BEACHWOOD CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLEE, v. WARRENSVILLE HEIGHTS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLANT.
No. 2020-1326
Supreme Court of Ohio
September 6, 2022
2022-Ohio-3071
Submitted October 6, 2021
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Beachwood City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Warrensville Hts. City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3071.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-3071
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Beachwood City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Warrensville Hts. City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3071.]
Agreement made in 1997 between two city school district boards of education is valid and enforceable—Former
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 108253, 2020-Ohio-4459.
O’CONNOR, C.J.
{¶ 1} In 1990, the city of Beachwood annexed approximately 405 acres of land known as the Chagrin Highlands, which is part of the Warrensville Heights City School District. Appellee, the Beachwood
{¶ 2} In 1997, following several years of negotiations, Beachwood and Warrensville Heights agreed that the Chagrin Highlands territory would not transfer to the Beachwood City School District but that the districts would instead share the tax revenue generated from real property located within the territory. This appeal concerns the enforceability of that agreement.
{¶ 3} Because we conclude that the parties’ agreement is valid and enforceable, we affirm the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which reversed the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas’ entry of summary judgment in favor of Warrensville Heights.
R.C. 3311.06
{¶ 4} To provide context for the facts of this case and the parties’ primary arguments, we begin by reviewing
{¶ 5} When a city annexes territory that includes part, but not all, of a school district‘s territory, the annexed territory remains part of that school district unless the state board of education approves a transfer of the annexed territory to the city school district.1
{¶ 6} To obtain the state board‘s approval, the school board of at least one district whose territory would be affected by the transfer must first pass a resolution requesting the state board‘s approval and submit the resolution to the state board.
{¶ 8} With these procedures in mind, we now turn to the facts of this case.
Facts and procedural background
Beachwood requests a transfer of annexed territory
{¶ 9} In October 1990, Beachwood initiated the statutory process described in
{¶ 10} The districts engaged in negotiations but were unable to reach an agreement on their own. They eventually engaged retired federal judge Robert M. Duncan to serve as a facilitator. Following mediation with the parties in November 1996 and January 1997, Judge Duncan issued written recommendations in April 1997. Judge Duncan recommended that the Chagrin Highlands territory remain part of the Warrensville Heights City School District but that the parties share real-estate tax revenue “generated from that amount of market value of the property [within the territory] (as determined by the Auditor) which exceeds * * * $22,258,310.”2 Judge Duncan recommended that, absent an abatement of real-estate taxes in the Chagrin Highlands territory, Beachwood receive 30 percent of the tax revenue generated by nonresidential and nonagricultural property and that Warrensville Heights receive the remaining 70 percent. Judge Duncan noted that
the districts’ representatives had agreed to support their respective school boards’ adoptions of the recommendations.
The parties agree to settle their dispute without a transfer of territory
{¶ 11} In May 1997, the parties executed a written agreement that incorporated Judge Duncan‘s recommendations; they characterized the agreement as a “fair and equitable settlement” that was “in the best interests of” both districts. The superintendents, treasurers, and board presidents of both districts signed the agreement, which stated that Beachwood would withdraw from the state board its request for approval of a transfer of the Chagrin Highlands territory, that the territory would remain part of the Warrensville Heights City School District, that the districts would share tax revenue generated from nonresidential and nonagricultural property within the territory as set out in Judge Duncan‘s recommendations, and that they would engage in joint educational programs and activities to benefit both districts. The parties agreed to “jointly request[]” that the Cuyahoga County auditor
{¶ 12} There is no evidence that either Beachwood or Warrensville Heights transmitted the agreement to the state board, but in accordance with the agreement‘s terms, Beachwood withdrew from the state board its request for approval of a transfer of the Chagrin Highlands territory.
Beachwood attempts to enforce the agreement
{¶ 13} As early as 2013, Beachwood Superintendent Dr. Robert P. Hardis (he was the district‘s assistant superintendent from August 2012 through July 2015) discussed with representatives of Warrensville Heights the implementation of the agreement‘s revenue-sharing and joint-educational-programming provisions. Dr. Hardis testified that during discussions and meetings between the districts about the valuation of property within the Chagrin Highlands territory and implementation of the agreement‘s revenue-sharing provisions in 2015 or 2016, “[n]o one stated any sense of disagreement or hesitation” about the validity of the agreement. Nevertheless, Warrensville Heights has at all times refused to share with Beachwood the tax revenues generated from the Chagrin Highlands territory.
Beachwood turns to the courts to enforce the agreement
{¶ 14} In 2017, Beachwood sued Warrensville Heights for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief, but the parties filed a stipulated notice of dismissal without prejudice. Dr. Hardis wrote to Warrensville Heights Superintendent Donald J. Jolly II in January 2018, asking Warrensville Heights to reconsider its position that the parties’ agreement was invalid and unenforceable. Dr. Hardis claimed that Beachwood was entitled to $5,571,421.99 in tax revenue generated from properties within the Chagrin Highlands territory for tax years 2012 through 2017.
{¶ 15} In August 2018, Beachwood refiled its claims against Warrensville Heights. Beachwood alleged that by refusing to share tax revenue from the Chagrin Highlands territory, Warrensville Heights breached a contract that arose from the parties’ adoption of Judge Duncan‘s recommendations and the May 1997 written agreement that wholly incorporated those recommendations.3 Beachwood alleged that it had reasonably and foreseeably relied on Warrensville Heights‘s promise to share tax revenue and that it had conferred a substantial benefit on Warrensville Heights by withdrawing its request to transfer the Chagrin Highlands territory. In addition to restating the claims from its original complaint, Beachwood‘s refiled complaint contained claims for unjust enrichment, conversion, and fraud. Beachwood alleged that Warrensville Heights had wrongfully converted tax revenue to which Beachwood was entitled and that it had fraudulently represented
that it would share the tax revenue and had thereby induced Beachwood to withdraw its transfer request.
{¶ 16} Warrensville Heights moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted its motion. The court held that the parties lacked “the capacity to contract over the transfer of tax dollars” without the state board‘s approval and that by not
{¶ 17} A divided panel of the Eighth District reversed the trial court‘s judgment. The majority held that the parties’ agreement did not require the state board‘s approval, because it did not call for a transfer of school-district territory. It also rejected Warrensville Heights‘s alternative argument—which had not been addressed by the trial court—that the parties’ agreement was invalid because it lacked a statutorily required fiscal certificate. The dissenting judge, on the other hand, concluded that the failure to secure the state board‘s approval rendered the parties’ agreement void.
{¶ 18} We accepted Warrensville Heights‘s discretionary appeal, 161 Ohio St.3d 1407, 2021-Ohio-106, 161 N.E.3d 680, which presents three propositions of law. Warrensville Heights firsts asks this court to hold that
Analysis
R.C. 3311.06 requires the state board to approve only transfers of territory
{¶ 19} A school board is a statutory creation that possesses only the authority the legislature has conferred on it, either expressly or by clear implication. Wolf v. Cuyahoga Falls City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 52 Ohio St.3d 222, 223, 556 N.E.2d 511 (1990). It is “a body politic and corporate” that has the power to contract,
{¶ 20}
{¶ 21} Beachwood initiated the statutory process to obtain the state board‘s approval for a transfer of the Chagrin Highlands territory, but the parties ultimately agreed that the territory would not transfer and that they would instead share tax revenue generated from property within the territory. The question then is whether despite the absence of a transfer of territory,
{¶ 22} Our primary goal when analyzing a statute is to give effect to the legislature‘s intent, which we discern by first looking to the plain statutory language. Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 148 Ohio St.3d 483, 2016-Ohio-7432, 71 N.E.3d 974, ¶ 20. We read the words and phrases in context, and we construe them in accordance with the rules of grammar and common usage. Mahoning Educational Assn. of Dev. Disabilities v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 137 Ohio St.3d 257, 2013-Ohio-4654, 998 N.E.2d 1124, ¶ 15. If the plain statutory language is unambiguous, we apply it as written. Antoon at ¶ 20.
{¶ 23} A “transfer of school district territory or division of funds and indebtedness incident thereto” may be completed only in the manner specified by
{¶ 24}
{¶ 25} Warrensville Heights mischaracterizes the Eighth District‘s holding as interpreting the phrase “incident []to” as requiring a causal relationship. The court of appeals simply held that for a division of funds to be incident to a transfer of territory, the division of funds must coexist with a transfer of territory, not that one must be the cause of the other. And neither Kelm v. Kelm, 68 Ohio St.3d 26, 623 N.E.2d 39 (1993), nor Woodside v. United States, 606 F.2d 134 (6th Cir.1979)—the cases that Warrensville Heights cites in support of its argument that “incident to” does not implicate causation—undermines that holding.
{¶ 26} In Kelm, this court held that an antenuptial agreement that required arbitration of ” ‘a dispute as to the alimony or child support provisions incident to a termination of [the parties‘] marriage’ ” encompassed disputes that arose “during the pendency of a matrimonial dispute,” not just those matters “which are concomitant to a final degree of divorce.” Kelm at 28. The question in Kelm related to timing; no matter when the dispute arose, there could be no alimony or child support without a termination of the parties’ marriage. In Woodside, the Sixth Circuit addressed a rule that precluded a military service member from suing the government for injuries that were ” ‘incident to service.’ ” Woodside at 140, quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950). It held that whether an activity is “incident to service” depends on the ” ‘degree to which the activity is divorced from or related to military service.’ ” Id. at 141, quoting Schwager v. United States, 279 F.Supp. 262, 263 (E.D.Pa.1968). There is no suggestion in that case, however, that the decedent‘s injury could have been “incident to service” had the decedent not been a service member to begin with. Thus, neither case weighs against an understanding, based on the plain statutory language, that
{¶ 27} Looking to other subsections of
{¶ 28} Warrensville Heights next argues that
{¶ 29} Warrensville Heights fares no better with its citations to other statutory language in support of its position that the parties’ agreement was invalid without the state board‘s approval. For example, although
R.C. 5705.41 and 5705.412 are inapplicable
{¶ 31} Warrensville Heights next argues, under its second proposition of law, that the parties’ agreement is invalid for the independent reason that a fiscal certificate, as described in
{¶ 32} As it existed in 1997,
{¶ 33}
Notwithstanding
section 5705.41 of the Revised Code , no school district shall adopt any appropriation measure, make any contract, give any order involving the expenditure of money, or increase during any school year any wage or salary schedule unless there is attached thereto a certificate signed by the treasurer and president of the board of education and the superintendent that the school district has in effect for the remainder of the fiscal year and the succeeding fiscal year the authorization to levy taxes * * * which, when combined with the estimated revenue from all other sources available to the district at the time of certification, are sufficient to provide the operating revenues necessary to enable the district to operate an adequate educational program * * * for the current fiscal year and * * * the succeeding fiscal year.
Former
{¶ 34} A contract to which
{¶ 35} In Tri-County N. Local School Bd. of Edn. v. McGuire & Shook Corp., 748 F.Supp. 541 (S.D.Ohio 1989), the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio undertook an extensive historical review of
when the Ohio legislature passed what is known as the Worthington law, which provided that the city of Cincinnati could borrow $1 million to rid itself of a debt in a proportion similar to that which the city had incurred by contracting for debts and making appropriations in greater amounts than the city could afford. Emmert v. Elyria, 74 Ohio St. 185, 193, 78 N.E. 269 (1906). The Worthington law supplemented a similar provision in the state municipal code, also enacted in 1874, which provided that the City Council of Cincinnati was prohibited from “making appropriations or contracting for debts for the ordinary purposes of the city, exceeding the amount of taxes and revenues from other sources for the current year.” State, ex rel Seiter v. Hoffman, 25 Ohio St. 328, 333 (1874) (emphasis in the original).
Id. at 545.
{¶ 36} Two years later, the legislature enacted the Burns Law, which extended application of the 1874 law to all Ohio municipalities. See id. at 546.
{¶ 37} In 1934, this court described the Burns Law, in its various forms, as serving the “useful and salutary purpose [of] curtailing the unwise and reckless expenditure of public funds when such funds were not on hand or in sight.” Mayfield Hts. v. Irish, 128 Ohio St. 329, 332, 191 N.E. 129 (1934). “[T]he clear intent of the Ohio legislature in enacting the Burns law was to prevent municipalities in Ohio from incurring debt problems * * * as a result of contracting for debts in greater amounts than the city could finance from its present tax revenues.” Tri-County at 546. The Tri-County court described
{¶ 38}
{¶ 39} Warrensville Heights contends that the court of appeals incorrectly, and too narrowly, construed the term “expenditure.” It maintains that the agreement necessarily involved an expenditure of funds because Beachwood would benefit monetarily from its enforcement. In support of its broad understanding of “expenditure,” Warrensville Heights unpersuasively cites unrelated statutes that define the term elsewhere in the Revised Code. But those definitions do not apply to
{¶ 41} The parties’ agreement does not require Warrensville Heights to expend money; it simply allocates the collectable tax revenue between the two districts. To “collect” is the opposite of to “expend.” See https://www.thesaurus.com/browse/expend (accessed Apr. 20, 2022) [https://perma.cc/K9ZX-84LX]. Warrensville Heights‘s agreement that it would be entitled to collect only 70 percent of the tax revenue generated from relevant portions of the Chagrin Highlands territory does not establish that it would be required to expend the other 30 percent, which is to be diverted to Beachwood. The plain language of the agreement reveals an effort to remove any obligation for Warrensville Heights to make direct payments to Beachwood, as well as the parties’ anticipation that the county treasurer would pay the agreed-on percentages of the tax revenue directly to the two districts. Although the agreement does describe a process by which Warrensville Heights would transfer collected tax revenue to Beachwood, that process is to apply only if the county auditor or treasurer refuses to make the agreed-on distributions. The Eighth District correctly characterized the agreement as concerning the collection of revenue, not an expenditure of revenue, even if the tax revenue earmarked for Beachwood first passes through Warrensville Heights‘s treasury as an intermediary on its way to its rightful recipient. Because the agreement does not involve an expenditure of money, it is not subject to
{¶ 42} Warrensville Heights next argues that even if the agreement is not subject to
{¶ 43} Warrensville Heights maintains that the applicable version of
{¶ 44} To determine the scope of
{¶ 45} The context here supports the Eighth District‘s reading of
{¶ 46} Although not binding on this court, the federal district court‘s reasoning in Tri-County undercuts Warrensville Heights‘s argument that former
{¶ 47} Although for different reasons than those in Tri-County, certification under former
the school district has in effect for the remainder of the fiscal year and the succeeding fiscal year the authorization to levy taxes * * * which, when combined with the estimated
revenue from all other sources * * *, are sufficient to provide the operating revenues necessary to enable the district to operate an adequate education program for * * * the current fiscal year and * * * the succeeding fiscal year.
Sub.S.B. No. 257, 143 Ohio Laws, Part I, at 1288-1289.
{¶ 48} The information contained in a fiscal certificate has no relevance to a contract that does not require the school district to spend money; thus, it would make no sense to read the statute to require a school district to attach a fiscal certificate in those circumstances. What would be the point of a fiscal certificate, for example, if a school district contracts to place an advertisement for a local pizza shop on its football stadium in exchange for a payment of money? Notably, no Ohio appellate court has applied
{¶ 49} For these reasons, we conclude that neither former
This court will not decide the applicability of political-subdivision immunity in the first instance
{¶ 50} Having concluded that the 1997 agreement between Warrensville Heights and Beachwood is valid and enforceable, we now turn to Warrensville Heights‘s final proposition of law, which relates to Beachwood‘s claims for promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, fraud, and conversion. Warrensville Heights maintains that the court of appeals erred by reversing the trial court‘s dismissal of those claims, and it asks this court to hold that
{¶ 51} In its motion for summary judgment, Warrensville Heights argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Beachwood‘s promissory-estoppel, unjust-enrichment, conversion, and fraud claims, in part because it was immune from liability under
was formed and [Beachwood‘s] remaining counts for promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, conversion, and fraud fail.” Then, the court of appeals stated that the sole issue on appeal was whether the parties’ agreement was valid and enforceable. By concluding that the agreement was enforceable, the court rejected the sole basis for the trial court‘s entry of summary judgment on Beachwood‘s noncontract claims. It therefore reversed that judgment and remanded
Conclusion
{52} The 1997 agreement to share tax revenue in lieu of a transfer of the Chagrin Highlands territory from the Warrensville Heights City School District to the Beachwood City School District—an agreement unanimously adopted by both school boards—required neither approval from the state board of education pursuant to
Judgment affirmed and cause remanded to the trial court.
KENNEDY, DEWINE, and DONNELLY, JJ., concur.
FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion.
STEWART, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by BRUNNER, J.
FISCHER, J., dissenting.
{53} I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority opinion that the plain language of former
Former R.C. 5705.412 is unambiguous and applies to any contract entered into by a school district
{54} In upholding the contract between Warrensville Heights and Beachwood, the majority opinion determines that former
{55} We look to the plain language of a statute to determine the legislature‘s intent. State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 9. In reviewing the statute, we must give effect to the statutory language without deleting or inserting words. Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 39-40, 741 N.E.2d 121 (2001), citing Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105, 304 N.E.2d 378 (1973), and Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland, 37 Ohio St.3d 50, 524 N.E.2d 441 (1988), paragraph three of the syllabus. And only when the statute is ambiguous do we look to legislative history and other factors to provide guidance. Dunbar v. State, 136 Ohio St.3d 181, 2013-Ohio-2163, 992 N.E.2d 1111, ¶ 16.
{56} Former
{57} The majority opinion ignores the word “any” and inserts words into the statute that are not there. And not only does the majority opinion insert words into the statute, but it inserts words that the General Assembly expressly included in one item in the list of items at issue here and excluded from another item in that list. The interpretive canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius is instructive.
{58} ” ‘[T]he canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping; it has force only when the items expressed are members of an “associated group or series,” justifying the inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.’ ” (Brackets sic.) Summerville v. Forest Park, 128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 35, quoting Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168, 123 S.Ct. 748, 154 L.Ed.2d 653 (2003), citing United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002). As the Supreme Court of the United States has explained in regard to the canon:
Just as statutory language suggesting exclusiveness is missing, so is that essential extrastatutory ingredient of an expression-exclusion demonstration, the series of terms from which an omission bespeaks a negative implication. The canon depends on identifying a series of two or more terms or things that should be understood to go hand in hand, which is abridged in circumstances supporting a sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81, 122 S.Ct. 2045, 153 L.Ed.2d 82 (2002).
{59} Here, we have a list of four actions that were valid only if a school district first obtained a fiscal certificate. The General Assembly forbade the school district from “mak[ing] any contract” and “giv[ing] any order involving the expenditure of money” without the required fiscal certificate. (Emphasis added.) Former
{60} Even if the phrase is read as “make a contract” instead of “make any contract,” in context with the rest of former
{61} Because the plain language of former
Though obtaining a fiscal certificate in this circumstance might have been difficult, that does not mean that one was not required
{62} Beachwood argues that obtaining a certificate described in former
Conclusion
{63} Former
STEWART, J., dissenting.
{64}
R.C. 3311.06 must be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose
{65} A remedial statute is designed to correct an existing law, redress an existing grievance, or introduce regulations conducive to the public good. 50 American Jurisprudence, Statutes, Section 15, at 34 (1944). Remedial laws also include laws that are procedural in nature. State ex rel. Slaughter v. Indus. Comm., 132 Ohio St. 537, 543-544, 9 N.E.2d 505 (1937), quoting Miami Cty. v. Dayton, 92 Ohio St. 215, 219, 110 N.E. 726 (1915) (” ‘A statute undertaking to provide a rule of practice, a course of procedure, or a method of review, is in its very nature and essence a remedial statute’ “). Importantly, the Ohio General Assembly has made clear that “[r]emedial laws and all proceedings under them shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining justice.”
{66} There can be no doubt that
“The entire legislation regulating school districts, and especially that part regulating the establishment of public school districts in territory annexed to a city, is indeed remedial. * * * The entire matter is subject to legislative control; and legislation treating these problems is remedial in the sense that it is directed solely to the advancement of the public welfare.”
(Emphasis added.) State ex rel. Worthington Exempted School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 172 Ohio St. 237, 239-240, 175 N.E.2d 91 (1961), quoting Bohley v. Patry, 107 Ohio App. 345, 348-349, 159 N.E.2d 252 (9th Dist.1958).
{67} Because
{68} As we have previously explained:
To determine the plain meaning of a statute, a court relies on the definitions provided by the legislative body, because a “definition by the average man or even by the ordinary dictionary with its studied enumeration of subtle shades of meaning is not a substitute for the definition set before us by the lawmakers with instructions to apply it to the exclusion of all others.” Fox v. Std. Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294 U.S. 87, 96, 55 S.Ct. 333, 79 L.Ed. 780 (1935). When a term is not defined in the statute, we use the term‘s plain and ordinary meaning. Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 56, 661 N.E.2d 706 (1996). And “[i]n ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988).
State v. Turner, 163 Ohio St.3d 421, 2020-Ohio-6773, 170 N.E.3d 842, ¶ 18. As with statutory terms, the terms in administrative rules are also to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. State ex rel. Richmond v. Indus. Comm., 139 Ohio St.3d 157, 2014-Ohio-1604, 10 N.E.3d 683, ¶ 28.
{69} The majority opinion holds that
In the event territory is transferred from one school district to another under this section, an equitable division of the funds and indebtedness between the districts involved shall be made under the supervision of the state board of education and that board‘s decision shall be final.
This sentence makes clear that when there is an actual transfer of territory there necessarily will be an accompanying division of funds and indebtedness between the districts and that this process must be overseen by the state board. On the other hand,
{70} Similarly, it is clear from the administrative regulations corresponding to
{71} With regard to
{72} Had the state board reviewed this matter, it would have done so “with primary consideration given to the present and ultimate good of the pupils in the affected districts.” Ohio Adm.Code 3301-89-01(F); Bartchy v. State Bd. of Edn., 120 Ohio St.3d 205, 2008-Ohio-4826, 897 N.E.2d 1096, ¶ 45 (plurality opinion) (noting that Ohio Adm.Code 3301-89-01 sets forth the general policies of the state board regarding requests for territory transfers, including that the primary merit consideration is the good of the pupils involved). In reviewing the language of
BRUNNER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
Reminger Co., L.P.A., Holly Marie Wilson, Brian D. Sullivan, and Aaren R. Host; and Brindza McIntyre & Seed, L.L.P., and Daniel McIntyre, for appellee.
Pepple & Waggoner, Ltd., Christian M. Williams, Donna M. Andrew, and Brian J. DeSantis; and Taft Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Thomas J. Lee, Adrian D. Thompson, Aaron M. Herzig, and Brian A. Morris, for appellant.