after making the foregoing statement of the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiffs in error seek a reversal of. the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed a decree of a lower court, directing the consolidation of the сities of Pittsburgh and Allegheny. This decree was entered by.authority of an act of the General Assembly of that State, after proceedings taken in conformity with its requirements. The act authorized the consolidation of two cities, situated with reference to each other as Pittsburgh and Allegheny are, if upon an election the majority of the votes cast in the territory comprised within the limits of both cities favor the consolidation, even though, as happened in this instance, a majority
Prior to the hearing upon the petition thе plaintiffs in error, who'were citizens, voters, owners of property and taxpayers in Allegheny, filed twenty-two .exceptions- to the petition. Thesé exceptions were disposed of adversely to the exceptants • 'by the Court of Quarter Sessions, and the action, of-that court, was successively affirmed by the Superior and Supreme courts of the State.' The case is here upon writ of error/ and the assignment of errors alleges that eight errors were committed by the Supreme Court of the State. This assignment Qf errors is founded upon the dispositiоns by the state courts of the .questions duly raised by the filing of the exceptions under the provisions of the Act of the Assembly. .
The defendants in error-moved to dismiss the case because
Some part of the assignments of error and of the arguments in support of them may be quickly disposed of by the application of well-settled principles. We have nothing to do with the policy, wisdom, justice or fairness of the act under consideration; those questions are for the consideration of those to whom the State has entrusted its legislative power, and their determination of them is not subject to review or criticism by this court. We have nothing to do with the interpretation of the constitution of the State and the conformity оf the enactment of the Assembly to that constitution; those questions are for the consideration of the courts of the State, and their decision of them is final. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is not restrictive of state, but only of national, action.
After thus eliminating all questions with which we have no lawful concern, there remain two questions which are within our jurisdiction. There were two claims of rights under the Constitution of the United States which were clearly made in the court below and as clearly denied. They appear in the second and fourth assignments of error. Briefly stated, the assertion in the second assignment of error is that the Act of Assembly impairs the obligation of a contract existing between the City of Allegheny and the plaintiffs in error, that the latter
Briefly stated, the assertion in the fourth assignment of error is that the Act of Assembly deprives the plaintiffs in error of their property without due рrocess of law, by subjecting it to the burden of the additional taxation which would result from the consolidation. The manner in which the right of due process of law has been violated, as set forth in the first assignment of error and insisted upon in argument, is that the method of voting on the consolidаtion prescribed in the act has permitted the voters of the larger city to overpower the voters of the smaller city, and compel the union without their consent and against their protest. The precise question thus presented has not been determined by this court. It is imрortant, and, as we have said, not so devoid of merit as to be denied consideration, although its solution by principles long settled and constantly acted upon is not difficult. This court
Applying these principles to the case at bar, it follows irresistibly that this assignment of error, só far as it relates to the citizens who are plaintiffs in error, must be overruled.
It will be observed that , in describing the absolute power of the State over the property of municipal corporations^we have not extended it beyond the property held and used for governmental purposes. Such corporations are sometimes authorized to hold and do hold property for the same purposes that property is held by private corporations or individuals. The distinction between property owned by municipal. corporations in' their public and governmental capacity and that owned by them in their private capacity, though difficult to define, has been approved by ihany of the state courts (1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations*' 4th -ed., sections 66 to 66a, inclusive, and cases cited in note to 48 L. R. A. 465), and it has been held that as to the latter class of property the legislature is not 'omnipotent: If-the distinction is recognized it suggests the question whether property of a municipal corporation owned in its private and proprietary capacity may be taken from it against its will and without compensation. Mr. Dillon
The judgment is
Affirmed,