THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. TURNER, APPELLANT.
No. 2019-1674
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
December 22, 2020
2020-Ohio-6773
Submittеd August 18, 2020. CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Clermont County, No. CA2018-11-082, 2019-Ohio-3950.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Turner, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6773.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-6773
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. TURNER, APPELLANT.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Turner, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6773.]
Traffic law—Marked-lanes violation—Statutory scheme merely discourages or prohibits a vehicle from crossing the fog line, not touching it—Judgment reversed.
(No. 2019-1674—Submitted August 18, 2020—Decided December 22, 2020.)
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Clermont County, No. CA2018-11-082, 2019-Ohio-3950.
{¶ 1} This case was accepted as a certified conflict between judgments of the Twelfth District and First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh District Courts of Appeals. The Twelfth District certified the issue in conflict as follows:
Does an officer have reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of a motor vehicle for a marked lanes violation under
R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) when the officer observes the tires of a vehicle driving on, but not across a marked lane line?
157 Ohio St.3d 1544, 2020-Ohio-94, 137 N.E.3d 1225.
{¶ 2} We conclude upon reviеw of the certified question that when an officer believes a traffic law has been violated, the focus of the inquiry is whether the officer had “probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); see also Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996), syllabus. We therefore consider the certified question within that context and answer it in the negative.
{¶ 3} We hold, based on the plain language of
{¶ 4} Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals and remand this matter to that court to address the issue raised there by appellee, the state of Ohio: whether the State Highway Patrol trooper reasonably believed that appellant, Ryan Turner, violated the law when he drove on the fog line, rendering the trooper‘s stop of Turner lawful.
{¶ 5} A State Highway Patrol trooper stopped Turner as Turner was driving on Old State Route 74, a two-lane, two-way road in Clermont County, for failing to drive within the marked lanes in violation of
{¶ 6} Turner filed a motion to suppress the evidence of driving under the influence of alcohol that had been obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the trooper did not have probable cause or a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate the stop. The trooper testified that he had observed the two right-side tires of Turner‘s vehicle touch the fog line on the right side of the roadway once and that that touch can be seen on the dash-cam video.
{¶ 7} Old State Route 74 is visible in the relevant portion of the dash-cam video. The yellow center lines of the road are visible. The lane in which Turner was traveling is marked by a single solid yellow longitudinal line; next to that line is a single broken yellow longitudinal line. On both sides of Old State Route 74, a single solid white longitudinal line is present, which the trooper referred to in his testimony as the fog line.
{¶ 8} After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that a reasonable, prudent police officer would not have believed that a marked-lanes violation had occurred. The trial court stated that although it could not see the one-time touch of the fog line by Turner‘s tires in the dash-cam video, it would take the trooper at his word that Turner‘s tires had touched the line. It concluded that touching the line does not establish probable cause that a violation of
{¶ 9} The Twelfth District reversed the judgment of the trial court in a split decision. 2019-Ohio-3950, 145 N.E.3d 985. Construing the plain language of
{¶ 10} The dissenting judge construed
II. Conflict Cases
{¶ 11} The Twelfth District certified its judgment as being in conflict with judgments from the First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh District Courts of Appeals,
{¶ 12} However, we find that the other cases certified as being in conflict with this one are in fact not. See State v. Franklin, 5th Dist. Licking No. 11-CA-128, 2012-Ohio-3089, ¶ 21 (trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to stop motorist when vehicle‘s tires touched the far right line of the double solid centerline); State v. Richardson, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 00-CA-A-01-003, 2000 WL 1055917 (July 14, 2000) (trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to stop motorist when his vehicle‘s tires drove on top of centerline four times); State v. Konneh, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-17-007, 2018-Ohio-1239, ¶ 26 (trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop motorist when his vehicle‘s tires completely crossed the lines separating the middle lane from the right lane); and State v. Grigoryan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93030, 2010-Ohio-2883, ¶ 25 (police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop motorist whose vehicle‘s tires drove on the left yellow edge line). These cases did not concern a vehicle‘s driving on or touching the fog line, and our holding today does not address them.
III. The Parties’ Arguments
{¶ 13} Turner argues that a majority of Ohio‘s appellate courts have held that a marked-lanes violation does not occur unless the driver crosses the marked lane line. Therefore, touching a marked lane line does not provide either a reasonable, articulable suspicion or probable cause to permit a traffic stop. The state points to the language “entirely within” in
IV. Analysis
A. Standard of review
{¶ 14} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. An appellate court must accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. See State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). But the appellate court must decide the legal questions de novo. Burnside at ¶ 8.
{¶ 15} The trial court accepted as true the trooper‘s assertion that Turner‘s tires touched the white fog line. The parties do not dispute this factual finding. Therefore,
B. R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) is unambiguous: the single solid white longitudinal line at issue here marks only the edge of the roadway and the statute merely “discourages or prohibits crossing” it
{¶ 16} This court has not previously passed upon the question presented here. In State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 16, we considered only whether a vehicle‘s drifting back and forth across the edge of the roadway line was a violation of
{¶ 17} To resolve the issue before the court, we turn, once again, to statutory construction. In construing a statute, we do not ask “what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact.” Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus. “When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need for this court to apply the rules of statutory intеrpretation.” Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000).
{¶ 18} To determine the plain meaning of a statute, a court relies on the definitions provided by the legislative body, because a “definition by the average man or even by the ordinary dictionary with its studied enumeration of subtle shades of meaning is not a substitute for the definition set before us by the lawmakers with instructions to apply it to the exclusion of all others.” Fox v. Std. Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294 U.S. 87, 96, 55 S.Ct. 333, 79 L.Ed. 780 (1935). When a term is not defined in the statute, we use the term‘s plain and ordinary meaning. Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 56, 661 N.E.2d 706 (1996). And “[i]n ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” Kmart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.C. 1811, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988).
{¶ 19}
{¶ 20}
{¶ 21} Markings on roadways serve an important function by “providing guidance and information” to the motoring public. MUTCD, Section 3A.01.01. “Major marking types include pavement and curb
{¶ 22} Markings are required to be yellow, white, red, blue, or purple in color and must conform to standard highway colors. Id. at Section 3A.05.01. White markings used for longitudinal lines delineate either ”A. The separation of traffic flows in the same direction, or B. The right-hand edge of the roadway.” (Boldface sic and emphasis added.) Id. at Section 3A.05.02. Yellow markings used for longitudinal lines delineate either ”A. The separation of traffic traveling in opposite directions, B. The left-hand edge of the roadways of divided highways * * *, or C. The separation of two-way left turn lanes * * *.” (Boldface sic.) Id. at Section 3A.05.03.
{¶ 23} The MUTCD sets forth the general function of longitudinal lines: ”A. A double line indicates maximum or special restrictions, B. A solid line discourages or prohibits crossing (depending on the specific application), C. A broken line indicates a permissive condition, and D. A dotted line provides guidance or warning of a downstream change in lane function.” (Boldface sic and emphasis added.) Id. at Section 3A.06.01. A normal single line is four to six inches wide, and a broken line is a normal line with segments separated by gaps. Id. at Section 3A.06.02(A) and (D).
{¶ 24} A yellow center line delineates a ”separation of traffic lanes that have opposite directions of travel on the roadway.” (Boldface sic.) Id. at Section 3B.01.01. A yellow center line might mark a two-lane, two-way roadway in three ways. Id. at Section 3B.01.04. Relevant to this case, оne of those options is to provide [o]ne-direction no-passing zone markings consisting of a double yellow line, one of which is a normal broken yellow line and the other is a normal solid yellow line where crossing the center line markings for passing with care is permitted for the traffic traveling adjacent to the broken line, but is prohibited for traffic traveling adjacent to the solid line. (Boldface sic.) Id. at Section 3B.01.04(B).
{¶ 25}
{¶ 26} The lane of Old State Route 74 in which Turner was traveling when the trooper stopped him is marked by a single solid yellow longitudinal line; next to that line is a single broken yellow longitudinal line. On both sides of Old State Rоute 74, a single solid white longitudinal line—the fog line—is present.
{¶ 28} Under the MUTCD, the only other use of a single solid white longitudinal line is to establish the right-hand edge of the roadway. The trоoper plainly understood the markings on the pavement and that the single solid white longitudinal line on the right-hand side of the roadway marked the edge of the roadway because the trooper referred to the marking as the fog line.
{¶ 29} As established in the MUTCD, a standard marking can ”be used only to convey the meaning prescribed for that marking” in the MUTCD. (Boldface sic.) Id. at Section 3A.02.01. Therefore, because the single solid white longitudinal line as used on this two-lane, two-way roadway served only to mark the right-hand edge of the roadway and because that marking merely discourages or prohibits crossing it, not driving on it or touching it, Turner‘s touching of the fog line was not a violation of
{¶ 30} It is the placement of traffic-control deviсes—the markings—that carry out the requirements of “sections 4511.01 to 4511.78 and 4511.99 of the Revised Code.”
{¶ 31} Ohioans are expected to know the meaning of roadway markings contained in the MUTCD because the enforcement of certain Ohio traffic laws is tied to the meanings of the markings contained therein. Most significantly,
{¶ 32} Other statutes rely on the MUTCD to flesh out their meanings.
{¶ 33} Certain permissive provisions of
{¶ 34}
{¶ 35} Many roadway markings have special purposes, and disobeying them givеs rise to different violations of Ohio‘s traffic laws, depending on what they signify. The single solid white longitudinal line on the right-hand side of Old State Route 74 discourages or prohibits the crossing of that line but does not prohibit the mere touching of it. Because Turner did not cross the single solid white longitudinal line—the fog line—and driving on it or touching it is not prohibited under
{¶ 36} This interpretation of
V. Conclusion
{¶ 37} We hold, based on the plain language of
{¶ 38} We accordingly answer the certified-conflict question, as modified, in the negative, reverse the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, and remand this matter to that court to address the argument raised by the state of Ohio: whether the trooper‘s reasonable mistake of law validated the stop.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
FRENCH, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., concur.
FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O‘CONNOR, C.J.
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. TURNER, APPELLANT.
No. 2019-1674
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
December 22, 2020
2020-Ohio-6773
FISCHER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 39} Because I would conclude that the plain language of
I. Legal Analysis
{¶ 40} In a Billboard Hot 100 single recorded and released by his band in 1980, Cleveland‘s Michael Stanley sang, “Thank God for the man who put the white lines on the highway.” See John Soeder, Three decades after “Heartland,” Michael Stanley is alive and well in “Shadowland,” (Jan. 12, 2019), https://www.cleveland.com/popmusic/2009/12/three_decades_after_heartland.html (accessed Oct. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/A5CG-8TV7]; Michael Stanley, The 80‘s, http://www.michaelstanley.com/THE_80S.html (accessed Oct. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/R6FG-M7W3]; Billboard, The Hot 100 Chart: Week of April 11, 1981, https://www.billboard.com/charts/hot-100/1981-04-11 (accessed Oct. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/G77P-9H5Z]. This case is not about the Ohioans who paint the white lines on the state‘s roadways, but rather the motorists who drive on those white lines. Specifically, the issue before the court in this certified conflict is whether an оfficer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop for a
{¶ 41} I begin my analysis by noting a procedural quirk in this case. In his motion to suppress, appellant, Ryan Turner, argued that the State Highway Patrol Trooper did not have probable cause or a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. In granting Turner‘s motion to suppress, the trial court concluded that “a reasonably prudent officer who is familiar with [R.C.] 4511.33(A)(1) would not believe that he had probable cause to stop the defendant‘s vehicle under these circumstances.” On appeal, the state raised a single assignment of error: “The trial court erred in granting appellee‘s motion to suppress, as the trooper had reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe appellee had committed a marked lanes violation under Section 4511.33(A)(1).” 2019-Ohio-3950, 145 N.E.3d 985, ¶ 8. The Twelfth District Court of Appeals did not address whether probable cause existed, but rather resolved the appeal by reversing based upon its conclusion that there was “reasonable and articulable suspicion for the traffic stop.” Id. at ¶ 22. I acknowledge that probable cause and reasonable and artiсulable suspicion are distinct concepts. See State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 23. Given the procedural posture of this case, the substance of the Twelfth District‘s decision, and the limited scope of the certified-conflict question that we accepted for review, my analysis is therefore confined to whether reasonable and articulable suspicion existed.
B. Legal background
{¶ 42} “[T]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual‘s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). “To justify a particular intrusion, the officer must demonstrate ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ ” State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 11, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). “[I]f an officer‘s decision to stop a motorist for a criminal violation, including a traffic violation, is prompted by reasonable and articulable suspicion considering all the circumstances, then the stop is constitutionally valid.” Mays at ¶ 8.
{¶ 43}
Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, or wherever within municipal corporations traffic is lawfully moving in two or more substantially continuous lines in the same direction, the following rules apply:
(1) A vehicle or trackless trolley shall be driven, as nearly as is practicablе, entirely within a single lane or line of traffic and shall not be moved from such lane or line until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.
{¶ 44} This court most recently analyzed
{¶ 45} In Mays, the only evidence of erratic driving witnessed by the officer was the defendant‘s crossing of the right fog line twice by approximately one tire width. Id. at ¶ 2. This court rejected Mays‘s argument that absolute observance of lane markings is not required by
{¶ 46} Thus, Mays stands for the proposition that an officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of a motor vehicle for a marked-lanes violation under
C. Reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop exists when an officer observes a vehicle‘s tires touch a lane line
{¶ 47} When we construe a statute, legislative intent is our primary concern. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 8. To determine legislative intent, we first look to the plain language of the statute, and if that language is unambiguous and definite, we apply it as written. Summerville v. Forest Park, 128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 18, citing Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, ¶ 11.
{¶ 48} “To discern legislative intent, we read words and phrases in context and construe them in accordance with rules of grammar and common usage.” Mahoning Edn. Assn. of Dev. Disabilities v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 137 Ohio St.3d 257, 2013-Ohio-4654, 998 N.E.2d 1124, ¶ 15. ” ‘[S]ignificance and effect should, if possible, be accorded to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act.’ ” Weaver v. Edwin Shaw Hosp., 104 Ohio St.3d 390, 2004-Ohio-6549, 819 N.E.2d 1079, ¶ 13, quoting Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231, 78 N.E.2d 370 (1948), paragraph five of the syllabus.
{¶ 49} The Revised Code does not define “lane.” Nor, for purposes of
{¶ 50}
{¶ 51} The statute presupposes a few things. First, there is a single roadway. Second, there are “clearly marked” lanes (or lines of traffic) on that single roadway. Third, the vehicle must be driven, as nearly as practicable, within one of those lanes (or lines of traffic).
{¶ 52} According to the clear language of the statute, then, each lane is a distinct,
{¶ 53} To avoid this flawed interpretation, we must treat “entirely within a single lane or line of traffic” as meaning that a driver who drives on the lines that establish the lane boundaries drives outside the lane or line of traffic. Thus, to honor the language of
{¶ 54} I note again that while lines marking the boundaries between lanes and the lines marking the edge of a roadway serve different functions, the relevant statute,
{¶ 55} I further note that I would not find the “as nearly as is practicable” language of
R.C. 4511.33 does provide for certain circumstances in which a driver can cross a lane line without violating the statute. However, the question of whether appellant might have a possible defense to a charge of violatingR.C. 4511.33 is irrelevant in our analysis of whether an officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. An officer is not required to determine whether someone who has been observed committing a crime might have a legal defense to the charge.
Id. at ¶ 17. Thus, I conclude that the “as nearly as is practicable” language of
D. The MUTCD is not relevant to the analysis of this case
{¶ 56} Because I reach this conclusion based on the plain language of the statute,
{¶ 57} It is significant that this “first canon” requires us to end the judicial inquiry when the words of the statute are unambiguous. This canon does not provide that the judicial inquiry ends when the words of the statute, considered in light of administrative rules or regulations adopted by an executive administrative agency, are unambiguous. As this court has explained, it is improper for an administrative agency to alter the meaning of a statute if that statute is unambiguous. See In re VHA Diagnostic Servs., Inc., 65 Ohio St.3d 210, 214, 602 N.E.2d 647 (1992) (explaining, in construing a particular statute, that “[t]he words ‘after receiving’ are clear and unambiguous. It is improper for the administrative agency to change the words ‘after receiving’ to, in effect, ‘after determining it has received’ “). It follows that when a statue is unambiguous, our inquiry should end, and we should not look to sources outside that statute to determine what the statute means.
{¶ 58} I acknowledge that
{¶ 59} If the language of
II. Conclusion
{¶ 60} Based on the plain language of
O‘CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
D. Vincent Faris, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nick Horton, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Faris & Faris, L.L.C., and Zachary F. Farris, for appellant.
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Louis E. Grube, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, and Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solicitor General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.