DEBRA METRIS-SHAMOON, ET AL. v. CITY OF DETROIT, ET AL.
Case No. 18-13683
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE ARTHUR J. TARNOW; U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE R. STEVEN WHALEN
This case stems from the September 13, 2012, raid of Plaintiffs’ homegrown medical marijuana business by members of the now defunct Detroit Police Department (“DPD“) Narcotics Unit. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10). Plaintiffs initially brought claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments via
Defendants argue in their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [121] that Plaintiffs’ action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that their Amended Complaint fails to put Defendants on notice as to what they allegedly did to violate the Constitution. (ECF No. 121, PageID.2287). Defendants argue in their Motion for Summary Judgment [123] that Sgt. Geelhood is entitled to qualified immunity and that Plaintiffs have failed to set forth genuine issues of material fact as to their Fourth Amendment and municipal liability claims. (ECF No. 123, PageID.2472, 2483). For the reasons articulated below, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [121] will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [123] will be DENIED. Plaintiffs will be permitted to proceed to trial only on their municipal liability claim.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 13, 2012, Sgt. Stephen Geelhood of the DPD swore out an affidavit in support of a search warrant for two houses—one located on Kings Dr., the other located on Wiloray Ave.—in Shelby Township, Michigan. (ECF No. 126-
After finding no evidence of criminal activity at the Kings Dr. address, the Narcotics Crew made their way to the Wiloray Ave. address, home to Plaintiffs Mukhlis (“Mark“) Shamoon and Debra Metris-Shamoon (“the Shamoons“), where Debra‘s elderly parents, Plaintiffs Paul and Julia Metris (“the Metrises“), were visiting for lunch. (ECF No. 123-2, PageID.2565; ECF No. 126-3, PageID.3076;
I. PLAINTIFFS’ VERSION
Carl was the first to notice something unusual was happening. He was traveling to the Wiloray Ave. house to pick up some clothes for an upcoming trip with the Shamoon‘s son, Adam, and observed a DPD vehicle following him. (ECF
Before Carl could get out of his truck, two Crew Members approached. (ECF No. 123-19, PageID.2981-82). The Crew Members did not identify themselves, though Carl later learned that one of them was Sgt. Tucker. (Id.). Sgt. Tucker pointed a shotgun at Carl‘s head through the passenger-side window; the other officer, armed with an assault rifle, “opened up the driver‘s side door, pulled [Carl] out by [his] shirt, slammed [him] to the ground, ... cuffed [him,] and then picked [him] up and took [him] to the back of [his] truck.” (Id. at 2982). Carl then observed several Crew Members break into the house through the front door without announcing their presence, while two others proceeded around the side of the house towards the back yard. (ECF No. 123-19, PageID.2894).
Inside, Debra and her parents were having coffee. (ECF No. 126-3, PageID.3077; ECF No. 123-17, PageID.2890; ECF No. 123-18, PageID.2945, 2948). Debra had just started a phone call with Adam, who was attempting to pass along what Carl had told him, when Crew Members burst through the front door. (ECF No. 126-3, PageID.3076, 3080; ECF No. 123-17, PageID.2890-91; ECF No.
Outside, in the back yard, Mark was preparing to grill some steaks for lunch. (ECF No. 126-59, PageID.3982). Two Crew Members approached with guns aimed at his head and told him to drop what he was holding and put his hands up. (Id. at 3982, 3989). He was led to the front of the house, handcuffed behind his back, and directed to stand near Carl at the back of the Carl‘s truck. (Id. at 3982-83; ECF No. 123-19, PageID.2988). The two were instructed not to communicate with one another. (ECF No. 123-19, PageID.2984). Mark, who had a history of shoulder
Prior to Mark being taken inside, Crew Members searched Carl‘s truck and questioned him about why he had come to the house. (ECF No. 123-19, PageID.2989). While conducting the search, which lasted about ten minutes, Crew Members punctured one of Carl‘s seats and “completely ripped everything out” of his vehicle, destroying the sound system. (Id. at 2998). Carl remained outside after Mark was taken into the house. (Id. at 2995). Eventually, about forty-five minutes after he had first arrived, Carl‘s handcuffs were removed, and he was instructed to leave. (Id.).
Back inside, Crew Members led Mark to the kitchen where Debra was being questioned and began to question him as well. (ECF No. 126-59, PageID.3984). They first asked Mark how much money was in his safe and instructed him to open it. (Id.). When he complied, Crew Members confiscated the $200 they found in the safe as well as $115 they found in Mark‘s wallet. (Id.). Two other safes were also in the house. One, an antique for which Mark did not have the combination, was broken
In addition to taking $315 from Mark, Crew Members confiscated all of the Shamoon‘s marijuana—just under seventy live plants—as well as their lawfully owned firearms. (ECF No. 123-15, PageID.2842; 2848). Both Mark and Debra were licensed medical marijuana caregivers and they cared for their plants jointly. (ECF No. 126-3, PageID.3069). Debra offered to let the Narcotics Crew see their paperwork and caregiver cards, but they were not interested. (Id. at 3071).
The Narcotics Crew left the Shamoon‘s home with as little notice as they provided upon entry. All in all, the raid lasted about an hour and a half or two hours and no warrant was displayed. (Id. at 3061, 3080). None of the Plaintiffs were charged with any crimes after the raid. (ECF No. 126-59, PageID.3980-81). Crew Members forgot to remove Mark‘s handcuffs before they left, and he remained cuffed for approximately ten hours. (ECF No. 126-59, PageID.3986; ECF No. 126-66, PageID.4029). Eventually, Mark‘s son, who worked in security and had his own handcuffs, was able to unlock Mark‘s cuffs. (ECF No. 123-15, PageID.2849, 2856).
Before the Narcotics Crew broke through the front door of the Shamoon‘s home, they announced “police, search warrant” and received no response. (ECF No. 123-2, PageID.2620). Their warrant, which would have been left at the scene, had been lawfully procured by Sgt. Geelhood. (Id. at 2616-20). He based his affidavit on information from a CI, which he corroborated with his own surveillance. (Id. at 2510). The CI, whom Sgt. Geelhood knew only as “Harry,” is now deceased. (ECF No. 132-2, PageID.4124-31). Sgt. Geelhood does not have any records documenting the information he received from the CI or his own surveillance because, “as a matter of practice, [he does] not keep records or notes when using [a CI] and [does] not keep records from previous investigations.” (ECF No. 126-48, PageID.3740).
After the Narcotics Crew forced their way into the Shamoon‘s home, they observed that there were no medical marijuana cards on display and concluded that “[n]othing about the grow operation was legal.” (ECF No. 123-2, PageID.2580). Accordingly, Sgt. Geelhood deemed it unnecessary to ask for proof of licensure or inquire about whether there was more than one licensed provider. (Id.). Despite the operation‘s apparent illegality, Sgt. Geelhood declined to charge the Shamoons with a crime because he thought it might hinder future investigations and hoped to obtain
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs allege that they were asserted class members in the case of Davis v. City of Detroit, et. al., No. 15-10547 (E.D. Mich.), filed February 11, 2015. (ECF No. 121-2, PageID.2311-15). The Davises claimed that they had been subject to illegal raids conducted by members of the DPD Narcotics Unit and sought institutional liability against the City of Detroit. (Id.). Once the Davises had an opportunity to conduct discovery, they were able to determine the specific officers involved, and filed an amended complaint on July 14, 2015, identifying those officers, who included Sgt. Geelhood. The Davises moved for class certification on July 14, 2016, but their motion was ultimately denied by Judge Borman on August 31, 2018. (ECF No. 121-4; ECF No. 121-6).
Upon denial of class certification, several putative class members filed individual lawsuits.3 Plaintiffs here filed suit against the City of Detroit and several “Doe” DPD personnel on November 26, 2018. (Compl.). Through the discovery process, Plaintiffs identified Sgts. Joe Tucker, Candace Matschikowski, and Stephen
Plaintiffs have agreed to dismiss Defendants Johnson, Matschikowski, Davis, and Tucker, as well as their Fourteenth Amendment claim. (ECF No. 128, PageID.4037; ECF No. 123, PageID.2458). Remaining are Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim against Sgt. Geelhood and Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claim against the City of Detroit. (ECF No. 125, PageID.3014).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(C)
Courts review a
II. FED. R. CIV. P. 56
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating an absence of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
If the moving party meets this burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish a “genuine issue” for trial via “specific facts.” Additionally, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment when the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party‘s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Abu-Joudeh, 954 F.3d at 840 (citations omitted) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 324).
The court views all of the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws “all justifiable inferences” in the nonmoving party‘s favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “In other words, ‘at the summary judgment stage[,] the judge‘s function is not ... to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to
ANALYSIS
I. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [121]
a. Statute of Limitations
Defendants first argue they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings because the statute of limitations has run on Plaintiffs’ claims. (ECF No. 121, PageID.2287). In Michigan, the statute of limitations for
Plaintiffs will benefit from American Pipe tolling as to the City of Detroit if they are deemed asserted class members in Davis v. City of Detroit, et. al., No. 15-10547 (E.D. Mich.). Defendants contend Plaintiffs are not asserted class members, while Plaintiffs argue they are. (ECF No. 121, PageID.2299-2303; ECF No. 128, PageID.4042-46). The Davises set forth six identifiers for their proposed class:
(a) individuals who were the owners and/or occupants of homes and/or businesses engaged in the licensed distribution of marijuana for medical purposes; (b) who were subjected to search and/or seizure by agents and/or members of the Detroit Police Department‘s Narcotics’ Unit; [(c)] from the period of February 11, 2012 until the date of judgment or settlement of this case; [(d)] who were never convicted of any offense arising from the search and/or seizure; [(e)] whose search and seizure were executed without probable cause; and [(f)] where such searches and/or seizures were conducted pursuant to Defendant City of Detroit‘s policies, practices, and/or customs.
(ECF No.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to meet the first identifier because they have not alleged specific facts showing “they were operating in compliance with the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act.” (ECF No. 121, PageID.2300). But this asks the Court to read an additional identifier into the class definition that simply is not there. Moreover, even if the Court were to infer this additional identifier, Defendants’ analysis would fail. Nothing in the record suggests that Plaintiffs engaged differently in the distribution of marijuana than the plaintiffs in the Davis action.
From the time the raid took place on September 13, 2012, until February 11, 2015, 881 days had run on the statute of limitations. Another eighty-seven days elapsed between August 31, 2018, when class certification was denied, and November 26, 2018, when Plaintiffs commenced this action. Because the total number of days (968) is fewer than 1,095 (three years), the statute of limitations does not bar Plaintiffs’ claims against the City of Detroit.
ii. Sgt. Geelhood
According to Defendants, Sgt. Geelhood is subject to a separate tolling calculation because he was given a “John Doe” placeholder in the original Davis complaint and was not added by name until it was amended on July 14, 2015. (ECF No. 121, PageID.2297; ECF No. 121-2, PageID.230; ECF No. 121-3, PageID.2318).
In general, American Pipe tolling only applies to defendants named in the prior related class action. Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 568 (6th Cir. 2005). Plaintiffs concede that Sgt. Geelhood was not named in the original Davis complaint but argue that the February 11, 2015, tolling date should apply because the July 14, 2015, amendment related back to the original complaint. (ECF No. 128, PageID.4039).
b. Adequate Pleading
Defendants next argue that “the Amended Complaint fails ... to specify which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged constitutional violation.” (ECF No. 121, PageID.2303). Because all that remains is Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claim, this argument is moot.
II. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
a. An Underlying Constitutional Violation
Defendants next argue that there has not been an underlying constitutional violation, and that without such a violation, there cannot be municipal liability under Monell v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (ECF No. 123, PageID.2483). Defendants are correct that “[a] municipality or county cannot be liable under
It is axiomatic that “an officer [or investigator] cannot rely on a judicial determination of probable cause if that officer knowingly makes false statements and omissions to the judge such that but for these falsities the judge would not have issued the warrant.” Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Yancey v. Carroll County, 876 F.2d 1238, 1243 (6th Cir. 1989)) (alteration in original). “Such reliance is unreasonable, and [search or seizure] ... pursuant to such
Here, Plaintiffs allege that the material portions of Sgt. Geelhood‘s warrant affidavit—his claims of being tipped off by a CI called Harry and conducting independent surveillance—were untruthful, and that the resulting raid on the Shamoon‘s home was invalid. (ECF No. 125, PageID.3019). As an initial matter, the Court agrees that without the alleged tip and surveillance, the only evidence in support of the warrant would have been excessive electricity use, which could not have supported a finding of probable cause. (ECF No. 126-1, PageID.3053-54); see United States v. Thomas, 605 F.3d 300, 315 (6th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the question is whether Plaintiffs’ evidence creates a reasonable dispute of material fact as to whether Sgt. Geelhood received and corroborated a tip from a CI. The Court finds that it does.
First, although Defendants have produced a death certificate for an individual whom Sgt. Geelhood apparently knew as “Harry,” nothing in the record apart from Sgt. Geelhood‘s word connects Harry to the Shamoons, narcotics trafficking, or anything in this case. (ECF No. 132-3, ECF No. 132-4, ECF No. 132-5, ECF No.
Second, while Sgt. Geelhood claims to have surveilled the Shamoon‘s address on approximately five occasions prior to seeking a warrant, Defendants have produced no documentary evidence in support of this claim. (ECF No. 126-50, PageID.3768; ECF No. 132-7, PageID.4158). According to Deputy Chief Fitzgerald, DPD officers are required to document their surveillance, even if it is just jotting a
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Sgt. Geelhood included knowingly false statements in his warrant affidavit with the intent to mislead the issuing judge.7 Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs must make a “strong preliminary showing” (i.e. go beyond merely establishing a question of fact) is unpersuasive. (ECF No. 123, PageID.2474). In
when qualified immunity is at issue or where there are no “factual questions underlying the probable-cause determination.” Harmon v. Hamilton Cty., 675 F. App‘x 532, 543 (6th Cir. 2017); see Vakilian, 335 F.3d at 517.
b. Monell Liability
It is well established that “[a] municipality may not be held liable under
A plaintiff can make a showing of an illegal policy or custom by demonstrating one of the following: (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.
Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005)). Here, Plaintiffs allege liability under the second, third, and fourth theories. (ECF No. 125, PageID.3029).
i. Actions Taken By Officials with Final Decision-Making Authority (i.e. Ratification Theory)
Where an “authorized policymaker[] approve[s] a subordinate‘s decision and the basis for it, their ratification [is] chargeable to the municipality.” St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality opinion). Here, Plaintiffs argue that “the numerosity of [allegedly] illegal raids” by the Narcotics Unit makes “the City . . . liable for the unconstitutional conduct of its sergeants who were the highest-ranking officers in charge of th[ose] raids.” (ECF No. 125, PageID.3035-36).
Sgt. Tucker was the highest-ranking officer in charge of the raid on Plaintiffs’ home, however, he apparently was not required to review Sgt. Geelhood‘s affidavit until the warrant had already issued. (ECF No. 126-50, PageID.3777, 3793-94). Accordingly, it is unclear who, in Plaintiffs’ view, should be considered the final policymaker for the purpose of this analysis. Regardless, because Plaintiffs cite no authority in support of either sergeant being a municipal policymaker, this detail matters little. According to former DPD Chief James Craig, sergeants can only “[c]arry out policy,” not make it. (ECF No. 132-10, PageID.4318). Chief Craig‘s position is backed up by the 2012 Narcotics Standard Operating Procedures, which
Moreover, while it is true that policymaking authority can also be delegated, see Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483, merely being given the “authority to exercise discretion while performing particular functions does not [by itself] make a municipal employee a final policymaker.” Feliciano, 988 F.2d at 655 (citing Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127). In other words, even where an official is delegated final decisionmaking authority by a superior, they will not necessarily be a final policymaker with respect to those decisions. See Cristini v. City of Warren, No. 07-11141, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162325, at *40 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 2012). Rather, a municipal employee can be said to have final policymaking authority only when
In Miller v. Calhoun Cty., 408 F.3d 803, 814 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit considered whether a shift commander at a county jail had been delegated policymaking authority with respect to overnight medical treatment for pretrial detainees. The plaintiff argued that despite state law giving the sheriff final policymaking authority over the jail, liability should be imputed to the municipality because “[the sergeant] was, by county policy, the de facto decision-maker as to emergency care for inmates on the midnight shift.” Id. But the Sixth Circuit disagreed. Id. It explained that the plaintiff was “conflate[ing] decisionmaking with policymaking,” and noted that there was “no evidence that [the sergeant‘s] decisions were not subject to review, or that [the sergeant] possessed any authority to ‘formulate[] plans for the implementation of broad goals.‘” Id. (quoting Hager v. Pike Cty. Bd. of Educ., 286 F.3d 366, 376 (6th Cir. 2002)).
Here, like in Miller, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate how the actions of Narcotics Unit sergeants, even those who supervised raids, were anything more than discretionary decisions subject to the review of superior officials. Accordingly, Plaintiffs may not proceed on their Monell claim under a ratification theory.
A municipal liability claim premised upon a “custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations” is sometimes referred to as an “inaction theory.” See D‘Ambrosio, 747 F.3d at 387. To prevail under this theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) the existence of a clear and persistent pattern of violating federal rights . . .; (2) notice or constructive notice on the part of defendants; (3) the defendants’ tacit approval of the unconstitutional conduct, such that their deliberate indifference in failing to act can be said to amount to an official policy of inaction; and (4) that the defendants’ custom was the “moving force,” or direct causal link for the constitutional deprivation.
Powers v. Hamilton County Pub. Def. Comm‘n, 501 F.3d 592, 607 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Doe v. Claiborne Cty., 103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Plaintiffs argue that “the City knew, in the summer of 2010, about the corruption of DPD‘s Narcotics Unit” but “waited until July 2014 . . . to address [it].” (ECF No. 125, PageID.3031). In support, Plaintiffs cite several allegedly unlawful raids by the Narcotics Unit, as well as examples they argue show the City‘s notice of allegedly illegal conduct. (ECF No. 125, PageID.3031-33). But the majority of Plaintiffs’ examples are from 2013 to 2017, and “contemporaneous or subsequent conduct” cannot be relied upon to prove an inaction theory. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 63 n.7 (2011). Accordingly, the Court will only consider Plaintiffs’
First, documents from the Wayne County Prosecutor‘s Office (“WCPO“) regarding the exoneration of Darell Chancellor, who was arrested in 2011 following the execution of a search warrant by Sgt. Geelhood. The evidence within these records, which include a WCPO press release9 and a memo by the WCPO‘s Conviction Integrity Unit (“CIU“), would enable a jury to find that there had been illegal conduct in the Narcotics Unit by Sgt. Geelhood well before the raid on Plaintiffs’ home. Defendants have objected to Plaintiffs’ reliance upon the CIU memo, but the Court need not address the merits of this objection here. The press release by itself makes clear that Chancellor was released from prison because the WCPO determined that the evidence against him “ha[d] been credibly refuted” and “was based upon a fraudulent search warrant” by Sgt. Geelhood. (ECF No. 126-8, PageID.3253-54; ECF No. 126-17, PageID.3314).
Second, a letter from DPD Lt. Kelly Fitzgerald to the City‘s Office of the Inspector General (“OIG“), chronicling how, in late 2011, officials in the Narcotics
Third, the trial testimony of Gary Jackson and related supporting evidence, which go to when the City first became aware of alleged corruption in the Narcotics Unit. Jackson was a drug dealer turned DPD informant who served as a cooperating witness in the 2015 prosecution of David Hansberry, Bryan Watson, and Arthur
At trial, Jackson testified as follows: In the summer of 2010, he had learned of a $3 million cocaine deal in Detroit, including how and when the profits would be moved out of the city. (ECF No. 126-26, PageID.3441-43). To make the most of this knowledge, he made an agreement with Leavells and Watson to exchange his information for a formal reward from the City of Detroit and an off the books cut of the seized money. (Id. at 3446-47). The bust was successful, but afterwards, Leavells told Jackson that there had been no opportunity to skim money off the top of the
Chief Godbee agrees that he met with Jackson very soon after the bust, but disputes Jackson‘s version of their meeting. (ECF. No. 126-53, PageID.3836-37, 3840). He claims that Jackson did not mention a shortfall in the seized money and
Also supporting a finding of constructive notice is the fact that there were several discrepancies in the amount of currency reportedly seized as the cash moved through the chain of custody. (ECF No. 125, PageID.3039-41). The initial police report references a “tally sheet” that was discovered with the cash, which listed the amount of currency as $2,370,000. (ECF No. 126-51, PageID.3807-08; ECF No. 126-53, PageID.3846, 3857). This is the number that Chief Godbee first reported to the media. (ECF No. 126-53, PageID.3841). But by the time the money was logged into the property room, only $2,100,190 was accounted for. (ECF No. 126-51, PageID.3815; ECF No. 126-53, PageID.3846). And an additional shortfall of approximately $15,000 was discovered when the money was deposited at Comerica Bank. (ECF No. 126-51, PageID.3810; ECF No. 126-53, PageID.3846). This final shortfall triggered an Internal Affairs investigation, which concluded that it was attributable to a faulty counting machine, but the first shortfall was never investigated. (ECF No. 126-34, PageID.3547; ECF No. 126-54). In other words,
Defendants argue that these questions regarding missing money were already resolved by the jury when it found Hansberry and Watson not guilty on all counts except conspiracy and fully acquitted Brown. (ECF No. 132, PageID.4116; ECF No. 132-8, PageID.4160). But this argument fails to account for the differing burdens of proof in civil and criminal cases. And, in any event, the issue here is not whether Plaintiffs can prove that members of the Narcotics Unit stole currency from a drug bust, but whether the City had notice that they might have done so, and failed to look into it.
Taken together, these three examples—the Chancellor investigation and exoneration, the Fitzgerald OIG complaint, and the City‘s knowledge of a possible shortfall in the Hansberry seizure—are sufficient to create a reasonable dispute of material fact as to whether there was a pattern of illegal conduct in the Narcotics Unit about which the City had notice. In addition, a reasonable jury could find, based on Plaintiffs’ evidence that Sgts. Geelhood and Tucker had previously falsified DPD records, that a raid premised upon a fraudulent warrant affidavit could have been
iii. A Policy of Inadequate Training or Supervision
In deposition, Chief Craig opined that there was a lack of supervision in the Narcotics Unit going back “even before [2010].” (ECF No. 126-34, PageID.3546). It is unsurprising, therefore, that several of the evidentiary items that support Plaintiffs’ inaction theory also support a claim for failure to supervise. See Ellis v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006) (“To succeed on a failure to train or supervise claim, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the training or supervision was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the municipality‘s deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury.” (citing Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1046 (6th Cir. 1992))).
CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [121] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Motion [121] is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual officers. It is DENIED as to Plaintiffs’ Monell claim against the City of Detroit.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within thirty days, Plaintiffs may file a Second Amended Complaint consistent with the conclusions set forth above.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 25, 2021
s/Arthur J. Tarnow
Arthur J. Tarnow
Senior United States District Judge