribe now under Federal [2] all persons who are descendants of such members present residing within the were, 1, 1934, on June
who boundaries of reservation, and ... [3] all other persons In other Ibid. of one-half or more Indian blood.” expand statutory provisions, Congress the Secre- chose to necessarily tary’s particular Indian tribes not encompassed forth in of “Indian” set within the definitions 479 to en- “include” in it understood the word 479.6 Had satisfying compass the three one of other than those tribes §479 Congress to enact have not needed definitions, would specific statutory Tribes. references to these additional statutory go beyond also and his amici justification argue policy had no text to *12 limiting authority trust to those tribes under jurisdiction IRA intended in was federal because regardless strengthen whole, of communities as a Indian pur- main counter that the their status in 1934. Petitioners § pose loss of lands that Indians of 465 was to reverse the Act, Allotment see Atkinson sustained under the General (2001), Trading Shirley, 645, 650, n. so Co.v. U. S. jurisdiction at statute was limited to tribes under federal they time their lands. that because were the tribes who lost competing policy views, because We need not consider these §479 Congress’ speaks for itself of the word “now” use says presume legislature in a statute and “courts must that a says there.” what means and means in a statute what it (“Sections g., e. See, 25 U. §473a S. C. ... ... and 479 of this title 1041e(a) (“The Alaska”); Territory § May 1,1936, apply after to the shall of eligible acquired in trust for its [Shawnee] Tribe shall be to have land 1300b-14(a) (“[Sections ”); § pursuant ... benefit to section 465 this title to the Band hereby applicable [Texas] 465 and 479 of this title made are] (“[Sections § Kickapoo ”); 479] . and shall 1300g-2(a) [of Indians] . . tribe, tribe, the to the Ser apply [Ysleta Pueblo] members of the del reservation”). Germain, Nat. Bank v. 253-254 Connecticut 503 U. S. (1992).7
Ill Secretary supporting and his amici also offer al- two arguments rely provisions statutory ternative that on other § support than the definition of “Indian” in 479 to the Secre- tary’s parcel decision take this into trust the Narra- gansett reject arguments. Tribe. We both argue
First, and several amici by definition of “Indian” in 479 is rendered irrelevant §479 by broader definition of “tribe” in the fact that the statute authorizes the to take title to “in lands the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe §465 acquired.” or individual Indian for which the land is added); (emphasis Respondents Brief for 12-14. But the §479 “any definition “tribe” itself refers to Indian (emphasis added), tribe” and therefore is limited the tem- poral §479’s apply restrictions that definition “Indian.” (“The §479 See term ‘tribe’ wherever used this Act shall organized be construed to refer to Indian tribe, band, pueblo, residing (emphasis the Indians on one reservation” added)). §465 although And, authorizes the United States to take land in trust for an tribe, 465 limits the Sec- retary’s purpose provid- exercise “for the ing simply way legitimate land for Indians.” There is no *13 to delineating circumvent the definition of “Indian” in the §§465 Secretary’s authority under and 479.8 7 §465 Because we language conclude that the unambiguously pre of Secretary’s cludes the respect parcel action with to the of land at in issue ease, petitioners’ this we do not argument address alternative that Act, Rhode 813,25 § Island Indian Claims Settlement 92 Stat. U. S. C. 1701 seq., precludes et Secretary § exercising from his under 465. 8 reason, disagree argument For this we by with the made Justice Ste §465 vens in meaning the term “Indians” has a different than the provided §479, definition of in meaning “Indian” and that the term’s in §465 regulations Secretary’s is governing controlled later-enacted
394 Congress Indians American of amicus National
Second, § (NCAI) argues was enacted as 2202, which that 25 U. S. C. (ILCA), II, Title Act part Land of the Indian Consolidation §479 set forth in limitations overcomes the 2517, Stat. 96 action. Section turn, authorizes and, provides: 2202 apply provisions 465 this title shall of of
“The section notwithstanding provisions section to all tribes nothing Provided, in this section That 478 of this title: any provision supersede of Federal other intended acquisi- prohibits, restricts the which or authorizes, law respect any specific tribe, land for Indians with tion of state(s).” or reservation, independently grants argues that the author-
NCAI “ILCA ity to execute the chal- under Section 465 for the agree. lenged acquisition.” Brief 8. do not trust NCAI We §2202 expand power plain language of does not § requires 465, forth in which that the take set purpose providing only “for land for land into trust §2202 of “Indian” in Nor does alter the definition Indians.” §479, limited to members of tribes that were under which is 4.9 supra, jurisdiction Rather, federal in 193 See at 387-393. §2202 by simply may its terms ensures that tribes benefit §465 they opted pursuant if from even out the IRA post, 404-406, Narragansetts. recognition of See at 409- tribes like (dissenting opinion). When has enacted a definition with 411 §479, this must unyielding provisions,” “detailed and has Court argued “fit be the line give effect to that definition even when could Hector, INS point.’” drawn at a v. U. S. should have been different curiam) Bell, (1986) Fiallo v. (per (quoting 88-89 U. (1977)). of “tribe” “means NCAI notes that the ILCA’s definition which, tribe, band, or group, pueblo, community for members which, is, by § §But 2201 holds lands in trust.” 2201. the United States terms, Chapter 25 of the United express applicable only to Title its Ibid. Chapter IRA 14 of Title 25. See States Code. is codified therefore, authority granted does not itself alter the 465. Section Secretary by to the 465.
395 reject application which §478, allowed tribal members to (“This § apply of the IRA to their tribe. 478 Act shall not majority reservation wherein a of the adult Indians against application”). shall vote result, ... its As a there is §2202 no conflict between and the limitation on the Secre- §465. tary’s authority Rather, to take contained in lands § provides protections 2202 additional to those who satisfied the definition of “Indian” in at the time of the statute’s opted shortly but out enactment, of the IRA thereafter. §2202 reading nullify plain NCAI’s also would meaning of the definition of “Indian” set forth in 479 and §465. incorporated obligation into Consistent with our give every provision effect to statute, Reiter, S., U. Congress repealed plain 339, at we will not assume that unambiguous restrictions on the exercise of §§465 §2202. trust and 479 when it enacted repeatedly clearly have “We stated . . . that absent ‘a ex- pressed congressional implied repeal [a]n will intention,’. .. only provisions be found where in two statutes are ‘irrec- oncilable conflict,’ or where the latter Act covers the whole subject clearly of the earlier one and ‘is intended as substi- ” (2003)(plurality Smith, tute.’ Branch 254, v. 538 U. S. opinion) (quoting Mancari, Morton v. 417 U.
(1974), City Bank, and Posadas v. National 296 U. S. (1936)).
IV jurisdiction” that the term under We hold “now Federal §479 unambiguously tribes that were under refers to those jurisdiction the federal of the when IRA United States including parties amici, was enacted in 1934. None argued Narragansett that the Tribe was itself, Tribe has jurisdiction in the And the evidence under federal in 1934. contrary. Reg. Moreover, is to the 48 Fed. 6177. record specifically petition filed in this case for writ of certiorari represented “[i]n Tribe juris- federally recognized nor under the . . . was neither *15 396 government.” Pet. for 6.
diction of the federal Cert. Re- spondents’ opposition declined to this brief contest asser- Opposition rules, tion. Brief in 2-7. Under our that See accept purposes alone is reason to this as fact for of our deci- sion in this case. this See Court’s Rule 15.2. We therefore judgment Appeals. reverse the Court
It is so ordered. Breyer, Justice concurring. join opinion qualifications.
I
with
Court’s
three
First,
say
language by
I cannot
that the statute’s
itself is determi-
Linguistically speaking,
native.
word “now”
phrase
jurisdiction,”
“now under Federal
25 U.
§479,
S. C.
may
jurisdictional
refer to a tribe’s
status as of 1934. But
one could also read it to refer to the time the
the Interior exercises his
to take land “for Indi-
§465. Compare
Kennedy,
ans.”
Montana v.
366
308,
U. S.
(1961)(“now”
statutory enactment),
311-312
refers to time of
with
v.
Health
Servs.,
and Human
Difford
(CA6 1990)(“now”
1316,
F. 2d
refers to time of exercise
delegated authority);
In re
Estate,
Lusk's
465,467-
Pa.
(1939) (property
363,
9 A. 2d
“now” owned refers
property
operative).
owned when a will becomes
I also
Department
concede that the Court owes the Interior
interpretive respect
agency’s
kind of
greater
that reflects an
knowledge of the circumstances in which a statute was
cf.
enacted,
Skidmore v.
Co.,&
Second, I am that “now” “in 1934” means not only gives for the reasons the but Court also because an ex- provision’s legislative history amination of the convinces me history, that so I intended. As read that it shows Congress expected phrase that clear would make that §465’s employ power could to take land into only respect trust in favor of those tribes in to which the already obligations Federal Government had the kinds of jurisdiction” imply. that the words “under Federal See Hearings Living on 2755 et A Bill to al.: Grant to Indians Tutelage Organize Under Federal the Freedom to for Pur- poses Enterprise, of Local Self-Government and Economic Cong., before Affairs, the Senate Committee on Indian 73d (1934). pp. pt. very Depart- Sess., 2d Indeed, 263-266 suggested phrase Congress during ment official who legislative hearings subsequently explained the relevant its meaning adopts. in terms that the Court now See Letter (Mar. Superintendents Collier, from Commissioner, John §479 1936), Lodging Respondents (explaining in- “persons cluded of Indian who are descent members recognized jurisdiction tribe that Act”). Federal at the was under date of the interpretation meaning
Third, an “in that reads “now” as may prove 1934” it at somewhat less restrictive than first appears. may been That is because a tribe have “under jurisdiction” though Federal Federal Gov- 1934 even know, for exam- ernment believe at the time. We did not so Reorganization following pie, Act’s enact- the Indian compiled Department a list of 258 Tribes covered ment, the wrongly that it left certain and we also know Act; Specializing Brief for Law Professors the list. See tribes off Fed- 22-24; Law as Amicus Curiae Quinn, in Federal Indian Acknowledgment Indian Tribes: Historical of American eral Legal Legal Concept, Development 34 Am. J. Hist. recognized Department The later some 356-359 grounds rec- that showed that it should have those Tribes on though ognized And the De- them in 1934 even did not. partment considered that circumstance suffi- has sometimes jurisdiction” cient that a tribe was “under Federal to show though Department did not know it at 1934—even the time. imposes upon recogni- all, after no time limit statute, (“The per-
tion. term ‘Indian’... shall include all See any recognized sons of Indian descent who are members of jurisdiction (emphasis Indian tribe now under Federal ...” added)). practice suggests And administrative that the De- partment accepted possibility. Department, has this *17 example, recognize Stillaguamish did not Tribe until recognition 1976,but its reasons for in 1976included the fact treaty rights against that the Tribe had maintained Consequently, Department United since 1855. States concluded that land could be taken into trust for the Tribe. Solicitor, See from Affairs, Memorandum Associate Indian Secretary, Request Affairs, Assistant for Reconsider- Stillagua- ation Take Land in for the of Decision Not to Trust (Oct. 1980), Lodging Respondents 1, mish Tribe 6-7. Similarly, Department thought in 1934 the that the Grand Chippewa long Traverse Band of Ottawa and Indians had since been dissolved. Grand Traverse Band Ottawa & Attorney Chippewa Indians v. U. S. Western Office of for 2004). (CA6 Mich., 961, n. 2 But Dist. 369 F. 3d Department recognized considering Tribe, later the it to continuously Reg. have existed since 1675. 45 Fed. Department thought Further, the in the 1930’s that anthropological study an that showed the Mole Lake Tribe longer Department no existed. But the later decided that study wrong, recognized was and then the Tribe. See Memorandum from the Solicitor to the In- Commissioner of (Feb. 1937) (recognizing dian Affairs 2762-2763 Tribe). separate Mole Lake Indians aas my possibility recognition In view, this later re —that jurisdiction” explains flects earlier “Federal some of the — early Department practice instances of administrative explain which Justice I refers. would the other Stevens involving instances to which Justice refers as Stevens taking of land “for” a tribe with members who fall under portion that of the statute that defines “Indians” to include “persons §479. of one-half or more Indian blood,” See Dept. Opinions Relating of Interior, of the Solicitor to Indian (Shoshone pp. Indians), Affairs, 1917-1974, 706-707 724-725 (St. (Nahma Chippewas), Croix 747-748 and Beaver Indi ans) (1979). Narragansett
Neither the Tribe nor the has ar- gued jurisdiction that the Tribe was under federal in 1934. they Narragansett Nor have claimed that member of the require- Tribe satisfies the “one-haF or more Indian blood” nothing suggests ment. And I have found in the briefs that prevail theory. Tribe could on either just Each of the administrative decisions discussed involved post-1934 recognition grounds implied on a 1934 rela- tionship between the Tribe and Federal Government jurisdictional, example, treaty could be described a (in 1934), (pre-1934) with the United States effect in con- (as 1934) gressional appropriation, or enrollment with the I Indian Office. can find no similar of 1934 indication fed- *18 jurisdiction eral Instead, here. both the State and Federal Narragansett Government considered the Tribe as under jurisdiction state, but not under in 1934. And until federal, the 1970’sthere was “little Federal contact with the Nar- Deputy group.”
ragansetts from Assist- Memorandum (Operations) to Assistant Affairs ant —Indian Summary and Affairs, Recommendation —Indian Acknowledg- Proposed Finding for Federal Evidence for Narragansett Pursuant Indian Tribe of Rhode Island ment of 29,1982). p. (July I Because see no realistic to 25 CFR prevail possibility Tribe could on the that the argued theory here, alternative to the theories basis of a I would not remand this case. expressed, join qualifications I here the Court’s
With the opinion judgment. and its Ginsburg Souter, with whom joins,
Justice Justice dissenting concurring part part. Breyer’s point, agree as to one I with con-
Save Justice curring opinion, opinion which in turn concurs with the Breyer subject qualifications Court, to the three Justice puts explains. I have, however, a further reservation that dissenting me in the column. disposition of the case turns on construction of
language “any recognized from 25 U. S. C. Indian tribe jurisdiction.” Nothing majority now under Federal in the opinion possibility concepts, that the forecloses two rec- jurisdiction, ognition may given separate be content. Breyer concurrence, As clear in makes his Justice imposes upon recognition, statute no time limit and in the past, Department of the Interior has that the fact stated ignorant that the United was of a tribe States Government preclude having in 1934does not that tribe from been under jurisdiction federal at that time. See Memorandum from Secretary, Solicitor, Associate Indian to Assistant Affairs, Request Affairs, for Reconsideration of Decision Not (Oct. Stillaguamish to Take Land Trust for the Tribe 1980), Lodging Respondents giving phrase 7. And each meaning princi- be with its own would consistent established ples statutory interpretation. *19 explained respondents
During argument, however, oral interpretation of this statu- more recent that the recognition tory language under Fed- had “understood respect jurisdiction to tribes to be one and at least with eral Secretary’s posi- Arg. 42. Given same.” Tr. Oral surprising Tribe raised neither he nor the it is not tion, jurisdiction in 1934: a the Tribe was under federal claim that party they simply under- an issue that no failed to address equally present. all was shared be The error stood to equitable that one side be demand there is no around, and penalized nodded. when both sides Breyer agree current record that the
I can with Justice might expect particular be that the Tribe no reason to raises jurisdiction in but I to have under federal shown been jurisdiction very stop as a notion of would not there. The litigation, statutory ignored in this was distinct condition history practice body precedent and I know of no gauging giving for the condition sufficient content to deny satisfying I see no reason Tribe’s chances of it. So opportunity Narragansett Tribe an phrase “jurisdiction” advocate a construction of might position favor their here. opportunity
I would therefore reverse respect “jurisdiction” respondents pursue claim and straight fully reversal.* from the dissent Court’s Stevens, dissenting. Justice Reorga- in the Indian has used the term “Indian” are who those individuals
nization Act of 1934 to describe In- special protections federal under and benefits entitled to available specifies shall be that benefits law. The Act dian qualify a result either as as Indian to individuals who remand, might nec- be on proceedings *Depending on the outcome case, going to issue this potential the second essary to address Act, S. C. 25 U. Indian Claims Settlement of the Rhode Island significance confronting seq. utility in it now. 1701 et no There is or as descendants of members of “any recog- blood quantum Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” nized In U. S. C. 479. Interior’s contesting Tribe of of trust land for Rhode acquisition *20 Island, the have focused on the of in “now” parties meaning the mind, Act’s definition of “Indian.” Yet to whether my (as holds) “now” means 1934 the or the time Court present (as it) would have sheds no on the respondents light question whether the actions on behalf of the Secretary’s Narra- were under the statute. text gansett permitted plain of the Act authorizes the to take clearly land into for trust Indian tribes as well as individual Indians, and it no limitation on the places definition of “Indian temporal tribe.”1 Because the Tribe an Indian tribe Narragansett within the Act, of the I would affirm the meaning judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I This case a involves to the of the Inte- challenge rior’s of a 31-acre of land in acquisition parcel Charlestown, Island, Rhode to be held in trust for the Tribe.2 Narragansett §479, In 25 U. S. C. defined both “Indian” and “tribe.” Sec states, tion in part: relevant
“The term ‘Indian’as in persons used this Act shall include all of Indian any recognized descent who are of members Indian tribe now under Fed- jurisdiction, persons eral and all who are descendants such members were, 1, 1934, who residing present on June within any the boundaries of reservation, Indian persons shall further include all other of one-half or more Indian blood.... The term ‘tribe’ in wherever used this Act shall tribe, organized band, be construed to refer to pueblo, or the residing Indians on one reservation.”
Notably “now,” categories word which is used to define one of the Indians, appear does not in the definition of “tribe.” 1991, Narragansett purchased In parcel Tribe in 31-acre fee simple private developer. from a In the Bureau of Indian Affairs notified the State decision to take the land into unre “acquired express served trust for the Tribe. The Tribe [the land] purpose building much Housing needed low-income Indian via a con tract Housing Authority between the Indian Wetuomuek political entity since That Tribe has existed as continuous early century. Although once 17th it was one of England, epi- powerful wars, most tribes New a series of and difficult with the of Rhode Island demics, relations State sharply landholdings. reduced the Tribe’s ancestral apart, particu- blows,
Two delivered centuries exacted a larly high King Philip’s First, toll on the Tribe. destroyed essentially forcing accept War it to Tribe, sovereign guardianship the Crown as and to submit to the Colony of the Then, Rhode Island. the State passed of Rhode Island a “detribalization” law that abol- authority, guardianship ished tribal ended State’s attempted Tribe, to sell all tribal lands. The Narra- gansett originally assented to detribalization and ceded all but two acres of its return, ancestral land. In the Tribe *21 Deputy $5,000. received See Memorandum from Assis- Secretary-Indian (Operations) tant Affairs to Assistant 1982)(Rec- Seeretary-Indian (Operations) (July Affairs 4 29, Acknowledgment). ommendation for Recognizing that its consent detribalization was a mis- century-long campaign take, the Tribe embarked on a to re- coup Obtaining recognition its losses.3 federal was critical recognized Secretary officially to this effort. The the Nar- ragansett as an 1983, Indian tribe in Final for Determination Acknowledgement Narragansett Federal Indian Tribe of Reg. recognition 48 Island, 6177, Rhode Fed. and with that qualified the Tribe for the bundle of federal benefits estab- (IRA Reorganization lished in Indian Act 1934 or (NIWHA) Housing Department Development and the and Urban (HUD).” App. 46a. 3 (and Indeed, litigation against from part this stems the Tribe’s suit with) subsequent private settlement and Rhode Island landowners on ground Act of 1880 sale violated the Indian Non-Intercourse 1834, 730, § 12, 177, prohibited 4 C. June Stat. 25 U. S. which sales “treaty pursuant into tribal land without convention entered Constitution.” seq. § 461 et to exer- The Tribe’s attempt
Act),4 25 U. S. C. to petition of those rights, ability cise one benefit, is now vigor- the Tribe’s into trust for to take land in this contested litigation. ously
II in 25 C. U. S. is located trust to take power §465. That grants provision in- Indian” “any tribe or individual “in trust Indian [an] Indi- land for of providing in lands ... for the purpose terest To effectu- be clearer: could not ans.”5 6TheAct’s language tribal development to revitalize ate the Act’s broad mandate take land can self-determination, the Secretary cultural and for an land into trust or he can take into trust for a tribe Indian. individual trust authority the Secretary’s outlined
Though be considered entities would §465, which specified “The intent Deal. IRA cornerstone of the Indian New was the life economic ‘to rehabilitate the Indian’s purpose of the was [IRA] by century destroyed develop the initiative give and to him a chance Jones, 411 Apache Tribe v. oppression paternalism.’” Mescalero Sess., (1973) Cong., 2d (quoting Rep. H. R. 73d U. S. No. (1934)). Law 1.05 Cohen, of Federal Indian generally See F. Handbook (2005) (hereinafter Cohen); Deal and American Taylor, G. The New Act, 1934-45 Reorganization of the Indian Tribalism: The Administration fully: Section 465 reads more discretion, acquire, *22 authorized, to in his Secretary “The of the Interior is any in- assignment, exchange, or through purchase, relinquishment, gift, lands, or without rights within lands, rights, or surface terest water allotments reservations, or otherwise restricted existing including trust providing deceased, purpose of living or for the whether the allottee be land for Indians. .. be to this Act. shall any rights acquired pursuant
“Title to lands or tribe or the Indian States in trust for taken in the name of the United rights lands or acquired, and such for which the land is individual Indian local exempt from State and taxation.” shall be qualify “tribes” and which individuals would as “Indian” § § 479. An individual Indian, 479 tells us, “shall include all
persons any recog- of Indian descent who are members of jurisdiction” nized Indian tribe now under Federal as well as persons “all other of one-half or more Indian A blood.” § goes tribe, 479 on to state, “shall be construed to refer to any organized pueblo, Indian tribe, band, or the re- Indians siding recognition on one reservation.” Because federal is generally required before a tribe can receive benefits, federal interpreted has this definition of “tribe” to only (2008) recognized §83.2 refer tribes. See 25 CFR (stating recognition prerequisite protection, that “is a to the government services, and benefits of the Federal available by § tribes”); to Indian tribes virtue of their status as 151.2 (defining purposes acquisition “tribe” for the of land to mean “any pueblo, community, Indian tribe, band, nation, ranch- colony, group recog- ería, or other . which Indians, . . is eligible nized special programs for the Affairs”).6 and services from the Bureau of Indian Having separate definitions for “Indian” and “tribe” is es- sential for the administration of IRA benefits. The statute Congress’ reflects intent to extend certain benefits to indi- § g., (offering vidual e. Indians, 25 U. S. C. loans to Indian §472 schools); students for tuition at vocational and trade (granting hiring preferences seeking to Indians federal em- ployment affairs), directing related to Indian while other §476 g., (allowing adopt tribes, benefits to e. tribes to consti- regulations govern recognition process, the tribal 25 CFR seq. 83 et (2008), promulgated pursuant general were to the President’s early mandate established in manage 1830’s to “all Indian affairs relations,” §2, arising . . . all matters C. and to out of Indian 25 U. S. “prescribe regulations may carrying such as he think fit for into effect the affairs,” Thus, provisions relating various act 9. con trary argument pressed by to the before the Governor of Rhode Island Court, Reply requirement this see Brief for Petitioner Carcieri federally recognized eligible a tribe be for trust land does not before stem from the IRA. *23 §470 (giving bylaws); loans to Indian-chartered
tutions and corporations). Secretary by giving discretion to steer 465, the
Section unique. alike, is therefore benefits to tribes and individuals undoubtedly establishing benefit scheme was But this broad presented original IRA to Con- draft of the intentional: only for gress into trust the to take land directed Cong., Compare 2d H. R. 78d entities such as tribes. (1934) (“Title pursuant any acquired to the land Sess., 30 provisions in the name of the of this section shall be taken community in trust the Indian tribe or United States for added)), acquired” (emphasis with 25 whom the land is for (“Title rights acquired pursuant lands or U. S. C. in the name of the United to this Act . shall be taken . . tribe or individual Indian States trust the Indian for added)). acquired” (emphasis which the land is §465 long exercised his trust has immediately years design. In the in accordance with this following adoption the De- the the IRA, Solicitor partment repeatedly Interior advised that Secre- federally recognized tary tribes could take land into trust for qualified benefits who for federal and for individual Indians by lineage quantum. or blood evaluating example,
For when whether Secre- tary purchase approximately acres of land for 2,100 could Chippewa Wisconsin, the Mole Lake Indians of Solicitor “completed purchase until it that the could not be instructed beneficiary title of the trust is determined whether designated title should as a or whether the should be band vicinity be taken for the Indians Mole individual Lake half more Indian blood.” Memoran- who are of one Affairs 2758 of Indian dum from Solicitor to Commissioner (Feb. 1937). Chippewa was not Because the Lake Mole yet recognized by as an Indian Government Federal Secretary had two that the tribe, Solicitor determined recognition options: Department provide “Either the should *24 of this or title to the land should be taken group, purchased on behalf of the individuals are of half or more In- who one Id., dian blood.” at 2763.
The tribal trust and individual trust were options similarly letters, outlined other those post-1934 including opinion with the dealing Nevada, Shoshone Indians St. Croix Wisconsin, Indians of and the Nahma and Beaver Chippewa Island Interior, Indians of Michigan. Opin See Dept. Affairs, 1917-1974, ions of the Solicitor to Indian Relating a pp. 706-707, 724-725, 747-748 Unless and until tribe was the Federal Government formally recognized by and therefore for land, trust would eligible Secretary take land into trust for individual met the blood Indians who threshold. quantum
Modern administrative has this well- followed practice trodden a Absent statute a tribe path. specific recognizing and a trust land has authorizing Secretary acquisition,7 exercised his trust authority governed by regulations —now in 1980 after notice-and-comment promulgated rulemaking, seq.; 25 CFR 151 et § 45 Fed. 62034—to land Reg. acquire 7Although Congress passed specific Secretary- granting has statutes authority tribes, to take land into for trust certain it would be a mistake Secretary authority conclude that the lacks residual to take land into §5 IRA, place §465. trust under 25 U. S. C. Some of these statutes explicit Secretary’s authority properly limits on the can be read trust establishing Secretary’s authority re the outer limit of the trust with 1724(d) See, g., e. spect specified (authorizing § to the tribes. trust land Indians, Passamaquoddy for the Houlton Band of Tribe of Maliseet Maine). Maine, statutes, identify and the Penobscot Tribe of Other while tribe, ing Secretary a do not parcels certain will take into trust for See, § purport authority under 465. to diminish the residual 1747(a) 1775e(a) § Tribe); Tribe); g., e. (Mohegan 1771d (Wampanoag (Miccosukee Tribe). §465 Indeed, Secretary author has invoked his despite the ity into trust for the Miccosukee Tribe to take additional land acquire land authorizing directing him to certain existence of a statute Post-Argument for the Tribe. En Banc Brief for National See 03-2647 of American Indians et al. as Amici Curiae App. 7 and 9 No. (CA1). federally recognized Narragansett. Indian tribes like the Chippewa Grand Traverse Band of Ottowa and Indians,
although recognition denied federal in 1934 and 1943, see Dept. of Acknowledgement, Interior, Officeof Federal Mem Acting Deputy orandum from Commissioner to Assistant (Oct. 1979) (GTB-V001-D002), was the first Secretary recognized Tribe regulations, under the 1980 Reg. see 45 Fed. 19322. Since then, has used expand his trust the Tribe’s land See, base. g., (1984) Reg. e. (setting Fed. 2025-2026 aside 12.5-acre parcel use). as reservation land for the Tribe’s exclusive *25 similarly Tunica-Biloxi Tribe of Louisiana has benefited recognition, (1981), from Reg. administrative 46 Fed. by acquisition. followed tribal trust in 2006, And the Secre tary took Snoqualmie land into trust for the which, Tribe although unrecognized as an Indian tribe in the re 1950’s, gained recognition federal Reg. in 1999. See 71 Fed. (taking Tribe); land into Reg. trust for the 62 Fed. (1997)(recognizing tribe). Snoqualmie anas history places
This brief of 465 the case before us into proper recognition, regardless context. Federal of when it necessary is conferred, is the triggers condition that a tribe’s eligibility party disputed receive trust land. No has Narragansett properly recognized Tribe was as an In- dian Reg. tribe in 1983. given See 48 Fed. Indeed, 6177. that history Tribe ahas documented that stretches back to 1614 rigorous and has met the criteria for administrative recognition, Acknowledgment Recommendation for 1, 7-18, it would be objection difficult to sustain an to the Tribe’s status. With light this in Secretary’s mind, of longstanding authority plain under the text of the IRA to acquire perfectly tribal trust it land, clear that the Secre- tary’s acquisition Narragansett land entirely for the was proper.
III Despite pedigree the clear text of the IRA and historical Narragansett, of the actions on behalf of the (“now”) majority holds one word nestled in one clause §479’s in one of several definitions demonstrates that the statutory authority acted outside his in this case. consequences majority’s reading are both curious and harsh: curious because it turns “now” into the most im- portant limiting only IRA, word not some individuals’ eligibility for federal benefits but also a tribe’s; harsh be- unsupportable cause it would result in the conclusion that, despite recognition, its 1983administrative Tribe is not an Indian tribe under the IRA. telling, Congress granted
In the Court’s when the Secre- tary power acquire purpose provid- trust land “for the ing §465 added), (emphasis land for Indians,” 25 U. S. C. permit acquisitions persons meant to land for those whose membership qualify tribal them as “Indian” as defined argument 479. In words, other runs, the can acquire “persons trust land for of Indian descent who are any recognized members of Indian tribe now under Federal §479. jurisdiction.” This strained construction, advanced by petitioners, explains majority’s laserlike focus on the *26 meaning recog- If “now”: Tribe was not jurisdiction nized or under federal in 1934,the Tribe’s mem- belong bers do not to an Indian tribe “now under Federal jurisdiction” and would therefore not be “Indians” under § membership. virtue of their tribal argument only
Petitioners’ works if one reads “Indians” (in Indians”) § phrase “providing in 465 land for to refer petitioners, to individuals, not an Indian tribe. To this read- ing they is obvious; alternative, insist, would be “nonsen- Reply sical.” Brief for Petitioner State of Rhode Island 3. they argue despite Congress’ This the clear evidence of in- provide Secretary option acquiring tent to with the “provid- either tribal in trusts or individual trusts service ing they unambiguous ignore for Indians.” evi- land And Congress “Indians” inter- dence that used “Indian tribe” and § changeably parts (discussing in other of the 'IRA. See 475 “any any against the United claim or suit of Indian tribe “any in of such Indians States” the first sentence and claim (emphasis against the in the last sentence United States” added)).
In much event, this must be admitted: Without person context, benefit of a reasonable could conclude that qualify multiple “Indians” refers to individuals who each person equally “Indian” under the IRA. An reasonable meant to refer to a col- could also conclude that “Indians” is namely, meaning— “[t]he lective, an Indian tribe. Because may only ambiguity phrases certain or become words —of placed context,” evident when in FDA v. Brown & William- (2000), proper Corp., son Tobacco 529 U. interpretive course of action to widen the lens and look to is clarity. Doing the rest of the statute for lead to so would specifies 465’slast which that the is to sentence, hold in land trust “for the Indian tribe or individual Indian §465 acquired.” simply, for which the Put land Con- gress used the term “Indians” to refer both to tribes and individuals.8 majority reading nevertheless dismisses this
statute. The Court notes that even if the has au- thority to take “In- tribe, land into trust for a it must be an determining dian tribe,” with 479’s definition of “Indian” eligibility. “tribe,” tribe’s The statute’s definition of majority goes on to “Indian state, itself makes reference simply “[t]here is no le- Thus, concludes, tribe.” the Court gitimate way in delin- to circumvent the definition of ‘Indian’ insist, meant majority quite incorrectly, continues to §465 meaning the term as the term “Indian” “Indians” to have same story §479. appears That the text of the statute tells a different to be *27 ignore. an inconvenience the Court would rather §479.” eating Secretary’s authority Ante, the . under . . at 393. majority bypasses straightforward explanation
The a on way Requiring its to a circular one. tribe be an “In- dian tribe” not does demand immediate reference simply require- definition of it “Indian”; instead, reflects the question formally recognized ment that the tribe in be as an explained Indian tribe. As above, the has limited including acquisition benefits under federal Indian law— recognized Recognition, of trust land—to tribes. then, is requirement being the central considered an “Indian purposes tribe” for If a tribe Act. satisfies the strin- gent by qualify criteria established for fed- recognition, including requirement eral that the tribe prove community that it “has existed as a from historical present,” 83.7(b), times until the CFR is a an fortiori “Indian tribe” aas matter of law. Narragansett upon Tribe no is different. In 1983,
meeting recognition, Secretary gave the criteria for no- Narragansett tice that “the . Indian Tribe . . exists as an added). Reg. (emphasis Indian tribe.” 48 Fed. How yet could an be tribe 1983 and today proposition not be an majority Indian tribe is a explain. cannot majority’s retort, that because “tribe” refers to “In- groups
dian,” the definition of “Indian” must control which entirely can be a “tribe,” considered circular. Yes, part word “tribe” is defined reference “Indian tribe.” part by But the word “Indian” is also defined in reference to Relying provide “Indian tribe.” on one definition to content “completely explains to the other is thus circular and noth- ing.” Mut. Darden, Nationwide Ins. Co. v. U. S. part, adopts
The Governor of Island, Rhode for his this logic examples why reading circular and offers two way implausible. argues statute other would be He first *28 §479’s determine a not of “Indian” does definition that if authority Secretary eligibility, to take would have tribe’s any group deems, that he “for the benefit land into trust ” Reply fancy, Brief be an ‘Indian tribe.’ to at whim his the Sec- The Governor caricatures Carcieri 7. for Petitioner long retary’s made clear that This has Court discretion. Secretary constitutional therefore the —lacks —and body community people “bring within a to calling by arbitrarily jurisdiction] [federal them an Sandoval, 231 U. S. United v. tribe.” States condoning acquisi- objection, that next Governor’s Narragansett Tribe would allow the for the tion of trust land acquire tribe that lacks Indi- land for an Indian to equally general unpersuasive. matter, As a to obtain ans, is recognition, “mem- a tribe must demonstrate that its federal bership from a historical consists of individuals who descend Indian tribes which combined Indian tribe or from historical entity.” single political a and functioned as autonomous 83.7(e). suspects If that the Narra- the Governor CFR may gansett lack members is not an Indian tribe because challenged quantum Indians, he have who are blood should Secretary’s recognize to Tribe in 1983when decision properly objection an could have been received.9 such degree Department high “a of retention of of the Interior found [Narragansett] family 1880 and and remarked that lines” between plus intermarriage stability composition, geo and the “[t]he close socially distinct stability group, of the reflect the maintenance of graphic It community.” Acknowledgment 10. also noted Recommendation for voting membership for Narragansett “require applicants full Narragansett Indian bloodlines back the ‘Detribalization trace their ” Id., 16. The does not tell us Rolls of 1880-84.’ at record this case qualify as “Indian” many Narragansett currently how members of Indeed, possible quantum requirement. it is meeting the individual blood quantum Narragansett Indians. significant number of the are blood that a today prevents the from Accordingly, nothing the Court decides independently for those Tribe who taking land into trust members §479. qualify as “Indian” under 25 U. S. C. many Although not how members the record does demonstrate Breyer quantum Indians, Justice never- qualify as blood
In sum, petitioners’ the Court’s conclu- arguments —and sion —are based on a misreading of the statute. “[N]ow,” limitation in temporal “Indian,” the definition of af- only fects an individual’s for federal benefits ability qualify under the IRA. If this case were about the deci- sion to take land into an trust individual who was inca- *29 of her pable proving eligibility by lineage blood quan- I tum, would have no trouble that such an action concluding was to the contrary IRA. But that is not the case before us. By land into trust taking a In- validly recognized Tribe, dian the Secretary acted well within his statutory authority.10
IV The Court a today adopts of a statute cramped reading Morton v. Congress intended to be in “sweeping” scope. Mancari, 417 U. S. 542 In so the Court doing, theless assumes that no quantum member of the Tribe is a blood Indian. Ante, (concurring at opinion). assumption misguided This for two start, reasons. To the record’s on expected; silence this matter is to be parties consistently have Secretary’s authority on the to focused take Tribe, land into trust for the not for individual members of the Tribe. legitimate There is thus no for interpreting basis the lack of evi- record dence as proof affirmative that none of the Tribe’s members are “Indian.” Second, neither the statute nor regulations the relevant mandate that tribe quantum have a threshold amount of blood Indians as members in Breyer’s order to receive trust assumption land. Justice unwarranted true, about Narragansett’s membership, even if would therefore also be to Secretary’s irrelevant whether the proper. actions were argument Petitioners advance the additional that the lacks authority to take land into trust for the because the Rhode Act, 813,25 § Island Indian Claims seq., Settlement 92 Stat. U. S. C. 1701 et implicitly §465 repealed applied trust as to lands in plainly Rhode Island. claim agreed This fails. the Tribe to sub While 1,800 ject the acres it obtained in the Act civil Settlement to the State’s laws, 1708(a), and parcel criminal 31-acre land at issue here was part And, nothing not critically, the settlement lands. in the text of suggests prevent the Settlement Act the Secre intended tary acquiring parcels from would additional of land Rhode Island that exempt jurisdiction. be from the State’s jurispru- [our]
ignores “principle deeply Indian rooted “ liberally in favor construed are to be dence” that ‘statutes ” County Tribes Yakima v. of the Indians.’ Confederated (1992)(quot- Nation, 251,269 502U. S. Bands Yakima and ing 759, 767-768 Tribe, 471 U. S. v. Montana Blackfeet (“The (1985)); p. Indian basic §2.02[1], also Cohen see agreements, require treaties, law canons of construction liberally in favor construed be statutes, and executive orders Indians”). of the plainly authorizes that the IRA
Given light tribe, Indian into trust for an take land be Narragansett’s decision can such, status Court’s (the State) sovereign protecting from understood as one best (the Tribe). Yet in matters encroachment from another political have been entrusted branches law, juris- proper tribal state mark the boundaries between 3; Petroleum Art. cl. Cotton Const., I, diction. See U. (1989); Corp. v. 490 S. Worcester Mexico, v. New U. *30 Georgia, IRA, With 6 Pet. boundary the Narra- in manner that favors drew the gansett. respectfully I dissent.