CLARK, FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, SEATTLE, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ET AL. v. MARTINEZ
No. 03-878
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Argued October 13, 2004—Decided January 12, 2005
543 U.S. 371
*Together with No. 03-7434, Benitez v. Rozos, Field Office Director, Miami, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for petitioners in No. 03-878 and respondent in No. 03-7434. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Clement, former Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Patricia A. Millett, and Donald E. Keener.
Christine Stebbins Dahl, by appointment of the Court, 541 U. S. 986, argued the cause for respondent in No. 03-878. With her on the brief was Stephen R. Sady.
John S. Mills, by appointment of the Court, 541 U. S. 1084, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 03-7434. With him on the briefs were Tracy S. Carlin and Rebecca B. Creed.†
†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 03-7434 were filed for the American Bar Association by Dennis W. Archer, John J. Gibbons, Lawrence S. Lustberg, Jonathan L. Hafetz, and Philip G. Gallagher; for the
Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance in No. 03-7434 and reversal in No. 03-878.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in No. 03-878 were filed for the Cuban American Bar Association et al. by Catherine E. Stetson, William H. Johnson, and Gilbert Paul Carrasco; for National Refugee Resettlement and Advocacy Organizations by Peter M. Friedman; for Religious Organizations by Isabelle M. Carrillo; and for Stuart E. Eizenstat et al. by David H. Remes.
Jonathan J. Ross and Melford O. Cleveland filed a brief for Law Professors as amici curiae in No. 03-7434.
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
An alien arriving in the United States must be inspected by an immigration official, 66 Stat. 198, as amended,
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Sergio Suarez Martinez (respondent in No. 03-878) and Daniel Benitez (petitioner in No. 03-7434) arrived in the United States from Cuba in June 1980 as part of the Mariel boatlift, see Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F. 2d 100, 101 (CA4 1982) (describing circumstances of Mariel boatlift), and were paroled into the country pursuant to the Attorney General‘s authority under
The Attorney General revoked Martinez‘s parole in December 2000. Martinez was taken into custody by the INS, and removal proceedings were commenced against him. Pet. for Cert. in No. 03-878, at 8. An Immigration Judge found him inadmissible by reason of his prior convictions,
Benitez‘s parole was revoked in 1993 (shortly after he was imprisoned for his convictions of that year), and the INS immediately initiated removal proceedings against him. In December 1994, an Immigration Judge determined Benitez to be excludable and ordered him deported under
Both aliens filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
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“An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been determined by the [Secretary] to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).”
By its terms, this provision applies to three categories of aliens: (1) those ordered removed who are inadmissible under
The question presented by these cases, and the question that evoked contradictory answers from the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, is whether this construction of
The dissent‘s belief that Zadvydas compels this result rests primarily on that case‘s statement that “[a]liens who have not yet gained initial admission to this country would present a very different question,” id., at 682. See post, at 390, 393 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). This mistakes the reservation of a question with its answer. Neither the opinion of the Court nor the dissent in Zadvydas so much as hints that the Court adopted the novel interpretation of
The dissent‘s contention that our reading of Zadvydas is “implausible,” post, at 389, is hard to reconcile with the fact that it is the identical reading espoused by the Zadvydas dissenters, who included the author of today‘s dissent. Worse still, what the Zadvydas dissent did find “not... plausible” was precisely the reading adopted by today‘s dissent:
“[T]he majority‘s logic might be that inadmissible and removable aliens can be treated differently. Yet it is not a plausible construction of § 1231(a)(6) to imply a time limit as to one class but not to another. The text does not admit of this possibility. As a result, it is difficult to see why ‘[a]liens who have not yet gained initial admission to this country would present a very differ-
ent question.‘” 533 U. S., at 710-711 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.).
The Zadvydas dissent later concluded that the release of “Mariel Cubans and other illegal, inadmissible aliens... would seem a necessary consequence of the majority‘s construction of the statute.” Id., at 717 (emphasis added). Tellingly, the Zadvydas majority did not negate either charge.
The Government, joined by the dissent, argues that the statutory purpose and the constitutional concerns that influenced our statutory construction in Zadvydas are not present for aliens, such as Martinez and Benitez, who have not been admitted to the United States. Be that as it may, it cannot justify giving the same detention provision a different meaning when such aliens are involved. It is not at all unusual to give a statute‘s ambiguous language a limiting construction called for by one of the statute‘s applications, even though other of the statute‘s applications, standing alone, would not support the same limitation. The lowest common denominator, as it were, must govern. See, e. g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, ante, at 11-12, n. 8 (explaining that, if a statute has criminal applications, “the rule of lenity applies” to the Court‘s interpretation of the statute even in immigration cases “[b]ecause we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context“); United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U. S. 505, 517-518, and n. 10 (1992) (plurality opinion) (employing the rule of lenity to interpret “a tax statute... in a civil setting” because the statute “has criminal applications“); id., at 519 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) (also invoking the rule of lenity). In other words, when deciding which of two plausible statutory constructions to adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequences of its choice. If one of them would raise a multitude of con-
The dissent takes issue with this maxim of statutory construction on the ground that it allows litigants to “attack statutes as constitutionally invalid based on constitutional doubts concerning other litigants or factual circumstances” and thereby to effect an “end run around black-letter constitutional doctrine governing facial and as-applied constitutional challenges.” Post, at 396. This accusation misconceives—and fundamentally so—the role played by the canon of constitutional avoidance in statutory interpretation. The canon is not a method of adjudicating constitutional questions by other means. See, e. g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 502 (1979) (refusing to engage in extended analysis in the process of applying the avoidance canon “as we would were we considering the constitutional issue“); see also Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 Geo. L. J. 1945, 1960-1961 (1997) (providing examples of cases where the Court construed a statute narrowly to avoid a constitutional question ultimately resolved in favor of the broader reading). Indeed, one of the canon‘s chief justifications is that it allows courts to avoid the decision of constitutional questions. It is a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts.
In support of its contention that we can give
The dissent, on the other hand, relies on our recent cases interpreting
critical distinction between the question before the Court in Jinks and the one before us today. In Jinks, the county could not claim the aid of Raygor itself because Raygor held only that
In passing in its briefs, but more intensively at oral argument, the Government sought to justify its continued detention of these aliens on the authority of
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The Government fears that the security of our borders will be compromised if it must release into the country inadmissible aliens who cannot be removed. If that is so, Congress can attend to it.8 But for this Court to sanction indefinite detention in the face of Zadvydas would establish within our jurisprudence, beyond the power of Congress to remedy, the dangerous principle that judges can give the same statutory text different meanings in different cases.
Since the Government has suggested no reason why the period of time reasonably necessary to effect removal is longer for an inadmissible alien, the 6-month presumptive detention period we prescribed in Zadvydas applies. See 533 U. S., at 699-701. Both Martinez and Benitez were detained well beyond six months after their removal orders became final. The Government having brought forward nothing to indicate that a substantial likelihood of removal subsists despite the passage of six months (indeed, it concedes that it is no longer even involved in repatriation negotiations with Cuba); and the District Court in each case having determined that removal to Cuba is not reasonably foreseeable; the petitions for habeas corpus should have been
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE O‘CONNOR, concurring.
I join the Court‘s opinion. I write separately to emphasize that, even under the current statutory scheme, it is possible for the Government to detain inadmissible aliens for more than six months after they have been ordered removed. For one thing, the 6-month presumption we described in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678 (2001), is just that—a presumption. The Court notes that the Government has not suggested here any reason why it takes longer to effect removal of inadmissible aliens than it does to effect removal of other aliens. It is conceivable, however, that a longer period is “reasonably necessary,” id., at 689, to effect removal of inadmissible aliens as a class. If the Government shows that to be true, then detention beyond six months will be lawful within the meaning we ascribed to
Moreover, the Government has other statutory means for detaining aliens whose removal is not foreseeable and whose presence poses security risks. Upon certifying that he has “reasonable grounds to believe” an alien has engaged in certain terrorist or other dangerous activity specified by statute,
Finally, any alien released as a result of today‘s holding remains subject to the conditions of supervised release. See
JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins as to Part I-A, dissenting.
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Today, the Court holds that this constitutional distinction—which “made all the difference” to the Zadvydas Court, id., at 693—is actually irrelevant, because “[t]he operative language of
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I begin by addressing the majority‘s interpretation of Zadvydas. The Court‘s interpretation is not a fair reading of that case. It is also not required by any sound principle of statutory construction of which I am aware. To the con-
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The majority‘s reading of Zadvydas is implausible. Zadvydas held that interpreting
The majority concedes that Zadvydas explicitly reserved the question whether its statutory holding as to admitted aliens applied equally to inadmissible aliens. Ante, at 379. This reservation was front and center in Zadvydas. It appeared in the introduction and is worth repeating in full:
“In these cases, we must decide whether [§ 1231(a)(6)] authorizes the Attorney General to detain a removable alien indefinitely beyond the removal period or only for a period reasonably necessary to secure the alien‘s removal. We deal here with aliens who were admitted to the United States but subsequently ordered removed. Aliens who have not yet gained initial admission to this country would present a very different question. Based on our conclusion that indefinite detention of aliens in the former category would raise serious constitutional concerns, we construe the statute to contain an implicit ‘reasonable time’ limitation, the application of which is subject to federal-court review.” 533 U. S., at 682 (citation omitted; emphasis in original).
The Court reserved this question because the constitutional questions raised by detaining inadmissible aliens are different from those raised by detaining admitted aliens. It stated that the detention period in
The majority‘s reading of Zadvydas is inconsistent with these qualifications. If it were true that Zadvydas’ interpretation of
The Zadvydas Court thus tethered its reading of
The Court‘s reasons for departing from this reading of Zadvydas are unpersuasive. The Court says that its reading is necessary to avoid “invent[ing] a statute rather than interpret[ing] one,” ante, at 378; to preclude “giving the same detention provision a different meaning” depending on the aliens before the Court, ante, at 380 (emphasis in original); and to forestall establishing “the dangerous principle that judges can give the same statutory text different meanings in different cases,” ante, at 386. I agree that we should adopt none of these principles, but this is no warrant for the reading of Zadvydas that the majority advocates. Zadvydas established a single and unchanging, if implausible, meaning of
I grant that this understanding of Zadvydas could result in different detention periods for different classes of aliens—indefinite detention for some, limited detention for others.
In support of its reading of Zadvydas, the Court relies on a statement in a dissent in Zadvydas that
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The majority strains to recharacterize Zadvydas because it thinks that “[i]t is not at all unusual to give a statute‘s ambiguous language a limiting construction called for by one of the statute‘s applications, even though other of the statute‘s applications, standing alone, would not support the same limitation.” Ante, at 380. In other words, it claims, “[t]he lowest common denominator, as it were, must govern.” Ibid. I disagree.
Beyond Zadvydas, the Court offers scant support for the idea that statutes should be stripped down to their “lowest common denominator[s].” It attempts to distinguish Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456 (2003), and Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002), ante, at 383, and n. 6, yet these cases employed exactly the procedure that the majority today says is impermissible. They construed
“Although we held in [Raygor] that
§ 1367(d) does not apply to claims filed in federal court against States but subsequently dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds, we did so to avoid interpreting the statute in a manner that would raise ‘serious constitutional doubt’ in light of our decisions protecting a State‘s sovereign immunityfrom congressional abrogation. . . . [N]o such constitutional doubt arises from holding that petitioner‘s claim against respondent—which is not a State, but a political subdivision of a State—falls under the definition of ‘any claim asserted under subsection (a) [of § 1367 ].‘” 538 U. S., at 466 (emphasis in original).
This passage reads the meaning of
The Court‘s “lowest common denominator” principle is also in tension with Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997). There, we rejected an argument that the federal bribery statute,
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More importantly, however, the Court‘s “lowest common denominator” principle is inconsistent with the history of the canon of avoidance and is likely to have mischievous consequences. The modern canon of avoidance is a doctrine under which courts construe ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional doubts, but this doctrine has its origins in a very different form of the canon. Traditionally, the avoidance canon was not a doctrine under which courts read statutes to avoid mere constitutional doubts. Instead, it commanded courts, when faced with two plausible constructions of a statute—one constitutional and the other unconstitutional—to choose the constitutional reading.2 The traditional version of the canon thus requires courts to reach the issue whether the doubtful version of the statute is constitutional before adopting the construction that saves the statute from constitutional invalidity. A court faced with an ambiguous statute applies traditional avoidance by asking whether, given two plausible interpretations of that statute, one would be unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff; and, if that interpretation is actually unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff, the court picks the other (constitutional) read-
This history suggests that the “lowest common denominator” principle is mistaken. Courts applying the modern version of the canon of avoidance should no more look to the rights of third parties than do courts using the traditional version. Under modern avoidance, in other words, an ambiguous statute should be read to avoid a constitutional doubt only if the statute is constitutionally doubtful as applied to the litigant before the court (again, unless the constitutional challenge involves third-party rights). Yet the Court‘s lowest common denominator principle allows a limiting construction of an ambiguous statute prompted by constitutional doubts to infect other applications of the statute—even if the statute raises no constitutional doubt as applied to the specific litigant in a given case and even if the constitutionally unproblematic application of the statute to the litigant is severable from the constitutionally dubious applications. The lowest common denominator principle thus allows an end run around black-letter constitutional doctrine governing facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to statutes: A litigant ordinarily cannot attack statutes as constitutionally invalid based on constitutional doubts concerning other litigants or factual circumstances.
The Court misses the point by answering that the canon of constitutional avoidance “is not a method of adjudicating constitutional questions by other means,” and that the canon rests on a presumption that “Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts.” Ante, at 381. That is true, but in deciding whether a plausible interpretation “raises serious constitutional doubts,” a court must employ the usual rules of constitutional adju-
All of this shows why the sole support the majority offers for its lowest common denominator principle can be squared with my analysis. That support is a plurality opinion of this Court (reaffirmed by footnote dictum in Leocal v. Ashcroft, ante, at 11-12, n. 8), that stated that the rule of lenity applies to statutes so long as they have some criminal applications. Ante, at 380 (citing United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U. S. 505, 517 (1992)). To the extent that the rule of lenity is a constitutionally based clear statement rule, it is like vagueness doctrine, as its purpose is to ensure that those subjected to criminal prosecution have adequate notice of the conduct that the law prohibits. Cf., e. g., McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931). Thompson/Center Arms is thus distinguishable, because our rules governing third-
The cases at bar illustrate well the exception to the normal operation of as-applied constitutional adjudication that the Court‘s approach creates. Congress explicitly provided that unconstitutional applications of
The Court misapprehends my interpretive approach. It suggests that I would “spare [us] the necessity of ever finding a statute unconstitutional as applied,” ante, at 384, and “would render every statute a chameleon, its meaning subject to change depending on the presence or absence of constitutional concerns in each individual case,” ante, at 382. My approach does none of this. I simply would read ambiguous statutes to avoid as-applied constitutional doubts only if those doubts are present in the case before the Court. This leaves plenty of room for as-applied invalidation of statutes that are unambiguously unconstitutional. Nor would I permit a court to read every statute‘s meaning to depend on constitutional concerns. That is permissible, in my view, only if the statute is ambiguous. Granted, I am thereby guilty of leaving courts free to interpret ambiguous statutes “as becoming inoperative when they ‘approach constitutional limits.‘” ante, at 384. That is hardly an absurd result—unless one considers the modern canon of constitutional
In truth, the Court‘s aggressive application of modern constitutional avoidance doctrine poses the greater danger. A disturbing number of this Court‘s cases have applied the canon of constitutional doubt to statutes that were on their face clear. See, e. g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 327-336 (2001) (SCALIA, J., dissenting); Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U. S. 440, 481-482 (1989) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U. S. 181, 212-213 (1985) (White, J., concurring in result). This Court and others may now employ the “lowest common denominator” approach to limit the application of statutes wholesale by searching for hypothetical unconstitutional applications of them—or, worse yet, hypothetical constitutional doubts—despite the absence of any facial constitutional problem (at least, so long as those hypothetical doubts pose “a multitude of constitutional problems,” ante, at 380-381). This is so even if Congress has expressed its clear intent that unconstitutional applications should be severed from constitutional applications, regardless of whether the challenger has third-party standing to raise the constitutional issue, and without the need to engage in full-fledged constitutional analysis.
This danger is real. In St. Cyr, this Court held that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) did not divest district courts of jurisdiction under
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The Court is also mistaken in affording Zadvydas stare decisis effect. Zadvydas was wrong in both its statutory and its constitutional analysis for the reasons expressed well by the dissents in that case. See 533 U. S., at 705-718 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.); id., at 702-705 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). I continue to adhere to those views and will not repeat the analysis of my colleagues. I write only to explain why I do not consider Zadvydas to bind us.
Zadvydas cast itself as a statutory case, but that fact should not prevent us from overruling it. It is true that we give stronger stare decisis effect to our holdings in statutory
Zadvydas’ reading of
Application of those traditional tools begins and ends with the text of
Even apart from the Court‘s incredible reading of
The Court points to
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For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Notes
“The [Secretary] may... in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the [Secretary], have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.”
