CITY OF BRECKSVILLE, APPELLANT, v. COOK, APPELLEE.
No. 94-1897
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
March 4, 1996
75 Ohio St.3d 53 | 1996-Ohio-171
MOYER, C.J.
Submitted November 8, 1995. Certified by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 65766.
The transfer of a case pursuant to
{¶ 1} The facts of this case are simple and undisputed. On May 22, 1993, appellee, Eric Cook, was cited for an automobile exhaust equipment defect, a minor misdemeanor violation of Section 337.20 of the Codified Ordinances of the city of Brecksville. The citing officer issued Cook a ticket and instructed him to appear in Brecksville Mayor’s Court on June 3, 1993.
{¶ 2} On June 3, 1993, Cook appeared as directed, entered a plea of not guilty, and did not waive his right to a speedy trial. On June 4, 1993, the mayor certified the case to the Garfield Heights Municipal Court for trial. On June 9, 1993, the municipal court received the matter, placed it on the docket, and notified Cook of his arraignment set for June 22.
{¶ 3} Cook appeared before the municipal court on June 22, again entered a plea of not guilty, and informed the court that thirty-one days had passed since the date of his citation, suggesting that the speedy trial statute had run without the state bringing him to trial. The judge explained that Cook was mistaken, that a new thirty-day period had begun when the mayor certified the case to the municipal court, and that the statute had consequently not run. The judge set the trial for June 28, 1993, at which time Cook was convicted and fined. Cook then appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals.
{¶ 4} The court of appeals held, over a dissent, that Cook had not been brought to trial within the time required by
Roger A. Wadsworth, Brecksville City Prosecutor, for appellant.
Augustin F. O’Neil, for appellee.
MOYER, C.J.
{¶ 5} This appeal presents two related issues: (1) whether the delay produced by the transfer pursuant to
{¶ 6} Ohio’s speedy trial statute was implemented to incorporate the constitutional protection of the right to a speedy trial provided for in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and in Section 10, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution. State v. Broughton (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 253, 256, 581 N.E.2d 541, 544; see Columbus v. Bonner (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 34, 36, 2 OBR 37, 39, 440 N.E.2d 606, 608. The constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial was originally considered necessary to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, to minimize the anxiety of the accused, and to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. State, ex rel. Jones v. Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 130, 131, 9 O.O.3d 108, 109, 378 N.E.2d 471, 472.
{¶ 7} Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantees to the party accused in any court “a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.” “Throughout the long history of litigation involving application of the speedy trial statutes, this court has repeatedly announced that the trial courts are to strictly enforce the legislative mandates evident in these statutes. This court’s announced position of strict enforcement has been grounded in the conclusion that the speedy trial statutes implement the constitutional guarantee of a public speedy trial.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Pachay (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 218, 221, 18 O.O.3d 427, 429, 416 N.E.2d 589, 591. We are acutely conscious of the magnitude of the rights we interpret today. We have also previously explained, however, that “the prescribed times for trial set forth in
{¶ 8}
{¶ 9} Circumstances justifying extension of the statutory period are contained in
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“(F) Any period of delay necessitated by a removal or change of venue pursuant to law[.]”
{¶ 10} The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals held that the transfer of the case from the mayor’s court to the municipal court was not a “removal” within the meaning of
{¶ 11} In determining whether a transfer from the mayor’s court to the municipal court for trial constitutes a removal under
{¶ 12} Though the term “removal” might be used most often in relation to the transfer from state court to a United States District Court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the General Assembly clearly was not referring to a removal to federal court when it enacted
{¶ 13} This interpretation is supported by the case law. Of the Ohio appellate cases directly addressing the issue, two published cases predating the case at bar both conclude that the transfer at issue is precisely the “removal” referred to in
{¶ 14} The Tenth District Court of Appeals held in Gahanna v. Partlow that “a transfer of a case from a mayor’s court to a municipal court for a jury trial pursuant to
{¶ 15} In view of our conclusion that the transfer from the mayor’s court to the municipal court constitutes a “removal” under
{¶ 16} The approach is a well-intentioned attempt to preserve the protections of the Constitution and the statute, while acknowledging the General Assembly’s intent to allow the court system a reasonable logistical framework within which to operate. We conclude, however, that the approach suffers from a fatal flaw. The flaw is exposed when one considers the result of a prolonged delay between certification in the mayor’s court and docketing in the municipal court. Under such circumstances, the tolling period could extend indefinitely. This result
{¶ 17} The better rule is that articulated by the Tenth Appellate District in Gahanna v. Partlow, and followed by the majority of courts that have written on the issue. This view holds that the tolling period should extend from the date of arrest or summons until the date of certification to the municipal court. This approach has the advantage of guaranteeing the municipal court the full statutory period within which to bring the accused to trial. It also places an absolute limit on the total amount of time that can pass between arrest and trial. Its disadvantage is that it provides for a possible doubling of the statutory period.
{¶ 18} Cook argues that the potential doubling of the permissible period between arrest and trial under the Partlow rule renders the solution unacceptable. He contends that the violence done to the right of the accused by doubling the period specifically chosen by the General Assembly to implement the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial is far greater than the administrative benefit of giving the mayor’s and municipal courts time to accommodate their current docketing systems. Cook, citing State v. Pudlock (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 104, 106, 73 O.O.2d 357, 358, 338 N.E.2d 524, 525, and State v. Wentworth, supra (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 171, 174, 8 O.O.3d 162, 164, 375 N.E.2d 424, 427, expresses concern that the Partlow rule conflicts with what he describes as the dual bedrock principles of speedy trial jurisprudence. The first is the principle that broad interpretation of the
{¶ 19} A further objection raised by Cook is the apparent conflict between the plain language of
{¶ 20} We do not agree that the extension contemplated by the Partlow rule would either contradict the plain language of the statute or permit the state to intrude on a defendant’s constitutional right. The Revised Code expressly provides for extension of the period under specific circumstances which include the instant removal. The fact that
{¶ 21} Under the Partlow rule, the period would have the advantage of a definite terminus. The mayor’s court would be required to certify the case within thirty days from the date of arrest in order to invoke the tolling period, and the municipal court would have to bring the defendant to trial within thirty days from the date of certification. The statutory period, therefore, could not be extended indefinitely and the accused’s right to a reasonably speedy trial would be protected. Because mayor’s courts are courts not of record, all cases first brought there would be subject to the thirty-day period set out in
{¶ 22} Furthermore, we are convinced that the General Assembly could constitutionally have chosen to allow the state sixty days within which to bring minor misdemeanor defendants to trial in the first place. See Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101; State v. Broughton, 62 Ohio St.3d at 256, 581, N.E.2d at 544, (The test for an unconstitutional denial of a speedy trial is one which considers the totality of the circumstances, rather than rigid numerical delineations.). There are clearly reasonable grounds for the General Assembly’s determination that an extension of the statutory period is necessary to allow courts to effectively conduct their administrative affairs. On the other hand, the inconvenience to a defendant originally appearing in mayor’s court is slight. Because the defendant is not subject to pretrial incarceration, he is neither unable to continue earning his livelihood nor impeded in his efforts to secure witnesses and prepare his defense. No evidence is likely to be lost or destroyed during the additional thirty days and no witnesses are likely to have become unavailable. The defendant, therefore, is not prejudiced by the further delay and his constitutional right to a speedy trial has not been denied.
{¶ 23} Conversely, the burden imposed on the state by a strict, thirty-day rule would be considerable. Although the right of the defendant to a speedy trial is one of constitutional proportions, there is an important countervailing interest that must be given weight in the balance of competing interests. It is the right of the people to require criminal defendants to stand trial for their alleged offenses. The mechanism of transfer from the mayor’s court to the municipal court, combined with the short statutory provision for courts not of record, would render it nearly impossible for the system to bring the defendant to trial in municipal court within thirty days of his or her arrest. We conclude, therefore, that the balance of important constitutional interests weighs in favor of the Partlow rule.
{¶ 24} Accordingly, we hold that the transfer of a case pursuant to
{¶ 25} The judgment of the court of appeals is therefore reversed and Cook’s conviction is reinstated.
Judgment reversed.
DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur.