GONZALEZ v. THALER, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION
No. 10-895
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued November 2, 2011—Decided January 10, 2012
565 U.S. 134
Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General of Texas, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Greg Abbott, Attorney
Ann O’Connell argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of respondent. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Verrilli, Assistant Attorney General Breuer, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Scott A. C. Meisler.*
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case interprets two provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The first,
The second provision,
I
Petitioner Rafael Gonzalez was convicted of murder in Texas state court. The intermediate state appellate court, the Texas Court of Appeals, affirmed Gonzalez’s conviction on July 12, 2006. Gonzalez then allowed his time for seeking discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (Texas CCA)—the State’s highest court for criminal appeals—to expire on August 11, 2006.
After Gonzalez, proceeding pro se, petitioned unsuccessfully for state habeas relief, he filed a federal habeas petition under
Gonzalez applied to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for a COA on two grounds: (1) his habeas petition was timely, and (2) his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right was violated. A Court of Appeals Judge granted a COA on the question “whether the habeas application
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 623 F. 3d 222 (2010). Acknowledging that a sister Circuit had run the limitations period from the date of a state court’s issuance of a mandate, the Court of Appeals deemed the mandate’s issuance “irrelevant” to determining finality under
The Court of Appeals did not address Gonzalez’s Sixth Amendment claim or discuss whether the COA had been improperly issued. Nor did the State allege any defect in the COA or move to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Gonzalez petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. In its brief in opposition, the State argued for the first time that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Gonzalez’s appeal because the COA identified only a procedural issue, without also “indicat[ing]” a constitutional issue as required by
barred under
II
We first consider whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to adjudicate Gonzalez’s appeal.
A
“(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals . . . “(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
“(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).”
When, as here, the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the petitioner seeking a COA must show both “that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 484 (2000).
In this case, the Court of Appeals Judge granted a COA that identified a debatable procedural ruling, but did not “indicate” the issue on which Gonzalez had made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, as required by
This Court has endeavored in recent years to “bring some discipline” to the use of the term “jurisdictional.” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435 (2011). Recognizing our “less than meticulous” use of the term in the past, we have pressed a stricter distinction between truly jurisdictional rules, which govern “a court’s adjudicatory authority,” and nonjurisdictional “claim-processing rules,” which do not. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 454-455 (2004). When a requirement goes to subject-matter jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consider sua sponte issues that the parties have disclaimed or have not presented. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S. 625, 630 (2002). Subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived or forfeited. The objections may be resurrected at any point in the litigation, and a valid objection may lead a court midway through briefing to dismiss a complaint in its entirety. “[M]any months of work on the part of the attorneys and the court may be wasted.” Henderson, 562 U. S., at 435. Courts, we have said, should not lightly attach those “drastic” consequences to limits Congress has enacted. Ibid.
We accordingly have applied the following principle: A rule is jurisdictional “[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 515 (2006).
(2006). But if “Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional.” Id., at 516.3 That
Here, the only “clear” jurisdictional language in
The parties also agree that
It follows that
It is telling, moreover, that Congress placed the power to issue COAs in the hands of a “circuit justice or judge.”5
would seem somewhat counterintuitive to render a panel of court of appeals judges powerless to act on appeals based on COAs that Congress specifically empowered one court of appeals judge to grant. Indeed, whereas
Treating
thy of judicial time and attention and ensures that frivolous claims are not assigned to merits panels. Once a judge has made the determination that a COA is warranted and resources are deployed in briefing and argument, however, the COA has fulfilled that gatekeeping function. Even if additional screening of already-issued COAs for
B
The State, aided by the United States as amicus curiae, makes several arguments in support of jurisdictional treatment of
Second, the State seizes on the word “shall” in
Third, the United States argues that the placement of
ever, is not necessarily true: Mere proximity will not turn a rule that speaks in nonjurisdictional terms into a jurisdictional hurdle. In fact,
Finally, the State analogizes a COA to a notice of appeal, pointing out that both a notice and its contents are jurisdictional hurdles. In fact,
We reject this analogy. We construed the content requirements for notices of appeal as jurisdictional because we were “convinced that the harshness of our construction [wa]s imposed by the legislature.” Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U. S. 312, 318 (1988). Rule 4, we noted, establishes mandatory time limits for filing a notice of appeal. Excusing a failure to name a party in a notice of appeal, in violation of Rule 3, would be “equivalent to permitting courts to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal,” in violation of Rule 4. Id., at 315. And “time limits for filing a notice of appeal have been treated as jurisdictional in American law for well over a century.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 209, n. 2 (2007). Accordingly, the Advisory Committee Note “makes no distinction among the various requirements of Rule 3 and Rule 4,” treating them “as a single jurisdictional threshold.” Torres, 487 U. S., at 315; see also id., at 316 (“[T]he Advisory Committee viewed the requirements of Rule 3 as jurisdictional in nature“). Here, we find no similar basis for treating the paragraphs of
Moreover, in explaining why the naming requirement was jurisdictional in Torres, we reasoned that an unnamed party
leaves the notice’s “intended recipient[s]“—the appellee and court—“unable to determine with certitude whether [that party] should be bound by an adverse judgment or held liable for costs or sanctions.” Id., at 318. The party could sit on the fence, await the outcome, and opt to participate only if it was favorable. That possibility of gamesmanship is not present here. Unlike the party who fails to submit a compliant notice of appeal, the habeas petitioner who obtains a COA cannot control how that COA is drafted.8 And whereas a party’s failure to be named in a notice of appeal gives absolutely no “notice of [his or her] appeal,” a judge’s issuance of a COA reflects his or her judgment that the appeal should proceed and supplies the State with notice that the habeas litigation will continue.
Because we conclude that
III
We next consider whether Gonzalez’s habeas petition was time barred. AEDPA establishes a 1-year limitations period for state prisoners to file for federal habeas relief, which “run[s] from the latest of” four specified dates.9
This
A
In construing the language of
In Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U. S. 113 (2009), we described Clay’s interpretation as comporting “with the most natural reading of the statutory text” and saw “no reason to depart” from it in “construing the similar language of
view of that [out-of-time] appeal.” Id., at 120-121. Because Jimenez did not seek certiorari, we made no mention of when the out-of-time appeal “conclu[ded].” Rather, we held that his judgment became final when his “time for seeking certiorari review in this Court expired.” Id., at 120. Nor did we mention the date on which the state court issued its mandate. Both Clay and Jimenez thus suggested that the direct review process either “concludes” or “expires,” depending on whether the petitioner pursues or forgoes direct appeal to this Court.
We now make clear what we suggested in those cases: The text of
B
Gonzalez offers an alternative reading of
First, Gonzalez lacks a textual anchor for his later-in-time approach. The words “latest of” do not appear anywhere in
Nor is Gonzalez’s later-in-time reading necessary to give both prongs of
Second, Gonzalez misreads our precedents. Gonzalez asserts that in Jimenez, we made a later-in-time choice between the two prongs. That is mistaken. Rather, we chose between two “expiration” dates corresponding to different appeals: Jimenez initially failed to appeal to the Texas Court of Appeals and that appeal became final when his “time for seeking discretionary review . . . expired.” 555 U. S., at 117, 119. When Jimenez was later allowed to file an out-of-time appeal, he pursued appeals with both the Texas Court of Appeals and Texas CCA; the out-of-time appeal thus became final when his “[t]ime for seeking certiorari review . . . with this Court expired.” Id., at 116, 120. We adopted the out-of-time appeal’s date of finality over the initial appeal’s date of finality. Id., at 119-121. Critically, by deeming the initial appeal final at the expiration of time for seeking review in state court, and the out-of-time appeal final at the expiration of time for seeking certiorari in this Court, we reinforced Clay’s suggestion that the “expiration” prong governs all petitioners who do not pursue direct review all the way to this Court.10
By contrast, Gonzalez urges us to scour each State’s laws and cases to determine how it defines finality for every petitioner who forgoes a state-court appeal. That approach would usher in state-by-state definitions of the conclusion of direct review. It would be at odds with the uniform definition we adopted in Clay and accepted in the
bility concerns. Even if roughly “half of the States define the conclusion of direct review as the issuance of the mandate or similar process,” Brief for Petitioner 40, that still leaves half with either different rules or no settled rules at all.11
Fourth, Gonzalez speculates that our reading will rob some habeas petitioners of the full 1-year limitations period. Gonzalez asserts that our reading starts the clock running from the date that his time for seeking Texas CCA review expired, even though, under Texas law, he could not file for state habeas relief until six weeks later, on the date the Texas Court of Appeals issued its mandate.
such a petitioner could file a request for a stay and abeyance from the federal district court. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U. S. 269, 277 (2005).
Finally, Gonzalez argues, as an alternative to his later-in-time construction, that his petition should be considered timely because it was filed within a year of when his time for seeking this Court‘s review—as opposed to the Texas CCA‘s review—expired. We can review, however, only judgments of a “state court of last resort” or of a lower state court if the “state court of last resort” has denied discretionary review. This Court‘s Rule 13.1; see also
* * *
In sum, we hold that
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is
Affirmed.
JUSTICE SCALIA, dissenting.
The obvious, undeniable, purpose of
Today‘s opinion transforms this into a provision that allows appeal so long as a district or circuit judge, for whatever reason or for no reason at all, approves it. This makes a hash of the statute. The opinion thinks this alchemy required by the Court‘s previously expressed desire to “‘bring some discipline’ to the use of the term ‘jurisdictional,‘” ante, at 141 (quoting Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435 (2011)). If that is true, discipline has become a code word for eliminating inconvenient statutory limits on our jurisdiction. I would reverse the judgment below for want of jurisdiction.
I
Fair Meaning of the Text
Congress amended
“(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.
“(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment
or trial a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person‘s detention pending removal proceedings. “(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from—
“(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or
“(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.
“(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
“(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).”
As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 142, all three subsections—(a), (b), and (c)—clearly speak to the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals. Subsection (a) gives appellate jurisdiction to “the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held“; subsection (b) carves out certain classes of cases from that appellate jurisdiction; and subsection (c) imposes a procedural hurdle to the exercise of that appellate jurisdiction—a judge‘s issuance of a certificate of appealability, see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U. S. 322, 336 (2003).
Paragraph
Its basis for proceeding in this fashion is the remarkable statement that “[a] defective COA is not equivalent to thelack of any COA.” Ante, at 143. That is simply not true with respect to a significant defect in a legal document. Would one say that a deed which lacks the words of conveyance is not equivalent to the lack of a deed? Or that a passport which lacks the Secretary of State‘s affirmance of the bearer‘s citizenship is not equivalent to the lack of a passport? Minor technical defects are one thing, but a defect that goes to the whole purpose of the instrument is something else. And the whole purpose of the certificate-of-appealability procedure is to make sure that, before a case can proceed to the court of appeals, a judge has made the determination that it presents a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. To call something a valid certificate of appealability which does not contain the central finding that is the whole purpose of a certificate of appealability is quite absurd.
The Court says that “[o]nce a judge has made the determination that a COA is warranted and resources are deployed in briefing and argument, . . . the COA has fulfilled [its] gatekeeping function.” Ante, at 145. But of course it has not done so—it has performed no gatekeeping function whatever—if “the determination that a COA is warranted” has not been accompanied by the issuing judge‘s opinion required to support the determination: that there is an issue as to which the applicant has made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,”
That is doubtless true, and it demonstrates the hollowness of the Court‘s assurance that “calling a rule nonjurisdictional does not mean that it is not mandatory or that a timely objection can be ignored,” ante, at 146. That statement is true enough as a general proposition: Calling the numerosity requirement in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500 (2006), nonjurisdictional, for example, did not eliminate it, whereprotest was made, as a continuing mandatory requirement for relief on the merits, id., at 516. Even the time-of-filing requirement in Eberhart v. United States, 546 U. S. 12 (2005) (per curiam), continued to have “bite” even though it was held nonjurisdictional: It prevented relief when the failure to observe it was properly challenged, id., at 19. But the Court has managed to create today a “mandatory” requirement which—precisely because it will not be worth the trouble of going back—has no practical, real-world effect.1 What is the consequence when the issuing judge, over properly preserved objection, produces a COA like the one here, which does not contain the required opinion? None whatever. The habeas petitioner already has what he wants, argument before the court of appeals. The government, for its part, is either confident in its view that there has been no substantial showing of denial of a constitutional right—in which case it is just as easy (if not easier) to win before three judges as it is before one; or else it is not—in which case a crusade to enforce
Past Treatment of Similar Provisions
As the Court acknowledges, “‘context, including this Court‘s interpretation of similar provisions in many years past, is relevant to whether a statute ranks a requirement as jurisdictional.‘” Ante, at 142, n. 3 (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 168 (2010)). Thus, we have said that a requirement prescribed as a condition to obtaining judicial review of agency action is quite different (nonjurisdictional) from a requirement prescribed as a condition to appeal from one court to another (jurisdictional). See
When this Court reviewed cases by writ of error, the law required that the lower-court record be filed with the Court “before the end of the term next succeeding the issue of the writ.” Edmonson v. Bloomshire, 7 Wall. 306, 309 (1869). The Court routinely dismissed cases that did not comply with that requirement. See, e. g., Mesa v. United States, 2 Black 721, 722 (1863) (per curiam); Edmonson, supra, at 309–310; Steamer Virginia v. West, 19 How. 182, 183 (1857). The same jurisdictional treatment was accorded to failure to serve notice on the defendant in error within the succeeding Term, see, e. g., United States v. Curry, 6 How. 106, 112–113 (1848); Villabolos v. United States, 6 How. 81, 88, 91 (1848), and to failure to file the writ of error with the clerk of the lower court, see, e. g., Credit Co. v. Arkansas Central R. Co., 128 U. S. 258, 261 (1888); Scarborough v. Pargoud, 108 U. S.567 (1883). Today, when a petition for certiorari in a civil case is not filed within the time prescribed by
So strict has been the rule enforcing as jurisdictional those requirements attached to court-from-court appeals, that we have applied it to a requirement contained in a statute not even addressed to the courts. Section 518(a) of Title 28 charges the Solicitor General with “conduct[ing] and argu[ing] suits and appeals in the Supreme Court . . . in which the United States is interested.” We held that, absent independent statutory authority, an agency‘s petition for certiorari filed without authorization from the Solicitor General does not suffice to invoke our jurisdiction. NRA Political Victory Fund, supra, at 98–99.3
“In the Judiciary Act of 1789, and in many acts since, Congress has provided for [appellate courts‘] exercise [of jurisdiction] in such cases and classes of cases, and under such regulations as seemed to the legislative wisdom convenient and appropriate. The court has always regarded appeals in other cases as excepted from the grant of appellate power, and has always felt itself bound to give effect to the regulations by which Congress has prescribed the manner of its exercise.” Castro v. United States, 3 Wall. 46, 49 (1866).
Jurisdictional Nature of Predecessor Provision
But similarity to a general type of provision that has always been held jurisdictional is not all that supports the jurisdictional character of
“[F]rom a final decision by a court of the United States in a proceeding in habeas corpus where the detention complained of is by virtue of process issued out of a State court no appeal to the Supreme Court shall be allowed unless the United States court by which the final decision was rendered or a justice of the Supreme Court shall be of opinion that there exists probable cause for an appeal, in which event, on allowing thesame, the said court or justice shall certify that there is probable cause for such allowance.”
The last version of this statute, before it was amended to its current form in AEDPA, provided for issuance of the certificate of probable cause by a circuit judge instead of a justice. See § 2253, 62 Stat. 967 (codified at
It would be an entirely strange way of achieving that result. It was not a strange way, however, of dividing the now more complex and lengthy provision into manageable subsections.
Stare Decisis Effect of Torres
In addition to the fact that conditions attached to court-to-court appeal have always been held jurisdictional, and the fact that this statute‘s predecessor was held to be so, we have considered, and found to be jurisdictional, a statute presenting precisely what is at issue here: a provision governing court-to-court appeals which made particular content a required element of a document that the statute said was necessary for jurisdiction; and which did that in a separate section that “excluded the jurisdictional terms,” ante, at 145. That case flatly contradicts today‘s holding. In Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U. S. 312, we dealt with
“The notice of appeal must:
“(A) specify the party or parties taking the appeal by naming each one in the caption or body of the notice . . . ;
“(B) designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed; and
“(C) name the court to which the appeal is taken.”
In Torres we held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over the appeal of a party not properly named in the notice of appeal. 487 U. S., at 314–315. The parallel is perfect.
The Court claims that the jurisdictional consequences of Rule 3(c) were “‘“imposed by the legislature,“‘” ante, at 147 (quoting Torres, supra, at 318), which according to the Court‘s analysis “‘clearly state[d],‘” ante, at 141 (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 515), that Rule 3(c) is jurisdictional. But the Legislature there did precisely what it did here: made a particular document necessary to jurisdiction and then specified
of no precedent for the proposition that legislative history can satisfy a clear-statement requirement imposed by this Court‘s opinions. Does today‘s distinguishing of Torres mean that legislative history can waive the sovereign immunity of the United States? See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 33–34 (1992). Or abrogate the sovereign immunity of the States? See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985). Or give retroactive effect to new legislation? See Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964). Or foreclose review of agency actions? See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 141 (1967). Today‘s opinion is in this respect a timebomb.
To make matters worse, the Advisory Committee Note considered by the Torres Court—as “support for [its] view,” 487 U. S., at 315—did not clearly say that Rule 3(c)‘s requirements were jurisdictional. It said this:
“‘Rule 3 and Rule 4 combine to require that a notice of appeal be filed with the clerk of the district court within the time prescribed for taking an appeal. Because the timely filing of a notice of appeal is “mandatory and jurisdictional,” United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, 224 (1960), compliance with the provisions of those rules is of the utmost importance.‘” Id., at 315 (quoting
28 U. S. C. App., p. 467 (1982 ed.); brackets omitted; emphasis added).
To say that timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, and that placing within the notice of appeal what Rule 3 says it must contain is “of the utmost importance,” does not remotely add up to a clear statement that placing within the notice of appeal what Rule 3 says it must contain is jurisdictional. There is simply no principled basis for saying that Torres satisfies the “clear-statement principle,” ante, at 142, except the commonsense notion that when a document ismade jurisdictional, and the required contents of that document specified, a document that
The Court is not willing to say that Torres is no longer good law, but I doubt whether future litigants will be so coy. They know that in the past, to avoid the uncongenial rigidity of the rule that procedures attending court-to-court appeals are jurisdictional, we have performed wondrous contortions to find compliance with those rules. For example, in Smith v. Barry, 502 U. S. 244, 248 (1992), we held that an “informal brief” filed after a defective notice of appeal counted as a valid notice of appeal. In Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, 181 (1962), we held that a notice of appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate the judgment was also a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment. And in Houston v. Lack, 487 U. S. 266, 270 (1988), we held that a prisoner‘s notice of appeal was “filed” when it was delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the District Court. These (shall we say) creative interpretations of the procedural requirements were made necessary by the background principle that is centuries old: “[I]f the mode prescribed for removing cases by writ of error or appeal be too strict and technical, and likely to produce inconvenience or injustice, it is for Congress to provide a remedy by altering the existing laws; not for the court.” Curry, 6 How., at 113. But if we have been willing to expose ourselves to ridicule in order to approve implausible compliance with procedural prerequisites to appeal, surely we may be willing to continue and expand the process
of simply converting those obnoxious prerequisites into the now favored “claims processing rules,” enabling us to avoid unseemly contortions by simply invoking the ever-judge-friendly principles of equity.
What began as an effort to “‘bring some discipline’ to the use of the term ‘jurisdictional,‘” ante, at 141 (quoting Henderson, 562 U. S., at 435), shows signs of becoming a libertine, liberating romp through our established jurisprudence.
II
A few remaining points raised by the Court‘s opinion warrant response.
The Court holds that the requirement imposed by paragraph (c)(2) (that a COA may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right“) is not jurisdictional, and says that “[i]t follows that
The Court points out that Gonzalez raised the Sixth Amendment issue in his application for a COA, that “[a] petitioner, having successfully obtained a COA, has no control over how the judge drafts the COA,” and that the petitioner, “as in Gonzalez‘s case, may have done everything required of him by law.” Ante, at 144. Perhaps it is true that the defective COA was not at all Gonzalez‘s fault—though he could have promptly moved to amend it. But no-fault elimination of jurisdiction is not forbidden. In Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205 (2007), we enforced a time limit on notice of appeal where the District Court had purported to extend the time to file and the appellant had complied with the court‘s order. Id., at 207, 213–214. It did not matter that the fault lay with the court.
Finally, the Court points out that treating
the time saved to judges and lawyers by an enforceable requirement that appeals be screened by a single judge may vastly outweigh the time wasted by the occasional need for enforcement. That, it seems to me, is what Congress believed.
* * *
Terminology is destiny. Today‘s holding, and the erosion of our prior jurisprudence that will perhaps follow upon it, is foreshadowed and facilitated by the unfortunate terminology with which we have chosen to accompany our campaign to “bring some discipline” to determinations of jurisdiction. We have said that the universe of rules placing limitations upon the courts is divided into (1) “claims processing rules,” and (2) jurisdiction-removing rules. Unless our prior jurisprudence is to be repudiated, that is a false dichotomy. The requirement that the unsuccessful litigant file a timely notice of appeal, for example, is (if the term is to have any meaning) a claims-processing rule, ordering
At the end of the day, the indication requirement in