PEREZ ET UX. v. CAMPBELL, SUPERINTENDENT, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, ARIZONA HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, ET AL.
No. 5175
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 19, 1971—Decided June 1, 1971
402 U.S. 637
Anthony B. Ching argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Robert H. Schlosser argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Gary K. Nelson, Attorney General of Arizona.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises an important issue concerning the construction of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution—whether
On July 8, 1965, petitioner Adolfo Perez, driving a car registered in his name, was involved in an automobile accident in Tucson, Arizona. The Perez automobile was not covered by liability insurance at the time of the collision. The driver of the second car was the minor daughter of Leonard Pinkerton, and in September 1966 the Pinkertons sued Mr. and Mrs. Perez in state court for personal injuries and property damage sustained in the accident. On October 31, 1967, the petitioners confessed judgment in this suit, and a judgment order was entered against them on November 8, 1967, for $2,425.98 plus court costs.
Mr. and Mrs. Perez each filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy in Federal District Court on November 6, 1967. Each of them duly scheduled the judgment debt
During the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, the provisions of the Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act came into play. Although only one provision of the Arizona Act is relevant to the issue presented by this case, it is appropriate to describe the statutory scheme in some detail. The Arizona statute is based on the Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act promulgated by the National Conference on Street and Highway Safety.1 Articles 1 and 2 of the Act deal, respectively, with definitional matters and administration.
The substantive provisions begin in Art. 3, which requires the posting of financial security by those involved in accidents.
Article 4 of the Arizona Act, which includes the only provision at issue here, deals with suspension of licenses and registrations for nonpayment of judgments. Interestingly, it is only when the judgment debtor in an automobile accident lawsuit—usually an owner-operator like Mr. Perez—fails to respond to a judgment entered against him that he must overcome two hurdles in order to regain his driving privileges. Section 28-1161, the first section of Art. 4, requires the state court clerk or judge, when a judgment4 has remained unsatisfied for 60 days after entry, to forward a certified copy of the judgment to the superintendent.5 This was done in the present case, and on March 13, 1968, Mr. and Mrs. Perez were served with notice that their drivers’ licenses and registration were suspended pursuant to
I
Deciding whether a state statute is in conflict with a federal statute and hence invalid under the Supremacy Clause is essentially a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction of the two statutes and then determining the constitutional question whether they are in conflict. In the present case, both statutes have been authoritatively construed. In Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P. 2d 136 (1963), the Supreme Court of Arizona held that “[t]he Financial Responsibility Act has for its principal purpose the protection of the public using the highways from financial hardship which may result from the use of automobiles by financially irresponsible persons.” 93 Ariz., at 280, 380 P. 2d, at 140. The Arizona court has consistently adhered to this construction of its legislation, see Camacho v. Gardner, 104 Ariz. 555, 558, 456 P. 2d 925, 928 (1969); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 104 Ariz. 544, 456 P. 2d 914 (1969); Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241, 243, 428 P. 2d 98, 100 (1967); Farmer v. Killingsworth, 102 Ariz. 44, 47, 424 P. 2d 172, 175 (1967); Hastings v. Thurston, 100 Ariz. 302, 306, 413 P. 2d 767, 770 (1966); Jenkins v. Mayflower Ins. Exchange, 93 Ariz. 287, 290, 380 P. 2d 145, 147 (1963), and we are bound by its rulings. See, e. g., General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm‘n, 322 U. S. 335, 337 (1944). Although the dissent seems unwilling to accept the Arizona Supreme Court‘s construction of the statute as expressive of the Act‘s primary purpose 11
sion.“); Dempsey v. Tynan, 143 Conn. 202, 208, 120 A. 2d 700, 703 (1956) (“The purpose of the legislature in enacting the financial responsibility provisions . . . was to keep off our highways the financially irresponsible owner or operator of an automobile who cannot respond in damages for the injuries he may inflict, and to require him, as a condition for securing or retaining a registration or an operator‘s license, to furnish adequate means of satisfying possible claims against him.“); City of St. Paul v. Hoffmann, 223 Minn. 76, 77-78, 25 N. W. 2d 661, 662-663 (1946) (“The apparent objective of the safety responsibility act is to provide financial responsibility for injuries and damages suffered in motor vehicle traffic. It seeks to achieve its objective solely by the suspension of licenses. While its announced purpose is to promote safety of travel, its provisions take effect after an accident happens and subject drivers and owners of vehicles involved to suspension of their ‘licenses’ unless liability insurance coverage equivalent to that re-quired by the act is carried by the owner or driver of the vehicle. . . . The purpose of the act was to effect financial responsibility to injured persons.“); Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N. H. 314, 318, 197 A. 701, 704 (1938) (“Two reasons were thought to avail for sustaining such a law. One was its character as a regulation of the use of public highways and the other was its capacity to secure public safety in dangerous agencies and operations. This latter reason has slight if any evidence for its factual support. Certainly, in the absence of known experience and statistics, it is doubtful whether the insured owner‘s car, driven either by himself or another, may be considered to be operated more carefully than one whose owner is uninsured. But protection in securing redress for injured highway travelers is a proper subject of police regulation, as well as protection from being injured. It is a reasonable incident of the general welfare that financially irresponsible persons be denied the use of the highway with their cars, regardless of the competency of themselves or others as the drivers.“). For legislative statements to the effect that financial responsibility laws are designed to secure compensation for injured victims, see, e. g.,
Turning to the federal statute, the construction of the Bankruptcy Act is similarly clear. This Court on numerous occasions has stated that “[o]ne of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act” is to give debtors “a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preëxisting debt.” Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234, 244 (1934). Accord, e. g., Harris v. Zion‘s Savings Bank & Trust Co., 317 U. S. 447, 451 (1943); Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605, 617 (1918); Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U. S. 549, 554-555 (1915). There can be no doubt, given Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U. S. 467 (1925), that Congress intended this “new opportunity” to include freedom from most kinds of pre-existing tort judgments.
With the construction of both statutes clearly established, we proceed immediately to the constitutional question whether a state statute that protects judgment creditors from “financially irresponsible persons” is in conflict with a federal statute that gives discharged debtors a new start “unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preëxisting debt.” As early as Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall stated the governing principle—that “acts of the State Legislatures . . . [which] interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution,” are invalid under the Supremacy Clause. Id., at 211 (emphasis added). Three decades ago MR. JUSTICE BLACK, after reviewing the precedents, wrote in a similar vein that, while “[t]his Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or federal laws touching the same subject, ha[d] made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference[,] . . . [i]n the final analysis,” our function is to determine whether a challenged state statute “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). Since Hines the Court has frequently adhered to this articulation of the meaning of the Supremacy Clause. See, e. g., Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm‘n, 389 U. S. 235, 240 (1967); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225, 229 (1964); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm‘n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U. S. 714, 722 (1963) (dictum); Free v. Bland, 369 U. S. 663, 666 (1962); Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538, 542-543 (1945); Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U. S. 173, 176 (1942). Indeed, in Florida Lime &
Both Kesler13 and Reitz, however, ignored this controlling principle. The Court in Kesler conceded that Utah‘s financial responsibility law left “the bankrupt to some extent burdened by the discharged debt,” 369 U. S., at 171, made “it more probable that the debt will be paid despite the discharge,” id., at 173, and thereby made “some inroad . . . on the consequences of bankruptcy. . . .” Id., at 171. Utah‘s statute, in short, frustrated Congress’ policy of giving discharged debtors a new start. But the Kesler majority was not concerned by this frustration. In upholding the statute, the majority opinion did not look to the effect of the legislation but simply asserted that the statute was “not an Act for the Relief of Mulcted Creditors,” id., at 174, and was “not designed to aid collection of debts but to enforce a policy against irresponsible driving. . . .” Id., at 169. The majority, that is, looked to the purpose of the state legislation and upheld it because the purpose was not to circumvent the Bankruptcy Act but to promote highway safety; those in dissent, however, were concerned that, whatever the purpose of the Utah Act, its “plain and inevitable effect . . . [was] to create a powerful weapon for collection of a debt from which [the] bankrupt [had] been released by federal law.” Id., at 183. Such a result, they argued, left “the States free . . . to impair . . . an important and historic policy
The opinion of the Court in Reitz was similarly concerned, not with the fact that New York‘s financial responsibility law frustrated the operation of the Bankruptcy Act, but with the purpose of the law, which was divined as the promotion of highway safety. As the Court said:
“The penalty which § 94-b imposes for injury due to careless driving is not for the protection of the creditor merely, but to enforce a public policy that irresponsible drivers shall not, with impunity, be allowed to injure their fellows. The scheme of the legislation would be frustrated if the reckless driver were permitted to escape its provisions by the simple expedient of voluntary bankruptcy, and, accordingly, the legislature declared that a discharge in bankruptcy should not interfere with the operation of the statute. Such legislation is not in derogation of the Bankruptcy Act. Rather it is an enforcement of permissible state policy touching highway safety.” 314 U. S., at 37.
The dissenting opinion written by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS for himself and three others noted that the New York legislation put “the bankrupt . . . at the creditor‘s mercy,” with the results that “[i]n practical effect the bankrupt may be in as bad, or even worse, a position than if the state had made it possible for a creditor to attach his future wages” and that “[b]ankruptcy . . . [was not] the sanctuary for hapless debtors which Congress intended.” Id., at 41.
We can no longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine of Kesler and Reitz that state law may frustrate the operation of federal law as long as the state legislature in passing its law had some purpose in mind other than
III
Even accepting the Supremacy Clause analysis of Kesler and Reitz—that is, looking to the purpose rather than the effect of state laws—those decisions are not dispositive of this case. Just as Kesler went a step beyond Reitz and broadened the holding of the earlier case, 369 U. S., at 184 (dissenting opinion), so in the present case the respondents asked the courts below and this Court to expand the holdings of the two previous cases. The distinction between Kesler and Reitz and this case lies in the State‘s expressed legislative purpose.
Kesler and Reitz were aberrational in their treatment of this question as well. The majority opinions in both cases assumed, without citation of state court authority or any indication that such precedent was unavailable,
IV
One final argument merits discussion. The dissent points out that the District of Columbia Code contains an anti-discharge provision similar to that included in the Arizona Act. Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of the District of Columbia,
Had Congress focused on the interaction between this minor subsection of the rather lengthy financial responsibility act and the discharge provision of the Bankruptcy Act, it would have been immediately apparent to the legislators that the only constitutional method for so defining the scope and effect of a discharge in bankruptcy was by amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, which by its terms is a uniform statute applicable in the States, Territories, and the District of Columbia.
V
From the foregoing, we think it clear that
It is so ordered.
I concur in the result as to petitioner Emma Perez and dissent as to petitioner Adolfo Perez.
I
The slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our wars.1 The country is fragmented about the current conflict in Southeast Asia, but I detect little genuine public concern about what takes place in our very midst and on our daily travel routes. See Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395, 401 (1971) (concurring opinion).
This being so, it is a matter of deep concern to me that today the Court lightly brushes aside and overrules two cases where it had upheld a representative attempt by the States to regulate traffic and where the Court had considered and rejected the very
II
I think it is desirable to stress certain factual details. The facts, of course, are only alleged, but for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are to accept them as true. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U. S. 546 (1964).
Arizona is a community property state. Adolfo and Emma Perez are husband and wife. They were resident citizens of Arizona at the time of the accident in Tucson in July 1965. Mr. Perez was driving an automobile registered in his name. He was alone. Mrs. Perez was not with him and had nothing to do with her husband‘s
Accompanying, and supposedly supportive of, the Perez complaint in the present suit, were affidavits of Mr. and Mrs. Perez. These affidavits asserted that the Perezes had four minor children ages 6 to 17; that Emma is a housewife and not otherwise gainfully employed; that Emma‘s inability to drive has required their two older children, aged 17 and 14, to walk one and a half miles to high school and the third child, aged 9, one mile to elementary school, with consequent nosebleeding; that Emma‘s inability to drive has caused inconvenience and financial injury; and that Adolfo‘s inability to drive has caused inconvenience because he must rely on others for transportation or use public facilities or walk.
III
The Statutory Plan
Arizona has a comprehensive statutory plan for the regulation of vehicles upon its highways.
The challenged
IV
Adolfo Perez
Inasmuch as the case is before us on the motion of defendants below to dismiss the Perez complaint that alleged Adolfo‘s driving alone, the collision, and the judgment in favor of the Pinkertons, it is established, for present purposes, that the Pinkerton judgment was
Adolfo emphasizes, and I recognize, that under
From these general and accepted principles it is argued that
As Mr. Perez acknowledges in his brief here, the argument is not new. It was raised with respect to a New York statute in Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U. S. 33 (1941), and was rejected there by a five-to-four vote:
“The use of the public highways by motor vehicles, with its consequent dangers, renders the reasonableness and necessity of regulation apparent. The universal practice is to register ownership of automobiles and to license their drivers. Any appropriate means adopted by the states to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees
and to protect others using the highway is consonant with due process. . . . “The penalty which § 94-b imposes for injury due to careless driving is not for the protection of the creditor merely, but to enforce a public policy that irresponsible drivers shall not, with impunity, be allowed to injure their fellows. The scheme of the legislation would be frustrated if the reckless driver were permitted to escape its provisions by the simple expedient of voluntary bankruptcy, and, accordingly, the legislature declared that a discharge in bankruptcy should not interfere with the operation of the statute. Such legislation is not in derogation of the
Bankruptcy Act . Rather it is an enforcement of permissible state policy touching highway safety.” 314 U. S., at 36-37.
Left specifically unanswered in that case, but acknowledged as a “serious question,” 314 U. S., at 38, was the claim that interim amendments of the statutes gave the creditor control over the initiation and duration of the suspension and thus violated the
Nine years ago, the same argument again was advanced, this time with respect to Utah‘s Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, and again was rejected. Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U. S. 153, 158-174 (1962). There, Utah‘s provisions relating to duration of suspension and restoration, more stringent than those of New York, were challenged. It was claimed that the statutes made the State a “collecting agent for the creditor rather than furthering an interest in highway safety,”
“But the lesson Zavelo [v. Reeves, 227 U. S. 625 (1913)] and Spalding [v. New York ex rel. Backus, 4 How. 21 (1845)] teach is that the
Bankruptcy Act does not forbid a State to attach any consequence whatsoever to a debt which has been discharged.“The
Utah Safety Responsibility Act leaves the bankrupt to some extent burdened by the discharged debt. Certainly some inroad is made on the consequences of bankruptcy if the creditor can exert pressure to recoup a discharged debt, or part of it, through the leverage of the State‘s licensing and registration power. But the exercise of this power is deemed vital to the State‘s well-being, and, from the point of view of its interests, is wholly unrelated to the considerations which propelled Congress to enact a national bankruptcy law. There are here overlapping interests which cannot be uncritically resolved by exclusive regard to the money consequences of enforcing a widely adopted measure for safeguarding life and safety.“. . . At the heart of the matter are the complicated demands of our federalism.
“Are the differences between the Utah statute and
that of New York so significant as to make a constitutionally decisive difference? A State may properly decide, as forty-five have done, that the prospect of a judgment that must be paid in order to regain driving privileges serves as a substantial deterrent to unsafe driving. We held in Reitz that it might impose this requirement despite a discharge, in order not to exempt some drivers from appropriate protection of public safety by easy refuge in bankruptcy. . . . To whatever extent these provisions make it more probable that the debt will be paid despite the discharge, each no less reflects the State‘s important deterrent interest. Congress had no thought of amending the
Bankruptcy Act —when it adopted this law for the District of Columbia; we do not believe Utah‘s identical statute conflicts with it either.“Utah is not using its police power as a devious collecting agency under the pressure of organized creditors. Victims of careless car drivers are a wholly diffused group of shifting and uncertain composition, not even remotely united by a common financial interest. The
Safety Responsibility Act is not an Act for the Relief of Mulcted Creditors. It is not directed to bankrupts as such. Though in a particular case a discharged bankrupt who wants to have his rightfully suspended license and registration restored may have to pay the amount of a discharged debt, or part of it, the bearing of the statute on the purposes served by bankruptcy legislation is essentially tangential.” 369 U. S., at 170-174 (footnotes omitted).
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, joined by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissented on the ground that
The Perezes in their brief, p. 7, acknowledge that the Arizona statutes challenged here “are not unlike the Utah ones discussed in Kesler.” Accordingly, Adolfo Perez is forced to urge that Reitz and the remaining portion of Kesler that bears upon the subject be overruled. The Court bows to that argument.
I am not prepared to overrule those two cases and to undermine their control over Adolfo Perez’ posture here. I would adhere to the rulings and I would hold that the States have an appropriate and legitimate concern with highway safety; that the means Arizona has adopted with respect to one in Adolfo‘s position (that is, the driver whose negligence has caused harm to others and whose judgment debt based on that negligence remains unsatisfied) in its attempt to assure driving competence and care on the part of its licensees, as well as to protect others, is appropriate state legislation; and that the Arizona statute, like its Utah counterpart, despite the tangential effect upon bankruptcy, does not operate in derogation of the
Other factors of significance are also to be noted:
1. The Court struggles to explain away the parallel District of Columbia situation installed by Congress itself.
2. Arizona‘s
3. The Court rationalizes today‘s decision by saying that Kesler went beyond Reitz and that the present case goes beyond Kesler, and that that is too much. It would justify this by noting the Arizona Supreme Court‘s characterization of the Arizona statute as one for the protection of the public from financial hardship and by con-
4. While stare decisis “is no immutable principle,”7 as a glance at the Court‘s decisions over the last 35 years, or over almost any period for that matter, will disclose, it seems to me that the principle does have particular validity and application in a situation such as the one confronting the Court in this case. Here is a statute concerning motor vehicle responsibility, a substantive matter peculiarly within the competence of the State rather than the National Government. Here is a serious and conscientious attempt by a State to legislate and do something about the problem that, in terms of death and bodily injury and adverse civilian effect, is so alarming. Here is a statute widely adopted by the several States and legitimately assumed by the lawmakers of those States to be consistent with the
5. Adolfo‘s affidavit protestation of hardship goes no further than to assert a resulting reliance upon friends and neighbors or upon public transportation or upon walking to cover the seven miles from his home to his place of work; this is inconvenience, perhaps, even in this modern day when we are inclined to equate convenience with necessity and to eschew what prior generations routinely accepted as part of the day‘s labor, but it falls far short of the “great harm” and “irreparable injury” that he otherwise asserts only in general and conclusory terms. Perez’ professed inconvenience stands vividly and starkly in contrast with his victims’ injuries. But as is so often the case, the victim, once damaged, is seemingly beyond concern. What seems to become important is the perpetrator‘s inconvenience.
6. It is conceded that Arizona constitutionally could prescribe liability insurance as a condition precedent to the issuance of a license and registration.
V
Emma Perez
Emma Perez’ posture is entirely different. Except for possible emotional strain resulting from her husband‘s predicament, she was in no way involved in the Pinkerton accident. She was not present when it occurred and no negligence or nonfeasance on her part contributed to it.
At this point a glance at the Arizona community property system perhaps is indicated. Emma Perez was a proper nominal defendant in the Pinkerton lawsuit, see Donato v. Fishburn, 90 Ariz. 210, 367 P. 2d 245 (1961), but she was not a necessary party there. First National Bank v. Reeves, 27 Ariz. 508, 517, 234 P. 556, 560 (1925); Bristol v. Moser, 55 Ariz. 185, 190-191, 99 P. 2d 706, 709 (1940). However, a judgment against a marital community based upon the husband‘s tort committed without the wife‘s knowledge or consent does not bind her separate property. Ruth v. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 138, 185 P. 2d 304, 310 (1947). The judgment would, of course, bind the community property vehicle to the extent permitted by Arizona law. See
In Arizona during coverture personal property may be disposed of only by the husband.
For what it is worth, Emma‘s affidavit is far more persuasive of hardship than Adolfo‘s. She relates the family automobile to the children and their medical needs and to family purchasing at distant discount stores. But I need not, and would not, decide her case on the representations in her affidavit.
I conclude that the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, in its application to Emma Perez and her operator‘s license, does not comport with the purpose and policy of the
I therefore would hold that under these circumstances the State‘s action, under
[For Appendix to opinion of BLACKMUN, J., see post, p. 672.]
MOTOR-VEHICLE DEATHS AND WAR DEATHS
From 1900 through 1969, motor-vehicle deaths in the U. S. totalled nearly 1,800,000. Deaths of U. S. military personnel in all wars are shown below. In making comparisons, it must be kept in mind that nearly everyone is exposed to motor-vehicle accidents but relatively few are exposed to war deaths.
U. S. MILITARY CASUALTIES IN PRINCIPAL WARS
| War | Deaths | Nonfatal Wounds | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | Battle | Others* | ||
| Total | †1,146,000 | 643,052 | †503,200 | §1,540,000 |
| Revolutionary War (1775-83) | 4,435 | 4,435 | N.A. | 6,188 |
| War of 1812 (1812-15) | 2,260 | 2,260 | N.A. | 4,505 |
| Mexican War (1846-48) | 13,283 | 1,733 | 11,550 | 4,152 |
| Civil War (1861-65) | ||||
| Union Forces | 364,511 | 140,414 | 224,097 | 281,881 |
| Confederate Forces | 133,821 | 74,524 | 59,297 | N.A. |
| Spanish-American War (1898) | 2,446 | 385 | 2,061 | 1,662 |
| World War I (1917-18) | 116,708 | 53,513 | 63,195 | 204,002 |
| World War II (1941-45) | 407,316 | 292,131 | 115,185 | 670,846 |
| Korean War (1950-53) | 54,246 | 33,629 | 20,617 | 103,284 |
| Viet Nam War (1961-69) | 47,251 | 40,028 | 7,223 | 262,799 |
Source: Office of Secretary of Defense.
*Includes deaths from disease, accidents, etc.
†Rounded.
§Incomplete and rounded. N. A. Not available.
Accident Facts 63, published by the National Safety Council (1970 ed.).
The same publication, page 59, discloses that the annual death toll for motor vehicle accidents in the United States has exceeded 52,000 in each of the last five calendar years. Thus, the annual motor vehicle carnage approximates the total number of lives lost during the entire Vietnam conflict beginning in 1961.
Notes
See also