475 F.Supp.3d 355
D.N.J.2020Background
- In November 2018 (revised September 2019) New Jersey Attorney General Grewal issued the "Immigrant Trust Directive," limiting state and local assistance to federal civil immigration enforcement (e.g., barring stops/detentions based solely on immigration status; restricting inquiries; banning sharing of nonpublic personally identifying information, database access, and advance release notices except in enumerated circumstances; and prohibiting new 287(g) agreements).
- Plaintiffs (Ocean County and Cape May County, and Cape May Sheriff) sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the Directive is preempted by federal law (Supremacy Clause) and violates state law; Cape May sought a preliminary injunction.
- The United States filed a Statement of Interest urging a broad reading of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373/1644; ACLU appeared as amicus supporting the State. The district court consolidated the suits and considered defendants’ motion to dismiss and the injunction motion.
- The court held plaintiffs (political subdivisions) have Article III standing under the Supremacy Clause exception, but rejected plaintiffs’ federal preemption claims: §§ 1373/1644 do not expressly preempt the Directive (their plain text covers information about immigration/citizenship status only), and a broader reading would raise Tenth Amendment anticommandeering problems.
- The court also found no conflict- or field-preemption by the INA (federal removal/detention statutes impose federal obligations and 287(g) participation is voluntary and subject to state law). It declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims and dismissed the federal claims with prejudice; the injunction motion was denied as moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing of political subdivisions to sue their creating State under the Supremacy Clause | Counties can challenge state law that conflicts with federal law; Supremacy Clause permits suits by subdivisions | State argues political-subdivision doctrine bars such suits | Court permitted suit: recognized Supremacy-Clause exception and found plaintiffs have standing |
| Express preemption under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 & 1644 (scope of "information regarding the citizenship or immigration status") | §§1373/1644 broadly require sharing of personal identifying info and release dates; Directive is expressly preempted | Grewal argues §§1373/1644 cover only immigration/citizenship status; Directive permits compliance with those statutes | Court held statutes unambiguous as limited to immigration/citizenship status; they do not expressly preempt the Directive |
| Tenth Amendment / Anticommandeering risk of a broad reading of §§1373/1644 | Federal interest requires broad reading to ensure enforcement; anticommandeering not implicated | Grewal argues a broad reading would commandeer states; Directive is a valid exercise of state police power | Court agreed a broad reading would raise anticommandeering problems; adopted the narrower reading to avoid Tenth Amendment conflict |
| Conflict/Field preemption (including §1226/§1231 and prohibition of 287(g) agreements) | Directive frustrates INA removal/detention scheme and prevents voluntary 287(g) cooperation | Grewal: INA duties fall on federal government; 287(g) participation is voluntary and "to the extent consistent with State law" | Court held no conflict- or field-preemption: INA places obligations on federal government; 287(g) is voluntary and state may limit local cooperation |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (federal supremacy in immigration; preemption analysis framework)
- Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (anticommandeering doctrine; federal government cannot conscript state officers)
- Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (anticommandeering reaffirmed; invalidating federal restriction on state legislative action)
- Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (limits on state control of subdivisions; basis for Supremacy-Clause standing exception)
- New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (anticommandeering principle applied to state regulation)
- DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (not every state law touching aliens is a federal regulation of immigration)
- United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2019) (interpreting §1373 narrowly to mean immigration status information; relevant Ninth Circuit precedent)
- City of Philadelphia v. Att'y Gen. of United States, 916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019) (JAG funding and limits of §1373 as applied; district/circuit discussion of scope)
- City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018) (states’ ability to limit local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement)
- City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (local refusal to provide advance release dates does not bar federal enforcement; voluntary cooperation context)
- Steinle v. City & County of San Francisco, 230 F. Supp. 3d 994 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (held §1373 does not require disclosure of release dates; informs narrower statutory reading)