*1 SECURITY OF SOCIAL BARNHART, COMMISSIONER CO. v. PEABODY COAL et al. 2003* January 2002 Decided Argued
No. 01-705. v. Security Bellaire Barnhart, Social *Together with Commissioner of (see 12.4), 01-715, et al. Holland and No. et al. Rule Corp. this Court’s al., to the same court. et also on certiorari Corp. Bellaire *3 Souter, Rehnquist, J., Court, delivered the in opinion which Stevens, Breyer, J., Kennedy, Ginsburg, JJ., C. and joined. and alia, J., Thomas, JJ., Sc filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor Thomas, J., joined, 172. post, p. filed a 184. opinion, post, p. dissenting argued petitioner Barbara B. in McDowell the cause for Olson, No. 01-705. theOn briefs were Solicitor General Attorney Deputy Assistant General McCallum, Solicitor Kneedler, General son, Ranter, Paul R. Q. William Wolf Jeffrey Clair. argued petitioners Peter Buscemi the cause for Mooney No. 01-715. With him on the briefs were John R. and David W.Allen. argued Peabody Roberts, Jr.,
John G. the cause for Coal respondents Co. et al., him No. 01-705. With on the brief Gregory Jeffrey were Lorane F. Hebert and W. Mott. S. argued Sutton Corp. respond al., cause for Bellaire et ents in both cases. With him on were the brief Brian G. Selden, Louis A. Chaiten, † and Thomas A. Smock. opinion delivered the of the Court.
Justice Souter Industry The Coal Retiree Health Act Benefit of 1992 *4 (Coal Act) § 9706(a), Act or present includes the 26 U. S. C. providing generally Security Commissioner Social “shall, assign before industry 1, 1993,” each coal re- eligible tiree for operating benefits to an company extant or entity, responsible “related” which funding shall then be for assigned beneficiary’s question benefits. The is whether assignment an initial made despite after that date valid its untimeliness. We hold that it is. †Mary Lou Smith Industries, Inc., filed a brief for Elgin National
amicus curiae urging affirmance.
I
spoken
portions
have
Act in
We
about
Coal
two
Sigmon
cases,
Co.,
recent
(2002),
Barnhart v.
Assignment
signatory operator
operator
to a
binds the
pay
premium
an annual
United Mine Workers
Fund,
America Combined Benefit
established under the Act
§9702.
premium
up
to administer
The
benefits.
has
components, starting
premium,”
three
with “health benefit
computed by
by
multiplying
the number of
retirees
year’s “per beneficiary” premium,
set
the Commis-
sioner and based on the
Fund’s health
ex-
Combined
benefit
penses
prior
adjusted
year,
changes
for the
for
in the Con-
9704(b).
sumer Price
element is a
Index.
second
premium”
projected
“death benefit
benefits to
the retir-
being
operator’s
premium
ees’
survivors, share
“the
aetuarially
amount,
which the
determined,
Combined
during
plan year
required
pay
Fund will
death
9704(c).
coverage.”
benefits
subject of our
persons”
The Coal Act’s
“related
was the
definition of
Co.,
(2002).
Sigmon
Coal
Term
Barnhart
last
opinion bal separately we will in the simplicity, persons For to related refer opinion. ance of this *5 possible premium
A third constituent of the is for retirees assigned particular operator, are who to a health whose paid and death nonetheless benefits are from Combined they passage Fund as if were beneficiaries. Before many operators wage of the Act, Coal withdrew from coal agreements, shifting the paying costs of for their retirees’ remaining signatories, Sigmon benefits to the Co., Coal supra, important object at 444, and an Act was Coal providing funding stable for the health benefits of these “or- phan Ways retirees,” House Committee on and Means, De- velopment Implementation Industry and of the Coal Retiree (Comm. Health Cong., 1992, Benefit Act of 104th 1st Sess., 1995)(hereinafter Implementation). Print Coal Act En- See ergy Policy Act 1992, 102-486, 19142, Pub. L. 106 Stat. (intent plan funding” “provide to “stabilize for the privately program”). continuation of a financed self-sufficient signatory operators may compelled Before to contribute unassigned funding for the beneficiaries, benefit however, from two other sources must run out. The United Mine (UMWA Workers of America 1950 Pension Plan Pension Plan) required was payments to make three substantial purpose February Combined Fund for this 9705(a)(1). 1, 1993, 1, 1994. and October The Act yearly payments also calls for to the Combined Fund from (AML Fund), the Abandoned Mine Land Fund Reclamation established for reclamation and restoration of land and water 1231(c). degraded by mining. resources coal 30 U. S. C. Annual transfers from this AML are Fund limited to the greater million the annual interest earned $70 subject equal fund, aggregate and are to an limit amount Sep interest earned on the AML Fund between 1232(h)(2),(3)(B). §§ tember and October 1995. far, So these transfers from the UMWA Pension Plan and unassigned the AML Fund have covered the of all benefits they short, however, If beneficiaries. fall the third source (and play comes operator’s into the third element of an Com- *6 actual): assignee operators all premium becomes Fund bined retirees) pay (that will have to assigned operators with is, applicable being their premium,” “unassigned beneficiaries pay bene to annual needed portion the amount percentage percent “applicable operator’s unassigned. An fits for the by dividing percentage determined age” “the is defined as assigned under section eligible beneficiaries the number eligible benefi number of the total operator 9706 to such (de operators to all such 9706 assigned under section ciaries 1, 1993).” assignments as of October basis of on the termined 9704(f)(1). most as signatory with the The 26 U. S. C. the greatest share cover the signed thus retirees (as spouses their unassigned well payable benefits dependants).2 certain II §9706 “shall” that the Although provides Commissioner the 1993, Com- assignments 1, before October complete all 10,000 some estimates that and she now not, did missioner assigned signatory operators after first were beneficiaries the parties disagree reason statutory on the The date. dispute deadline, but that to meet the failed here.3 not resolved need 2 sin Report, the total premium a 1995 According congressional includes $2,349.38 1995 year. figure for the fiscal This was
gle beneficiary benefici premiums, since no only unassigned the health and death benefit Coal 32-33. charged. Act premium Implementation aries has been yet $2,725. General approximately was premium The 2002 per-beneficiary 02-243, Health Benefit No. Retired Coal Miners’ Accounting Report Office 2002). (Apr. Continue 8 Challenges Funds: Financial Social reason is that proffered delay The Commissioner’s (SSA) permitted expend appropriated was not Security Administration 1993, 13, when Con July until assignments work on to commence funds 103-50, 1993, L. Pub. Act of Supplemental Appropriations enacted gress of research states that the task 254. The Commissioner also Stat. 80,000 industry coal workers for approximately records employment ing monumen was signatory operators to determine appropriate in order addi without by October completed not and could have been tal Acting counter companies respondent resources. tional assigned ben- 1,1993, After October the Commissioner Company respondents Peabody eficiaries Coal East- Corp., total of 270 ern Associated Coal and a beneficiaries respondents Corporation, Industries, Inc., Bellaire NACCO Corporation. compa- and The North American Coal These separate challenged in two actions be- nies claiming Courts, that the fore different District assign, date a time on the sets limit Commissioner’s (and beneficiary so beneficiary’s unassigned eligible dependants) must be left *7 respondent right, companies for life. If the are the chal- lenged assignments corresponding are void and the benefits by by them, financed must be but the transfers from the necessary, UMWA Pension and Fund and, Plan the AML if beneficiary unassigned premiums paid by signatory other operators timely assignments to whom were made.
The Commissioner denied that intended the perma- assignments impose tardiness in Commissioner’s charge public Fund, nent on the AML otherwise earmarked permanently for reclamation, or to raise the threat of heavier companies happened financial get assign- burdens on argued ments before October 1993. The Commissioner Congress primarily operators pay intended coal their own retirees. The Fund in- trustees of the Combined Commissioner assured Congress less than a month statutory before the SSA date its complete meet “statutory responsibility” on assignments time. on Health Hearing Provisions Ben Relating efits of Retired Coal Ways Committee, Miners before the and House Means (1993) (hereinafter Sess., Cong., 103d 1st 26 Hearing), 1993 Coal Act Ser. (Comm. 1994) (statement 103-59, 26p. No. Print of Acting Commissioner Thompson). representative The same informed Congress in 1995 that “completed SSA had process making assignment the initial decisions by October as required by law.” Hearing the Coal Industry Retiree Health Act of 1992 Benefit before the Subcommittee on Oversight Means, the House Ways Sess., Committee on 104th 1st 23 Cong., (1995), (1997) (statement 104-67, No. 23 Ser. p. of Principal Deputy Com missioner Thompson).
157 the Commissioner’s took tervened one of the cases and September 30, 1993, assignments after view that initial made valid.4 are case, judgments in companies summary each obtained Social
on the of Dixie Fuel v. Commissioner Co. (CA6 1999), against the went Security, which 171 3d 1052 F. States The United Court Commissioner on the issue here. opinions Appeals two like for the Circuit affirmed Sixth Massanari, v. Peabody following Dixie Coal Co. wise Fuel — (2001), Massanari, Corp. Appx. v. and Bellaire 14 Fed. 393 (2001) conflicting Appx. with the Fourth 14 Fed. — but Co., F. 3d holding in Holland Pardee Coal Circuit’s (2001). conflict,5 granted We resolve certiorari (2002), now reverse. U. S.
I I I simply argue that the point misses the It “mandatory,” “deadline,” “imperative,” or date was may the mandate course was, as of it however unrealistic to choose no discretion have been. The had assignments prescribed date, and until after the to leave represent on a here a default in issue duty, though may wholly one. But well be a blameless it *8 question, merely real raises the failure act on schedule' The consequence should be. which is of tardiness what the “jurisdictional,” respondent companies such call the failure (like truly orphan beneficiar- that the affected beneficiaries ies) may permanent assigned, never be but instead must
4 of The Office invalidation Accounting General estimated in 2000 require the Combined assignments made could September after L. of premium to refund in Letter Gloria payments. Fund $57 million Roth, Finance Jr., Jarmon to on Hon. William V. Senate Committee (as 15, Jan. 2000), visited (Aug. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ai00267r.pdf (available 2003) file). in Court’s Clerk of case certiorari, Appeals of Court grant After the the United States See on the Fourth Circuit. for the Third Circuit the came down side (2002). Inc. 307 F. 3d Shenango v. Apfel, po- Fund, and, wards Plan, of the UMWA Pension the AML operators prior relationship tentially, of coal without to these companies, say in beneficiaries. other that as to words, tardily assigned formerly perhaps, were, beneficiaries who employees, they go their the claim own scot free. thinkWe unsupportable is as as it is counterintuitive.
A
companies’ position
couching
First
is the
there
the
mandatory
duty
together
spe-
terms
the
“shall”
with a
cific
leaves
deadline
the Commissioner with no
assignment
make an initial
or
after
1993.
We
rejected
comparable argument
County,
a
in Brock v. Pierce
(1986),
dealing
Secretary
Nor, since have ever we construed specified “shall” within Government act time, without *9 jurisdictional precluding more, as a limit action Thus, later.
159 “ held immedi- ‘shall be a hearing a that detention provision before judi- first appearance [detainee’s] upon ately hearing, a tardy cial did not bar detention after officer’” (1990) Montalvo-Murillo, 711, 714 United States U. S. 495 v. that the Secre- a 18 C. and mandate 3142(f)), U. S. (quoting ” “ a within ‘shall of Health and Human Services report’ tary lacked power time did “not mean that official certain [the] Regions Hospital Shalala, U. v. 522 S. act it,” beyond (1998). 459, n. 3 does not “if a statute spec- this
We have summed way: up timing with statutory for a ify noncompliance consequence course will in the ordinary the federal courts provisions, United States v. their own coercive sanction.” impose Property, (1993).6 James Daniel Good Real 63 510 U. S. is a power that “[w]hen with disagree No one could Scalia Justice time, expiration automatic consequence for a limited conferred (dissenting at power,” post, 174-175 expiration time is the that re to assign that assumption but the Commissioner’s opinion), his very question away tirees was “conferred for a limited time” assumes this circular to be is an decided. Justice Scalia’s dissent elaboration 9706(a) constitutes ity, returning postulate forever it must to his Post, statutory on the date. “expired” mandate” “time-limited at 178. justification nonconclusory to a approach Scalia’s closest Justice entirely
his formal rule position interpretive assertion of of a manda date as the creation figuring in the same subsection Post, tory tardy performance. ipsofacto obligation negates any power of formalism, which no his 176-177. Justice cites Scalia Montalvo-Murillo, (1990), United v. U. S. 711 States contradicted judicial “shall where a that a officer single statutory provided subsection immediately upon hold a shall be held hearing” hearing and that “[t]he Id., (quoting at 714 officer.” person’s appearance judicial first before 3142(f)). County, S. 253 Brock Pierce C. v. U. Conversely, 18 U. S. S. 43 United Good Real (1986), Property, States James Daniel v. U. Shalala, (1998), (1993), no Regions Hospital 522 U. S. ascribed only the time limitation. One can significance the formal placement be perform duty shall its obligor ask that “The why providing statute one 1, 1993,” fundamentally from fore October differ thought should (ii) “(i) duty, obligor’s its The providing obligor perform shall *10 160 late official
Hence the date of a claim at this that oddity shift from action should financial burdens otherwise respon sible fisc, let alone siphon private purses money public from set for a funds aside different purpose, public expressly like the AML Fund reclamation. The would for land point same, be the if Brock case on however, were the even only was six after years Coal Act subject. adopted Brock came was aware down, when Congress presumably to limit an that we not intent do infer readily congressional a done from agency’s power job merely get mandatory to act time. See United States v. specification certain Wells, (1997).7 U. 482, 519 S. 495 The Brock conse example duty performed accepted shall fact is be before October 1993.” The that some time in jurisdictional sepa limits are even though expressed see, rate jurisdictional section from e. U. S. C. grants, g., § 1291 (providing appeals ap the courts “shall have of jurisdiction of States”); peals from all final of decisions the district courts of the United (providing notice in appeal of civil cases must be filed “within Director, thirty days after the entry of such judgment”); Dept. Browder v. Ill., (1978) Corrections (stating U. S. limitation “ ” (citation §2107 omitted)), in is ‘mandatory while jurisdictional’ and oth not, see, ers are even when into incorporated jurisdictional provision, Montalvo-Murillo, e. g., Formalistic rules do account for the supra. not difference, is explained which by contextual and historical indications of what meant to Here that revealed in accomplish. intent is sev ways: eral obvious in liability rules that an operator’s define terms employment history, 9706(a), appellate see rights appropri to test ateness of an initial assignment, infra, expressed at in the see and that the understanding companies got the benefit of a worker’s labor benefits, should pay else, infra, worker’s see What 164-166. all, after anyone naturally to the sensible indi expect? opposed As cations that the initial jurisdic was meant to be assignment deadline tional, Justice Scalia’s object new rule would formal thwart the statute’s other, relieve the respondent of all which companies responsibility, less lucky operators might undoubtedly be to shoulder. required There was much political Act, compromise in Coal but development politics does not justify process of initial into a turning assignment game chance. 7The respondent companies attempt to we distinguish Brock because noted in that case that party could the Administra aggrieved sue under “ tive Procedure Act to or un- action withheld agency unlawfully ‘compel directing quently mean that a statute official action has to mandatory grant before the needs more than a “shall” job sup- sensibly expire can read to when the limiting, posed Nothing however, is to be to be done. so express language supports the com- in the Act: no found Coal legislative panies, purpose, history go structure, while against them. *11 support clues the
Structural the Commissioner Coal combining “shall” with a Act’s other instances the word possibly prohibit specific that to ac- could not be read date Congress, statutory period. example, tion outside the provided Plan that the UMWA Pension “shall transfer to Fund” on Febru- the installments of million $70 Combined ary 1, 1993, 1, 1993, on and on October 1994. October 9705(a)(1). § It not that a failure to make a transfer could precise on one of would dates, reason, those whatever have left the UMWA Plan with no to make Pension payment; day. the was not even a business mandatory provisions Or consider the Act’s that the trustees designated of the Fund “shall” be no later than Combined §9702(a)(1), days date, the that the from enactment designated days “shall, trustees not later than 60 after the give date,” enactment the certain information 9704(h). § argue seriously benefits, about No one could that appointments the entire would have been scheme nullified if (whose day, appoint- been had left to the 61st or that trustees §706(1)). S., reasonably delayed,’” 476 U. at n. 7 5 U. S. C. (quoting remedy The companies applied assert that no such would have to the Com 9706(a). case, § missioner’s under not this is the duty Whether or companies they by do not were failure to argue aggrieved assign that retirees On they temporarily date. avoided contrary, have premium they indisputably amounts for which payment not timely been liable had the been made. It therefore does at any remedy that there was a “with appear provide operators need in this case —for remedy respondents] see[k] all —much less the drastic 1, 1993] deadline.” [October to meet the [Commissioner’s] failure S., U. 7.n. were to the 60th day) ments been left could have properly the 60-day after information to SSA powerless divulge had period expired.8 far as so extend theory concedes that his should Justice Scalia Combined funds to the Plan’s to transfer duty limit the UMWA Pension 9705(a)(1). attempts particular Fund dates Scalia Justice basis, Pen the “UMWA avoid without by assuming, such an outcome Fund in the to the Combined Plan has the funds” power sion transfer 9705(a)(1). Post, (dissenting opin at 176 absence the authorization in
ion). Coal Act’s Prior to the misplaced. confidenceis Justice Scalia’s Commis enactment, Secretary of the of Labor’s Coal the Wee Chairman needed was legislative sion authorization testified before the Commis that concerned things for such a transfer to occur: “One of the under was, of law all, of the state understanding present sion first of our it is not Act. Under that Act Security Income Employee Retirement to transfer signatories within the or any participants for the rec of the reasons pension surplus to a benefit fund. That one the Sub before Hearing ommendation a transfer be authorized.” of the Senate Committee committee on Medicare and Care Long-Term (statement (1991) Commission Finance, Sess., of Coal 102d Cong., 1st 9705(a)(1) Perritt). then, both provides It Vice Chairman appears, *12 limit, according which time power the UMWA Pension Plan’s to act and a vires, a date ultra any to Justice Scalia would render on other action even dissent does not embrace. result that the appoint to initial it thinks “debatable” the Justice Scalia 9702(a)(1). Post, § In to at 177. order trustees survives the deadline in remove all would avoid the embarrassment of that tardiness concluding trustees, the Act a authority to would render appoint the initial which letter, under appointed dead he an initial be suggests that trustee could a 9702(b)(2), of appointment to though provision applies only even the trustee being “successor trustee” to be “in made the same manner succeeded,” anyone. not The whereas an initial trustee does “succeed” of reading implausibility suggested extreme of Justice Scalia’s 9702(b)(2) gloss up jurisdictional the unreasonableness of a points placing 9706(a) that Congress on the time It is to believe impossible limitation. industry benefit crisis meant its Herculean the effort to resolve coal late. absolutely designated come to if trustees were nothing Scalia’s contortions There is a to be learned from Justice basic lesson time theory that from his formalistic flowing to avoid the untoward results they when always jurisdictional on official action are limits mandatory conclusion draw a instances, we each of these In a Congress had to set coun- meant grounds plausibility: if said more it have act, would terintuitive limit on its intent surely have couched it did, than jurisdic- any clear already lack language Brock had held significance. may here. be The said tional same
B plausibility is appealing to Nor do we think the result of that the com- by affected of two textual features either other inability assign beneficiaries panies indicating take as unassigned bene- provision after date: the operator’s provision ficiary itself, status be unassigned calcu- shall contribution for the benefit of 1, 1993.” “on as of lated the basis October (2). §§9704(f)(1), unassigned companies provision
The characterize “consequence” for fail specification of a beneficiaries as person. beneficiary operator related assign ure to a to an or consequence of Specifying Brock, S., Cf. 476 U. at 259. this by governed say, failure they failure, that the must shows tardy assign provided, consequence a not corrected ear made corresponding ment that should have been one consequence, words, reflects specified lier. other assign finality legislative over initial preference for accurate companies right part ments on the and creates they rely permanently were on state affairs as on the reasoning unsound We think this line 1, 1993. every step. from the fact begin might with, To whatever be inferable to make a specific provision failure *13 addressed something is very occur an The lesson is that authorizing provision. wrong theory. with the
timely assignment, part referring Act to “unas- provision. signed” any is not The Act such beneficiaries speaks of the beneficiaries not in terms Commission- assign simply er’s failure them in as “beneficiar- time, but 9704(d). assigned.” ies who The most obvious are not being unassigned, in fact, reason for beneficiaries’ the dis- employer, appearance beneficiary’s leaving of a no former 9706(a). signatory operator assignment for under This say assignment timely not to failure does not also beneficiary “unassigned” leave a simply Act. It under unassigned significance peculiar means that status has no assignment. timely failure of “unassigned”
Second, to the extent status is a conse- quence of mere untimeliness, there would be a far more obvi- specifying consequence supposed ous reason for than a finality.9 provision face, desire for On its for a benefi- ciary through simply left out tardiness functions as a default provide coverage regime required rule to under the new place by be in 1993; had to be there some source every funding beneficiary by provisions then, for for “unassigned” employees tell SSA what the source will any be in the absence of But other. we do not read provision apparently something made for want of better as an forgo something absolute command to better for all time. Congress
In fact, it is unrealistic to think that understood unassigned “consequence” enduring status of uncom- pleted nothing for work, indicates fore- even saw operators that some beneficiaries with matchable still in 9Many course, “consequences,” are intended induce an obligated person untimely to take action rather than bar that action altogether. 9704(i)(1)(C), Section example, denies certain tax opera deductions to tors 9707(a) who fail to make contributions periods, during specified provides a penalty operators who fail to pay premiums time. The first consequence is eliminated when takes operator action that is nec essarily untimely, and second to run penalty ceases when the premi ums paid, are albeit out time. *14 might not be before October 1993. As
business point companies out, themselves the led Congress possible assign- as late as believe 1995 that all supra, made on time, ments had been see n. and such little history legislative point as there is on to show tends that any assumed that that be could made business) (say, operator at all an still would be made on 1992, on time. On October the heels of the Conference Report just Committee on Act and before the vote adopting Wallop gave Act, the Senate Senator a detailed explanation provisions unassigned Act’s of the Coal bene- “unassigned” which ficiaries, assumed that would be orphans: true practical matter, all can
“As beneficiaries be as- signed specific signatory operator, per- to a last related assigned operator payment purposes. son or This is persons instances, because in none of some those remain non-mining in business, defined to include re- even as provisions Thus, lated are unas- businesses. made for signed beneficiary premiums.” Cong. Rec. 34003 (1992). report says
The Senator’s the transfer to the Combined Fund from the UMWA Plan and AML would Pension Fund “unassigned made because beneficiaries were not em- ployed by assigned operators the time of their operator [I]f retirement.... remains in business under no an above, formulations described retiree becomes unassigned purpose [The Act’s] beneficiary. tois . . . Coal any beneficiary, assigned, assure re- once remains the sponsibility particular operator, of a and that the number unassigned kept an absolute minimum.” beneficiaries Congress’s Ibid.10 It mind seems not to have crossed statements, though weight, Postenactment entitled to less are Ways same effect. At a the House Committee of before hearing September 9,1993, member whether SSA had estab- Means one asked category beneficiaries, include “unassigned” let beneficiaries, alone a lot of who could be connected with albeit late. operator, Providing of default consequence was apparently just happenstance.11 *15 did, however,
Congress plainly on October weigh finality of initial in circum against accuracy one stance, 9704(d) and won. Section accuracy of “bene speaks ficiaries who are not ... [any] plan year,” sug- procedures lished “to assure that beneficiaries are not improperly desig- nated as unassigned.” The Commissioner Acting Security of Social re- sponded that employee training “emphasized that the intent of the Coal Act was to miners to assign mine if operators possible.” at all 1993 Coal (statements Act Hearing of Rep. Acting Johnson and Thompson). The record of the hearing also contains a statement by the committee chairman that the Act required to operators “pay for their own retirees, to and a proportionate assume share of the liability for true ‘or- phans’ whose companies are no in existence and longer cannot —retirees Id., pay for the at benefits.” 85. At no point any did witness suggest that the unassigned beneficiary system was intended for miners who could be assigned 1993, but were 1, not assigned before October or that such miners would remain unassigned in perpetuity order to protect status quo on that date. 11The respondent companies cite a postenactment statement by Repre sentative Johnson that Congress had an obligation to “make sure that . . . companies have time to figure liability out their and prepare to deal Id., with it.” 42. The Representative’s comment purport did not interpret however, the Coal Act adopted, as but was made in discussing whether “there should be some resolution passed” give operators coal more time to prepare for their obligations. Coal Act Ibid.
One statement Senator Wallop’spreenactment report, which the com cite, panies do not indicates an understanding that assignments would be 1, 1993. (1992)(“[T]he fixed after October See 138 Rec. Cong. per centage of the unassigned beneficiary premiums allocable to each assigned operator on October 1993will years”). remain fixed in future As dis cussed, however, there is no indication that Congress foresaw that the Commissioner would be unable to complete assignments by date. A general statement made on the assumption that all assignments that could ever be made would be made before October does not legislative show a preference for over finality accuracy now that that as sumption proven has incorrect. year may change from assignment status
gesting that correcting an erroneous may way change is year. it One getting operator notice Act, an assignment. Under regarding request information days assignment has receipt days assignment from then basis 9706(f)(1)— §§ to ask for reconsideration. that information (2). error, Fund the Combined finds the Commissioner If any refunding by reducing premiums and it will fix trustees 9706(f)(3)(A)(ii). 9706(f)(3)(A)(i); see also overpayments. time and no finality 1,1993, Nothing about is said imposed on the Commissioner’s limit whatever they companies must, concede, reassign. The reassignment 1, 1993. permits after October statute pref- try apparent companies limit the do, however, provi- accuracy by arguing of this that one feature erence 9706(f) implicitly supports them; reconsideration in sion for unequivo- exception specific isolated to an otherwise this *16 suggests, statutory assignments date cal to after bar they Again, we say, the bar absolute. is otherwise no such conclusion follows. think argument avail- circular; is it that the
First, the assumes 9706(f) § process ability no time reconsideration with activity exception assignment im- limit is an to a bar on all 9706(a). § posed by But 1993, limit 1, the October time question, 1993, man- all, after is whether the October 1, 9706(f) say is, date a bar. is in fact it Section does not nothing provision suggests in that it was an ex- enacted as ception language 1993, 1, the October date. It has no operating notwithstanding specified about in the date §9706(a); contrary, on it will reassignment states that (a),” 9706(f)(3)(A)(ii). § made “under subsection if the But 9706(f) § § authority reassign 9706(a), is contained in then reasonably lifting jurisdictional read is not as bar but time specifying simply procedure operator an aggrieved as requesting in Commissioner the as- follow to exercise 9706(a) signment power all along. contained com- In the operation bined of the two im- subsections, there thus no plication powerless to make an assignment operator specified any initial to an date; after the suggestion goes way. the other 9706(f) provision
Second, there is no reason to read the implying correction erroneous as 9706(a) employ Commissioner should not her tardy assignment make a initial in a situation like this. We do read the enumeration of one case to exclude another suppose unless it is fair to considered the un possibility say named and meant to no to it. United Domin Industries, ion Inc. States, United U. S. (2001). repeatedly, As we have expressio held the canon unius est apply every statutory exclusio alterius does not listing grouping; or only it has force when the items ex pressed are group jus members of an “associated or series,” tifying the inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence. United States v. (2002). Vonn, 535 explained U. point S. We this recently opinion as last Term’s unanimous in Chevron (2002): U.S. A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U. S.
“Just as language suggesting exclusiveness is missing, so extrastatutory is that ingredient essential expression-exclusion demonstration, the series of terms from bespeaks negative which an omission im- plication. depends identifying canon a series of things two or more terms or that should be understood go [is] hand, hand in abridged which in circumstances supporting a sensible inference that the term left out *17 must have been meant to be excluded. Crawford, E. (1940) Construction of (expressio Statutes 337 unius ‘“properly applies only when in the natural association of ideas in the mind of the reader that which ex- is pressed is by way so set over strong of contrast to that which is omitted that the contrast enforces the affirma- ’ tive (quoting inference” State ex rel. Corps, Curtis v. De (1938))); 2d 295, 299, St. 16 N. E. Ohio Vonn, United States supra.” Echazabal, fail to show reason
As in here any respondents after that considered have Congress reassignments “to hand in hand” with initial tardy assignments. appeal go initial never that Since thought assign- apparently Congress infer- late, 164-167, see the better ments would be supra, a case than ence that we face is more is what here nothing for.12 unprovided the ex- is, course, exception” There of no ‘“case for’ unprovided (Scalia, J., merely It is unius canon, dissenting).
pressio post, at 181 for by negative was provided that the canon does not tell us that a case be associated with normally item unmentioned would implication unless an items listed. 9704(f)(2)(B) that beneficiaries requires The companies emphasize that unassigned whose treated as operator goes out business must be goes cannot be reassigned. assuming provision Even as directly implicate “applicable definition of does not percentage” and most that could be has signments companies suggest, the effect the first, opera responsible most identify said is that Congress wished retiree, assignment tor for a that with a second given and not to follow left the business. responsible operator operator a less if the initial accu finality over date-specific This interest does not object indicate an finality only once racy opts the first it assignment; contrary, on the absence of a more an accurate In the initial made. assignment has been the explanation exact explanation suppose for this we arrangement, terms good political by govern their horse But trading. provisions about the period after the initial assignment nothing is made tell us fact, permissibility which an initial assignment In may be made. 9706(f) 1, 1993, makes under after October postappeal reassignment matchup possi plain that as perfect was not as “insisting upon way both up changes, by ble future and then prohibiting J., dissenting), (Scalia, otherwise,” of initial or assignment at 183 post, contrary, reassignment as Justice On the Scalia himself agrees. assignments, “in initial provision indicates a system accuracy the Act what precisely whether made afterward,” deadline or before Here, refers “accuracy” envisions. Ibid. throughout opinion, this ibid., fairness,” system elusive but to “perfect 9706(a)(1)(3). §§ following out in scheme set *18 argument companies’ side remaining for the textual The percent operator’s “applicable of an rests on the definition (or obligation assignee operators of all age” of overall unassigned. for the Under persons) to fund benefits related 9704(f)(1), operator’s percentage it defined of is as assigned among beneficiaries assigned all own beneficiaries assignments as of October on the basis of “determined omitted). argue companies that the (parenthesis The 1993” that an .specification October means “as of” liability potential operator’s percentage for the benefit according assignments made unassigned is fixed only specific exceptions in subject set out date, at that 9704(f)(2), percentage change requiring when erro assignee reassigned opera neously assigned or retirees are companies go The that their contend tors out of business. meaning: position plain of” the date means “as “as rests on actually Yet the words assignments stand” on the date. “as way: another statute, can be read since of,” as used in complete possible assignments Congress required that all 9706(a), equally it is fair to read see “assignments they “as of” that date mean assuming complies date, shall be on that companies’ reading hospitable with our The command.” early finality assignments, while the alternative favors finality prevails. accuracy completeness before “plain” reading, however, is no Once it is seen that there argument except nothing of” stress there is left of the “as its only in ac- applicable percentage can be modified that the recognizing changes exceptions cordance with the two assignee operator. The an- error or the demise of an initial already given. The point, course, has been to this swer imply exceptions does exclusion enunciation of two third least reason to think the was at unless there is a third good reason to conclude considered, whereas there language question adopted it did not when supra, See make foresee a failure to timely assignments. read govern “as of” cannot be 168-169. *19 phrase nor did not contemplate,13 clearly situation Congress by of it the urged does absolute finality assignments require the companies.
IV Act rests Congress’s This much is certain: the Coal most to that it was necessary “identify persons stated finding to desire liabilities,” and on its for express plan responsible financed self- a continuation of the privately “provide benefits,” care of for the health sufficient delivery program 19142, 106 § Stat. 102-486, Act of Pub. L. Energy Policy delivered In of 3037.14 words Senator report the Wallop’s to allocate enactment, the statute “designed before shortly a the Plans prior number of beneficiaries the greatest initial trustee to serve The be said of for an provision same the may 9702(b)(3)(B), view. contrary 1, 1993, until to Justice November Scalia’s Post, at opinion). 182 (dissenting view, from AML if transfers the the respondent companies’ Under the unassigned of beneficiar Fund to cover the benefits all prove insufficient 1, 1993, ies, to October operator prior received no assignments beneficiary pool— unassigned would not contribute to the penny have to make all solely due to fortuitous failure to the Commissioner’s time, that received full At same by operators the deadline. the statutory be to cover more than would forced assignments prior to October premiums. fair unassigned their share of beneficiaries’ “seemingly as with unfair sees the Act rife Although Justice Scalia ibid, no even his view is inequitable (dissenting opinion), provisions,” to be con- provisions reason to meant contested Congress assume that event, In any manner possible. strued and inequitable unfair most 9704(f)(2)(B) his It help position. does not Scalia’s citation Justice Congress anticipated: to a provides statutory problem clear solution Had a re- propounded end of an operator’s Congress business. 9704(f)(2)(B), there would as sponse now before us as clear issue and no cases us Appeals doubtless have Courts split been no in the statute’s goals express provision, to review. Given of an the absence intended them by way best served treating operators Congress are treated, is, identify the operators by be allowing the most responsible. operator. this are in-
responsible reason, For definitions given by interpretation drafters broad tended (1992).15 Cong. accomplish goal.” To this Rec. specified accept companies’ argument that the date for jurisdictional be to read the Act so action is as to greatest, the least, but number of beneficiar- allocate not way congres- responsible operator. The to reach the ies to a objective, to read sional date as however, tardy spur prompt completion as a bar to action, ensuring funded, the business that benefits are as much by possible, principally as those identified responsible. judgments Appeals in both cases are Court
accordingly
Reversed. with whom Justice and Scalia, Justice O’Connor join, dissenting. Justice Thomas holding today upon The Court’s confers Commissioner Security unexpiring assign of Social to retired coal 9706(a). signatory operators miners to under 26 C. U. S. In my disposition view, this is irreconcilable with the text and Industry structure Coal Retiree Health Benefit Act (Coal Act), support prece- Act or finds in and no our respectfully dents. I dissent.
I respondents improp- contend that the Commissioner erly assigned responsibility them for 600 coal miners under 9706(a). 9706(a)provides, pertinent part: Section
15A Congressional Research report shortly Service dated before the en actment likewise states that the Act envisioned “[w]herever possible, responsibility individual assigned beneficiaries would be ... to previ a ous employer still business.” Coal Industry: Use Mine Abandoned Reclamation Fund Monies for UMWA “Orphan Retiree” Health Benefits 10, 1992), (Sept. reprinted Rec., Cong. in 138 at 34005. Security
“[T]he of Social before shall, assign industry each coal retiree who beneficiary signatory eligible operator is an which (or which) any person respect with related remains following in business in the order: “(1) signatory operator to the First, which— “(A) signatory wage agreement to the 1978 coal was any subsequent wage agreement, or coal “(B) operator signatory employ was the most recent industry industry the coal retiree in the coal for at least years. “(2) assigned para- if the Second, retiree is not under (1), graph signatory operator which— “(A) signatory wage agreement was a coal the 1978 any subsequent agreement, wage or coal “(B) signatory operator employ was the most recent industry industry. coal retiree in the coal “(3) para- Third, if the retiree is not under (1) (2), graph signatory operator or which em- ployed industry industry coal in the coal retiree longer period any signatory opera- of time than other prior tor wage to the effective date of the 1978 coal agreement.”
The Commissioner complete assigning failed to the task of eligible beneficiary each operator signatory to a before Octo- *21 1, ber a many 1993. As eligible result, were beneficiaries “unassigned,” and their a financed, time, benefits were by the United Mine Workers of America 1950 Pension Plan (UMWA Plan) Pension and the Mine Abandoned Land Recla- 9705(b)(2). §§9705(a)(3)(B), mation Fund. See The Commissioner blames her to meet the failure statu- tory “magnitude deadline the on of the task” and the lack appropriated funds. Brief for Trustees of Petitioners the UMWA Combined Benefit It should not be Fund 15. thought, however, letting the these about eases are
174 complete business little unfinished post- They barely 600 concern some missed deadline. vast respondents, the assignments to 1993, these 1, October years majority 1995 of which made between were statutory passed. App. Re- after 98-121. had deadline unlawful, and spondents are contend that these upon Congress unless has the Commissioner conferred assign power authority unexpiring that she claims—an respond- eligible signatory operators beneficiaries —the 9706(a) provide an prevail. ents not such must does Section expansive provisions con- power, Act other and the firm this.
II power regulate agency’s It is well established that an private statutory grant of grounded entities in a must be Congress. Brown William from FDA v. & See (2000); Corp., Bowen v. son Tobacco U. S. (1988); Georgetown Louisi Hospital, 204, 208 Univ. 488 U. S. (1986). FCC, ana Pub. U. S. Serv. Comm’n v. respect principle special This ex importance has with traordinary power compel here: to Commissioner asserts (and families) companies pay ben coal health miners their they pay. efits never We have held that contracted 9706(a), power even Commissioner’s this under use of when before violates the Constitu 1, 1993, exercised October liability imposes tion to the extent it severe retroactive Enterprises companies. Apfel, certain coal See Eastern (1998). power agency 524 U. When exercises S. that so obli tests we have all limits, constitutional the more gation to assure that it is rooted in the text of a statute. power holds Court that the Commissioner retains the “ 'spec to act after because did ify noncompliance’” consequence with the aWhen Ante, at This makes no deadline. 159. sense. conse time, a limited the automatic is conferred for expiration of quence expiration that time is *22 Christmas to cut If authorizes someone a landowner power. what doubt 15,” happens there is no trees “before December terminates. cut December when passes; is the authorization the situation is not when And changed a enters when the landowner with a mandate —as combined cut all “shall which that the Christ- contract other says party if Even 15.” December trees on the before mas property is of (as it the of that contract were not the essence of time III, in Part I discuss 9706(a), for reasons shall essence of infra) had would think that the contractor continuing no one or weeks —but per- few more just days authority —not to harvest trees.1 petually, out, ante, other three 161-162, that
The Court at points awith word “shall” the Coal Act combine the of provisions in its view is extendible: deadline that statutory Pen- (1) 9705(a)(1)(A) that the UMWA Section states . . . Fund transfer to the Combined sion Plan “shall 1, 1993”; $70,000,000 on February Fund (2) 9704(h) for the the trustees Combined says date, after the “shall, later than enactment not days” 9706(a) very ques the away “assum[e] This does interpretation accuses, ante, no is decided,” at n. 6. It tion to be Court the the all, proposition that consequence but the assumption rather scope the of an is determined text of power agency’s §9706(a)’s bene “assign... eligible grant of authority. Because 1993,” the statu is “before October prefaced by ficiaries]” phrase authority; very it tory part is date is with the grant intertwined If statute power. provided definition Commissioner’s 1993,” “shall, eligible each assign after on or beneficiary surely beyond dispute it signatory operator, conclu different pre-October 1, 1993, ineffective. No were here, the Commissioner's scope sion should temporal obtain where the date. unambiguous authority is to a clear according likewise defined ibid., (as “formalism,” lan only it because If this Court charges) Congress chose presump is matter of form. Here the form guage arrived at. tively represents political compromise *23 benefits to the furnish certain information regarding Commissioner; and
(3) 9702(a)(1) § de- certain individuals provides 9702(b)(1) the trustees § scribed in “shall designate” the after the Combined Fund later than 60 ... “not days enactment date.” these
I the the first two of actions mandated by agree have deadlines can be taken after the deadlines expired the after, which is what Court not (though perhaps forever 9706(a)). so, claims § for the deadline of The reason that is 9706(a). § In those however, does not at all to provi- apply power the to do what not stem is mandated does sions, from implication the mere the mandate private itself entities involved have the to do what prescribed, power from do it a the command that quite apart by statutory they certain the date: The has UMWA Pension Plan power funds,2 transfer the Fund have and trustees of the Combined information, whether power provide specified statute commands that do so or not. The they only question entities, Private unlike administrative do not need authoriza agencies, tion from in take all action they order to have the act— charter, within the scope their law it. The unless and until the forbids Court suggests that Security Act of Employee Retirement Income (ERISA) may Plan from actually forbid transfer the UMWAPension Ante, 162-163, its ring pension surplus to the n. 8. But benefit fund. true, 9705(a)(1) if § this is that does not into a power-conferring convert 9706(a). statutory provision in the mold of It instead means that UMWA mandates, Pension Plan is subject statutory contradictory 9705(a)(1) extent, § question whether, relevant becomes and to what implicitly repealed the provisions applied ERISA as UMWAPen task, sion Plan. Resolving given that question would be no small our Mancari, disinclination to find implied Morton 417 U. S. repeals, see (1974), Instead, and I will not it. I am content to speculate 9705(a)(1), go along with the Court’s or in the assumption nothing Act, rest of the Coal transferring Plan from prevents UMWAPension money deadline, to the Combined and to empha Fund after the size that nothing this the Court’s interpre concession support lends 9706(a). tation of unquestionably authorized whether the late exercise says consequences produce that the statute will act will though, timely It is as exercise of that act. follow from analogy, provided tree-harvesting pursue the contract by December will harvest deliver trees the landowner passes, surely harvest and even after December 15 he can 15; only and the issue is the December 15 trees, deliver whether delivery to the contract that late does not is so central date consequence requiring the other have the contractual counterperformance. Se- The Commissioner of Social side’s private entity curity, being contrast, but a creature *24 authority assign oper- Congress, beneficiaries to has no implicit except is in the man- ators insofar as such (and authority) implicit but the mandate hence the ex- date; pired on October 1993.' power provisions that
The last of these three does confer private is not otherwise the entities involved: available to power appoint to the board of the initial trustees the Com- however, I think it as clear the not, bined Fund. do as quite Court it debatable —whether indeed, I think does— thought utterly power If it survives the deadline. just place, it essential that all in seems to me the trustees be appointment interpret provision the reasonable to (§9702(b)(2)) power successor to fill to include the trustees appoint, arising vacancies as to inter- failure to from initial pret beyond spec- appointment power to the initial extend its surely provision ified does not termination estab- date. lish the mandates proposition that time-limited Court’s continuing authority. include I
I I re- None the Court relies even the which cases on County, motely point. 253 in 476 U. v. Pierce S. In Brock (1986), by an agency question was authorized the action authority, separate apart explicit statutory grant from provision mandate. the time-limited that contained 178 V) (now 816(d)(1) (1976 § ed., C. repealed)
Title 29 U. S. Supp. such . order of Labor to . . gave Secretary “authority An sanctions or actions as are corrective appropriate.” other 816(b), statute, former provision required when a recipient complaint Secretary, investigating funds, ... regard to “make the final determination misusing than the truth of . . . not later days ing allegation the Secre after held that We complaint.” receiving did not failure meet deadline prevent tary’s 120-day funds. him from Respond misspent ordering repayment the Secre not, ent had we that caused said, shown anything to “lose its act,” S., (emphasis U. tary power never added). had Here, contrast, by after to act which mandate, from the power apart expired 1, 1993. Property, Daniel Real United States Good James In (1993), Government U. S. 43 federal statutes authorized the action within a limitation period. forfeiture bring 5-year We held 881(a)(7); U. S. C. 19 U. S. C. 1621. to com- was not revoked the Government’s failure with some of “internal ply requirements” separate timing §§ failed set forth 1602-1604. Because those provisions *25 to “im- we refused specify consequence noncompliance, own sanction” of the Govern- [our] coercive pose terminating Daniel James ment’s a forfeiture action. authority bring supra, separate Good, the at 63. authorization The from obligation was not is no author- affected. There defaulted ization here. from the separate defaulted obligation Montalvo-Murillo, United States
In 495 711 (1990), U. S. § the statute at courts issue, 3142(e), 18 U. S. C. gave to order detention “after a the pretrial hearing pursuant (f) of of this of subsection section.” One those provisions was that the “shall be held provisions hearing immediately the the first before upon person’s judicial appearance 3142(f). officer ....” The court had to hold hear- failed the first ing immediately upon appearance, yet respondent’s
179 pretrial was detention authority to order the held that we that some conceivable explained: “It is As we unaffected. a de- irregularities could render procedural of combination constitute ‘a it not hear- hearing that would so flawed tention (f)’ purposes provisions of ing pursuant to subsection added), 3142(e),” but mere (emphasis S., of at U. requirement did comply first-appearance failure with again, the holds case have that effect. Once not alone obligation is separate authorization from defaulted separate from the affected; and is no authorization there obligation here. defaulted present ones contrast between these eases why discussion
demonstrates the Court’s extended consequences for specified the Commis- whether ante, deadline, comply with sioner’s failure to the October ter- quite point. specification of A 163-164, is beside sepa- may authority where there is mination of be needed utterly superfluous it is canceled; rate authorization to be only time-limited where the authorization contained expired. has mandate that
IV eligible assign lacks That the Commissioner by after the deadline confirmed beneficiaries provisions ren- other are otherwise Coal Act that dered incoherent.
A “unas- premiums” The calculation “death benefit signed premiums” operators is coal beneficiaries owed assigned operator’s on an “applicable percentage,” based 9704(f) percentage which is defined in as “the determined by dividing assigned eligible the number of beneficiaries operator by under section to such number of the total eligible such beneficiaries under section to all (determined operators on the basis as Oc- *26 1993).” added.) (Emphasis specifies 1, The tober statute may only adjustments made be two circumstances in which (1) assigned operator’s “applicable percentage”: when an changes assignments 1993,” re- 1, to the “as October 9706(f), appeals process from see sult set out (2) §9704(f)(2)(A); assigned operator goes out and when an 9704(f)(2)(B). adjust- provision see allows business, No assign- post-October 1993, ments to initial 1, account perfectly ments. This is the view that the consistent with 9706(a) assign beyond 1, does extend October holding incompatible 1993; it with the Court’s contrary. response nothing
The Court’s
dilemma is
this structural
astonishing.
applica
short of
concludes that
Court
percentage
assignments
1993,
ble
based on
as of October
may
assign
adjusted
subsequent
to account for the
initial
ap
notwithstanding
ments,
command that
plicable percentage
assign
be determined “on the basis
notwithstanding
ments as of
1993,”
provision
only
exceptions
statute’s
to this
two,
two,
command
post-October
that do
as
not include
initial
signments.
exceptions,”
“The
enunciation of two
Court
says,
imply
“does not
an
of a third unless there is
exclusion
reason to
Ante,
think the third was at least considered.”
“[s]ince
thought
Congress apparently
Here,
at 170.
never
that initial
infer
late,
would be
the better
. . .
nothing
ence is that what we
more than a case
face ...
(referred
170-171).
unprovided
ante,
for.” Ante, at 169
upon
accepted
This is an
principle
unheard-of limitation
of construction
g.,
unius,
inclusio
See,
exclusio alterius.
e.
O’Melveny
(1994);
Myers FDIC,
&
79, 86
512 U. S.
Leather
County
man v. Tarrant
Intelligence
Narcotics
and Coordi
(1993).
Unit,
nation
U. S.
It is also an absurd
unimaginable
limitation, since it means that
the more
unlisted
likely
is,
item the more
it
is not
be excluded.
example,
exceptions
Does
mean,
this new maxim
hearsay
beyond
rule
set forth in the Federal
those
Rules
*27
Congress
unlikely that
recognized
of Evidence must be
if it is
(or
committee)
perhaps
un
“considered” those
the Rules
exceptions?
support
propo
named
a
cases do not
such
Our
g.,
See,
States,
sition.
e.
S.
Williamson v. United
512 U.
(1992).3
(1994);
Salerno,
United States v.
3The most may well be its consequence today’s opinion gut enduring ting ancient canon of It volumes speaks construction. about precedent dearth of principal for the Court’s that the case it position relies ante, Echazabal, is Chevron U. A. Inc. upon, 168-169, at S. 536 U. S. (2002). language of the in that express interpreted statute case demonstrated that single example “qualification enumerated standard” ‘qualification was rather “The term illustrative than exhaustive: standards’ may shall include requirement pose individual not direct any threat or safety to the health of other individuals the work 12113(b) added). place.” U. S. C. Little wonder that (emphasis Court did not find in bespeaks negative text “an omission [that] S., implication,” nothing 536 U. 81. And of opinion course the said (central about today) it be requirement analysis the Court’s ante, “fair to suppose possibility,” considered the unnamed at 168.
B initial can also Post-October regarding appoint provisions Act’s reconciled with the Coal 9702(b)(1)(B)estab of trustees. Section ments to board members, one Fund a board of for the seven lishes Combined employers “designated by ... who is to be the three of whom greatest eligible benefici number of have been *28 provides 9706.” The Act for an “initial aries under section assign position pending completion to fill this of trustee” 9702(b)(3)(B) permits process, but this initial trustee ment only 1, 1993.” evident, serve “until November It is there assigned employers “three .. . who have been fore, that the greatest eligible number of beneficiaries under section simply It is 9706” must be known November 1993. employers appointing that were to be inconceivable the three (and unfilled) post unknown left until the Commissioner process completes open-ended assignment an —whenever might constantly designated that trustee is be; or that the change, employers identity as the of the “three ... who have eligible greatest been number of beneficiaries changes. constantly under section 9706” V reading bottom, At of the Coal Act—its confi- the Court’s provided filling provisions dent in of to cover “cases not upon overriding perception for”—rests its that the statute’s goal accuracy assignments. is in That is a foundation demonstrably sand. The Coal Act is not a scheme re- that quires, attempts require, perfect or even a match between beneficiary operator responsible each and the coal most for beneficiary’s provides, rough It best, health care. at justice; seemingly inequitable provisions unfair and abound. operator goes example,
When, business, out of 9704(f)(2)(B) provides previously that beneficiaries as signed operator go unassigned pool to that must into the purposes calculating “applicable percentage.” It reassigned to another provision to be for them no makes qualify under might operator operator, even another if 9706(a)(1) (3). §§ with scheme hardly compatible is That — envisions “accuracy assignments,” and that keen on is perpetual assignment in the Commissioner. 9704(f)(2)(B), the Court To account for the existence pre- Act the Coal position to the more retreats nuanced assignment,” finality only first accuracy “in fers over strange prefer- Why ante, n. have this 12. it should mystery. One virgin assignments perfection in ence for pos- matchup perfect as might insisting upon as understand prohibiting future up 1, 1993, and then sible to October assignment otherwise; that by way or changes, both initial pos- perfect system near initial that is as assure an expec- adjustments upset sible, but abstain from future companies more difficult. But tations and render sales of upon perfection what the conceivable reason for insistence or assignments, made the deadline whether initial before upon does insist is, however, As it Act afterward?4 be- assignments, made accuracy not even those in initial *29 only, beneficiary, one For each the deadline. fore responsible benefits, signatory operator for health is held signatory operators had worked for other even miner if responsibility. perfect in share the should fairness reality compromise be- Act reflects a is that Coal finality. goals assignments It perfection tween the of in and provides assignments along accuracy initial with some in
4 §9706(f)’s in process The Court review of its view points to support that the Act ‘in inital whether made “accuracy assignments, Coal envisions Ante, before the n. de (emphasis or deadline afterward.’” leted). In fact it opposite reflecting shows the statute’s tradeoffs — finality. objectives between the in accuracy competing 9706(f)(1) (f)(2) Sections for coal to re provide time limits operators Commissioner; after these quest reconsideration errors discovered by (Unless, of time limits have are closed from passed forever correction. course, chooses, in to accuracy assignments, the Court the interest 9706(a).) limits, time ignore time as has limit of just ignored those it repose given signatory operators, full notice some who are obligations plan by of their and can their (and accordingly surprise business new retro- without the active) imposed by is naive liabilities the Commissioner. It guesses Congress rely for the Court to on as to what legislation complicated have this, wanted in as the culmi- as long, legislative nation of a which, drawn-out battle in as we put Sigmon it in Co., Barnhart v. Coal 534 U. S. (2002),“highly parties attempted] pull pro- interested visions in way different directions.” The best to be faithful compromise resulting text, is to follow the statute’s I impute Congress statutory have done above—not to one objective majority favored ex- at the this Court pense equally plausible, statutory objectives. other,
[*] [*] [*] 9706(a) I think pro- it clear from the text of and other visions of the Act Coal that the Commissioner lacks author- ity assign eligible signatory operators beneficiaries or after respectfully October 1, 1993. I dissent from the judgment Court’s contrary.
Justice Thomas, dissenting. fully agree analysis with Justice these cases
I Scalia’s accordingly, join opinion. and, separately, his I write how- ever, seemingly to reiterate obvious rule: Unless explicitly states otherwise, “we construe term in accordance ordinary with its meaning.” or natural FDIC (1994). Meyer, 510 U. S. congres- 471, Thus, absent a sional contrary, directive to the “shall” must be construed as mandatory Heritage Dictionary command, see American (4th 2000) (l)a. ed. (defining “Something “shall” as *30 place will take or exist in Something, the future .... b. such promise, order, as an requirement, obligation: or You shall leave now. He penalty shall his misdeeds. The answer for shall not years exceed prison”). Congress two If desires nonmandatory meaning, it give “shall” a to for this Court consequences for by specifying the say explicitly must so mean to “shall” explicitly defining term noncompliance or Indeed, Con- mandatory something directive. other than a hortatory its nature of signify the gress perfectly free do, array words among choosing a wide wishes “preferably,” and “if meaning; “should,” carry such fact, readily to mind. possible” come v. Pierce disagree Brock foregoing, with I
Given (1986), progeny, the extent County, and its S.U. ante, at 177-179 erroneously, they perhaps see taken, are (1) man- “shall” is not dissenting), suggest that J., (SCALIA, (2) consequence for specify a datory a failure to of such preserves power in the face noncompliance to act grant of noncompliance, here, the where, even as mandatory I fail command. with the to act is coterminous meaning of eviscerating any clear reason for to see saving Congress goal impermissible “shall,” other than the policy. achieving better the name of its own choices in from authority to judges with But Article III does not vest as view we rectify congressional decisions those imprudent. interpretive current that,
I also note under the Court’s comply failing penalty approach, for there is no at all consequences Congress specify duty with a if does not If noncompliance. irrational: result is most The (i. than noncompliance e., less penalty indicates lesser act), if there power it; but we will administer loss of will let we own, penalty “shall” stands on its lesser no duty impunity. government with shirk their officials ordinary depriving its term “shall” of than Rather mandatory directive apply meaning, I term is obvious: conclusion then Commissioner. The initial make has no 1, 1993. after October