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Richard Wade Cooey, II v. Ted Strickland, Governor Terry J. Collins, Director E.C. Voorhies, Warden
479 F.3d 412
6th Cir.
2007
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 herein, and the additional reasons provided

we AFFIRM grant the district court’s

summary judgment favor of the FIA. COOEY, II,

Richard Wade

Plaintiff-Appellee, STRICKLAND, Governor; Terry

Ted Collins, Director; Voorhies,

J. E.C.

Warden, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 05-4057.

United of Appeals, States Court

Sixth Circuit.

Argued: Dec. 2006.

Decided and Filed: March *2 Collyer, L. Office of Michael

ARGUED: Cleveland, Ohio, General, for Attorney Meyers, Gregory W. Public Appellants. Columbus, Ohio, Office, Ap- for Defender’s Collyer, BRIEF: Michael L. pellee. ON Attorney Sweeney, of the Kelley A. Office General, Cleveland, Ohio, Appellants. for Culshaw, Kelly L. Meyers, Gregory W. Of- Kimberly Rigby, Defender’s S. Public Columbus, Ohio, fice, Appellee. SILER, SUHRHEINRICH, Before: GILMAN, Judges. Circuit SUHRHEINRICH, J., delivered SILER, J., court, in which opinion joined. 424-31), a

GILMAN, (pp. delivered J. dissenting opinion. separate OPINION SUHRHEINRICH, Judge. Circuit inmate under Cooey, an Ohio Richard death, against action filed this sentence Collins, Governor, Strickland, Terry J. Ted (col- Yoorhies, Director, Warden and E.C. “State”) pursu- “Defendants” lectively 1983, challenging the to 42 ant U.S.C. of Ohio’s lethal constitutionality us issues before protocol. (1) a whether interlocutory appeal are against inmate’s claim death row precursor opposed to injection itself—as to be properly considered procedure —is brought pursuant or one (2) row a death whether 42 U.S.C. chal- method-of-execution inmate’s accrues, for statute lenge imminent or is purposes, when stage in at some earlier state federal United States Court denied cer- judicata tiorari on March proceedings, originally whether res 2003. Ohio July row inmate’s claim set execution date for bar to death concerning the means and methods of exe- *3 raised, issues were or cution when similar 21, 2003, July Cooey On a filed motion raised, specific claim could have been judgment pursuant for relief from to Fed. in a action. previous habeas 60(b) stay R.Civ.P. and a motion for 23, 2003, July execution. On the district Background

I. granted Cooey’s stay court motion for a three-judge panel In con- Ohio ruling execution and deferred on the Rule 60(b) Cooey aggravated victed of two counts of motion. Both the Sixth Circuit and murder, panel and the sentenced him to Supreme Court denied the Warden’s Supreme death. The Ohio Court affirmed stay motions to vacate the of execution. and sentence on direct convictions ultimately The district court denied the 60(b) appeal. Cooey, motion, v. 46 Ohio See State St.3d Rule and this Court denied (1989), 544 N.E.2d 895 and the United Cooey’s application ap- for a certificate of Supreme States Court denied certiorari pealability from the denial of his Rule 1, 1991, Ohio, Cooey 60(b) April see v. motion and his motion for leave to 113 L.Ed.2d 482 petition. file second or successive habeas (1991). Cooey unsuccessfully sought post- 10, 2004, Cooey On June and another pursuant conviction relief to Ohio Rev. inmate, Dennis, Adremy a complaint filed §Ann. Cooey, Code 2953.21. See State v. alleging that the lethal (Ohio May 25, Ct.App. WL 201009 constitutes cruel and punishment unusual 1994). Supreme The Ohio Court declined in violation of Eighth Amendment. jurisdiction appeal over his further drugs performing Ohio utilizes three Cooey subsequently sought this decision. injection: thiopental, pancu- sodium to reopen appeal his direct on the basis of bromide, rionium potassium chloride. appellate ineffective assistance of counsel. The sodium thiopental designed to anes- Appeals The Ohio Court of denied his re- prisoner thetize the and render him uncon- quest reopen to procedural on the basis of Next, pancuronium scious. bromide Cooey default because had not established paralyzes all prisoner’s voluntary of the good filing cause for application his to sensation, muscles but does not affect his reopen ninety days July within consciousness, ability pain. to feel Fi- 26(B). App. effective date Ohio R. nally, potassium chloride induces cardi- Ohio Court affirmed. See ac Cooey arrest. Dennis and asserted v. Cooey, State 73 Ohio St.3d 653 if thiopental the sodium is not adminis- (1995). N.E.2d 252 properly dosage, tered sufficient

In Cooey October a petition prisoner filed could experience pain intense af- for a writ of habeas corpus being injected under 28 ter potassium with the chlo- ride, U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied would convey but be unable to petition on September 1997. See sensation paralyzing agent due Anderson, Cooey v. 988 F.Supp. pancuronium They bromide. main- also (N.D.Ohio 1997). granted subject This Court prisoner tained to such appealability certificate of excruciating pain as to two issues while he is still conscious Cooey and denied relief as to both. See would amount to cruel and punish- unusual (6th Cir.2002). Coyle, 289 They alleged The ment. that the person- Analysis II. are inade- the executions attending to nel such, and, Defendants’ trained quately de reviews novo This Court prison- violate would methods of motion or denial grant court’s district rights. er’s constitutional 12(b)(6). under Fed.R.Civ.P. to dismiss Allen, 411 F.3d Mezibov the com- court dismissed The district — denied, U.S.-, Cir.2005), cert. his exhaust failed because plaint 1911, 164 L.Ed.2d 663 exhausting After remedies. administrative com construe the analysis, we must on De- complaint them, Cooey re-filed light in the most favorable plaint 4, 2005, January 8, 2004.1 On cember allega his factual accept all of plaintiff, com- moved dismiss Defendants *4 tions, he undoubt determine whether limitations on the statute based plaint facts in support no set of edly prove can arguing to in addition judicata, and res him to relief. entitle his that would claims con- should be complaint Cooey’s that Tatum, Res., 58 Inc. Natural Columbia On petition. a successive as strued Cir.1995). (6th 1101, 1109 F.3d 2005, court denied 28, the district March them granted motion but the defendants’ § § vs. 2254 A. 1983 interlocutory ap- pursue this permission 42 pursuant relief Cooey sought 30, 2005, Defendants March peal. On 1983, alleging proposed that the § U.S.C. im- certify for court to district asked the would constitute injection protocol lethal made arguments the three appeal mediate punishment and unusual violation cruel 13, April On motion dismiss. in their mo In their Amendment. Eighth motion, 2005, granted district court dismiss, that argued Defendants tion to Cooey’s of whether as to issue part, presented been claim should of limita- statute barred claims are corpus of habeas in a for writ petition sought permission then tions. Defendants 2254, as a § rather than under 28 U.S.C. to 28 pursuant the three issues appeal Hill, Court Supreme § claim. 1983 1292(b). granted This Court § U.S.C. issue concluded this same addressed all three issues. request as to raise plaintiff could penalty that death Relying § in a 1983 action. challenge his stay pending granted later We Camp in Nelson v. decision on its earlier Mc Hill v. decision Supreme Court’s 2117, - 47, bell, 124 S.Ct. U.S. -, 541 126 S.Ct. U.S. Donough, 645— (2004), the Court conclud 924 (2006), 158 L.Ed.2d which was decided 165 L.Ed.2d was properly action decision, plaintiffs ed that 12, 2006. After on June it did § 1983 under because brought briefs address supplemental filed parties execu challenge to his general present parties case. The on impact this ing limited rather injection, but by lethal briefs supplemental second also submitted cur specific challenge to the in the changes impact of recent discussing the Hill, 126 by the defendants. rently used is on the injection protocol supplemental In their 2101-02. at mat Court. The before this pending sues Hill acknowledge that brief, Defendants De on this Court argued before ter was argument. their defeats 7, 2006. cember up- 2004. This Court September September nied complaint on 1. re-filed Dennis filing. injunction Dennis join in this denial of the Cooey did not held request prelimi- for a subsequently executed. also re-filed his was Dennis de- the district court nary injunction, which ” B. Timeliness obtain relief.’ (quoting Id. Bay Area Laundry, 542). 118 S.Ct. argue Defendants that Cooey’s 1983 action is barred the statute of This Court has previously stated limitations. Court held has law, “[u]nder federal developed 1983 claims best are characterized Circuit, the statute of peri limitations as tort recovery actions for the damages od begins to run plaintiff when the knows for personal injury federal courts reason has to know that the provid act must borrow the statute of gov limitations ing the basis of his or her injury has erning personal injury actions (6th from the Cir.2001); occurred.” Collyer v. Dar state where the 1983 action brought. ling, (6th Cir.1996); Ruff Garcia, Wilson v. 275-76, (6th v. Runyon, 258 F.3d 500-01 Cir. 2001) L.Ed.2d If a (same); Turner, Sevier v. 742 F.2d state more than one statute of Cir.1984). limita Stated differently, tions for personal injuries, the state’s re “[i]n determining when the cause sidual or general statute of gov cases, §in accrues we look to the erning personal injury actions applied event that should have alerted typical *5 §all brought 1983 actions in that lay state. person protect his or rights.” her Okure, 235, Owens v. 249-50, 488 U.S. City Cleveland, Trzebuckowski v. of 573, (1989). S.Ct. 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (6th This 853, Cir.2003). must We Court has held that a two-year statute of therefore look at when the harm ques applies claims occurred, guided by principle that Ohio. City Whitehall, Banks v. 344 F.3d plaintiff “[a] has reason to of of know his (6th 550, Cir.2003) (citing Browning v. injury when he should have discovered it Pendleton, (6th (en Cir.1989) 869 F.2d 989 through exercise of dili reasonable banc)). Sevier, gence.” 742 F.2d at 273. Defendants the burden of hand, On the other as Su demonstrating that the statutory period preme Court recently clear, made federal had run before Cooey filed his action. law determines when the statute of limita v. Rogers, 647, 308 F.3d Griffin tions for a civil rights begins run. Cir.2002). We — review de novo the district Kato, Wallace v. 05-1240, No. court’s conclusion that Cooey’s complaint — -, -, 1091, 1095, 127 S.Ct. was filed within applicable statutory L.Ed.2d-, 517122, (Feb. 2007 WL at *3 period. Burks, Kelly v. 558, 415 F.3d 2007). 21, “Under principles, those it is (6th Cir.2005). ‘the standard rule [accrual that occurs] plaintiff when the complete and pres Cooey was sentenced to death in 1986. ” — ent Wallace, of cause action.’ U.S. His conviction and sentence were affirmed -, 1091, 1095, WL the Ohio Supreme Court on ap- direct 517122, at *3 (quoting Bay Area Laundry peal 1989, and the United States Su- & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. preme Court affirmed in 1991. in- Lethal Cal, Ferbar Corp. 192, 201, 118 jection became available as a means 542, (1997)). 139 L.Ed.2d 553 This execution in Ohio in 1993. In it occurs plaintiff “when ‘the can file and suit became sole method of execution.2 2. In passed bill was granting into law trocution as the "default” method. See Ohio prisoners option to choose 2949.22(A)-(B) between death Rev.Code In injection, electrocution or lethal elec- Ohio injection made lethal the sole method of nine-page which injection protocol, lethal relief denied federal This Court explained). and state officials policy DRC States the United and staff follow-up letter counsel A 2008. on March certiorari Court denied and of Rehabilitation Department the Ohio July set for date was Cooey’s execution 30, 2002, further May dated Correction by prison used procedures describes that, at least reflects The record performing personnel 2002, information about April early as under this formu- quantities used and the At- upon request. available lation.4 a letter complaint is tached court concluded The district Havi- from Warden April dated his execution Cooey’s claim accrued when mixture disclosing the chemical land had he knew or imminent became also Deborah used.3 See to be equipment rise gave of the facts to know Delegate reason Denno, Legislatures When W. chal- method-of-execution specific Behind Troubling Paradox Death: be- defining when an execution lenge. Lethal Electrocution Uses State imminent, court stated the district Us, 63 comes About Says it Injection and What an it was “of view (explaining 63, 146 L.J. Ohio St. necessarily when becomes imminent written vague had Ohio that as set, other when all but execution date specific information but that more policy, validity a death challenges to the legal Mary Beth upon request); was available ie., end, to an sentence come Berry; to Kill Lane, Plans “How State all of his state exhausted plaintiff has Six Minutes” About to Take Execution occurs This of relief.” (February federal avenues Dealer Plain *6 Cleveland Court States “when the United in the 1999) drugs three (describing the placed on the 2949.22(A) been prisoner has the After Rev.Code See Ohio execution. bed, delivery 2949.22(A) tubing of the the execution §Ann. (amending Ohio Rev.Code The to each lock. attached 2000)). (West chemicals via hand infusion. are administered chemicals been part: performing these functions relevant states in Persons 3. The letter nurse, practical a licensed as either certified purchased equipment was intravenous The The technician. phlebotomy paramedic or consisted of: and source a commercial from If the one arm. into are infused chemicals 01). Angiocath Abbocath-7 unavailable, arm the other becomes arm (70 inch) 02). Primary IV Set No. 1820 pro- Doctor has A Medical would be used. Chloride, 0.9?) 03). 1000m. Sodium death. nounced pharmaceuticals generic names The following in the drugs are administered The are: used in thiopental grams of sodium dosages: two 01). Bromide Pancuronium concentration; one hundred normal saline 02). Potassium Chloride nor- in pancuronium bromide milligrams of 03). Thiopental Sodium concentration; milliequi- and 100 mal saline equipment monitoring is no cardiac There saline in normal potassium chloride valents stethoscope. other than used thiopental sodium The concentration. Ohio De- May letter 4. The purchased from bromide are pancuronium Correction partment of Rehabilitation pharmacy institution pharmacy. The local part: pertinent provides drugs over drugs. turns the It purchases the receipt a record of keeps to the Warden rehearsing the begins execution team keeping and record usage. Purchase execution thirty days from the procedure have been coordinated execution, procedures saline day On the date. State Agency and Ohio Drug Enforcement prisoner's placed each of the locks are Pharmacy. Board entering chamber. the death prior to arms denies certiorari plaintiffs lenge habeas protocol until the execution was corpus proceeding or otherwise issues a imminent. decision foreclosing federal corpus appeal, On argue Defendants relief.” In determining when plaintiff statute of began to run in knows or has reason to know the facts when lethal became available as a giving rise to specific method-of-execu- means of Ohio, execution in or alternative- claim, the district court stated that ly lethal injection became

because protocol is a creation of the Ohio’s sole method of execution. Defen- Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and dants assert that it is the issuance of a Correction, subject and therefore government order, in this case proto- change execution, until the time of col, rather than the carrying out of that requiring a plaintiff death-sentenced order, which starts the clock. Cooey file his method-of-execution challenge urges us to affirm the district court’s con- any sooner ... [would be] wasteful and clusion that his claim accrued March possibly absurd, given the possibility 2003, when the United States Supreme that, prior to his execution becoming Court denied certiorari as to Cooey’s first imminent, plaintiff could see his con- habeas petition and after his execution viction or reversed, death sentence date was set. precise alteration plaintiff might Setting seek to chal- an accrual date at point

lenge as unconstitutional. when the actual inflicted, i.e., harm is point execution, is problematic in Applying this test to Cooey, the district this context because the death-sentenced court concluded that “Cooey knew or had inmate’s claim would not accrue until he reason to know of the giving facts rise to was executed, at which it time would also specific allegations presented he has be simultaneously moot. any event, complaint instant in May 2002” when both Nelson and Hill establish inferential- he received information the protocol, about ly 1983 method-of-execution chal- and that his execution became imminent lenges may be brought before the execu- when the United States Supreme Court *7 tion is out. case, carried however, Neither denied certiorari as to his habeas corpus addressed the appropriate accrual date. proceedings 31, 2003; “[thus, March Thus, the relevant “event that should have Cooey] years had two from that date to file alerted a lay person protect to rights” his method-of-execution claim.” Because must be redefined here. Cooey filed the instant action on December 8, 2004, three months before expiration the If point the of infliction is not a viable of the statute of limitations, the district option, the logical most of trigger choice a court deemed his cause of action was time- ing event is point the when the death ly- penalty ordered, is upon judgment of con

The district court also that, commented viction and sentence. At least one Court as the protocol was not established by has set the accrual date at the conclusion statute or rule, administrative it was sub- of direct review the state. See Neville ject to change at any time before Johnson, the (5th 440 F.3d Cir. execution. Because 2006) curiam) Defendants could (per (holding, in reliance on change the up to the time of an a state, concession the a challenge execution, inmate’s the district court be- to a method of execution bemay any filed lieved that it premature would be to chal- time plaintiffs after the conviction has be otherwise, the statute it review).5 Were also This is on direct final come plaintiff only after a begin to run the would it marks because choice attractive an he had been its satisfied became rendered state has the at which point supposed the enough, placing and, collat absent harmed final judgment criminal sole hands of the which of point repose at statute the proceedings, civil eral seeking Fur relief. party date. sets the state can inmate thermore, the death-sentenced — at-, Wallace, 127 S.Ct. U.S. relief. and obtain file suit 517122, *4. at 2007 WL conclusion court’s The district setting accrual fundamentally, More im when execution occurs date accrual imminency plus ex point date at remedies and federal all state minent remedies of federal collateral haustion is problematic exhausted been a delay to period significant adds a First, subverts it reasons. several sovereign its ability to exercise state’s limitations, which statutes purpose which judgments, to finalize power and economy judicial “promote designed are balance be yet disrupts the vital delicate rights.” John defendants’ protect “Our relations. and federal tween state Servs., Kent v. Old Inc. Fin. Hancock independent recognizes system federal Cir.2003) Bank, societal to articulate aof State power rule discovery (and noting law; pow through criminal but norms unjust results prevent applied “has been if little means pass laws of State to er denied otherwise plaintiff would when McCles them.” enforce cannot the State due bring suit opportunity reasonable 467, 492, 111 Zant, 499 U.S. key v. or the injury nature to the latent (1991). Further 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d connection the causal inability discover interest significant more, retains “a State injury and defendant’s between in a of death a sentence meting out omit (internal marks quotation action” Nelson, timely fashion.” noted ted)). Supreme Court theAs 124 S.Ct. Wallace: “[fjederal review of course, Of accrual rule of the traditional “Under both frustrates convictions accrues, and state of action tort cause ... offend- punish power sovereign to States’ commences of limitations the statute to honor faith-attempts good their ers and omission act or wrongful run, Calderon rights.” constitutional of ac- The cause damages. results 555-56, Thompson, the full extent though even tion accrues (internal quo- 140 L.Ed.2d pre- known or then injury is not reason, omitted). For this *8 marks tation Corman, of Limitation 1 C. dictable.” judg- court of state (1991) habeas review federal 7.4.1, 526-527 pp. Actions Court As the limited. C.J.S., ments is omitted); 54 (footnotes also see in Calderon: 112, 150 observed p. Actions of Limitations (“The concedes White, State 572, 574 F.3d at Johnson, 429 429 F.3d v. cites White 5. Neville final on became conviction Harris's curiam), support that when Cir.2005) (per 574 review, the State’s challenge his However, direct the reference proposition. this execution, of dra- absence of method by the state merely a concession White is changes to the State’s matic fi- became conviction —would an inmate’s any at time filed appropriately been review, have challenge to the direct nal on imminent await an need not and thereafter appro- have been would execution of method date.”). See thereafter. any time priately filed 420 In light profound of “the societal costs vance [the] doctrines comity, [of finality, attend exercise juris of habeas and federalism]. Federal habeas corpus diction,” Smith v. Murray, 527, principles 477 U.S. must inform shape

539, 2661, 106 S.Ct. 91 historic and L.Ed.2d 434 still vital relation of mutual (1986), respect we have found it necessary to common purpose existing impose significant between the limits on the States and discre the federal tion of federal courts. keeping courts grant habeas delicate balance See, we relief. e.g., been careful Zant, McCleskey v. limit the 499 scope of 467, federal 487, U.S. intrusion 111 1454, into state S.Ct. criminal 113 adjudications (1991) L.Ed.2d 517 ... to safeguard (limiting “a dis States’ trict interest integrity court’s discretion to their entertain abu criminal and collateral petitions”); proceedings. sive Wainwright v. Sykes, 72, 90-91, 433 U.S. 2497, 97 S.Ct. 53 Williams v. Taylor, 420, 529 436, U.S. 120 (1977) L.Ed.2d 594 ... 1479, S.Ct. (limiting courts’ 146 (2000); L.Ed.2d 435 see discretion to Garceau, entertain procedurally 202, de 538 U.S. Woodford claims); faulted Lane, Teague 123 S.Ct. (2003) L.Ed.2d 363 308-10, 109 (“Congress U.S. ... enacted S.Ct. AEDPA to reduce de- lays (1989) L.Ed.2d 334 the execution of (plurality opinion state and federal J.) O’CONNOR, sentences, criminal (limiting particularly in capital courts’ discre cases, ... and tion to give further the principles retroactive application to comity, finality, (internal “new rules” in federalism.” cases); habeas Brecht v. quotes omitted)); Abrahamson, Williams v. Taylor, 637-38, U.S. 362, 386, 120 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (1993) L.Ed.2d 353 ... (2000) (Stevens, J.,) (stating that (limiting “Con- courts’ grant discretion to ha- gress wished to curb delays, to prevent beas relief error”). the basis of “trial ‘retrials’ on habeas, federal give and to 554-55, Id. at 118 S.Ct. 1489. The Court effect to state convictions to the extent added that “[t]hese limits refleet our en- possible law”); under see also id. at during respect for “the State’s interest” in 120 S.Ct. 1495 (majority opinion). In addi- finality of convictions that have sur- tion to revising the standards for evaluat- vived direct review within the state court ing the merits aof application, see system.” (cita- Id. at 118 S.Ct. 1489 2254(d) 28 U.S.C. (providing that omitted). a writ of habeas corpus shall not be grant- The Antiterrrorism and Effective Death ed to a state prisoner unless the state Penalty Act 1996 reflects Congress’s court proceedings “resulted in a decision desire to restore and maintain the proper to, contrary or involved an unrea- balance between state adjudica- criminal sonable application of, clearly established tions and federal collateral proceedings. law,” Federal “resulted a decision See generally Weber, Rhines v. that was based on an unreasonable deter- 269, 274, 161 L.Ed.2d 440 mination the facts light of the evi- (2005) (stating that “[t]he enactment of dence presented in the State pro- court AEDPA in 1996 dramatically altered the ceedings”), the AEDPA created one-year landscape for federal habeas corpus peti- *9 statute of limitations for filing a federal tions”). habeas petition, running from “the date on There is no doubt Congress intended which the judgment became final by the AEDPA [the Antiterrorism and Effec- conclusion of direct review or expira- the tive Death Penalty Act of 1996] to ad- tion of the time for seeking such review.”

421 a more than 1983 42 U.S.C. (1996). pursuant 2244(d)(1)(A) gen See 28 U.S.C. his direct completion of U.S.198, the after decade 547 McDonough, Day v. erally execution); shortly before 164 appeal, n. 1680 1, 126 S.Ct. -n. (5th Johnson, 574 F.3d 429 v. (2006) (noting “[u]ntil White 376 L.Ed.2d curiam) in an Cir.2005) (rejecting of (per no statute in took effect AEDPA chal petitions”). § 1983 “method-of-execution” to habeas mate’s applied “quite had period inmate “been limitation the lenge where one-year The years”). interest well-recognized than six for more the row serves death plainly ... judgments Hill, Supreme Court finality of state court in recently, in the Most delay on for potential 1983 filing a reduces emphasized [and] time restricting the finality by constitutionality of certain road to challenging petition habeas federal prospective a not “en does execution of a state’s aspects habeas federal to seek in which staying er an order complainant title the Walker, U.S. 533 v. Duncan review.” course.” matter of as a [his] 251 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 179, 121 S.Ct. added The Court Hill, at 2104. 126 S.Ct. omitted); Acosta see also (internal citation of and the victims the State that “[b]oth Cir.2000) (2d Artuz, 123 221 F.3d v. interest important crime have [the] pro limitation of (“The statute AEDPA sentence.” [the] of timely enforcement and conservation efficiency judicial motes assert intending to Thus, an inmate Id. the accu resources, safeguards judicial file his generally must challenge such by requiring judgments court racy of state consider to “allow time sufficient suit in while questions of constitutional resolution en merits, requiring without ation of finality to fresh, lends the record (quoting Id. stay” execution. try of a a reasonable judgments within court state 2117). 650, 124 S.Ct. Nelson, 541 U.S. at Day v. time.”) approval with (quoted “flat out” stated also Court The Nelson McDonough)). should can and courts federal that “[t]he Su by the articulated concerns speculative dilatory or protect States post-AEDPA, pre- and both preme Court 466 McDonough, suits.” Rutherford itself, AEDPA Congress Cir.2006) Hill, (11th (quoting 970, 974 F.3d case, which in this force equal with apply 2104). Court adheres This at 126 S.Ct. Nelson, habeas.” margins of at the “fall[s] Taft, See, e.g., Hicks principles. these (noting that 646,124 S.Ct. 541 U.S. at Cir.2005) cited (pre-Hill, 431 F.3d at challenges “fall method-of-injection Hill; a last- ruling that approval habeas”). Indeed, margins inmate, row a death petition minute Nel Hill decisions recent Court’s execu his scheduled before days six filed that federal core concern son reflect stay of execution tion, not entitled au a state’s displace should allowed court had though the district even Nel judgments. to execute thority inmate’s if a fellow intervene him to “meth stated son, Court injection lethal challenge to § 1983 challenges should od-of-execution” Little, Fed.Appx. Alley v. protocol); consid as to allow at such time “brought denied, 452 (6th Cir.), reh’g en banc merits, requiring without eration — denied, U.S. (6th Cir.), cert. 650, stay.” entry 2975, 165 L.Ed.2d -, 126 S.Ct. Dist. v. U.S. 2117; see Gomez Court, 503 U.S. Thus, the “date” since (1992) (criticizing inmate L.Ed.2d infeasible, imposed is protocol is challenge filing “method-of-execution” *10 it stands to reason that the next most should have known upon based reasonable appropriate accrual date should mirror inquiry, and could have filed suit and ob- found the AEDPA: upon conclu tained relief. Cooey should have known of sion of direct review in the state court or his cause of 2001 after amend- expiration of time for seeking such ments to the required law that he be exe- review. See 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A) § by injection, cuted lethal and the informa- (1996).6 All same concerns articu tion was publicly upon available request. by lated Supreme Court and as re Yet, (and even if accepted we we would flected in the AEDPA are relevant here. not) May 2002, the date when he received actions, Like § federal habeas 1983 the response, Warden’s Cooey’s complaint challenge method-of-execution “implicates is still untimely. beyond values parties.” concerns of the Acosta, See (and Cooey also argues F.3d at 123 noting the statute of that the AEDPA statute of limitation limitations did begin not to run until the Congress’ primary vehicle for streamlining Nelson § decision made a 1983 action a process the habeas lending review fi possible remedy for Cooey. Prior to that convictions). nality to state decision, this precluded Court a death row inmate from filing a Thus, 1983 action standard, under this Cooey’s claim challenging his method of execution. See would accrued after the Unit- Sapp, In re (6th ed States Supreme Court Cir. denied direct Williams, In 1997); re However, (6th review. Ohio did not F.3d 811 adopt le- Cir.2004). Williams, Indeed, thal until or make it the the plain exclusive method of tiff attempted execution until to bring a 1983 action so the accrual date adjusted must be raising be- argument same presented now cause obviously could not by have dis- Cooey, and this Court concluded that covered “injury” until one of those two the claim must be raised in a 2254 habe- dates. We need not pinpoint the accrual Nonetheless, as action. plaintiff “the case, date in however, because even Nelson was similarly barred circuit date, 2001, under the later Cooey’s claim precedent at the time he filed his suit. So two-year exceeds the statute of limitations long as there remains the possibility of en deadline because his claim was not filed banc reconsideration and Supreme Court until December 2004. review, circuit law does completely Cooey asserts, foreclose all avenues for Harris v. and the relief.” district court Johnson, found, (5th that Cooey 376 F.3d did not have actual 418-19 Cir. 2004). knowledge of This precedent until May Circuit’s did not 2002 when he prevent received responses to his Lewis Williams John Roe inquiries from the Warden. Actual from filing knowl- their injection § however, edge, is not Williams, the appropriate actions. See re 359 F.3d 811 measure; (6th Cir.2004).7 test is whether he knew or Ohio, Direct review of conviction review (6th includes Cir.2000); 235 F.3d Randle, the United Supreme States Isham v. Court. Bell v. 226 F.3d 694-95 Cir.2000). 226, 232, Maryland, 12 L.Ed.2d one-year statute 7. The Sixth Circuit decided in In re Williams of limitations review under AEDPA January petitioner 2004. The in that begin does not ninety-day run until the case, whose claim is Cooey’s, identical period time for direct review in the United request based stay for a of execution on Supreme States expired. Bronaugh Court having granted Court certiorari

423 peti- Ford first-instance last-minute that district the and Cooey argues, Lastly, in change a by a justified could be of Ohio’s tions nature found, fluid court health. mental imminency of defendant’s requires protocol execution accrual in the key factor to be execution 607. at Id. v. Martinez-Villa calculus, citing Stewart injection contrast, the lethal while In 644-45, S.Ct. real, 118 523 U.S. change, subject to is in this case protocol re (1998). recently We 849 L.Ed.2d 140 evidence, recently, that until nowas there Alley. In argument similar jected a And, changed. been had ever protocol argued that inmate a Tennessee Alley, do not furthermore, changes the recent Tennessee’s challenging § 1983 claim complaints. core relate to ripe until was injection protocol lethal in- appeal, of this pendency During In re imminent. date was an execution stayed, the matter while deed we stated: argument this jecting briefing expand supplemental moved v. Martinez- cites brief Stewart Alley’s to further the district court to remand S.Ct. Villareal, 118 U.S. 523 execu- changes recent Ohio’s address prohibit- ... 849 L.Ed.2d 140 is consis- he claimed which protocol, tion challenges considering from courts ing na- malleable that the claim with his tent before our case one in as the such lethal of Ohio’s ture immi- reaches execution petitioner’s im- action cannot that a 1983 means reading this this reject We nence. of execution. close to date until minent ours, case, unlike In that precedent. writ- a memo Cooey attached support, Ford under claim defendant’s of Rehabilitation Department by Ohio ten 399, 106 S.Ct. Wainwright, Collins, Terry Director Correction and (1986), had ... 335 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d memo Col- In that 2006. June dated preju- without dismissed originally been “recommendations adopted five lins ruling Court’s The dice. execu- regarding changes” process in a proceed the claim merely allowed protocol. date. The a later at petition habeas to its lethal amendments Ohio’s recent had courts lower that the Court noted difficulties from resulted injection protocol possibility open left specifically of Jo- the execution during encountered pro- could claim Ford the defendant’s prepar- May When on Clark seph filing. Id. in a future ceed execution, officials prison Clark ing his- procedural No such 1618.... S.Ct. vein accessible only one find § 1983 could posture of tory informs lock, heparin to establish arms Moreover, Clark’s note we in our case. claim drugs are admin- through which competency involving mental claims inserted.) (Two usually are locks istered. inherently different are began and However, once respect: one at least us in before petition administered, being drugs were to vari- subject is competency mental ad- repeatedly Clark collapsed, vein possible indeed time. It over ance corpus action as a successive Campbell, 541 Nelson for authoriza- transferring this Court it majority L.Ed.2d Williams, margin. tion, See by a slim it was adhere to continue it would decided concurring (one judge 814-17 Sapp, 359 F.3d at namely In re precedent, Circuit Sixth dissenting, judge grounds, Cir.1997). one different At the denying the judges in among the split close time, majority affirmed while same review). petition for en banc construing the decision district court's *12 vised officials that the process was not execution claim because it used an improp- working. stopped Officials the lethal in- er test for establishing the accrual date for jection procedure, and after a significant § 1983 method-of-injection challenges. period time, were able to establish a

new intravenous process site. The C. Res then Judicata restarted, and Clark was executed. Because we conclude Cooey’s that claim To avoid similar difficulties in future fails on grounds, we need not executions, Ohio made several changes to address the judicata State’s res argument. protocol. First, officials removed time that deadlines III. previously Conclusion dictated begin by executions a certain For foregoing reasons, we RE- hour, and be completed within a narrow MAND this matter to the district court time Second, prisoners frame. given are with instructions to DISMISS Cooey’s more in-depth medical prior examinations § 1983 complaint prejudice as barred Third, execution. person- correctional by the statute of limitations. nel will every make effort to obtain two for heparin sites locks before proceeding RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit to the Fourth, execution chamber. per- Judge, dissenting. sonnel will no longer use “high pressure” The majority sets forth two rationales injections saline to check the viability of for its conclusion that two-year statute the intravenous lines. Instead, a “low of limitations on Cooey’s 42 U.S.C. pressure” drip of saline will be used to claim accrued at the end of the direct keep the open line and confirm its ongoing review of his conviction and sentence viability. Fifth, personnel correctional will Ohio First, Court. the ma- observe each inmate’s arms and check for jority expresses concern that the district signs of intravenous incontinence while the court’s accrual date —at point when the drugs are being administered to the in- inmate’s execution is imminent and all mate. state and federal remedies, including post- As assert, Defendants none of these conviction proceedings, have been exhaust- changes relates to Cooey’s core com- ed, purpose of statutes —“subverts plaints. Further, none of these areas were limitations, which designed are to promote implicated as a for Cooey’s basis expert’s judicial economy protect defendants’ conclusion that process presents a risk rights.” (Maj. 419) (citation atOp. Cooey will experience pain. Rather, quotation omitted). marks majority’s Heath, Dr. Cooey’s expert, criticized the other rationale is that the district court’s use of pancuronium bromide, the use and accrual date a significant “adds period of dosage of sodium thiopental, the failure to delay to a state’s ability to exercise its provide a continuous dose an ultra- sovereign power and to finalize its judg- short-acting barbiturate, and lack of ments, which disrupts the yet vital delicate information regarding prison personnel’s balance between state and federal rela- training to prepare and administer (Maj. 419). tions.” Op. at In essence, drugs. prevail cannot on this basis however, I believe that these two reasons either. boil down to the single assertion that the sum, we hold the district court process “takes too long.” I find erred ruling that the statute of limita- this rationale disturbing for the following tions had not run method-of- reasons: costs of financial human and despite the efficiency judicial Justice

A. litigation. postconviction protracted is justice but important, is Timeliness justice may be “[Wjhile delayed justice common Although the important. more not the an- is injustice denied, prompt justice is delayed “justice saying Smith, 676 Refugee Ctr. swer.” Haitian in which are situations denied,” there Cir.1982) (em- 1040 n. 43 I believe true. hold *13 not adage does added). phasis in Judges situations. of those is one this in AEDPA the to apply to majority looks allowed The cases are criminal ques- cer- permit the statute-of-limitations analysis exclusion of justice” of “ends not- the distinction blurs prosecution, this in a criminal I think tion. delays tain to a and right proceedings habeas defendant’s federal withstanding the between 3161(h)(8)(A); the § dis- actions, misapprehends U.S.C. and § trial. 18 1983 speedy 879 F.2d of action. Monger, causes two States the tinction between United see Cir.1989) that (finding the of lim- (6th one-year statute imposes 221-22 AEDPA granted petition. properly habeas judge filing federal magistrate for itations complex in a 2244(d)(1)(A). one-year This continuance justice” of “ends 28 U.S.C. of large quantity involving in finality state-court trial promotes criminal period coconspira- multiple Walker, and 533 U.S. Duncan v. wiretap evidence judgments. justice” of “ends tors). that the 251 150 L.Ed.2d I believe 167, 179, 121 S.Ct. Gooey’s applicable to poten- the equally (“This principle provision reduces finality by challenge. § 1988 the road delay on for tial fed- prospective that a the time restricting com- his intervenors Cooey and the seek which petitioner eral habeas lethal-injection proto- the allege that plaint review.”). But a habeas federal Eighth their will violate in Ohio used col validity of the an attack is not cruel and of free to be right Amendment conviction or inmate’s the death-sentenced they Specifically, punishment. unusual complaint in his concedes Cooey sentence. acting anes- ultra-short that contend ... relief injunctive seek not he “does that in- sodium, may fail thetic, thiopental underlying attacking of a means as result, that, aas unconsciousness duce sen- His sentence.” or death conviction paralytic conscious when may be they on March final became tence potassi- bromide pancuronium agents, to re- declined Court Supreme when They as- chloride, administered. are um Cooey’s federal denial court’s view likely they will happens, if that sert 538 U.S. Coyle, Cooey v. petition. resulting from the excruciating pain suffer L.Ed.2d 947, 123 S.Ct. in- chemically by suffocation death a claim Instead, raises (2003). he that, attack, because but heart duced sen- executing the death for method state’s their vol- paralyzes bromide pancuronium rights. his constitutional violate will tence unable muscles, they will untary fading to speak. or move faults majority challenge method-of-execution where, bring his great justice are The interests made 1993, when Ohio earlier, as in such challenge claimants here, § 1988 exe- methods injection one lethal sen- death their by which method only state, when in the used validity of cution out, carried are tences method the sole made Ohio executions Ensuring sentences. their Supreme to the prior But execution. of the United the Constitution comply with Campbell, Nelson courts, decision Court’s duty for paramount is a States 124 S.Ct. 158 L.Ed.2d I am of opinion the district (2004), method-of-execution challenges court’s analysis Cooey’s complaint and under were barred this circuit. of the State’s motion to dismiss is thor- (6th In Sapp, Cir.) See re ough, compelling, frankly more per- (holding that a method-of-execution chal suasive than majority’s analysis. After lenge habeas, sounded in not as a civil carefully considering the evidence before action), rights cert. mom., denied it, sub court district articulated a reasoned McQueen v. Sapp, basis for setting the accrual point for stat- 138 L.Ed.2d 1035 fact, ute-of-limitations purposes at the time this court reiterated that position shortly a prisoner’s execution becomes immi- before Court decided Nelson. nent and prisoner knows or has reason See Williams, In re 359 F.3d 811 to know of the giving facts rise to his *14 Cir.2004) (concluding § that a § 1983 meth 1983 claim. The district court fixed the od-of-execution challenge should be con point at which an execution becomes immi- strued as an motion for leave to file a nent as the time “when all legal other petition, successive habeas which was de challenges to the validity of a death sen- nied). i.e., tence come end, an to plain- when the tiff has exhausted all of his state and fed- Despite caselaw, the above majority eral avenues of relief.” present case asserts that “[t]his Circuit’s precedent did prevent not A Lewis death-sentenced inmate knows or has Williams and John Roe from filing their reason to know of the facts of his method- injection § Maj. actions.” Op. of-execution challenge when he learns the at 9. I agree with the district court’s re details of the protocol that will be used for sponse to this line of argument: “[The his execution. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d majority] is correct that Williams and Roe Cir.1996) (“Under federal law tried bring [to claim. major The as developed in Circuit, the statute of ity] neglect[s] point out, to however, that limitations period begins to run when the Williams and Roe failed. Their plaintiff knows or has reason to know that action, consistent with In Sapp, re the act providing the basis of his or her construed unauthorized successive injury occurred.”). This latter consid- petition fully was never heard eration poses a greater difficulty for ensur- on the merits.” Williams and Roe unsuc ing judicial efficiency and stability in Ohio cessfully sought rehearing en banc before because the lethal-injection protocol is a this court and their request for review creature of the Ohio Department of Reha- the United States Court was de bilitation (ODRC) and Correction and is nied. Williams v. Taft, 124 not established statute or administra- 1478, 158 L.Ed.2d 129 tive rule or regulation. The ODRC can change protocol any time, at regard- present case, the district court less of whether an inmate is scheduled for declined the State’s invitation to hold that execution. Cooey was required to bring his

method-of-execution challenge prior to This because, concerns me as has been Nelson. I agree. Even if Cooey could evidenced in the aftermath of the Joseph brought his civil rights complaint be- execution, Clark Ohio is free to periodical- fore which I dubious, find I ly see no change lethal-injection protocol. See justification for holding that he was re- Reginald Fields, Ohio revamps lethal-in- quired to do so. jection procedure, Cleveland Dealer, Plain unwilling I am rights, constitutional ex- (describing the 2006, B 1 at June the recent majority with agree af- Joseph Clark to execute effort tended Cooey’s not relate changes do protocol find unable were officials prison ter complaint. core arm other arm, vein in one vein be- shortly after collapsed Cooey to know had reason B. When staff correctional informed and Clark gan, claim grounds for statutory No working”). isn’t “this contends majority such howor The determines framework drug lethal-injection com- frame- isNor there was aware may occur. changes would be if, equipment that such when, even bination and governing work assertion This as of least used publicized. changes will Cooey’s com- inclusion on the rests asserts majority 19, 2002 from April dated aof letter plaint execu- the Clark resulting changes Haviland, then the Warden S. James com- “core relate not tion do Facility, where Correctional Ohio Southern as a basis implicated not were plaints” located, dis- chamber death only may experience that he assertion for his lethal-injec- about closing information require however, law, does Ohio pain. however, letter, Haviland’s tion protocol. to the changes any publish the ODRC *15 no and carries to no one is addressed ODRC protocol. lethal-injection recipient. any for information address protocol the about information some deems letter, I cannot reading my From basis on that information public to be or addressed it whom was ascertain request. public upon the it to provide will con- of its have learned might information other considers the ODRC But tents. nonpublic. letter, Warden 19, 2002 April In the convinced Moreover, I not am of the intra- the names provided Haviland merely changes were protocol in executions used equipment venous the procedure the “refinements” pharmaceuticals the names the generic from The switch them. describes state not He did inmate. the to execute used low- to a injections saline high-pressure be drugs to the amounts the disclose tubing IVthe drip to flush saline pressure form the about information used, any or concerns “viability” raises its maintain stored, ad- or they purchased, were which be- tubing flushing the adequately about not state Further, did he ministered. not drugs do the so that injections tween indi- administered drugs were whether reach they before another one react individually, and, if once, at or all vidually nothing in I see arm. inmate’s in- no was There sequence. in what addresses amendments or protocol length of about provided formation occurrence, or what of such risk any death-cham- used, tubing whether IV remedy or prevent taken be steps would for tubing monitored personnel ber reading have learned we it. As tubing or whether blockages, kinks ac- literature voluminous sometimes drags. between was flushed simplest prescription, even the companies Vincent May dated In a letter alter dramatically can interactions drug responded Counsel, Staff Lagaña, ODRC safety pharmaceuticals. efficacy or request recipient’s unidentified to an the record further evidence any Without lethal-in- about information additional risk affect the changes how regarding “informa-. noting that jection inmate’s violating death-sentenced [lethal-injection] about training, proce- novo standard. See Miller v. Currie, 50 dures, and procurement .... falls outside F.3d Cir.1995). After review- scope” of the Ohio Public Record Law. ing the letters from officials, ODRC which Nonetheless, Lagaña provided some infor- purport to set out the lethal-injection poli- mation about the procedure because “the cy that place I am unable Department recognizes public [that] the to conclude that Cooey had reason to know legitimate interests in this subject.” of the facts underlying his claim prior to This information revealed that the three time. The ODRC’s response to re- drugs in the lethal-injection protocol were quests for information has been grudging administered “normal saline concentra- and incomplete, and it apparently has un- tion,” that the thiopental sodium pan- fettered discretion in determining whether curonium bromide were purchased from “a the requested information is or is local pharmacy” by the correctional insti- made public. tution pharmacy, and that the drugs were Even having letters, read the I can see kept by the Warden in accordance with how a person reasonable would still be procedures developed by the Ohio State uninformed as to Ohio’s pro- death-penalty Board of Pharmacy and the Drug Enforce- tocol or it how might support a civil rights ment Agency. best, action. At Cooey’s knowledge of the note, I however, that the letter also in- protocol as May of 2002 would have cludes potentially misleading information. been murky; it would have totally been For example, it states that “[a] Medical opaque any time prior to that date. Doctor has pronounced death.” Although The point of all this is that the majority’s this might be true the extent that a assertion that Cooey had reason to know medical pronounced doctor the death anof of the basis for his complaint in the 1990s *16 inmate some point after the execution is not supported by the record. And al- was completed, it fails to acknowledge though I recognize May that of 2002 repre- that several associations of medical profes- sents point more than two years before sionals, including the American Medical Cooey fact filed §his 1983 complaint, (AMA) Association and the Society of Cor- only is one part of the necessary anal- rectional Physicians (SCP), direct their ysis. The part other is to determine when members not to be involved in a legally Cooey’s execution date became imminent. authorized execution. The AMA permits This did not occur until March physicians to “certifyf] death, provided when the Supreme Court denied peti- his that the condemned has been declared tion for certiorari in his proceed- habeas by dead person.” another Am. Med. ing. He filed present his complaint on Ass’n, Code of Ethics E-2.06 Un- 8, 2004, December which was 21 months der SCP the Ethics, Code of “[t]he correc- later. tional health professional shall not in-

volved any aspect of execution of the C. When execution became im- death penalty.” Soc’y of Physicians, Corr. minent Code of Ethics (1998), http://www. Almost every death-sentenced inmate corrdocs.org/ethics.html (last visited Feb. challenges his or her conviction and sen- 16, 2007). tence through habeas proceedings. Under

I take the facts in light the most favor- the majority’s rationale, however, virtually able to Cooey, Ias must when reviewing a every death-sentenced litigant will be denial of a motion to dismiss under the de from barred bringing §a 1983 action chai- court in of district analysis the the logical the method constitutionality of the lenging of the fixes statute that present the case Habeas by the State. chosen execution point when a at the date accrual become, or for good have proceedings imminent becomes execution petitioner’s carrying process the part ill, a routine the facts know of to he reason and justice criminal in our sentence a death out to his claim. rise giving to file petitioner require To system. years before five to three clarity and provides date accrual This legal to obtain order execution or her in- the death-sentenced certainty to both lethal-injection protocol the is

review the sentence that State and the mate counterintuitive, unduly attack, me strikes that susceptible not and final is Yet that wrong. plain harsh, just and set, that the is and date require. will rationale majority’s what Such likely fixed. is for that execution process judicial clarity also aids and the petitioners Moreover, both proceed- judicial efficiency of increases cognitive manage the have will courts courts ensuring federal that ings simulta- inefficiency of dissonance but con- overseeing simultaneous not are at- petitions habeas deciding neously parties. tradictory arguments conviction of the validity tacking the challeng- (2) § actions sentence, nothing I see majority, Contrary to procedure constitutionality of 21, 2007 February ing Court’s in the — The ma- U.S.-, sentence. carry Kato, out used in Wallace opinion - — pris- death-sentenced (2007), force thus will jority L.Ed.2d that claims their pursue the statute oners the issue on bears or, in some culpability lack of their case assert accrue should of limitations innocence, si- while instances, actual rights their case a civil is us. before Wallace re- guilt their multaneously implying point well-recognized turned imposed upon the sentence even questing accrues of action cause “[t]he constitutionally in a out injury be carried them extent though full at 1097. compliant manner. Id. predictable.” known or then basis to no reasonable Here, had intended are of limitations Statutes (in all injury at any if he would know de protect economy and judicial “promote *17 until lethal-injection protocol) of the terms Fin. Hancock John rights.” fendants’ I imminent. date became execution Bank, F.3d 346 Kent Servs., Inc. Old ac- § 1983 that conclude therefore Cir.2003). of concept (6th But the 727, 734 stat- two-year by Ohio’s is not barred tion more than contemplates economy judicial limitations. ute of delay temporal the minimization just sen capital aof imposition between de- arguments forestall Equitable D. Al execution. inmate’s tence lay a held that has Fifth Circuit though the the statute that I believe Because be can challenge method-of-execution until an to run begin should sen after an inmate’s any time raised imminent, and because becomes review, execution Ne on direct final became tence promptly move always almost (5th will Ohio 222 Johnson, 440 ville date, envision I would an execution set in curiam), analysis is Cir.2006) this (per rarely, would of limitations the statute adop its defends majority The complete. cases. these ever, an issue if “the point accrual Neville to de- courts federal for issue crucial more even consider I but logical,” most cide, then, is not limitations, the statute of plaintiffs would-be ... “nothing but whether equitable considerations should be construed as guaranteeing or prisoner bar a should from bringing even a last- suggesting that plaintiff a who waits minute long claim. This is a too concern to file his 1983 action raising a that Ohio makes much inof present method-of-execution claim will be entitled case. to a Although preliminary injunction.” there undoubtedly some This concern concern, merit about delay I excessive see no reason to underscored diverge Hill, from the Supreme Court’s decision in position Court’s — which stated Hill that equity requires v. McDonough, U.S.-, that in- mates seeking stay a S.Ct. (2006), L.Ed.2d 44 to raise §a 1983 claim must meet all the require- “inmates seeking time challenge ments for stay. a 126 S.Ct. at “[E]q- manner which the plans State to execute uity must be sensitive to the State’s strong them satisfy must all of requirements interest in enforcing its criminal judg- for a stay, including a showing of a signifi- ments without undue interference from the cant possibility of success on the merits.” federal courts.” Id. Id. at 2104. This includes applying “a strong equitable presumption against the Factors may play persuasive a grant stay of a where a claim could even dispositive role in a court’s determi- been brought at such a time nation of as to whether grant allow stay of execu- consideration of tion might the merits requir- without include such considerations as (1) ing entry stay.” of a whether protocol Nelson v. Campbell, has recently been (2) 637, 650, changed, whether petitioner has been diligent L.Ed.2d 924 in pursuing claim, his or her (3) whether petitioner has taken rea- court, The district ability to hear sonable steps to ascertain what the proto- and weigh evidence, necessarily has (and col is I note that past ODRC letters greatest information available to it in response to requests for information from which to equities balance the about have been shown to be considering a prisoner’s death-sentenced incomplete and terse to point being request for stay of execution. As we uninformative), whether the tradi- have seen in present case, the district tional factors involved in the balancing test court capably engaged in that very for granting a preliminary injunction task, despite the sometimes inconsistent weigh in stay. favor A conclusory guidance received from this court. Com statement petitioner with no factual pare Gooey (Lundgren) v. Taft, No. 06- support or development is unlikely to re- 23, 2006) Cir. Oct. (summarily sult in the entry stay of a any this or vacating stay of execution Jeffrey other matter. Petitioners who have been *18 Lundgren, who had execution date of diligently pursuing their method-of-execu- 24, 2006), October (Henderson) Cooey claims, tion contrast, will likely include No. 1, 2006) 06-4527 Cir. Dec. Taft. affidavits from a expert medical in support (reversing the district court’s denial Je of their arguments. If jurists reasonable rome Henderson’s motion stay his exe could debate whether a well-documented cution). claim could result in the relief that The district court also considered and petitioner seeks, equitable then consider- addressed the concern that death-sen- ations, barring persuasive other evidence tenced inmates might seek to use 1983 to the contrary, weigh would in favor of actions as a delaying tactic, cautioning granting a stay. the relief emphasize again

I wish the death spared be here

sought from cruel spared rather to but

penalty, administra- punishment unusual I am convinced Because thereof. within the claim § 1983 brought his period

two-year statute dissent. defined, respectfully I

properly America, STATES

UNITED

Plaintiff-Appellee, DIXON, Defendant- Joe

Ronnie

Appellant.

No. 05-6310. Appeals, States Court

United Circuit.

Sixth 31, 2006. Oct.

Submitted: 8, 2007. March and Filed:

Decided

Case Details

Case Name: Richard Wade Cooey, II v. Ted Strickland, Governor Terry J. Collins, Director E.C. Voorhies, Warden
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Mar 2, 2007
Citation: 479 F.3d 412
Docket Number: 05-4057
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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