*1 ALI FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS et al. FOR THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS CERTIORARI TO CIRCUIT THE ELEVENTH January Argued No. 06-9130. October 2007 Decided *2 André, Jean-Claude Court, by appointment U. S. him on 1186, argued cause for With petitioner. briefs were Michael Smith, Stris, G. Peter K. P. Mar- Shaun tin, and Brendan Maher.
Kannon K. Shanmugam argued the cause respond- Solicitor General Clem- ents. him on were With the brief ent, Solicitor Keisler, Assistant Attorney Deputy General Kneedler, General and Mark B. Stern. of the Court. delivered opinion
Justice Thomas of 28 which This ease concerns the U. S. C. scope waiver of carves out certain United States’ exceptions employ- for torts committed federal sovereign immunity 2680(c) ees. of sovereign Section the waiver provides immunity arising apply from the detention does not to claims property by “any officer of or excise or this officer.” Petitioner contends law enforcement enforcing applies only cus- to law enforcement officers clause toms or and thus not affect the waiver laws, excise does sovereign immunity against for his claim (BOP). that the the Federal Bureau of Prisons We conclude phrase “any covers all broad other law enforcement officer” judg- Accordingly, we affirm the law enforcement officers. peti- Appeals upholding ment of the Court of the dismissal tioner’s claim.
I prisoner Petitioner M. Ali was federal Abdus-Shahid *3 Penitentiary Georgia, from Atlanta, at United States petitioner 2001 to 2003. In December was scheduled 2003, Penitentiary Big to be to the transferred United States (USP being Sandy Sandy) Kentucky. Big Before Inez, containing personal bags transferred, he left two duffle his Discharge property prison’s Receiving in the Atlanta and Big shipped packaged, inventoried, Unit to be and to USP Sandy. bags his arrived transferred, Petitioner was and days Upon inspecting property, he noticed some his later. Big missing. that several items were The staff at USP Sandy’s Receiving Discharge him that he had and Unit told given everything things been that if were sent, was and missing Many purportedly he miss- file a claim. of could ing nostalgic significance, religious includ- items were of and mag- religious ing copies rug, prayer two a of Qur’an, worth the items were azines. Petitioner estimated that $177. denying claim. In
Petitioner an administrative tort filed receipt signature agency on the relief, that, noted his inventory accuracy petitioner certified the form, had thereby relinquished future listed thereon and had missing damaged property. relating Petitioner claims complaint alleging, alia, of inter violations then filed
217 §§ (FTCA), Federal Tort Claims Act 1346, 28 U. S. C. 2671 seq. petitioner’s et The BOP maintained that claim was 2680(c) § barred claims against agreed law enforcement officers. District Court petitioner’s subject- and dismissed FTCA claim for lack of jurisdiction. appealed. matter Petitioner agreeing The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, with the District 2680(c). interpretation Appx. Court’s 204 778, Fed. 779- (2006) curiam). (per rejecting petitioner’s argu In Appeals ments, the Court of relied on this Court’s broad §2680(c)’s interpretation of “detention” clause in Kosak v. (1984), United States, 465 U. 854-859 on decisions Appeals, Courts on its own decision in Dept. Schlaebitz Justice, v. United States F. 2d (1991) curiam) (per (holding that United States Mar allegedly negligent releasing parolee’s who shals, were luggage party, to a third were “law enforcement officers” 2680(c)). Appx., under See 204 Fed. 779-780. granted (2007), We certiorari, U. S. resolve the disagreement among Appeals scope the Courts as to the 2680(c).1 §of
II In the FTCA, sov- waived United States’ ereign immunity arising for claims out torts committed *4 1 joined The Eleventh Appeals construing Circuit five other of in Courts 2680(c) § v. Bu to encompass all law enforcement officers. See Bramwell Prisons, reau (CA9 Chapa States 804, 806-807 2003); F. United 348 3d v. of Dept. Justice, curiam); (CA5 388, 2003) (per Hatten v. 339 F. 3d 390 of White, States, (CA10 1208, Cheney v. United 2002); 275 F. 3d 1210 972 Rivkind, (CA8 1992) curiam); 247, (per 1520, F. Ysasi 2d 248 v. 856 F. 2d (CA 1988). Appeals contrary 1525 Fed. Five other Courts of reached the conclusion, performing interpreting the as limited to officers cus clause DEF, (CA2 103, 107 ABC v. 2007); toms or excise functions. 500 F. 3d See curiam); States, (CA7 2007) (per Dahler United 769, v. F. 3d 771-772 473 (CA4 2006); States, Bazuaye Andrews v. 220, United 441 F. 227 v. 3d States, States, (CADC Kurinsky 1996); United United 482, 3d v. 83 F. 486 (CA6 1994). 33 F. 3d 1346(b)(1). § As 28 U. by federal See S. C. employees. the here, against the authorizes “claims relevant FTCA of ... loss States, injury United for for money damages act or the negligent wrongful . . . caused by property while acting of of Government any omission employee Ibid. The of or employment.” within the his office scope certain claims. from this waiver exempts categories FTCA 2680(a)-(n). here is the subsec- §§ See Relevant 1346(b) to “[a]ny § shall not (c), apply tion which that provides collection any claim of the assessment or respect arising merchan- tax goods, or customs or the detention duty, any or excise or officer of customs dise, or other property by 2680(c). § other law enforcement officer.” turns on the BOP who allegedly This case whether law enforcement lost “other petitioner’s property qualify 2680(c).2 Petitioner ar- within meaning officer[s]” enforcement do other law “any that not because gues they in a acting includes enforcement officers officer” law refer- or excise that Noting capacity. language customs and excise activities both enced §2680(c), argues issue and the clause in petitioner preceding that the entire is focused on preserving subsection officers enforc- as to immunity only United States’ sovereign those laws. ing the statute’s
Petitioner's is inconsistent with argument law officer” enforcement language.3 assume, “detained” Ali’s deciding, without that BOP officers We 2680(c)’s . . detention” satisfy “arising respect of. and thus requirement. clause was Appeals The Court held the “detention” satisfied, issue on certiorari. petitioner expressly declined raise the curiam); 2006) (per (CA11 Brief Peti Appx. See 204 Fed. 779-780 10-11, n. 9. tioner first this ease. Petitioner question this for the time in We consider States, in Kosak 465 U. United argues that this Court concluded ambiguous. officer” is (1984), phrase “any other law enforcement case, portion construed Reply for Petitioner In that Court Brief 4. *5 Ibid, suggests added). meaning. (emphasis a broad We previously “[r]ead have naturally, ‘any’ noted that the word expansive meaning, has an that is, ‘one or some indiscrimi nately of whatever kind.’” United Gonzales, States v. (1997)(quoting U. 1,S. 5 Webster’s Third New International (1976)). Dictionary provi In Gonzales, we considered a imposed sion that an additional sentence for firearms used in drug trafficking provided federal crimes and that such addi “ tional ‘any sentence shall not be concurrent with other term imprisonment.’” (quoting 520 U. at 4 S., 18 U. S. C. 924(c)(1) (1994 deleted). ed.); emphasis Notwithstanding drug trafficking subsection’s initial reference to federal expansive “any” crimes, we held that the word and the ab language sence of restrictive left “no basis in the text for limiting” phrase “any imprisonment” other term of federal Similarly, sentences. 520 S.,U. at 5. in Harrison (1980), v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. 578 the Court con phrase “any sidered the other final action” in amendments to explained Clean Air Act. The Court that the amend expanded ments Agency a list of Environmental Protection by adding Administrator categories actions two of actions: specifically actions statutory provision, under a enumerated “any other final action” under the Id., Clean Air Act. deleted). (emphasis at Focusing Congress’ on choice of “any,” “discern[ed] word uncertainty the Court no in the ” meaning phrase, ‘any empha of the other final action,’ and “expansive language sized that offer[ed] the statute’s no indi here, same clause bearing at issue but the decision had no on the meaning S., other law enforcement officer.” 465 U. at 853-862 (holding that “detention” encompasses resulting negligent claims from handling Indeed, or storage). expressly the Court declined to reach the Id., (“We issue. n. 6 have no occasion in this ease decide what officer[s],’ officials, kinds of ‘law-enforcement other than customs are cov (alteration exception” original)). ered Petitioner’s reliance on concluding footnote as much ambiguous reads too into the question Court’s reservation of a that was not then before it. *6 220 to limit the phrase intended” Congress
cation whatever that enumerated to those in the final actions similar specifically to Id., sections. at 588-589. and Harrison applies of Gonzales think the reasoning
We in 28 Congress employed to language equally expansive 2680(c). to “other of “any” modify use Congress’ U. S. C. law to mean is most read naturally law enforcement officer” “any” kind.4 word officers of whatever enforcement and 2680(c), §of four in the relevant portion times repeated in the phrase those appear particular two of instances law en- excise or other “any officer of customs or issue: added.) inserted (Emphasis Congress forcement officer.” before “other law enforcement immediately the word “any” To that it modifies that officer,” phrase. no doubt leaving or customs duty” the text’s references to “tax sure, be in- Congress of or excise” indicate that “officer[s] an offi- claims from immunity tended to for preserve arising also laws. The text enforcement of tax and customs cer’s im- intended indicates, that however, Congress preserve from the of for claims detention munity arising property, 4 course, expansive of may counteract effect Of circumstances narrowly “any” example, phrase For we have construed an modifiers. See Circuit that compelled when it included a term of art result. Stores, Adams, (2001) “any (construing City Inc. v. U. S. 115-116 1, narrowly commerce,” U. in . .. S. C. engaged other class of workers a term interpretation of “in commerce” as previous on the Court’s based phrases such meaning). a We also have construed art with narrower only under a provision in the made sense narrowly when another term Alvarez-Sanchez, 350, 357- States v. U. S. see United reading, narrow (1994) be (limiting “any law-enforcement officer” federal respect to only with “delay” made sense cause the statute’s reference officers), implicated have sover reading broad would and when a federal Minn., Regents Raygor Univ. concerns, 534 U. eignty see (2002) applicable rule” to waivers (applying the “clear statement 541-542 to exclude phrase “all civil actions” sovereign immunity to construe the ex expressly claims, though nothing in the statute category “even them). our decisions that motivated of the circumstances clude[d]” None present in these cases is here. Congress
there is no immunity indication that intended type those being claims to turn on the of law enforced. require Congress Petitioner clarify would its intent to cover by. all adding phrases law enforcement officers such “performing any official law enforcement function,” or Congress “without limitation.” But could not have chosen all-encompassing more than other law enforce- express ment officer” to that intent. We have no reason to demand economically write less and more *7 repetitiously. 2680(c) §
Recent support amendments to the conclusion “any other law enforcement officer” is not limited to acting capacity. in a customs or excise In the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, added sub (c)(l)-(c)(4) § 2680. sections §3(a), to 28 U.S.C. 114 Stat. 2680(c) § 1346(b) § 211. provides As amended, the sovereign immunity, waiver of notwithstanding excep the tion applies at issue in this case, to:
“[A]ny injury goods, claim based on or loss of merchan- property, dise, or possession other any while in the of officer any of customs or excise or other law enforcement officer, if—
“(1) property the purpose was seized for of for- any provision feiture under providing of Federal law property the forfeiture of other than as a sentence im- posed upon conviction of a offense; criminal
“(2) the interest of the claimant was not forfeited; “(3) the interest of the claimant was not remitted or (if mitigated property subject forfeiture); was “(4) the claimant was not convicted of a crime for which property the interest of the claimant in the was subject to forfeiture under a Federal criminal forfeit- ure law.” govern petitioner’s
The amendment does not claim because property purpose his was not “seized for the forfeiture,” of (1). required paragraph amendment Nonetheless, the law en our construction relevant because possible, ensure that to the extent must, forcement officer” statutory Rob and consistent. See is coherent scheme (1997)(citing United Co., v. Shell Oil U. S. inson Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. v. Ron Pair States (1989)). thus The amendment canceled - and immunity sovereign certain sei restored waiver - for property law. forfeiture See based on federal zures of 2680(c)(1) (excepting property if “the claims C. 28 U. S. purpose forfeiture under was seized for prop providing provision for the forfeiture Federal law added)). erty” (emphasis only interpretation, petitioner’s of- law enforcement Under enforcing immune under laws were ficers customs or excise 2680(c). reading, petitioner’s prior Thus, on version of the waiver for effect was to restore the amendment’s acting or officers officers, in which customs or excise cases capacity, us This strikes enforce forfeiture laws. such interpretation implausible If that were of the statute. as an why Congress apparent Congress’ would intent, it is not *8 respect to the enforcement the waiver with have restored simply those related civil forfeiture instead of all laws interpretation makes sense customs or excise. Petitioner’s way Congress to re- out of its if we assume that went officers, in customs or excise store the waiver for cases which capacity, acting laws enforce forfeiture or officers in such a petitioner fails to dem- or But unrelated customs excise. acting in officers, excise officers onstrate that customs or capacity, laws unrelated enforce civil forfeiture such a ever they with such do so much less that excise, to customs or singled likely Congress them out frequency to have is that likely that far more It seems in the amendment.5 Kennedy’s dissent) (hereinafter that, argues dur Justice dissent “routinely” enforce civil searches, customs and excise ing border any restored the waiver for officers civil forfeiture enforcing all such officers were covered by law in because, view, its to the waiver to the prior amendment. Against this textual and structural evidence that “any other law enforcement officer” in does fact mean other any law enforcement officer, invokes petitioner numerous canons ejusdem of statutory construction. He relies on primarily generis, or the a “when term a principle general follows one, the specific term general should be understood ref- as a erence to subjects akin to the one with enumera- specific Dispatchers, & Western R. v. Co. Train tion.” Norfolk (1991). U. S. In petitioner’s view, officer of customs or excise or law enforcement officer” should be read as a list, three-item final, and the catchall forfeiture Post, laws unrelated to customs or at excise. But 239-240. examples provides support dissent do not assertion. dissent maintains that a customs officer material who seizes defined as contraband Post, § 80302 under 49 U. S. example. C. et is seq. one such at 240. But a authority customs officer’s to effect a forfeiture of such contra specific 1595a(c)(l)(C). § band derives from C. customs law. See 19 U. S. Similarly, suggests the dissent Drug that a Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent “assisting a in customs official” a border search who seizes drug-related § contraband acting under U. S. C. 881 is a “traditional Post, capacity.” revenue argument at 240. But that is based on the as sumption that an officer conducting who assists in a border search acts capacity customs even enforcing if he is not a customs officer and is not a customs law. That assumption, self-evident, only far from underscores difficulty that would attempt attend to define the contours of 2680(c)’s implied § limitation on proposed petitioner reach and embraced “Acting the dissent. self- capacity” a customs or excise is not a defining concept, having and not a limitation the statute’s included such language, Congress Finally, did provide course a definition. points dissent that a effect might out customs or officer a forfeiture excise 5317(c). Post, currency monetary 31 U. instruments under S. C. 5317(e) 240. But hardly a civil law unrelated to forfeiture *9 5317(c)(2) (2000 V) § ed., (authorizing or excise. Supp. See forfeiture (2000 alia, § 5316 of, ed.), in a involved violation inter which monetary forth reporting requirements importing sets for exporting and instruments).
224 be limited law enforcement officer” should preceding specific as the
to officers of the same nature phrases. we cases in which
Petitioner likens his case
two recent
Dept.
Washington
So
In
State
found the canon useful.
Guardianship Estate Keffeler,
cial and Health Servs. v.
(2003),
clause “execu
U.
375
we considered the
371,
legal process”
garnishment,
levy,
tion,
attachment,
or other
407(a).
§
ejusdem generis,
Applying
we con
in 42 U. S. C.
legal
legal
proc
process”
was limited
cluded that “other
specific
items listed.
esses
the same nature as the
serving
department’s
S., at 384-385. The
scheme
U.
representative payee
due to children under
of the benefits
process,”
“legal
not share the common
its
while a
did
care,
judicial
“utilization of some
items, viz.,
attribute of the listed
quasi-judicial
prop
over
which control
mechanism ...
discharge”
erty passes
person to
in order to
from one
another
Similarly,
Service,
Id.,
in Dolan v. Postal
at 385.
debt..
excep
(2006),
an
whether
Petitioner asserts that generis ejusdem “‘presents a textbook Dolan, Keffeler scenario.’” (quoting Andrews for Petitioner Brief 2006)). (CA4 disagree. We States, 441 F. 3d United *10 phrase “any The structure of the officer or of customs excise other law enforcement officer” does not lend itself to application phrase disjunctive, of the canon. The is with one specific general category, and one not—like the at clauses specific sepa issue in and Dolan—a list of items Keffeler general rated commas and a followed or collective specific term. The absence aof list of items undercuts the ejusdem generis inference embodied in that re mained focused on the common attribute when it used the phrase. Aguilar, catchall Cf. United States v. 515 U. S. (1995) concurring part dissenting J., and (Scalia, part) (rejecting applicability the canon’s anto omnibus clause that independent prohibi was “one of... several distinct and general following tions” rather than “a or collective term specific particular statutory list of items to which a command applicable”). is apparent
Moreover, is not what common attribute con 2680(c). specific nects the items in Were we to use meaning canon to limit the other law enforcement required officer,”we would be to determine the relevant lim iting characteristic of “officer of In customs or excise.” (1961), Jarecki v. Co., G.D. & Searle 367 U. 303 for exam ple, limiting scope the Court invoked noscitur sociis in “'discovery’” of the term to the common characteristic it '"exploration”’ '"prospecting.”’ shared with Id., conjunction 307. The Court noted that all three words activity “describe[d] income-producing gas in the oil and mining Here, contrast, industries.” Ibid. no relevant immediately appears common attribute from “of suggests ficer of excise.” Petitioner types charged common attribute is that both of officers are enforcing with But no customs and excise laws. we see why op reason should be relevant characteristic as posed example, commonly type to, for that officers of that are involved in the the as- activities enumerated the statute: and the customs duties and collection of taxes and sessment property. detention interpretive principles appeals are to other
Petitioner’s reading unconvincing. contends that his Petitioner also *11 according supported “ to which sociis, noscitur a the canon ” company keeps.’ D. it S. Warren is known ‘a word Protection, 547 370, U. S. Co.v. Maine Bd. Environmental (2006). support petitioner cites in cases But the stronger applying statutes with involved noscitur sociis 254- Ada, 528 U. S. Gutierrez v. contextual cues. See (2000) phrase, (applying the relevant the canon narrow spe closely “any surrounded six it was election,” where elections); supra, gubernatorial at Jarecki, cificreferences to (applying “discover canon to narrow the term 306-309 it con where was of mineral resources ies” discoveries applied to oil, words, list all of which tained in a of three conceivably gas, mining all and could industries although any industry). apply customs Here, §2680(c),nothing in the overall áre mentioned twice in excise statutory suggests and excise context that customs emphasis provision. were the exclusive focus (c) with is not inconsistent subsection on customs and excise “any enforcement officer” the conclusion that other law suggests. sweeps broadly language as its petitioner against superfluities Similarly, lends the rule adopt today sparse support. does not we The construction super- “any necessarily of customs or excise” officer render Congress may simply remove have intended to fluous; included in “law or excise were officers of customs doubt that FLRA, officer[s].” Schools See Fort Stewart enforcement (1990) “technically (noting unneces- 641, 646 495 U. S. may sary” examples abundance out an have been “inserted caution”). petitioner’s threatens construction Moreover, superfluous “any officer” other law enforcement to render enforcement if “other law when, ever, because it is not clear act in a officer[s]” excise In event, capacity.6 we do not woodenly time apply limiting principles every Congress includes a with a specific example along general Harrison, phrase. S., See U. n. 6 an (rejecting ejusdem argument must generis when a broad apply interpretation the clause could render the enumer- specific ations unnecessary).
In the end, we are unpersuaded by petitioner’s attempt to create where the ambiguity statute’s text and structure §2680(c)’s suggest none. Had intended to limit reach as petitioner contends, could have written easily “any other law enforcement officer in a customs acting or excise capacity.” Instead, it used the all- unmodified, encompassing phrase other law enforcement officer.” in the Nothing context con- statutory requires narrowing *12 as indeed, we have the statute is most explained, struction — consistent and coherent when other law enforcement example As an of “other acting law enforcement in officer[s]” an excise capacity, petitioner Motors, customs cites Formula Ltd. v. One United States, (CA2 1985) 777 F. (holding 2d 823-824 that the seizure a vehicle still in from agents transit overseas DEA who it for searched drugs was “sufficiently akin to the offi functions carried out Customs 2680(c)”). place agents’ cials scope conduct within the of section But it is clear agents not that the an acting that case were excise capacity ordinary capacity customs rather than in their as law enforcement agents. agents searching drugs It seems to us that DEA for are a car acting capacity charged enforcing their as officers with the Nation’s laws, drug not customs or excise laws. 89(a) Similarly, the dissent notes that 14 U. S. C. authorizes Coast Post, very Guard officers to enforce customs laws. at 233. But the next §89 provides effectively subsection of that Coast officers are cus- Guard 89(b)(1) they (providing toms when enforce customs laws. See they engaged, pursuant that Coast to the Guard officers “insofar as are section, authority enforcing any of the United contained in this law agents particular execu- acting States shall... be deemed to be of the department particular charged tive . . of the . with the administration law”). result, enforcing law is a As a a Coast Guard officer a customs officer, law not some “other enforcement officer.” says. literally Nor it See officer” is read to mean what interpre (noting Co., S., R. U. & Western folk yield a the whole context dictates tive must “when canons conclusion”). emphasis, moreover, different It bears §2680(c), immunity maintaining sovereign far from against officers, law enforcement entire universe of claims respect “arising in of” the “detention” for claims does so liberty property. the statute are not at rewrite We meaning Instead, we deem more desirable.7 to reflect a give Section to the text enacted: we must 2680(c) effect against for the States the United forecloses lawsuits just property by “any,” “some,” unlawful detention of officers. law enforcement
III Ap- judgment Court of of the stated, For the reasons peals for the Eleventh Circuit
Affirmed. Stevens, Jus- Kennedy, with whom Justice Justice Breyer dissenting. Souter, join, tice and Justice requires beginning Statutory interpretation, end, from respect respect enhanced, however, is not for the text. The within consideration of the text decisions that foreclose determining guide as a the whole context statute analysis legislature’s prevent from be- intent. To textual legislator departs coming how most from so rarefied that likely she for the when he or voted understood the words *13 interpretative text rules consider use certain law, courts statutory design. do not demand canons within the These prop remedy for note, lost provide an administrative Congress, we did authority under 31 agencies like Federal have erty petitioner. claimants $1,000 for 3723(a)(1) for not more than “claim[s] C. settle U. S. certain by the is caused to, of, property that... damage privately or loss owned Government of the United States employee of an officer or negligence than more BOP has settled scope employment.” The acting within the 41, n. 17. Respondents years. 1,100 Brief for such claims in the last three dispositive, wooden reliance and are not themselves but they helpful guides construing ambiguous do function as in statutory provisions. ejus- accepted Two of these rules are generis dem together and noscitur a sociis, which instruct interpreted words a series should be in relation to one another.
Today my understanding opinion holds, Court if of its only is possible way correct, that there is one to read the Placing implicit upon statute. reliance a comma at the be- ginning says of a clause, the Court that the two maxims helpful noted, recognized principles and indeed other statutory analysis, interpretative are not useful as aids in this case because the clause cannot be understood what my respectful went before. In ap- submission the Court’s proach general applied incorrect as a rule and as to the analytic statute now before us. Both the framework and the specific interpretation employs the Court now become bind- ing on the federal courts, which will confront other cases in operate which a series of words in a clause similar to the one today. troubling we consider So this case is for the analysis employs. result the Court reaches but also for the My disagreements with the Court lead this dissent.
I A (FTCA Act) The Federal Tort Claims Act allows those allege injury governmental who from over actions a vast sphere damages enacting to seek tortious conduct. exceptions enumerated to the Act’s broad sovereign immunity, waiver of all of which shield the Gov- exceptions specific ernment from suit instances. These given prevent must be in- careful consideration order to governmental operations terference As with described. 848, 853, n. 9 States, noted Kosak v. United S.U. (1984), generous “unduly interpretations ex- however, *14 purpose defeating ceptions of the central the risk run of the statute.” ex- of the here the extent states, the at issue is
As Court goods ception arising in de- from the detention of for suits provision excepts from The relevant circumstances. fined general the waiver respect collec- arising or
“claim[s] of the assessment any duty, of any the detention tion tax or customs of property by goods, officer or other merchandise, enforcement officer.” excise or other law customs or 2680(c). 28 U. C.S. reading upon consideration, close further, on and
Both first plain the indicate that of the statute words provision and with customs taxes. is concerned dealing exclusively begins with customs awith clause provision four ex- as whole contains tax duties. And making press revenue duties tax, references to customs and features. its most excise officers salient and customs and (2000). Ada, 254-255 Cf. 528 U. Gutierrez reading wholly suggest is is that the Court’s This not support. grammatical After impermissible or some without goods outset until the all, is stated detention the words clause at the end of same second clause and appear; be ar- “any so can officer” other law enforcement provision are gued so clauses of that the and second first separate all law enforcement that all detentions might capacity they Still, this act are covered. in whatever begin- reading; preferred ought between not be the closing ning reference clause and its of the second appears another reference law officer” enforcement context “officer[s] in the excise,” this time my view, to quite sufficient, This detention. very exception. scope At the the limited continue simply by adopting bars a rule which errs least, Court generis ejusdem nosci- the canons of all consideration of *15 together tur a sociis. And when those canons are consulted, principles interpretation, with other of common the case limiting to customs and more tax than position by overcomes the maintained the Government and adopted by the Court. ejusdem generis provides
The canon seem- that, where a ingly phrase, broad clause constitutes a residual it must be by, controlled and to, defined with reference the “enumerated categories just . . . which are it,” recited before so that the encompasses only objects clause similar nature. Circuit (2001). City Stores, Adams, Inc. v. 532 U. 105, 115 The immediately words other law enforcement officer” fol- “officer[s] low the statute’s reference to excise,” of customs or as well as the first clause’s reference to the assessment of 2680(c). § tax and customs 28 duties. U. C.S. 2680(c) disjunctive,
The Court counters that “is with one specific general category,” rendering ejusdem gene and one inapplicable. applicability, ris Ante, at The 225. canon’s however, is not limited to those a statutes that include laun dry g., list of See, items. e. & Western R. Co. v. Norfolk (“[WJhen (1991) Dispatchers, gen Train 499 U. S. 129 117, specific general eral term follows a one, term should be subjects understood as a reference to akin with one enumeration”). specific ejusdem generis In is addition, conjunction interpretative often invoked in with the canon provides noscitur a which sociis, that words are be “ ” by companions.’ Washington Dept. ‘known their State of Guardianship Social and Health v. Estate Keffeler, Servs. 255). (2003) supra, (quoting 371, Gutierrez, U. S. at general “meaning word, and, rule that the conse quently, legislature,” “ascer the intention of the should be considering tained reference to the context, surrounding question whether words the word and the ejusdem generis, to the same are, in and referable fact, (in (1878) subject-matter.” Clark, Neal v. U. S. omitted). quotation ternal marks 2680(c) reading proper to the last thus attributes A officer”) (“any phrase the discrete law enforcement (“officer[s] phrases preceding characteristic shared and “assessment collection of customs or excise” duty”). Utah tax or See also Norton Southern (2004) (applying Alliance, 542 U. S. 62-63 Wilderness ejusdem generis act’” means that “‘failure to conclude original)); agency (emphasis in “failure to take an action” supra, Dept. Washington Servs., Health State Social legal process” (holding “other that the 384-385 *16 407(a) judicial § only of a 42 refers to the utilization U. S. C. quasi-judicial shared the commonattribute mechanism, it). statutory preceding enumeration and the otherwise, in all likelihood would Had intended apply law enforcement have drafted the section to including rather than officer, excise,” officers customs and tacking “any on the end other law enforcement officer” categories the enumerated as it did here. common and customs and excise attribute of officers of performance is of func
other law enforcement officers including, assigned officers, inter tions often to revenue most laws and alia, the enforcement of the revenue United States’ Although of cus searches. conduct border in most instances the toms and officers of excise are charged duty, federal with this officers of other full-time staff agencies general be often will law enforcement officers capacity upon a revenue called to act in traditional example, Drug Administration officer. For Enforcement (FBI) (DEA) agents Investigation fre Bureau of or Federal quently in of border officials the execution assist customs g., Gurr, 471 F. 3d See, United States v. searches. e. (CADC 2006) (FBI of financial in search involved 147-149 border); Boumelhem, F. 3d 339 United States v. documents 2003) (“FBI (CA6 cooperating with Cus had been 414, 424 force”); joint Motors, part Formula One toms of a task 1985) (CA2 (DEA States, 777 2d 824 Ltd. v. United F. were agents performing functions carried out traditionally customs officials where and searched an auto- they seized mobile that had been from shipped abroad was still Schoor, container). Cf. United States v. its shipping (CA9 1979) F. 1303,1305-1306 2d (upholding constitutionality searches). cooperation federal border among agencies 89(a) 14 U. S. Similarly, C. the Coast grants Guard plenary authority to and board American stop vessels inspect e.g., United States obvious customs See, violations. Gil-Carmona, (CA1 (Coast 2007) F. 3d Guard assisted an Immigration and Customs Enforcement aircraft patrol Rico). off vessel the coast interdicting of Puerto To the extent detain they goods whose possession violates customs laws, Coast Guard officers —while of cus- “officer[s] or excise,” 2680(c) toms 28 U. S. C. without en- doubt —are in the enforcement gaging of the United States’ revenue laws.
The same is true in the tax context. Under 26 S. C. U. §6321, a delinquent taxpayer’s to forfeit subject City Glass Bank v. United States, see ure, U. S. 265 (1945), and bemay seized any federal agent assisting (IRS) Internal Revenue Service forfeiture, executing *17 Currency, $515,060.42 United States v. in United States cf. 491, (CA6 1998) (IRS 152 F. 3d 495 and FBI seized jointly currency). Thus, final the other law enforce phrase “any ment officer” has work to do and makes sense considerable when the statute is limited in this way.
B The Court its concentrat- by reaches conclusion contrary on the the law word before “other enforce- ing “any” phrase 2680(c). ment 28 last officer.” U. C. It takes this single to extend the statute that all detentions phrase so it covers ca- in whatever by law enforcement officer with he or There pacity she acts. are fundamental problems mentioned. this addition to the ones approach, already 234 squared analysis with the the cannot be
First, Court’s single longstanding recognition must not be read that a word statutory to reference its in isolation but instead defined King Hospital, 215, 502 U. S. v. context. See St. Vincent’s (1991) (“[T]he plain language, meaning statutory 221 context”); depends Service, 546 U. S. not, Dolan v. Postal on (2006)(“A may may not extend in a statute 481, 486 word Interpre possibilities. definitional the outer limits its depends upon reading phrase the whole tation of a word or statutory considering purpose and context the text, precedents consulting any or authorities statute, and facially analysis”). broad This true inform the even things “any” de can mean “different modifiers. The word Municipal pending upon setting,” v. Missouri Nixon (2004); League, v. United see also Small 125, 541 U. S. 132 (2005) cases), (citing must be States, 385, 544 388 U. S. legis objects application “to to which in its those limited apply Palmer, 3 United States v. them,” láture intended to (1818). 610, Wheat. 631 example, we held 254-255, Gutierrez, S.,
In at U. Organic phrase Guam, Act of “in election” in that the broadly but to all elections not refer U. S. C. does Lieutenant Gov- to the election Governor Guam’s explained elec- The reference ernor. Court gubernatorial preceded elec- references to tion” is two context In the more references. tions and followed four repetition,” that the concluded the Court of such “relentless companions.” by [its] phrase S., U. must “known be Alvarez-Sanchez, 255. in United States Likewise, (1994), similar addressed U. S. the Court today. interpret statutory Court provision we dispositive “placing respondent erred noted that ‘any’ statutory enforce- weight law reference on broad *18 considering of the agency rest ment officer or without “ [the in which ‘the context and instead statute,” consulted Id., Deal v. United is phrase] used.’” at 357, 358 (quoting States, S. 129,132 U. alteration in (1993); original).
As mentioned, 2680(c) already the context of suggests that, in accordance with these precedents, pro statutory vision be should cus interpreted narrowly apply only toms and revenue duties. Its first clause deals exclusively with customs and tax and, duties between the sec first and ond clauses, refers two more times to customs and tax. supra, Gutierrez, A-Mark, Inc. v. United See 254-255; Dept. Treasury, States Secret Serv. (CA9 849, 851 F. 2d 1978) (“The J., (Tang, concurring) clauses both dwell exclu on sively taxes, and for final reference to except officers”). other law-enforcement 2680(c) Further, § there provides will be immunity where there has been “detention” of merchan- goods, dise, property. “[Detention” is defined non- by legal and dictionaries legal alike as a “forced,” or “compulsory,” “puni- tive” (7th containment. Black’s Law Dictionary ed. 1999) (4th American (compulsory); Heritage Dictionary 2000) (forced ed. The issue punitive). whether petition- er’s was “detained” within the stat- property meaning ute was not case; raised this and so the Court leaves another day to these See exception’s applicability facts. ante, at 218, 2. It n. to bear in mind important, however, that, the context of tax detention of customs and goods by it will be the agents, rare case when is voluntarily turned rather over, than cus- indeed, forcibly appropriated; toms and tax agents are business of regular seizing and as are law enforcement forfeiting agents acting property, in the of revenue enforcement. of Home- See capacity Dept, U. land U. S. Customs Security, and Border Protection FY2007— Immigration Enforcement, and Customs Mid-Year 2007), IPR Commodities online at Top http://www. Seized (May cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ipr/ (all In- seizure/07_midyr_seizures.ctt/07_midyr_seizures.pdf ternet available materials as visited Jan. *19 file) officials 2007, customs midyear of case (by Clerk Court’s of worth total seizures, 7,245 commodity had executed GAO, Despite Progress, Border $110,198,350); Security: at Our Nation’s Exist in Traveler Inspections Weaknesses 2007), Nov. online at (GAO-08-219, http:// Ports of Entry to S. Cus- (“According [U. www.gao.gov/new.items/d08219.pdf CBP (CBP)], year Protection fiscal toms and Border drugs, 644,000 illegal more than pounds officers ... seized items, 1.7 million agricultural intercepted nearly prohibited commercial merchan- million in illegal and seized over $155 (footnote handbags” footwear and dise, such as counterfeit omitted)). contexts, however, may
In other the word “detention” of the Government not describe the nature may accurately A to deliver property action. decision voluntary prisoner’s bears a greater for transfer to another facility, example, property to a “bailment” —the similarity delivery personal Heri- see American trust, after held being prison to a “detention.” supra, at 134—than tage Dictionary, Bureau the Federal federal statute mentions Not single On (BOP) in detention. of Prisons the context property of the nine federal statutes hand, the other the majority 2680(c) than a reference to detention § containing cus merchandise, are specific or other goods, property 1499(a) (authorizing toms and 19 U. S. C. Compare excise. merchan imported customs examine and detain agents to detain §1595a(c)(3) officials to customs dise); (authorizing § 5311 26 U. S. C. law); contrary merchandise introduced containers officers to detain internal revenue (authorizing rea there is wines, or beer where distilled containing spirits, been paid); taxes have son believe applicable § 2411(a)(2)(A) customs officials (authorizing C. U. S. App. in the enforcement of entry and detain seize goods ports (authorizing §464 22 U. C. defense); of war and national property armed vessels to detain agents 981(e) (“ found thereon), with 18 U. C.S. . .. The Attorney General, the or the Postal Secretary Treasury, Service, as the be, case shall may ensure the transfer equitable pursu- (2) ant to paragraph forfeited to the appro- priate State or local law enforcement .... agency *20 United States shall not be of liable action out any arising the seizure, and detention, transfer of seized to property (2000 State or officials”); 524(c)(1) local 28 § U. S. C. ed. and V) Supp. for of (appropriating fund special purpose property detention under law enforced or administered by the Justice); 9703(a)(1)(A) (es- of 31 Department U. S. C. tablishing a of Department Treasury Forfeiture Fund to pay expenses detention); §§ 16 1540(e)(3), U. S. C. 3375(b) the detention (authorizing of goods packages and for inspection where there is reason to believe there has been violation of fish, laws governing wildlife, and plants).
This would seem to indicate that Congress contemplated that the statutory here provision considered would apply only those narrow circumstances where the officer is in the regular business of revenue forfeiting property, namely, enforcement. At the least, it demonstrates that very “de- tention” will be a difficult case case apply concept under the of the majority’s statute —a interpretation prob- lem alleviated the statute to customs tax. by limiting Second, the Court’s construction other phrase “any “ law enforcement officer” runs to ‘our “to contrary duty give if effect, clause of a statute.”’” possible, every and word Walker, Duncan v. United (2001) 167, 533 U. S. (quoting Menasche, States (1955)). U. 538-539 Court’s or excise” mere renders of customs reading “officer[s] as there have no need surplusage, Congress would been and officers ex- have customs specified if cise were immune were subsumed within they indeed See Circuit officer clause. allegedly all-encompassing “any” City Stores, S., U. 114. though law en- reference to the final
Third, legisla- ambiguity, the in some officer” does result forcement history, by to customs its exclusive reference tive virtue of attention shift its did not excise, confirms that these when it used enforcement from the context of revenue g., Rep. No. See, e. S. of the statute. words at end (in (1946) discussing Cong., 28 U. C.S. Sess., 33 79th 2d 2680(c) goods referring “the detention officers”); Report Proposed Tort on Federal Holtzoff, A. (1931)(noting property-detention ex- Claims Bill immunity legislation ception to “include was to the added liability respect the deten- connection with from of loss in goods of customs tion of or merchandise officer excise”). exception to de- reads the
Indeed, Court’s construction interpretative purpose dan- statute, an feat the central against explicit ger terms. See has warned the Court *21 (the identify only must 854, 465 U. at n. Court Kosak, S., “ and words rea- are within the ‘those circumstances which (quoting exception’ and no more” of the less son —no (1953))). It is dif- 15, States, 346 U. S. Dalehite United which enacted Con- FTCA, ficult conceive that the was gress liability “the the tort United States to make person private circumstaneefs],” under like same that of a as Rep. officer under at would allow No. being property accountable without circumstance to detain injured by his or her tortious conduct. Act those under the say law that all enforcement If wanted including liability may property when tort, without detain they general have perform tasks, would law enforcement expect express least one would terms; in more done so the customs officers outside enforcement reference law legis- or in the the statute the text of excise context either in history. the Court reference, lative In absence person who owns ought presume the liberties disregarded. lightly property dismissed would be so II A require contrary The 2000amendments do not conclusion. (CAFRA), The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 §2680(c)’s applicable operation exception. here, limits the (i. § 3(a), See e., Stat. 211. The limitation exception) applies injury to the where there an has been goods property purpose loss of and “the was seized for the any provision forfeiture under of Federal law.” 28 U. S. C. 2680(c)(1). my In view the that of amendment establishes ficers of customs and excise, and law enforcement officials performing traditionally functions for revenue offi reserved damage shall cers, be liable in tort for to the when goods the owner’s interest in the end is not forfeited (and apply). regard when other conditions is so And this less of whether the officer acted under the revenue laws of alternatively, or, United States criminal another civil or provision. forfeiture majority’s contrary reading proposi- for a CAFRA premised assumption
tion is on the circum- that there is no stance which a act- officer, customs or excise or an officer ing capacity, [civil] in such a would “enforce forfeiture laws unrelated to But Ante, customs or excise.” at 222. cus- along officials, toms and tax with law enforcement officers performing routinely just duties, customs and tax do that. g., e. See, Protection, Customs and Border Seizures http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/legal/ Penalties Links, (CBP authority_enforce/seizures_penalties.xml “full au- has *22 thority or to of CBP laws ... seize merchandise for violation CBP”). by agencies those of that are enforced other federal expressly contemplate forfeitures Indeed, the customs laws provisions. See, nonrevenue and seizures of under (“The § g., procedures [governing seizures e. 19 U. S. C. 1600 apply 1602-1619] property] [§§ to seizures forth in shall set by any property law under effected customs officers unless such or the Customs Service enforced administered law different specifies procedures”). effect excise official might a customs or
By way example, under or instruments currency monetary a civil forfeiture of 5317(c) (2000 ed., Act, Supp. § Bank 31 U. S. C. Secrecy music recordings, V); instruments, illegal or of counterfeit seq. et § S. C. 80302 Act, firearms under the U. Contraband IV). (2000 DEA agent assisting and Similarly, ed. Supp. (and in a thus acting a customs official in a border search forfeiture of vehicles customs effect a civil might capacity) under drug with the trade federal associated goods drug (2000 also, § and see Supp. V); ed. laws. See U. S. C. g., Motors, e. Formula One at 822-823. 2d, Though 777 F. law that a civil forfeiture is specific acting pursuant DEA would be covered taxes, to customs agent and 2680(c)’s he would § to the because or she exception in a of conduct be traditional revenue acting capacity - that cross a routine effects of persons search and ing persons an boundary. international ing C. Act, that the Bank 31 U. S. Secrecy
The Court counters or excise” because 5317(c), § is not “unrelated customs and for exporting importing cross-references requirement ante, But § n. 5. instruments, 5316. monetary See is duties, customs part § despite being “[r]elated” the federal Transactions Reporting Currency Foreign seq. (2000 et IV), § 5311 ed. not the United Act, see and Supp. customs laws. States’ have the author- notes that customs agents Court also laws, under the customs particularly seize contraband
ity 1595a(c)(l). I not dispute 19 U. S. C. do laws when seizing property. often act under customs agents it was Court, unrefuted which My point, goes that customs to have reasonable for Congress specified ex- to the the exception excise officers be covered by would more gen- to federal laws even acting pursuant when ception 1595a(c)(l) “[m]er- where instance, applies For erally. *23 contrary chandise... is introduced... into the United States appears target importation property law,” to which the subject duty entry or restrictions. Title 28 C. U. S. §2680(c),by encompass contrast, was amended 2000to not “goods the detention of but merchandise” the deten § 3(a), “property.” tion of all 114 Stat. 211. In circum involving imported stances not “merchandise,” then, the cus acting pursuant toms official would be to law enforcement authority derived not but, alia, from customs laws inter Secrecy the Contraband and Bank Acts. The same is true acting capacity. noncustoms officers in a customs very At the least this renders the Court’s reliance on the subsequent Congress suspect. views of a We have said “subsequent shape meaning acts can focus” of a stat Corp., FDA ute. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 529 S.U. (2000). 120, 143 There is no indication, however, that adding exception, Congress forfeiture to the scope immunity. intended original to broaden the Capital Cf. SEC v. Inc., Gains Bureau, Research S.U. (1963). 180, 199-200
B Though rely point, perhaps the Court does much on the respecting it has concerns suits like the one now us. before Petitioner sues for lost valued at about Law $177. system prison enforcement officers in the federal must take inventory property they just store, under and with persons prison population, 200,000 see federal Federal Weekly Report, Population Bureau of Prisons, online (reporting http://www.bop.gov/news/weekly_report.jsp 2008), January on 199,342 federal inmates as of burden missing of little value Government account for items be could a substantial one. rejecting though,
There are this con- reasons, sound already interpreting begin with, cern To the statute. congressional objective give if a com- discussed, it were a prehensive exception property, to all officers who detain provision likely specific *24 Congress written a have most would special point, quite apart concerns it from the to the address exception the Court as revenue. had with only detentions, interprets to not not trivial it extends now custody, only but prison to in not those officials, by property all law held value all of whatever detentions comport reading simply that does officials,a enforcement plain the statute. text and context with interpreting another when the Court observed Second, as frivolous of numerous concern that raised the liability negligent a risk shared transmission “is claims, management by [involved facili- of detention in business including Dolan, S.,U. 491. Government. ties],” proce- already place there are administrative Third, allowed, di- before the suit is that must be exhausted dures minishing suits would be heard number frivolous (“No 1997e(a) § action shall court. See 42 U. S. C. federal respect prison brought under section conditions be with by prisoner law, Federal title, 1983 of this facility any jail, prison, or other correctional confined in are ex- as are available administrative remedies until such hausted”). 543.31(a) (2007), “owner of Under CFR damaged property” claim an FTCA or lost first must file regional authorized BOP, turn, with the office; BOP not more than claims for statute to settle administrative 3723(a), encompasses likely which see 31 U. S. $1,000, C. pris- Only brought prisoners. if the most claims federal may agency he action” the final oner is “dissatisfied with “appropriate Court.” in an U. S. District she file suit § 543.32(g). CFR immunity give sweeping to all Congress
If had intended to liability for the deten- from law enforcement officials federal dropped onto property, this not have tion of would appear some- statutory there clause so as the end of the an afterthought. of- thing The seizure of of an liberty fleer people raises serious concerns for the of our permit the Act appropriation prop- should not be read to erty remedy by language without a in tort so obscure and indirect. my judgment
For these reasons, view, of the Court Appeals ought to be reversed. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joins, dissenting. Kennedy agree with Justice
I that context makes clear phrase “any intended the other law enforce- apply only carrying ment officer” to to officers out customs *25 2680(c). sep- or excise 28 duties. See U. C. But I S. write Kennedy’s arately emphasize, to as Justice dissent itself beyond clear, makes that the relevant context-extends well purely Latin canons and other such textual devices. many questions statutory interpretation, As with the meaning dictionary issue here is not the of the words. The meaning of each is well Rather, word known. the issue is scope. Congress the statute’s What boundaries did intend to set? To what circumstances did intend the phrase, statutory provision, apply? in as used to this majority question referring answers this to an amend- ment that creates an for certain forfeitures and emphasizing statutory “any.” the to word As the amend- Kennedy’s counterargument I ment, find Justice convinc- ing. my opinion). (dissenting See ante, And, 239-241 “any” help provides view, the word no whatsoever. (includ- “any” speakers help The word all is of no because ing legislators) general writers such as who use words “any,” normally rely upon “all,” “never,” and context “none” they place to indicate the limits of time and within which linguistic intend And with those words to do their work. possible exception truth, the assertion of a universal the say, theologian, philosopher, or mathematician, scientist, a my always wife, I out such limits call almost exist.' When 244 any “There isn’t butter,” mean, I do not
“There isn’t am her I makes clear to town.” The context butter That is our refrigerator. contents of about the talking boundaries that sets the dictionary, context, say, as words such within which time, and circumstance place, Palmer, United States v. Wheat. will See “any” apply. J.) (“[G]eneral as words,” such (1818) (Marshall, 610, 631 C. “ “to in their application must “be limited” ‘any’,” the word intended apply the legislature those which objects States, (2005) them”); Small v. United 385, 544 U. S. the (“The answer” ques- alone cannot ‘any’ word considered ‘convicted reference statutory tion “whether foreign court”); entered in court’ includes a conviction Municipal League, Missouri Nixon v. 541 U. S. ” (2004) (“ upon depending means “different ‘[A]ny’ things Alvarez-Sanchez, setting”); United States U. (1994) weight in placing errs dispositive (“[Respondent law enforce- to ‘any’ on the broad reference statutory rest of considering ment officer without agency statute”). sur course, immediately includes words
Context, ejus canons such And question. rounding generis sociis offer dem noscitur a in evaluating help Yet that help words. of those significance surrounding *26 can features other contextual is limited. That is because more broadly intended a Congress phrase apply show sug themselves than the words immediately surrounding City Adams, 532 U. S. Stores, Inc. 105, Circuit See gest. rea (2001) (Souter, (finding “good J., dissenting) 138-140 ejusdem generis his statute’s because sons” not to apply other class that the words make clear tory and purposes or “seamen, employees, railroad in the of workers” phrase transpor refer, not just other class of workers” any retail including kinds of all workers, tation but to workers not are clerks). construction of It because canons store is some maxim ... countered “conclusive” and “are often pointing (majority opin- in a different Id., direction.” at 115 ion). particular crys- simply And it because these canons English speakers namely, already tallize what know, (but always) together group lists often items with similar why characteristics. cannot, That is we without ef- comic yoke radically g., single fect, different nouns to a verb, e. “He caught salmon, three trout, two and a cold.” only immediately surrounding
In this case, not words every supports but also other contextual feature Justice conclusion. textual context Kennedy’s includes provision location of the a within that otherwise ex- clusively concerns customs duties. And and revenue nontextual context includes several taken that, features together, indicate that intended a narrow tort- liability exception related to customs and excise. drafting history portion
First, shows that the relevant of the bill that became the Federal Tort Act Claims concerned only Initially, provision customs excise. the relevant of exempted only “arising respect the bill claims of the as- any duty.” sessment or collection tax or customs See, (1930). e.g., Cong., Sess., 71st 2d In 1931, Special Attorney General, Assistant to the Alexander namely, language, Holtzoff,wrote additional “or the de- draft goods any by any tention merchandise officer customs or excise or Bill Draft, other law enforcement officer.” p. reprinted Report Proposed on Federal Tort Claims (1931) added). p. (emphasis report Bill in a Holtzoff, congressional agency, expanded language that the said sought immunity liability respect “to include from loss goods in connection with the detention of or merchandise by Id., at 16. Holtzoff officer customs excise.” explained language suggested a similar Brit- that the was ish bill and excise officials. that mentioned Ibid, (referring proposed Proceed- bill Crown (Cmd. 1927) § ll(5)(c), ings pp. (Apr. Report 17-18 Committee 2842) (“No proceedings lie under this section ... shall *27 246 or damage
or in of the loss of or deterioration respect of, release any goods occasioned the to, delay omitted to be done or merchandise reason anything such”)); acting excise as done officer of customs and by any States, (1984) see Kosak v. United 857, 13 848, 465 U. S. n. (While should report] “the ideas Holtzoff’s expressed [in the intent of the be given determining Legis- great weight “it us circumstances, seems to sense- lature,” at least some drafts- less the views of [the to ignore entirely provision’s] man”). referred And Members Congress repeatedly customs and claims involving exception encompassing g., e. H. 2428, R. No. 76th See, Cong., excise functions. Rep. Sess., 2d (1940); 1196, Cong., 3d 5 No. 77th Sess., Rep. S. (1942); Sess., H. 77th 2d (1942); 2245, Cong., R. No. Rep. (1945); H. 1287, Sess., Rep. R. No. 79th 1st Rep. Cong., (1946). 1400, Sess., No. 79th 2d Cong., Act’s ex Second, through insofar as Congress sought, tort suits the Government ceptions, against to preclude Kosak, available,” already where were remedies “adequate supra, 33; at at H. R. No. 858; Rep. see S. No. Rep. makes exception at forth that a limited purpose), (setting already statutes sense; a broad does not. Other federal officers harmed recovery provided plaintiffs harmed and tax laws but not for plaintiffs enforcing other laws. See all other federal most enforcing officers Bazuaye 1996) States, (CADC United 482, 485-486 83 F. 3d (detailing history). a limited and
Third, difference between practical considerable, magnifying impor- broad interpretation to which Justice silence congressional tance Ken- ante, nedy interpretation at A limited see 238. points, likely would law officer” enforcement working, say, law enforcement those encompass only excise laws. customs and to enforce borders and helping to include this provision instead majority interprets tasks. unrelated of thousands of officers performing tens *28 Department The Justice that there more than estimates are including 100,000law enforcement officers, not members of g., Dept, See, armed e. of Justice, services. Bureau of Justice Bulletin, Statistics Reaves, B. Federal Law Enforce- 2006). p. (July although ment Officers,2004, 1 And the law’s history provision’s scope contains much indicates the nothing sug- limited to customs it excise, and contains all gesting apply provision broadly, an intent to in- more multiply applies deed, to the number of officers to whom likely magnitude. what is one or more orders of It is ejusdem generis thus not the Latin canons, noscitur a and light application statutory sociis, that shed on the pertinent easily but Justice Scalia’s more re- English-language membered observation that elephants “does not . . . hide in mouseholes.” Whitman v. (2001). Trucking American Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. join For these I reasons, I dissent Ken- Justice nedy’s dissent.