KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. MELISSA CLOER
No. 12-236
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
May 20, 2013
569 U. S. ___ (2013)
SOTOMAYOR, J.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SEBELIUS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. CLOER
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
No. 12-236. Argued March 19, 2013—Decided May 20, 2013
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA or Act) established a no-fault compensation system to stabilize the vaccine market and expedite compensation to injured parties. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U. S. ___. Under the Act, “[a] proceeding for compensation” is “initiated” by “service upon the Secretary” of Health and Human Services and “the filing of a petition containing” specified documentation with the clerk of the Court of Federal Claims, who then “immediately” forwards the petition for assignment to a special master.
In 1997, shortly after receiving her third Hepatitis-B vaccine, respondent Cloer began to experience symptoms that eventually led to a multiple sclerosis (MS) diagnosis in 2003. In 2004, she learned of a link between MS and the Hepatitis-B vaccine, and in 2005, she filed a claim for compensation under the NCVIA, alleging that the vaccine caused or exacerbated her MS. After reviewing the petition and its supporting documentation, the Chief Special Master concluded that Cloer‘s claim was untimely because the Act‘s 36-month limitations period began to run when she had her first MS symptoms in 1997. The Federal Circuit ultimately agreed that Cloer‘s petition was untimely. Cloer then sought attorney‘s fees and costs (collectively, fees). The en banc Federal Circuit found that she was entitled to recover
Held: An untimely NCVIA petition may qualify for an award of attorney‘s fees if it is filed in good faith and there is a reasonable basis for its claim. Pp. 6-13.
(a) As in any stаtutory construction case, this Court proceeds from the understanding that “[u]nless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning.” BP America Production Co. v. Burton, 549 U. S. 84, 91. Nothing in either the NCVIA‘s attorney‘s fees provision, which ties eligibility to “any proceeding on such petition” and refers specifically to “a petition filed under section 300aa-11,” or the referenced
The Government‘s argument that the 36-month limitations period is a statutory prerequisite for filing lacks textual support. First, there is no cross-reference to the Act‘s limitations provision in its fees provision,
The Government‘s contrary position is also inconsistent with the fees provision‘s purpose, which was to avoid “limit[ing] petitioners’ ability to obtain qualified assistance” by making awards available for “non-prevailing, good-faith claims.” H. R. Rep. No. 99-908, pt. 1, p. 22. Pp. 6-10.
(b) The Government‘s two additional lines of argument for barring the award of attorney‘s fees for untimely petitions arе unpersuasive. First, the canon of construction favoring strict construction of waivers of sovereign immunity, the presumption favoring the retention of fa-
675 F. 3d 1358, affirmed.
SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined as to all but Part II-B.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United Stаtes Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.*
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA or Act), 100 Stat. 3756,
A
The NCVIA “establishes a no-fault compensation program ‘designed to work faster and with greater ease than the civil tort system.‘” Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 3) (quoting Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U. S. 268, 269 (1995)). Congress enacted the NCVIA to stabilize the vaccine market and expedite compensation to injured parties after complaints mounted regarding the inefficiencies and costs borne by both injured consumers and vaccine manufacturers under the previous civil tort compensation regime. 562 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2-3); H. R. Rep. No. 99–908, pt. 1, pp. 6–7 (1986) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.).
The compensation program‘s procedures are straightforward. First, “[a] proceeding for cоmpensation under the Program for a vaccine-related injury or death shall be initiated by service upon the Secretary [for the Department of Health and Human Services] and the filing of a petition containing the matter prescribed by subsection (c) of this section with the United States Court of Federal Claims.”
The Act also includes an unusual scheme for compensating attorneys who work on NCVIA petitions. See
B
Respondent, Dr. Melissa Cloer, received three Hepatitis-B immunizations from September 1996 to April 1997. Shortly after receiving the third vaccine, Dr. Cloer began to experience numbness and strange sensations in her left forearm and hand. She sought treatment in 1998 and 1999, but the diagnoses she received were inconclusive. By then, Dr. Cloer was experiencing numbness in her face, arms, and legs, and she had difficulty walking. She intermittently suffered these symptoms until 2003, when she began to experience the full manifestations of, and was eventually diagnosed with, multiple sclerosis (MS). In 2004, Dr. Cloer became аware of a link between MS and the Hepatitis-B vaccine, and in September 2005, she filed a claim for compensation under the NCVIA, alleging that the vaccinations she received had caused or exacerbated her MS.
Dr. Cloer‘s petition was sent by the clerk of the Court of Federal Claims to the Chief Special Master, who went on to adjudicate it. After reviewing the petition and its supporting documentation, the Chief Special Master concluded that Dr. Cloer‘s claim was untimely because the Act‘s 36-month limitations pеriod began to run when she first experienced the symptoms of MS in 1997. Cloer v. Secretary of Dept. of Health and Human Servs., No. 05–1002V, 2008 WL 2275574, *1, *10 (Fed. Cl., May 15, 2008) (opinion of Golkiewicz, Chief Special Master) (citing
The en banc court then reversed the panel‘s decision, Cloer v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 654 F. 3d 1322 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U. S. ___ (2012), and held that the statute‘s limitations period begins to run on “the calendar date of the occurrence of the first medically recognized symptom or manifestation of onset of the injury claimed by the petitioner.” 654 F. 3d, at 1324-1325. The Court of Appeals also held that the Act‘s limitations provision was nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling in limited circumstances, overruling its prior holding in Brice. 654 F. 3d, at 1341-1344. The court concluded, however, that Dr. Cloer was ineligible for tolling and that her petition was untimely. Id., at 1344-1345.
Following this decision, Dr. Cloer moved for an award of attorney‘s fees. The en banc Federal Circuit agreed with her that a person who files an untimely NCVIA petition “assert[ing] a reasonable limitations argument” may recover fees and costs so long as “the petition was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.” 675 F. 3d 1358, 1359-1361 (2012) (quoting
II
A
As in any statutory construction case, “[w]e start, of course, with the statutory text,” and proceed from the understanding that “[u]nless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning.” BP America Production Co. v. Burton, 549 U. S. 84, 91 (2006). The Act‘s fees provision ties eligibility for attorney‘s fees broadly to “any proceeding on such petition,” referring specifically to “a petition filed under section 300aa–11.”
Nothing in these two provisions suggests that the reason for the subsequent dismissal of a petition, such as its untimeliness, nullifies the initial filing of that petition. We have explained that “[a]n application is ‘filed,’ as that term is commonly understood, when it is deliverеd to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4, 8 (2000). When this ordinary meaning is applied to the text of the statute, it is clear that an NCVIA petition which is delivered to the clerk of the court, forwarded for processing, and adjudicated in a proceeding before a special master is a “petition filed under section 300aa-11.”
The Government argues that the Act‘s limitations provision, which states that “no petition may be filed for compensation” 36 months after a claimant‘s initial symptoms began,
The Government‘s argument lacks textual support. First, as noted, there is no cross-reference to the Act‘s limitations provision in its fees provision,
When the Act does require compliance with the limitations period, it provides so expressly. For example,
Second, to adopt the Government‘s position, we would have to conclude that a petition like Dr. Cloer‘s, which was “filed” under the ordinary meaning of that term but was later found to be untimely, was never filed at all because, on the Government‘s reading, “no petition may be filed for compensation” late.
The Government asks us to adopt a different definition of the term “filed” for a single subsection so that for fees
Our “inquiry ceases [in a statutory construction case] if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 450 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). The text of the statute is clear: like any other unsuccessful petition, an untimely petition brought in good faith and with a reasonable basis that is filed with—meaning delivered to and received by—the clerk of the Court of Federal Claims is eligible for an award of attorney‘s fees.
B
The Government‘s position is also inconsistent with the goals of the fees provision itself. A stated purpose of the Act‘s fees scheme was to avoid “limit[ing] petitioners’ ability to obtain qualified assistance” by making fees awards available for “non-prevailing, good-faith claims.” H. R. Rep., at 22. The Government does not explain why Congress would have intended to discourage counsel from representing petitionеrs who, because of the difficulty of distinguishing between the initial symptoms of a vaccine-related injury and an unrelated malady, see, e.g., Smith v. Secretary of Dept. of Health and Human Servs., No. 02-93V, 2006 WL 5610517, *6–*7 (Fed. Cl., July 21, 2006) (opinion of Golkiewicz, Chief Special Master), may have good-faith claims with a reasonable basis that will only later be found untimely.
The Government offers two additional lines of argument for barring the award of attorney‘s fees for untimely petitions. It first invokes two canons of construction: the canon favoring strict construction of waivers of sovereign immunity and the ““presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar [common-law] principles.” Brief for Petitioner 32 (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U. S. 529, 534 (1993)). Similarly, the Government also argues that the NCVIA should be construed so as to minimize complex and costly fees litigation. But as the Government acknowledges, such canons and policy arguments come into play only “[t]o the extent that the Vaccine Act is ambiguous.” Brief for Petitioner 28. These “rules of thumb” give way when “the words of a statute are unambiguous,” as they are here. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253–254 (1992).
Second, the Government argues that permitting the recovery of attorney‘s fees for untimely petitions will force special masters to carry out costly and wasteful “shadow trials,” with no benefit to claimants, in order to determine whether these late petitions were brought in good faith and with a reasonable basis. We reiterate that “when [a] statute‘s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” Hartford Underwriters Ins. Cо. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U. S. 1, 6 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, even if the plain text of the NCVIA requires that special masters occasionally carry out such “shadow trials,” that is not such an absurd burden as to require departure from the words of the Act. This is particularly true here because Congress has specifically provided for such “shadow trials” by permitting the award of attorney‘s fees “in any proceeding [on an unsuccessful] petition” if such petition was brought in good faith
In any event, the Government‘s fears appear to us exaggerated. Special masters consistently make fee determinations on the basis of the extensive documentation required by
The Government also argues that permitting attorney‘s fees on untimely petitions will lead to the filing of more untimely petitions. But the Government offers no evidence to support its speculation. Additionally, this argument is premised on the assumption that in the pursuit of fees, attorneys will choose to bring claims lacking good faith or a reasonable basis in derogation of their ethical duties. There is no basis for such an assumption. Finally, the special masters have shown themselves more than
*
*
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We hold that an NCVIA petition found to be untimely may qualify for an award of attorney‘s fees if it is filed in good faith and there is a reasonable basis for its claim.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Notes
“(1) In awarding compensation on a petition filed under section 300aa-11 of this title the special master or court shall also award as part of such compensation an amount to cover—
“(A) reasonable attorneys’ fees, and
“(B) other costs,
“incurred in any proceeding on such petition. If the judgment of the United States Court of Federal Claims on suсh a petition does not award compensation, the special master or court may award an amount of compensation to cover petitioner‘s reasonable attorneys’ fees and other costs incurred in any proceeding on such petition if the special master or court determines that the petition was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.”