History
  • No items yet
midpage
Summerville v. City of Forest Park
128 Ohio St. 3d 221
Ohio
2010
Check Treatment

*1 City Aрpellants. Summerville, Appellee, al., Admr., Park et of Forest Park, v. Forest as Summerville [Cite 221, 2010-Ohio-6280.]

Ohio St.3d (No. 2010.) 2009-2106 Submitted October 2010 Decided December O’Connor, J. In appeal, reconcile with we of a summary judgment

determine whether the denial motion for which employee immunity subdivision or its sought qualified federal final, brought claims under Title is a appealable Section U.S.Code order. governs political-subdivision immunity. Pursuant orders denying employees immunity subdivision final, under of law any provision appealable orders. R.C.

2744.01(D)defines “law” to laws. the term include fedеral R.C. 2744.09 exceptions applicability sets forth 2744. Pursuant to civil claims chapter upon based alleged violations federal constitution or statutes. conflict as the specifical- inasmuch former

{¶ law, ly under applies allowed federal the latter precludes application while to civil actions on premised statute, violations of law. As the more recent and more that an prevails over R.C. we hold in which an of a summary judgment order motion for employee from claims sought subdivision is a Title U.S.Code *2 Background

Relevant аppellant for police and Hall are officers Pape Corey Adam Appellants Park, 15, 2005, and Pape Officers Hall city September On of Forest Ohio. Summerville, call Leola who telephone appellee, to a 9-1-1 responded husband, Summerville, may Roosevelt have committed suicide. reported that her in times with multiple Mr. stab himself the chest Pape Officer saw Summerville himself, to stabbing a ordered Mr. stop what looked like knife. He Summerville order, to with the Officer comply Pape and Mr. Summerville refused when Summerville, lungеd did not Mr. who at deployed his taser. The taser subdue Hall shot Mr. simultaneously with the knife. Officers and Pape Pape Officer He died a result of the wounds. gunshot Summerville. 6, 2007, Summerville, in individually capacity Mrs. and her September On estate, Park, Forest complaint against

as administrator of her husband’s filed Hall, Kenneth and causes of Hughes, Pape asserting Police Chief Officers (2) (1) of force under indifference action for excessive use Section deliberate (3) in to medical care under Section deliberate failing provide adequate (4) in trаin failing adequately wrongful indifference to under Section death (6) 2125.01, (5) distress, loss negligent under R.C. infliction of emotional of consortium. Hughes summary judgment and Police Chief moved for on all Appellants immunity were on They argued they

claims. entitled to the state-law claims to 2744. and Hall pursuant Hughes, Pape, they also claimed of qualified immunity1 were entitled for the violations Section relating Forest Park did not claim to Summerville’s Section 1983 1983. who, provides: “Every person any statute, Section Title U.S.Code under color of {¶ a} ordinance, custom, any Territory Columbia, regulation, usage, or of or or the District of subjects, subjected, any person causes to be citizen within or of the United States or other the jurisdiction by deprivation rights, privileges, thereof to the or immunities secured the laws, party injured equity, in an action at Constitution shall be liable suit section, proper proceeding plaintiff for redress.” To establish claim under this must show that (1) (2) question by person acting the committed law and the conduct was color of state plaintiff privileges, deprived rights, conduct or immunities secured the United States Corp. Constitution or other federal law. St. Clair v. Cleveland 550 N.E.2d 456. officers, officials, including discretionary generally police perform Public who functions {¶ b} damages for in a action if shielded civil Section 1983 “clearly rights established or constitutional of which a their conduct violate person Fitzgerald would reasonable have known.” See Harlow v. 457 U.S. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. not did respondeat superior Instead, argued that the doctrine city

claims. for the officers’ conduct. it was liable and therefore apply, on the in favor of judgment appellants granted summary The trial court failing indifference 1983 claim for deliberate claims and the Section state-law summary judgment also granted care. The court adequate medical provide summary trial denied all claims. The court Hughes Chief on favor of Police to Summerville’s Section 1983 respect and Hall with judgment Pape Officers claim deliberate city claim force and to the on for excessive train. failing adequately indifference in on trial court’s denial of Appellants appealed the Appeals. appeal District Court of notice

Section 1983 claims the First related because authority was filed *3 requested The city to Officers and Hall. qualified immunity Pape to the denial of its jurisdiction over claimed appeals pendent appellate that the court of exercise Forest Park’s involving City appeal [were] “the the of errors because issues defendants, the inextricably relating appeal with the of intertwined issues Corey Adam Hall.” Pape and that argued appeal. Summerville moved to dismiss She brought pursuant 2744 did not to claims Section final,

therefore, not summary judgment appeal- trial court’s denial of was a appeals granted able order. The court of Summerville’s motion and dismissed of appeal issuing opinion. accepted discretionary without an We review of which “A trial appellants’ proposition sole states: court’s decision overrul- in a its ing Summary Judgment political a Motion for which subdivision or § 42 employee brought from claims 1983 is sought pursuant U.S.C. is, therefore, an an final denying alleged immunity’ order ‘the benefit of 2744.02(C).”2 Park, appealаble order under R.C. Summerville v. Forest 124 Ohio 1473, 2010-Ohio-354,921 St.3d N.E.2d

Analysis “ it ‘It that an order must be final before can be is well-established final, by an If an is not then an court appellate appellate reviewed court. order ” Xenia, 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, jurisdiction.’ has no 115 Ohio 873 Hubbell v. St.3d ¶ Am. 44 quoting N.E.2d Gen. Acc. Ins. v. Ins. Co. N. Ohio Co. of review, appellants proposition accepted now ask In addition to the of law that this court us adopt pendent-appellate-jurisdiction appeals against claims doctrine to allow immediate of they closely immunity. municipal qualified intertwined with the сlaims of defendants when entirety, Having appeal in dismissed the its the court of did reach merits Furthermore, pendent-jurisdiction argument. appellants appellants’ not raise this issue as did jurisdiction. support appellants’ proposition in their We decline invitation law memorandum application appeal. this to consider the doctrine in not a summary judgment generally is 540 N.E.2d 266. The denial St.3d Id., final, Overmeyer ex rel. Walinski appealable citing order. However, appellants argue 222 N.E.2d 312. 37 O.O.2d

Ohio St.2d 2744.02(C), summary judgment the denial of a motion for to R.C. рursuant employee sought subdivision or its political which and, final, appealable 1983 is a order there

from claims fore, an rule. exception 2744.02(C), order that denies ‍‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍a subdivision or political Under R.C. “[a]n an alleged immunity

an of a subdivision the benefit of employee of the law is a final provided order.” Hubbell, 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, In at N.E.2d to R.C. “when a subdivision or its

we held an employee immunity, seeks an order denies the benefit of case, In immunity is a order.” we reversed the dismissal of immunity. an from the denial of on a claim of state-law expanded upon Twp., We Hubbell Sullivan v. Anderson * * * 83, 2009-Ohio-1971, 88, stating: St.3d “R.C. makes final an alleged immunity subdivision the benefit of an * * * Therefore, liability. certify there is no reason for a trial court to 54(B) that just delay.’ under Civ.R. ‘there is no cause for When the denial of concerned, immunity is trial court political-subdivision has no discretion to separate determine whether to claims or parties permit interlocutory *4 ¶ ¶ 12, appeal.” citing Id. at Hubbell at 27. Although immunity, Hubbell and Sullivan involved state-law R.C.

{¶ 15} 2744.02(C) to the denial of the of an expressly applies alleged immunity benefit 2744.01(D) provided any of law. R.C. defines the term “law” for provision purposеs Chapter provides 2744 and that “law” means of “any provision constitution, statutes, or rules of the United or of this state.” States 2744.01(D) 2744.02(C) terms of express render the denial of afforded under or law a state order. However, 2744 does not pursuant Chapter

{¶ 16} “[cjivil of or upon alleged claims based violations the constitution States, except provisions statutes of the United that the of section 2744.07 of the civil Revised Code shall such claims related actions.” This case action, allegations question involves a civil and the are based federal law- upon Hall Pape qualified immunity. Section 1983. And Officers claim federal 2744.09(E) renders R.C. Appellee argues inappli- because R.C. 2744.02(C) laws, cable to civil actions based on violations of federal motion for appellants’ and the trial court’s denial of apply, does final, appealable is not a order. 2744.09(E) construe the statutes to determine whether R.C. We must {¶ 17} 2744.02(C) that it not. to this case. We hold does inapplicable renders R.C.

Statutory Interpretation of the statute itself to plain language “We must first look to the Hubbеll, 2007-Ohio-4839, 77, legislative determine the intent.” 115 Ohio St.3d ¶ 878, 11, (1997), ex rel. Burrows v. Indus. Comm. citing 873 N.E.2d 78, 81, as it is written when its Ohio St.3d 676 N.E.2d 519. “We statute Id., Portage Cty. and definite.” Bd. Commrs. meaning unambiguous citing Akron, 106, 2006-Ohio-954, 478, 52; v. 109 Ohio St.3d 846 N.E.2d see also State (1996), ex rel. v. Local Dist. Bd. Edn. 74 Ohio Buckeye Savarese School St.3d 543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463. “However, subject where a statute is found to be to various interpreta

tions, a upon interpret may court called its invoke rules of legislative construction order to arrive at intent.” Bur. Motor Cline Ohio (1991), Vehicles 61 Ohio St.3d 573 N.E.2d Meeks v. citing Papadopulos 16 O.O.3d 404 N.E.2d 159. “The rule primary in statutory legislature’s construction is to effect to the intention.” Id. at 203, O.O.184, citing 573 N.E.2d Carter v. 146 Ohio St. Youngstown one of the paragraph syllabus. and R.C. Conflict parties argue statutory provisions this case are clear and However, unambiguous. each a conflicting interpretation side sets forth of the statutes. Appellants argue clearly allows an immediate any provision from the denial of They federal laws. that if had argue Assembly the General intended

that R.C. apply only immunity pursuant denial it would not have “or added the the law” to that section. Conversely, appellee argues plainly forbids thе *5 2744.09(C),

application Chapter including R.C. to civil claims and, therefore, brought pursuant to federal law the denial of federal final, immunity appealable clarity is not a order. contends that the Appellee fact that across statutory appellate scheme is evidenced courts uniformly have refused to R.C. 2744 to federal causes of action 22549, 2009-Ohio-52, Dayton, Montgomery App. under Section 1983. W.P. v. No. ¶ 50150, 12; MA Youngstown, Mahoning App. v. No. 06 Campbell 2009 WL ¶ 4696963, 15; Soc., 2007-Ohio-7219, Cty. v. Humane 2007 WL and Patton Wood ¶ 670, 2003-Ohio-5200, correctly 798 N.E.2d App.3d Appellee 154 Ohio 2744.09(E), ‍‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍that the courts of in these cases pursuant appeals *6 1.12,1.51, in statutory the rules of construction contained R.C. “Utilizing 1.52, statute, general than a preexisting enacted later time statute, will control where a conflict between the two arises.” Davis v. State Personnel Bd. Rev. 64 Ohio St.2d 18 O.O.3d 1.51, special Pursuant to R.C. conflicts with a general provision “[i]f construed, if provision, they possible, given local shall be so that effect is to both. irreconcilable, If the conflict or local special between the the as an to provision prevails exception general prоvision, general the unless the provision adoption is the later and the manifest intent is that 1.52(A) provision prevail.” R.C. “If statutes enacted at the same or provides: irreconcilable, legislature different sessions of the the statute latest in date of prevails.” enactment already We have determined that a conflict exists between R.C.

{¶28} 2744.02(C) 1.51 to requires initially, attempt we statutes, reconcile the if possible, effect to both. In re Petition to Annex 320 Acres to S. Lebanon 597 N.E.2d 463. Appellants attempt to reconcile the statutes that R.C. аrguing only means that the immunities set forth in do apply federal claims and that the section does not dictates procedural set forth in the chapter, including final-and-appealable-order provision con- tained in Appellants’ argument the clear ignores (with language that states that the entire 2744.073) exception of R.C. does not to civil actions based on violations of federal law. Appellee attempts provisions by explaining to harmonize the

although generally will render orders denying alleged immunity subdivisions and their employees immediately appealable, provi- sion Assembly to the class of cases that the General excluded from the dictates of language virtue of the R.C. 2744.09. Appellee interpretation meaningless contends such would not render “any provision of the law” because “federal claims are far from the only potential liability source for By way subdivisions.” of example, appellee (providing cites R.C. 2305.34 immunity from certain tort for liability water-supply operators) and R.C. 2305.39 (providing immunity damages by persons responding to оil discharges). Appellee’s attempt Appellee’s reconcile the statutes fails. inter- duty indemnify employees 3. R.C. 2744.07 relates to the to defend and and is subdivisions present appeal. not at issue in the to claims application would preclude of the statutes pretation fact that R.C. ignores This interpretation under federal law. of law and available expressly applies 2744.01(D) to include federal law. defines the term “law” *7 2744.02(C) 2744.01(D), forth in R.C. R.C. virtue of the definition set By time, federal law. At the same to the denial of under expressly aрplies 2744.02(C) 2744.09(E) R.C. application chapter (including forbids the R.C. 2744.01(D)) cannot on federal law. These statutes be to civil actions based we must applied so as to effect both. reconciled analysis under R.C. 1.51 and 1.52. continue with set forth in R.C. 1.51 and statutory the rules of construction Applying can

1.52, general that a statute will unless the statute be specific prevail we note adoption shown to the later of the two and the manifest intent General be Annex, In re Petition to 64 Assembly general provision was to have the control. 594,

Ohio St.3d at 597 N.E.2d 463. 2744.02(C) and the more spеcific is both more recent 2744.02(C) 106, was enacted in 2003.4 No. 149 provision. R.C. Am.Sub.S.B. Ohio Laws, II, earlier, Part 3500. was enacted almost two decades 176, Laws, I, Further, 141 1985. No. Ohio Part 1699. Am.Sub.H.B. that the not civil action generally apply any states does 2744.02(C) contrast, law; alleged by specifical-

based on violations of federal that an an ly provides denying employee subdivision the an alleged immunity any provision (including benefit of of law 2744.01(D)) final, appealable federal law virtue of R.C. order. Pursuant to 1.52, statute, R.C. 1.51 and as the more recent and a trial prevails. Accordingly, court’s decision motion judgment in which an of a subdivision immuni- employee sought qualified ty brought pursuant from claims to Section 1983 is a order under Expressio The Maxim Unius Est Exclusio Alterius Does Not Apply Appellee argues expressio that under the maxim unius est exclusio alterius, a specifies exception general statute one rule is assumed to (1997), 221, exclude all other Thomas v. Freeman exceptions. See legislature attempted 4. The to amend R.C. to include the relevant 1997. 350, Laws, II, (2001), No. 146 Part v. Ackman 91 Am.Sub.H.B. Ohio 3867. See Stevens Ohio St.3d 182, 190-191, However, 743 N.E.2d 901. this court hеld that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350 violated the one- 15(D), subject provision II of Section Article of the Ohio Constitution and declared the bill (1999), Academy Lawyers in toto. rel Trial v. unconstitutional State ex Sheward Ohio 451, 1062, syllabus. paragraph legislature St.3d 715 N.E.2d three of the The amended R.C. again April in 2002 Am.Sub.S.B. No. which became effective 2003. that because maxim, argues appellee

224-225, Applying apply 2744 does not rule that R.C. exception 2744.09lists one law—that violations of federal upon civil claims based to list failure Assembly’s claims—the General to such 2744.07 exceptions thаt no other its intent illustrates exceptions disagree. We prohibition. alterius does exclusio unius est expressio canon “[T]he expressed when the items only it has force or statutory listing grouping; every that items series,’ justifying the inference group members of ‘associated Barnhart choice, not inadvertence.” deliberate were excluded not mentioned L.Ed.2d (2003), 123 S.Ct. 537 U.S. Coal Co. Peabody 152 L.Ed.2d 122 S.Ct. 535 U.S. v. Vonn United States citing U.S.A., Inc. v. in Chevron explained Court Supreme States United 73, 81, 122 L.Ed.2d 82: 536 U.S. S.Ct. Echazabal missing, so is exclusiveness is suggesting statutory language “Just demonstration, exprеssion-exclusion of an extrastatutory ingredient that essential *8 The negative implication. bespeaks an omission of terms from which the series that should things or more terms or a series of two identifying canon on depends hand, supporting in circumstances abridged hand in which is go understood to be excluded.” have been meant be that term left out must a sensible inference including one by appellee’s argument persuaded We are not 2744.09(E), intended to legislature exception to the broad of not contain a series does exсeptions. all other preclude must that terms left out Assembly’s intent that illustrates the General exceptions Further, enacted almost was intentionally excluded. have been specifically did not exclude legislature The two decades after R.C. did provision because the prohibition from the not exist. yet

Legislative Policy Considerations considerations. legislative policy is consistent with holding Our 2744, stating protections “the Chapter enacted R.C. Assembly General subdivisions employees political subdivisions and of political affordеd to of orderly operation in order to ensure the continued urgently act are needed governments provide of local ability and the continued governments local No. health, to their residents.” Am.Sub.H.B. safety services public peace, Hubbell, 1,1733. 115 Ohio St.3d Laws, Part noted 141 We “ statutory purpose 2007-Ohio-4839, manifest 873 N.E.2d ‘[t]he subdivi integrity political of the fiscal 2744 is the Chapter preservation ” (1994), ¶ Human Cty. Dept. Servs. at Wilson Stark quoting sions.’ Id. 70 Ohio St.3d judicial We also note that economy by plain is better served reading of “ ‘[Djetermination at Id. whether a subdivision

is immune from liаbility usually pivotal to the ultimate outcome of a lawsuit.

Early resolution of the issue of a political whether subdivision is immune from liability pursuant to R.C. is beneficial to both of If parties.

appellate court holds that immune, subdivision is can litigation end, come to an early with the same outcome that otherwise would have been trial, only reached resulting after in a savings parties to all attorney costs and fees. if Alternatively, the appellate court holds that immunity does not apply, that early will finding encourage the politicаl subdivision to promptly settle with the victim than pursue rather a lengthy trial and appeals. scenario, Under either plaintiff both the and the may time, effort, subdivision save the ” expense of a trial sic.) and appeal, which could take years.’ (Emphasis Id. at ¶ 25, quoting Burger v. Cleveland 188, 199-200, Hts. “ Stratton, N.E.2d 912 (Lundberg J., dissenting). ‘As the Assembly General envisioned, the determination of immunity could be prior made to investing the ” * * time, effort, expense courts, of the attorneys, parties, and witnesses *.’ ¶ 26, at Id. quoting Burger Stratton, J., at 200 (Lundberg dissenting). These policy considerations equally whether thе immunity in

question is based on 2744 or another qualified Indeed, immunity. applied courts have a similar ration- ale holding orders denying public official the benefit of See, are final and appealable. e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth 472 U.S. 511, 525-530, 105 S.Ct. Qualified ‍‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍L.Ed.2d 411. immunity “is an * * * iwinunity suit rather than a mere defense to liability; it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted sic.) to go to trial.” (Emphasis Id. at 526. Qualified immunity provides immunity only from liability but from the *9 “ “consequences” suit, of a including ‘the costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial —distraction of officials from governmental duties, their inhibi- ” tion of disсretionary action, and deterrence of people able from public service.’ Id., quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 102 S.Ct.

L.Ed.2d 396. Failure to effect to the language of barring immediate appeal denials of qualified immunity for alleged violations of Section 1983would defeat the purpose for which the immunity exists.

Conclusion 2744.02(C), Pursuant to an {¶ order that an 41} denies employee of a political subdivision immunity from liability any provision of law a is final order. Although this section conflicts with R.C.

prevails as the more recent and statute. an order denying motion for summary judgment in which a political subdivision or employee its 1983 is brought from claims under Section qualified immunity

sought to R.C. Accord- dismissing appeal. erred in the officers’ appeals The court the cause to the court of we reinstate the and remand ingly, opinion. consistent with this proceedings further reversed,

Judgment and cause remanded. Lundberg Stratton, O’Donnell, Cupp, JJ., concur.

Brown, C.J., JJ., Lanzinger, Pfeifer dissent.

Brown, C.J., dissenting. in majority holds that the denial of Today

{¶ 43} in court that than all disposes Section Title U.S.Code action state of less against immediately govern- claims all Because the statute parties appealable. of an order subdivision or its

ing appealability employee to civil liability upon benefit does claims based statutes, I respectfully violations dissent. 2744.02(C)provides: {¶ 44} “An order that denies a or an of a employee subdivision

{¶ 45} alleged immunity provided subdivision the benefit of any other of the law is a final order.” chapter provision law,” Appellants phrase, any provision claim that the “or other of the law, applies

means the statute to actions under federal 1983 actiоns in courts. bolster their with the Appellants argument Section 2744.01(D), definition of “laws” in R.C. which provides: “ constitution, statutes, ‘Law5 any provision means of the or rules of the * *

United States or of this state Thus, according appellants, phrase “or laws, expressly law” R.C. includes federal such as 2744.01(D). operation of the definition of “law” R.C. However, R.C. prohibits application any statute including to a cause of action under federal

such as the federal causes of action at issue here. R.C.

provides: to, to, the following: “This and shall not be construed to

{¶ 51} “ *** “(E) violations of the constitution or upon alleged Civil claims based

{¶ 52} States, 2744.07 of of the United that the of section the except statutes shall to such claims or related civil actions.” Revised Code 2744.09, Thus, express under the terms of R.C. the to claims under federal law. statutes, I recognize that there is tension between these two but unlike I A majority, do not find these two statutes irreconcilable. reasonable construction, a harmonizing construction of these two statutes would be under immunity may which an order be under appealed immediately 2744 or except provisions expressly those from the еxempted chapter by procedural

and its dictates do not to civil claims based upon alleged reasonable, violations of federal constitutional or law. This reading statutes, majority’s harmonizes both and avoids the resort to a of statutory rule construction that renders the meaningless. Accordingly, we should apply ordinary regarding appeal- rules

able orders to this For an appealable, satisfy case. order to be it must both R.C. rules, 2505.02 and Civ.R. 54. applies Under court of first 2505.02(B)(1) ‍‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍to determine whether the order right “affects substantial whether it in effect an prevents determines action and a judgment.” Wisintainer v. Elcen Power Strut Co. 617 N.E.2d 1136. If the 2505.02, trial court order is determined to be “final” under court appeals looks for certifying language from the trial court as required by Civ.R.

54(B) that “there is no just delay.” reason for Id. The trial court’s use of Civ.R.

54(B) certification ais matter of discretion. Id. order this case is not a final order under 2505.02 and Civ.R. Thus, because it is lacking required by certification Civ.R. 54. it fails to

meet procedural analysis. criteria of the final order And the qualify order fails substance as а final order under R.C. determined,

2505.02 as well. As a number of of appeals already courts have denying qualified immunity on a Section 1983 motion for order, judgment is not a final it “merely postpones because the final disposition both the claim and the until trial.” Martynyszyn merits case Budd, 03-MA-250, 2004-Ohio-4824, 17; 7th Dist. No. 2004 WL Emp. 1290; Civ. Serv. Assn. v. Moritz 39 Ohio App.3d 24, 2000), v. Tracy, (Aug. Thus, Shane 8th Dist. No. 2000 WL 1222016. 2505.02(B)(1), the order is not final under R.C. because it does not “determine} ] the action and prevent} judgment.” ]

Conclusion 2744.02(C) and reasons, I would construe foregoing For the In my effect to both. harmonize and in a manner that would is limited in R.C. of the law” view, “any рhrase 2744.09(E). I would under R.C. of law those trial court’s order right have no city and its officers hold that the order, affirm the dismissal and I would it was not because appeals. court of this case JJ., opinion. foregoing concur and Lanzinger,

Pfeifer Mezibov, appellee. D. for and Marc Law Offices of Marc Mezibov Barbiere, D. Powers, Jay E. Maundrell, Lawrence Schroeder, Barbiere & Patton, for appellants. K. Co., L.P.A, Byron, L. Rebecca Schal-

Schottenstein, Stephen Dunn Zox & Gotherman, Smith; urging reversal tenbrand, and John Stephen J. Municipal League.

amicus curiae Ohio Dinkiеr, rever- L.L.C., Jamey Pregón, urging T. Lynette Pregón, Dinkier Attorneys. Trial Association of Civil sal for amicus curiae Ohio Appellant. Faraj, Ohio, Appellee, v. The Faraj, [Cite as State v. 2010-Ohio-6333.] 128 Ohio St.3d 2010.) (No. 14, 2010 Decided December 2010-1679 Submitted December is discretionary appeal accepted. The authority affirmed on the of State of the court of 2} 2010-Ohio-6320, 941 N.E.2d 768. Hodge, notes 2744 in actions violations grant immunity alleging refused under R.C. However, that these cases rights brought were Section 1983. with the These cases did not inapposite they grant immunity. because deal 2744.02(C) and for interplаy determining consider between R.C. final, whether the denial of is a order. appealable Moreover, contrary appellee’s argument, Ohio courts of have 2744.02(C) authority to review applied denials relation Cty., App. claims under Section 1983. See Hunt v. Morrow Morrow No. ¶ 13, 2009-Ohio-4313, 2602204, 22-23, (noting 08 CA 2009 WL 53-61 that the trial final, court’s denial of summary judgment pursuant was 2744.02(C) the trial court’s denial of reversing summary judgment based on the claim of appellants’ qualified immunity alleged for violations of Section 1983); Comm., Paul C. v. Harger Cty. Regional Planning Trust Morrow Morrow ¶ 03-CA-19, 2004-Ohio-6643, 2847797, 24, No. App. 2004 WL 29-30 (stating the triаl court’s denial of appellants’ motion for on the pleadings 2744.02(C), was final and appealable pursuant affirming but the denial because under appellants were not entitled to state-law immuni ty claims); Norwood, on appellees’ Section 1983 Chaney App.3d 189 Ohio 124, 2010-Ohio-3434, (concluding the court had jurisdiction over the because to R.C. the denial of motion appellants’ summary judgment was a appealable order and claims, holding appellees’ complaint because the alleged violations of Section аppellants were entitled to state-law 2744.09(E)). However, immunity pursuant to R.C. like the cases cited these courts appellee, expressly did not consider the between interplay 2744.09(E). “It is a statutory ‍‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍well-settled rule of interpretation {¶24} be construed together and the Revised Code be read as an interrelated body of law.” v. Moaning N.E.2d together, When construed conflict. we must statutory interpretation resort to and construe the statutes so as to give effect to the legislature’s intent. Specific The More Recent and Prevails Statute Appellants argue statute, that as the more recent and more prevails over R.C. We agree.

Case Details

Case Name: Summerville v. City of Forest Park
Court Name: Ohio Supreme Court
Date Published: Dec 27, 2010
Citation: 128 Ohio St. 3d 221
Docket Number: 2009-2106
Court Abbreviation: Ohio
Read the detailed case summary
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.