RONELL WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee.
No. 121,815
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
October 9, 2020
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
- The
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a mandatory sentencing scheme that includes a punishment of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a juvenile homicide offender if the sentencing process does not give the sentencing court discretion to consider ajuvenile offender‘s youth and individual attendant characteristics as part of the sentencing process. - The constitutional protections afforded under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), are triggered regardless of whether a sentencing scheme is mandatory or discretionary.
- The constitutional protections afforded under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), are triggered when a juvenile offender convicted of premeditated first-degree murder is subject to a sentence for a term of years that is the functional equivalent to a sentence of life without parole.
- A hard 50 term of years sentence is the functional equivalent to a sentence of life without parole for purposes of applying the constitutional protections afforded juvenile homicide offenders under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012).
- In deciding whether imposition of a hard 50 sentence on a juvenile offender convicted of premediated first-degree murder is constitutionally disproportionate in violation of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution , the sentencing court must consider the offender‘s youth and attendant characteristics, including the child‘s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; J. DEXTER BURDETTE, judge. Opinion filed October 9, 2020. Reversed, sentence vacated in part, and case remanded with directions.
Joseph A. Desch, of Law Office of Joseph A. Desch, of Topeka, for appellant.
Daniel G. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, Mark A. Dupree Sr., district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
STANDRIDGE, J.: Ronell Williams committed a very serious, violent crime when he was 14 years old and, as a result, was convicted of two counts of premeditated first-degree murder arising from the death of two victims. He is serving two concurrent life sentences without the possibility of parole for 50 years (hard 50). Williams will spend at least a half century in jail before he is eligible to be considered for release.
When the sentences originally were imposed, the trial judge did not consider the characteristics and circumstances attendant to Williams’ age. In the past decade, however, the United States Supreme Court sent a clear message in that regard: “children are different” when it comes to sentencing, and “youth and its attendant characteristics” must be considered at the time a juvenile is sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465, 480, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012). The Supreme Court recognized the mitigating qualities of youth and directed that judges in those cases consider a number of factors at sentencing, including immaturity and “failure to appreciate risks and consequences“; “family and home environment“; family and peer pressures; an “inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors” or the juvenile‘s own attorney; and “the possibility of rehabilitation.” Id. at 477-78. The Miller Court ultimately held that that the
Citing Miller and the sentencing court‘s failure to consider the characteristics and circumstances attendant to his age, Williams brings this
court failed to fully consider his diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change before imposing the hard 50 sentence on him. As a result, we reverse and remand the case, with specific directions, for resentencing on the premeditated first-degree murder convictions. We also vacate the part of Williams’ sentence imposing lifetime postrelease supervision.
FACTS
Highly summarized, the essential facts presented at trial to support the underlying criminal charges against Williams are fairly straightforward. On August 3, 1999, Williams and his twin brother, age 14, stole a gun from a residence and walked away from the crime. After proceeding about a block, they saw Wilbur Williams in his front yard on the way to his mailbox. The brothers forced Wilbur back inside his house where they held him and his wife Wilma prisoner while searching the house for items to steal. Williams’ twin brother left the house to drive the victim‘s vehicle around to the front of the house. While his brother was moving the vehicle, Williams shot and killed Wilbur and Wilma. The victims are not related to the brothers.
The district court authorized the State to prosecute Williams as an adult pursuant to
the aggravating circumstances were not outweighed by any existing mitigating circumstances. For each of the two first-degree murder charges, the district court imposed a hard 50 sentence. The court also imposed lifetime postrelease supervision. For the aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary convictions, the district court sentenced Williams to 59 months and 32 months, respectively. The court ordered all four sentences to run concurrently. Our Supreme Court affirmed Williams’ convictions and sentences on March 19, 2004. State v. Williams, 277 Kan. 338, 85 P.3d 697 (2004).
On March 15, 2005, Williams filed his first motion for relief under
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller, 567 U.S. at 489, that the
On September 30, 2016, Williams filed a second pro se
ANALYSIS
Williams claims the district court erred by summarily denying his motion on procedural grounds because he sufficiently established the manifest injustice and exceptional circumstances necessary to justify his untimely and successive filing. Assuming we find in his favor on this procedural claim of error, Williams asks us to find in his favor on the merits of his claims: that his hard 50 sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for a new sentencing hearing with directions for the court to consider his youth and its attendant characteristics as set forth in Miller before imposing a new sentence. Williams also claims the district court erred by imposing lifetime postrelease supervision as part of his sentence for the premeditated first-degree murder convictions. We address each of Williams’ claims in turn.
The district court summarily denied Williams’
constitutes an exceptional circumstance justifying our consideration of a successive motion. Williams also argues that the one-year time limit should be extended by the court to prevent a manifest injustice; specifically, that the untimely nature of his motion should be excused because Miller—the case providing substantive support for the 60-1507 claim that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment—was not decided until 2012 and was not given retroactive effect until the Supreme Court decided Montgomery in 2016.
1. Exceptional circumstances
When a district court summarily denies a
A court is not required to entertain successive motions for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
Applying the legal principles set forth in Beauclair to the facts here, we necessarily conclude that the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Miller and Montgomery are intervening changes in the law under which Williams can now claim an error affecting his constitutional rights and therefore constitute exceptional circumstances justifying our consideration of Williams’ second
2. Manifest injustice
The mandate in Williams’ direct appeal was issued on April 15, 2004. Williams filed his second habeas motion in September 2016, well past the one-year time limit. The one-year time limit “may be extended by the court only to prevent a manifest injustice.”
Williams argues his reason for failing to file a timely motion establishes the required manifest injustice. The following chronology is relevant to Williams’ argument:
- On June 25, 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller, which held that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for offenders who committed homicide crimes as juveniles violates the
Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. - On June 5, 2015, the Kansas Supreme Court applied Miller to a case on direct appeal, holding that mandatory lifetime postrelease supervision for juveniles who have committed and are later convicted of aggravated indecent liberties categorically constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See State v. Dull, 302 Kan. 32, 35, 351 P.3d 641 (2015).
- On January 27, 2016, the United States Supreme Court decided Montgomery, which held that Miller applies retroactively on collateral review of a prisoner‘s sentence.
- On September 30, 2016, Williams filed his second
K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.
From this chronology, we can see that Williams filed his second
(Kansas’ manifest injustice exception to procedural bar based on untimeliness should remain rare and be applied only in the extraordinary case).
In sum, we conclude that the intervening change in the law as set forth in Miller and made retroactive in Montgomery constitutes a manifest injustice and extraordinary circumstances to justify the untimely and successive nature of Williams’ motion under the specific facts presented in this case. Based on our conclusion, we move on to consider the merits of Williams’ substantive claims for relief.
B. The constitutionality of Williams’ hard 50 sentence under the rule in Miller
Williams claims his hard 50 sentence violates the
In 1988, the Supreme Court held that the execution of a person under the age of 16 violated the
In 1989, the Supreme Court again referred to contemporary “standards of decency” but came to a different conclusion in holding that the execution of persons who
were 16 or 17 years old at the time of their offense did not violate the
In 2005, the Supreme Court overruled Stanford and held that the
allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability.” 543 U.S. at 572-73.
In 2010, the Supreme Court extended its reasoning in Roper to overturn the sentence of a juvenile offender sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010). Unlike the holding in Roper, the Graham Court did not conclude that this punishment was unconstitutional for all juvenile offenders. Instead, the Court drew a distinction between juveniles convicted of homicide and those convicted of offenses other than homicide. The Court held that a sentence of life without parole violates the
The Graham Court acknowledged that its cases previously had considered two distinct subsets when adopting categorical rules to define
“With respect to the nature of the offense, the Court has concluded that capital punishment is impermissible for nonhomicide crimes against individuals. In cases turning on the characteristics of the offender, the Court has adopted categorical rules prohibiting the death penalty for defendants who committed their crimes before the age of 18, or whose intellectual functioning is in a low range. [Citations omitted.]” 560 U.S. at 60-61.
The Graham Court began its categorical
characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question. In this inquiry the Court also considers whether the challenged
The Supreme Court then turned to the “penological justifications” for imposing a life without parole sentence on juvenile nonhomicide offenders. 560 U.S. at 71. The Court discussed the four common purposes of sentencing schemes: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 560 U.S. at 71-74. It found retribution was insufficient as justification for a life sentence without parole because “‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender,‘” and that “‘the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.‘” 560 U.S. at 71. Deterrence could not justify the sentence because the characteristics that make juveniles more likely to make bad decisions also make them less likely to consider the possibility of punishment, which is a prerequisite to a deterrent effect. Incapacitation could not support the sentence because of the difficulty in determining whether a juvenile defendant is incorrigible at the time of sentencing—i.e., “‘to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.‘” 560 U.S. at 72-73. Finally, rehabilitation could not justify the sentence
because it denies the prisoner the right to “reenter the community [based on] an irrevocable judgment about that person‘s value and place in society.” 560 U.S. at 74.
After considering the especially harsh nature of a sentence of life without parole for juvenile offenders, the lack of penological justifications for the sentencing practice, and the characteristics of youth outlined in Roper, the Supreme Court considered several potential procedural solutions. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68-79. The Court concluded that a “categorical rule” was needed to “give[] all juvenile nonhomicide offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform,” and held that the
In 2012—two years after Graham—the Supreme Court applied some of the same reasoning to hold that the
At issue in Miller was an
imprisonment without the possibility of parole based on their single murder convictions. In both defendants’ cases, there was only one possible punishment for the murders: a statutorily mandated sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Based on the mandatory and lifetime nature of those sentences, the Court determined that the sentences implicated “two strands of precedent reflecting [its] concern with proportionate punishment.” 567 U.S. at 470.
The Supreme Court began with the first strand of precedent by reaffirming the foundational principle articulated in Roper and Graham: “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing [b]ecause juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 471. The Court concluded that the mandatory nature of the sentencing schemes infringe on the constitutional principles announced in Roper and Graham because the “laws prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law‘s harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 474.
With regard to the second strand of precedent that deals with the lifetime nature of the punishment, the Court stated that Graham‘s treatment of juvenile life without parole sentences as analogous to capital punishment requires individualized sentencing where the judge or jury can assess any mitigating factors—including the mitigating qualities of youth—to ensure that the most severe penalty “is reserved only for the most culpable defendants committing the most serious offenses.” 567 U.S. at 475-76. Relying on the analysis in Graham, the Supreme Court concluded that the flaw with a mandatory life sentence without parole was that it “preclude[s] a sentencer from taking [into] account . . . an offender‘s age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it,” and “disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 476-78.
Dovetailing the two strands of precedent, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the
Most recently, the Supreme Court decided that the holding in Miller “is retroactive to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were final when Miller was decided.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725. The State of Louisiana argued that the rule announced in Miller was procedural in nature and therefore not retroactive to juvenile offenders whose sentences were final when Miller was decided. But the Court disagreed. In its
a juvenile offender‘s youth and attendant characteristics before deciding that life without parole is a proportionate sentence was simply an attendant procedural process that was necessary to implement the underlying substantive rights under the
Having provided the legal framework for our forthcoming analysis, we turn to the merits of Williams’ claim that the mandatory hard 50 life sentence imposed on him as a juvenile constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the legal principles announced in Miller. Williams sets forth three arguments to support his claim. First, Williams argues the constitutional protections afforded under Miller are triggered in this case because his hard 50 sentence was imposed under a mandatory sentencing scheme. Second, he argues the constitutional protections afforded under Miller are triggered in this case because his hard 50 sentence is the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence. Third, Williams argues he was deprived of the constitutional guarantees afforded under Miller because the sentencing court failed to fully consider his diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change before imposing the hard 50 sentence on him.
1. The mandatory nature of the hard 50 sentencing scheme
Williams argues the mandatory nature of the framework under which he was sentenced triggers the constitutional protections afforded under Miller. The State disagrees arguing that Miller does not apply in this case because the hard 50 sentencing
framework provided the court with discretion to determine whether the aggravating circumstances in Williams’ case outweighed any mitigating circumstances. See
The states are split over whether the constitutional protections afforded by Miller apply when a juvenile defendant is sentenced under a discretionary sentencing framework. There was some hope that the split would be resolved by the United States Supreme Court in the Washington D.C. sniper case, Mathena v. Malvo, No. 18-217 (U.S.), which was argued before the Court on October 16, 2019. But before an opinion was issued, Virginia enacted new legislation allowing prisoners serving life sentences without parole for crimes committed as juveniles to be eligible for parole after 20 years of incarceration. The parties in Malvo stipulated to dismissal of the case, and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on February 26, 2020. Mathena v. Malvo, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 919, 206 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2020). Just over two weeks later, the Court granted certiorari in the case of Jones v. Mississippi, No. 18-1259 (U.S.), in which a distinct but related issue was presented: whether Miller and Montgomery require the sentencing court to find that a juvenile homicide offender is permanently incorrigible before sentencing him or her to a sentence of life without parole. 140 S. Ct. 1293 (2020).
509 (N.D. 2017); Luna v. State, 387 P.3d 956, 961 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016); Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534, 544, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014); see also State v. Valencia, 241 Ariz. 206, 208-09, 386 P.3d 392 (2016); People v. Gutierrez, 58 Cal. 4th 1354, 1360-61, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 421, 324 P.3d 245 (2014); State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637, 658, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015); Veal v. State, 298 Ga. 691, 700-03, 784 S.E.2d 403 (2016); Johnson v. State, 162 Idaho 213, 225, 395 P.3d 1246 (2017); State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 555-58 (Iowa 2015); Diatchenko v. District Attorney, 466 Mass. 655, 668-71, 1 N.E.3d 270 (2013) (concluding that discretionary scheme allowing imprisonment without parole for juvenile offender violates state constitution but relying on reasoning of Graham and Roper in so concluding); State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 447, 152 A.3d 197 (2017); State v. Young, 369 N.C. 118, 125-26, 794 S.E.2d 274 (2016); State v. Long, 138 Ohio St. 3d 478, 483-84, 8 N.E.3d 890 (2014); White v. Premo, 365 Or. 1, 15-16, 443 P.3d 597 (2019); Commonwealth v. Batts, 640 Pa. 401, 444, 163 A.3d 410 (2017); State v. Ramos, 187 Wash. 2d 420, 440-44, 387 P.3d 650 (2017). Some of these courts first addressed the issue of whether the statutory schemes themselves were constitutionally valid before applying the rule in Miller. But regardless of the outcome on that issue, these courts ultimately applied the legal principles announced in Miller in cases where the trial court had at least some form of sentencing discretion.
A minority of states conclude in published opinions that Miller offers no protection if the sentencing court has even nominal discretion. See Bell v. State, 522 S.W.3d 788, 789 n.1 (Ark. 2017); Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 879 (Ind. 2012); State v. Williams, 862 N.W.2d 701, 703-04 (Minn. 2015); State v. Nathan, 522 S.W.3d 881, 891 (Mo. 2017); State v. Charles, 892 N.W.2d 915, 920 (S.D. 2017); Jones v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 29, 40-42, 56-57, 795 S.E.2d 705 (2017).
After due consideration, we agree with the majority of courts that conclude Miller applies to both mandatory and discretionary sentences alike. We see no constitutional reason why a juvenile with the mandated sentence of life should receive a Miller hearing,
while a juvenile with the discretionary life sentence is deprived of the opportunity to have his or her “youth and attendant characteristics” taken into account. Both Miller and Montgomery support our conclusion.
Supreme Court precedent now firmly establishes that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 471. Because juveniles lack maturity, are more vulnerable to negative influences, and have characters that are less well formed, they “are less deserving of the most severe punishments” than adults. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). For the same reasons, the “penological justifications” for a sentence of life without parole are dramatically weakened for juveniles. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472-74. Applying these principles to a sentencing scheme that mandated life without parole, the Miller Court concluded that such a scheme “poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment” to survive constitutional scrutiny. 567 U.S. at 479. The Court continued:
“[G]iven all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about children‘s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. That is especially so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this early age between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ [Citations
omitted.]” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80.
The
irreparable corruption. The reasoning in Miller makes clear that the mere existence of discretion, unguided by the factors relevant to the proportionality of sentences for young offenders, could not save a juvenile sentence of life without parole. The
Montgomery later reinforced the rule in Miller. The Court reasoned that the Miller rule “rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for ‘a class of defendants because of their status‘—that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth. [Citation omitted.]” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. The rule recognized in Miller is not about policing formalistic distinctions in state law between mandatory and nonmandatory sentences. Instead, it is a constitutional guarantee designed to protect individual rights by ensuring that any punishment imposed on a certain “class of offenders” (juveniles) satisfies the
Based on the constitutional principles articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Miller and Montgomery, we hold that the
2. Does the rule announced in Miller apply to Williams’ hard 50 sentence?
Although acknowledging that the punishment at issue in the Miller case was a sentence of life without parole and not a hard 50 sentence, Williams claims the rule in Miller is triggered here because his hard 50 sentence is the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without parole. The State disagrees, arguing the Miller rule is applicable to only those juveniles who are sentenced to life without any opportunity for parole and Williams is eligible for parole after serving 50 years in prison. The parties’ dispute requires us to resolve two separate issues. First, we must decide whether a sentence expressed as a term of years, like the hard 50 sentence at issue here, can ever be functionally equivalent to a sentence of life without parole for purposes of applying Graham and Miller. If so, we must decide whether
a. Term of years as the functional equivalent of life without parole
In support of its argument that Miller is inapplicable to any sentence other than one expressly characterized by the sentencing court as a life sentence without parole, the State notes that two panels of this court previously held the Miller analysis does not apply to a hard 50 sentence. See Ellmaker v. State, No. 108,728, 2014 WL 3843076 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion); State v. Redmon, No. 113,145, 2016 WL 5344034 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion). The defendant in Ellmaker was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder committed when he was 17 years old. The sentencing court imposed a hard 50 sentence. After his conviction was affirmed on appeal, Ellmaker filed a
Two years later, another panel of this court cited Ellmaker approvingly to hold that the Miller rule does not apply to a 732-month (61-year) aggregate sentence for rape, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and aggravated intimidation of a witness because the aggregated sentence was not the functional or literal equivalent of a life sentence without parole. Redmon, 2016 WL 5344034, at *6. The Redmon panel acknowledged, however, that a split of authority on the issue had become more prevalent since Ellmaker was decided, with other jurisdictions concluding that the rationale set forth in Graham and Miller applies equally to both sentences of life without parole and sentences that are the functional equivalent of life without parole. Nevertheless, the panel ultimately relied on Ellmaker to hold that the rule in Miller did not apply to a hard 50 sentence. The panel did so without engaging in an analysis of the reasons provided by the Ellmaker panel for its decision or engaging in an analysis of the reasons for the mounting split in authority on the issue; the panel simply concluded it would be “reasonable” to go along with the holding in Ellmaker until the United States Supreme Court expressly resolved the issue. 2016 WL 5344034, at *6.
For the reasons stated below, we respectfully disagree with both the analysis and the holdings in Ellmaker and Redmon. See State v. Urban, 291 Kan. 214, 223, 239 P.3d 837 (2010) (one panel not bound by decision of previous panel). “While we must carefully consider each precedent cited to us, we also must uphold our duty to correctly determine the law in each case that comes before us. In doing so, we sometimes find that we must respectfully disagree with the opinion of another panel.” Uhlmann v. Richardson, 48 Kan. App. 2d 1, 13, 287 P.3d 287 (2012).
In Graham, Miller, and Montgomery, the United States Supreme Court placed constitutional limits on sentences that may be imposed on children. Graham held that children convicted of nonhomicide offenses cannot be sentenced to life without parole and must have a “realistic” and “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” 560 U.S. at 74-75, 82. Miller and Montgomery mandate that the states must provide a juvenile convicted of homicide a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation except in the rarest of instances where the child is found to “exhibit[] such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is
And although not a categorical proportionality claim, we find the discussion in Graham regarding the absence of any legitimate penological justification for a sentence of life without parole to be just as persuasive in the context of considering whether the rule in Miller is triggered for a lengthy juvenile sentence for a term of years that is the functional equivalent of life without parole. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 71. The Supreme Court considered whether any theory of penal sanction could provide an adequate justification for sentencing a juvenile nonhomicide offender to life without parole and found none. The same test applied to a sentence of a lengthy term of years without eligibility for parole yields the same conclusion. The Graham Court‘s reasoning regarding retribution is equally applicable to a lengthy term-of-years sentence as it is to one labeled as “life.” Sentences must directly relate to the personal culpability of the offender, which is diminished in the case of a juvenile offender who has not committed homicide. 560 U.S. at 71-72. In terms of deterrence, “‘the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest . . . that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.‘” 560 U.S. at 72. Regardless of what the punishment is, children are “less likely to take a possible punishment into consideration when making decisions,” especially “when that punishment is rarely imposed.” 560 U.S. at 72. There is no reason to believe that a juvenile would be deterred from crime depending on whether the sentence was life without parole or a number of years that is the functional equivalent of life without parole. Finally, there is no difference in terms of rehabilitation or incapacitation between two sentences that would both incarcerate the defendant for the functional equivalent of the defendant‘s life. Neither type of sentence contemplates the defendant returning to society for a period of time that is the functional equivalent of a term of life, either as a reformed citizen or as a potential threat.
Most courts that have considered the issue focus not on the label attached to a sentence but instead on whether imposing the sentence would violate the principles Miller and Graham sought to effectuate. See Williams v. United States, 205 A.3d 837, 844 (D.C. 2019); Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675, 680 (Fla. 2015) (“[T]he Graham Court had no intention of limiting its new categorical rule to sentences denominated under the exclusive term of ‘life in prison.‘“); State v. Shanahan, 165 Idaho 343, 349-50, 445 P.3d 152 (2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 545 (2019); People v. Reyes, 63 N.E.3d 884, 888 (Ill. 2016); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 70-71 (Iowa 2013); Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676, 691 n.11, 1 N.E.3d 259 (2013); Zuber, 227 N.J. at 448; Ira v. Janecka, 419 P.3d 161, 167 (N.M. 2018); State v. Moore, 149 Ohio St. 3d 557, 572-73, 76 N.E.3d 1127 (2016); Premo, 365 Or. at 12-13; Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416, 438 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018); Ramos, 187 Wash. 2d at 438-39; Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132, 144 (Wyo. 2014); see also Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047, 1059-60 (10th Cir. 2017); McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1020-21 (8th Cir. 2016)
In applying the rule in Miller, we note that some of these courts did not ultimately conclude that the term of years to which the offender was sentenced rose to the level of cruel and unusual punishment under the
We are persuaded by our own analysis and the compilation of cases set forth above holding that a sentence expressed as a term of years that fails to provide an opportunity for release at a meaningful point in a juvenile‘s life triggers the
While acknowledging the split in authority, we find the conclusion in these cases that Miller categorically does not apply to a sentence expressed as a term of years is inconsistent with the reasoning of Roper, Graham, and Miller, in which the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized the lessened culpability of juvenile offenders, the
b. Hard 50 sentence is the functional equivalent to life without parole.
We now must decide whether the hard 50 sentence imposed on Williams is the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without parole. “Courts that have grappled with the issue of how lengthy a sentence must be to trigger the protections of Miller often reference Graham‘s instruction that juvenile offenders must retain a meaningful opportunity for release.” Premo, 365 Or. at 14 (citing Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71-72 [“explaining that it does ‘not regard the juvenile‘s potential future release in his or her late sixties after a half century of incarceration sufficient to escape the rationales of Graham or Miller‘“]); Casiano v. Comm‘r of Corr., 317 Conn. 52, 73-75, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015) (noting that most courts that have considered the issue have determined that a sentence that exceeds life expectancy or that would make the individual eligible for release near the end of his or her life expectancy is a de facto life sentence).
In this case, Williams must serve a minimum of 50 years in prison for his single conviction before he can be considered for release. We are unaware of any state high court that has found a single sentence in excess of 50 years for a single homicide provides a juvenile with a meaningful opportunity for release. See People v. Contreras, 4 Cal. 5th 349, 369, 229 Cal. Rptr. 3d 249, 411 P.3d 445 (2018) (same for 50-year-to-life sentence); Casiano, 317 Conn. at 73, 79-80 (same for 50-year sentence); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71 (same for 75-year sentence with parole eligibility after 52.5 years); Zuber, 227 N.J. at 448 (110-year sentence with parole eligibility after 55 years and 75-year sentence with parole eligibility after 68 years and 3 months “is the practical equivalent of life without parole“); White, 365 Or. at 15 (same for nearly 67-year sentence); Bear Cloud, 334 P.3d at 141-42 (same for 45-year-to-life sentence). In finding that a juvenile defendant‘s 50-year sentence is equivalent to life without parole for purposes of applying Miller, the Connecticut Supreme Court relied on Miller and Graham to construe the concept of life more broadly than biological survival; specifically, it found that the United States Supreme Court “implicitly endorsed the notion that an individual is effectively incarcerated for ‘life’ if he [or she] will have no opportunity to truly reenter society or have any meaningful life outside of prison.” Casiano, 317 Conn. at 78.
We conclude Williams’ hard 50 sentence is the functional equivalent to life without parole for purposes of applying the rule in Miller.
3. Individualized consideration of a juvenile‘s youth and attendant characteristics
We now address Williams’ claim that he was deprived of the constitutional protections afforded by Miller when the sentencing
There is nothing in the hard 50 sentencing scheme that facilitates the court‘s consideration of the characteristics and circumstances attendant to a juvenile offender‘s age or the fact that juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform. And our review of the sentencing transcript reflects that the sentencing court did not consider any of the unique characteristics attendant to Williams’ age, his diminished culpability, or prospects for reform before imposing the hard 50 sentence. We are not surprised by this fact because Williams was sentenced in 2001, which was 11 years before Miller established the rule requiring individualized sentencing considerations for juveniles before imposing a sentence of life without parole or, in this case, its functional equivalent. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.
The State relied on the existence of four statutory aggravating circumstances to argue in favor of a hard 50 sentence for Williams: (1) he knowingly or purposely killed more than one person, (2) he committed the crime for the purpose of receiving money, (3) he committed the crime to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or prosecution, and (4) he committed the crime in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner.
Defense counsel disputed the existence of any of the statutory aggravating circumstances, except the killing of more than one person. Counsel relied on the expert‘s trial testimony to argue that the murders were “really a senseless act committed by a person who has a deficiency in understanding what he is doing.” Counsel went on to argue that any aggravating circumstances the court found were outweighed by mitigating circumstances: his youth, his mental capacity, and his emotional state at the time of the offense. Counsel referenced the testimony of the clinical psychologist who found Williams had markedly impaired abilities to perceive and conceive of sequence of events. Counsel argued the case boiled down to Williams’ inability “to think through the situation, define options, foretell consequences, make enlightened or objective choices, strategize and see those factors as ahead before acting is deficient. And he is slow in processing, therefore will not examine, observe or violent thoughts on his own.”
People who knew Williams spoke on his behalf, each requesting the court impose a hard 25 sentence instead of a hard 50 sentence. A middle school teacher spoke to the absence of parents or other support systems in Williams’ life growing up. An individual who employed Williams over the summer on some property she managed described Williams as respectful, mannerable, very disciplined, and a person with potential. She expressed hope that “he could be put into some type of situation where he‘s not just thrown away and the key thrown away with him.”
The adult child of the two victims killed by Williams spoke on behalf of the family, explaining how wonderful his parents were and the devastating impact his parents’ murders had on his adult siblings, their children, and his parents’ siblings.
After hearing the arguments of counsel and the statements of these various individuals, the court imposed a hard 50 sentence for each of the two first-degree murder charges. In support of its decision to impose the hard
“The time to have helped Ronnell Williams was before this date, August of 1999. I mean, we talk about and we—we rail about and we—we bemoan the fact that this and that wasn‘t done for him. And now, you know, when it‘s too late, you can do something for him.
“Whatever it was that drew him and his brother to that address on that date and whatever it was that made him do the things that he did, and I confess, I will never know. I mean, I look at you and I—I don‘t have a clue as to what motivated you. And you‘ve given me absolutely nothing to help me figure out what—what happened. To be honest with you, I frankly don‘t even think you know or that you have an answer for that.” (Emphasis added.)
The court advised Williams that the decision he made on the day of the murders not only ruined his own life but the life of the victims and their surviving family members. The court then made a formal finding that the aggravating factors outweighed any mitigating factors presented.
The sentencing court did not consider any characteristics and circumstances attendant to Williams’ age or the fact that, as a child, he was constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform. In fact, the italicized language above reflects that the court considered this 14-year-old boy, a child in middle school with no criminal history, to have zero possibility for reform and therefore was entitled to the most severe sentence that could be imposed (even on an adult) for the crime committed: life without the possibility of parole for 50 years.
We find Williams was deprived of the constitutional protections afforded by Miller, which require the sentencing court to consider his diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change before imposing the hard 50 sentence for his conviction of premeditated first-degree murder.
4. Conclusion
A sentencing court cannot impose a hard 50 sentence on a juvenile offender convicted of premeditated first-degree murder without first considering the offender‘s youth and attendant characteristics, including the child‘s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, while keeping in mind that such a sentence is constitutionally disproportionate for all but the rarest of children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption. We emphasize that neither Miller, the
C. Remedy
Williams asks this court to vacate his hard 50 sentence under
Because Williams was deprived of the constitutional protections afforded by Miller, he is entitled to habeas relief in the form of an evidentiary hearing. See
Finally, we look to Graham, Miller, and Montgomery for guidance in directing the habeas court on remand. In Miller, the Supreme Court held that a juvenile defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole but only if the sentencing court determines that the defendant‘s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation. See 567 U.S. at 471-73, 479-80. The sentencing court may make that decision only after considering the defendant‘s youth and its attendant characteristics. Those characteristics include, but are not limited to, the following:
- Consideration of the juvenile offender‘s chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences;
- Consideration of the family and home environment that surrounds the juvenile offender and from which the juvenile offender cannot usually extricate himself or herself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional;
- Consideration of the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of the juvenile offender‘s participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected the juvenile offender;
- Consideration of the possibility that the juvenile offender might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, the juvenile offender‘s inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or the incapacity to assist his or her own attorneys; and
- Consideration of the juvenile offender‘s prospects for rehabilitation. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78.
After identifying these characteristics as relevant considerations to determine a child‘s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, the Miller Court stated its
Although we have summarized the list of characteristics identified by the Miller Court as relevant to consider before imposing a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile convicted of homicide, we emphasize that this list is not exclusive. At resentencing, the habeas court may consider any characteristic it finds to be relevant in deciding the issue before it: whether imposing a hard 50 sentence on Williams for the offense of premeditated first-degree murder is constitutionally disproportionate under the
We find additional guidance necessary on three more issues. The first issue relates to the decision of the original sentencing court to run both of Williams’ hard 50 sentences concurrent to each other. The concurrent nature of these sentences was not an issue addressed by the parties on appeal, and we expressly exclude it from review on remand for purposes of our mandate.
The second issue concerns the scope of evidence that can be considered by the habeas court in deciding whether the hard 50 sentence imposed on Williams is constitutionally disproportionate given his age at the time he committed the crime and its attendant characteristics, including his diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change. Specifically, whether the court is limited to considering the evidence that was available at the time Williams originally was sentenced or whether the court can consider what has happened since Williams was placed in prison. Under Miller, the court must consider youth and its attendant characteristics at the time of sentencing to “take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 480. But Graham explains that the Constitution “prohibit[s] States from making the judgment at the outset that [a juvenile] never will be fit to reenter society.” 560 U.S. at 75. The Court later highlighted that Graham‘s sentence violated the
As noted above, the issue before the court at resentencing will be whether imposing a hard 50 sentence on Williams is constitutionally disproportionate under the
The third issue provides guidance to the district court in the event it finds Williams’ original sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate. At the time Williams was sentenced, the default sentence for premeditated first-degree murder was life without the possibility of parole for 25 years. See
But in 2013, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013). Alleyne held that the facts a sentencing court relies upon to increase an offense‘s mandatory minimum sentence are elements of that enhanced offense. As such, those sentence-enhancing facts must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt to avoid a violation of the defendant‘s
On the issue of retroactivity, the amended statute provides that the amendments “shall not apply to cases in which the defendant‘s conviction and sentence were final prior to June 17, 2013, unless the conviction or sentence has been vacated in a collateral proceeding, including, but not limited to,
“(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (f), for all cases on appeal on or after the effective date of this act, if a sentence imposed under this section, prior to amendment by this act, or under
K.S.A. 21-4635 , prior to its repeal, is vacated for any reason other than sufficiency of the evidence as to all aggravating circumstances, resentencing shall be required under this section, as amended by this act, unless the prosecuting attorney chooses not to pursue such a sentence.“(f) In the event any sentence imposed under this section is held to be unconstitutional, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced shall cause such person to be brought before the court and shall sentence such person to the maximum term of imprisonment otherwise provided by law.”
K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620(e) ,(f) .
Although the Legislature amended the statute in 2014 and again in 2017, the substance of the language quoted above has not changed. See
Bottom line, in the event the district court finds it necessary to vacate Williams’ original sentence because it was unconstitutionally disproportionate, the court must comply with the statutory directives set forth in
D. Lifetime postrelease supervision
When the sentencing court ordered Williams to serve a hard 50 sentence, it also imposed lifetime postrelease supervision. For the first time on appeal, Williams argues that
“A sentence is illegal under
K.S.A. 22-3504 when: (1) it is imposed by a court without jurisdiction; (2) it does not conform to the applicable statutory provisions, either in character or punishment; or (3) it is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served.” State v. Hayes, 307 Kan. 537, 538, 411 P.3d 1225 (2018).
Williams argues that the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to impose lifetime postrelease supervision. The State agrees. “An inmate who has received an off-grid indeterminate life sentence can leave prison only if the [Kansas Prisoner Review] Board grants the inmate parole. Therefore, a sentencing court has no authority to order a term of postrelease supervision in conjunction with an off-grid indeterminate life sentence.” State v. Cash, 293 Kan. 326, Syl. ¶ 2, 263 P.3d 786 (2011); see State v. Harsh, 293 Kan. 585, 590, 265 P.3d 1161 (2011) (parole is separate and distinct from sentence; if defendant with off-grid indeterminate life sentence ever leaves prison, it will be because parole was granted). Williams’ off-grid sentence permits parole eligibility after 50 years have been served, not lifetime postrelease supervision. See State v. Ross, 295 Kan. 1126, 1134, 289 P.3d 76 (2012) (defendant who received off-grid life sentence for felony murder was subject to lifetime parole instead of lifetime postrelease supervision).
Because the sentencing court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision, that portion of Williams’ sentence must be vacated. See State v. Johnson, 309 Kan. 992, 997-98, 441 P.3d 1036 (2019) (vacating order of lifetime postrelease supervision rather than remanding case for resentencing); State v. Floyd, 296 Kan. 685, 690-91, 294 P.3d 318 (2013) (same).
CONCLUSION
- We find Williams sufficiently showed the manifest injustice and exceptional circumstances necessary to justify the untimely and successive filing of his second
K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Accordingly, we reverse the district court‘s decision to summarily deny Williams’ habeas claim for relief and remand to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing. - We hold the constitutional protections afforded under Miller are triggered regardless of whether the sentencing scheme is mandatory or discretionary.
- We find Williams’ hard 50 sentence is the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without parole for purposes of the constitutional protections in Miller.
- We find Williams was deprived of the constitutional guarantees afforded under MillerK.S.A. 60-1507 matter to the habeas court to hold an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the habeas court must specifically consider evidence about whether imposing a hard 50 sentence on Williams for the offense of premeditated first-degree murder is constitutionally disproportionate under the
Eighth Amendment given Williams’ age at the time he committed the crime and its attendant characteristics. - In considering the evidence presented on remand, the habeas court shall expressly decide whether Williams is irretrievably depraved, permanently incorrigible, or irreparably corrupt beyond the possibility of rehabilitation. In making this decision, the habeas court must consider, at a minimum, the following circumstances with regard to Williams’ diminished culpability and heightened
capacity for change, while keeping in mind that such a sentence is constitutionally disproportionate for all but the rarest of children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption: - Williams’ chronological age at the time of the crime and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.
- Williams’ family and home environment that surrounded him at the time of the crime.
- The circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of Williams’ participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him.
- The possibility that Williams might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, Williams’ inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or the incapacity to assist his own attorneys.
- Williams’ prospects for rehabilitation at the time of the crime as well as whether Williams has, in fact, worked toward rehabilitation in the 20-plus years since he committed his crimes.
- On remand, the habeas court shall not consider the concurrent nature of Williams’ two hard 50 sentences in deciding whether imposing a hard 50 sentence on Williams for the offense of premeditated first-degree murder is constitutionally disproportionate under the
Eighth Amendment given Williams’ age at the time he committed the crime and its attendant characteristics. - If the habeas court determines on remand that imposing a hard 50 sentence on Williams for the offense of premeditated first-degree murder is constitutionally disproportionate under the
Eighth Amendment , then the unconstitutional hard 50 sentence is necessarily rendered illegal and the habeas court has jurisdiction to vacate the sentence and set the matter to impose a sentence that complies with the constitutional mandate in Miller and with the statutory directives set forth inK.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6620 . - Both the evidentiary hearing—and any later hearings on sentencing disposition that may be held—must reflect that the habeas court meaningfully engaged in Miller‘s central inquiry.
- That part of Williams’ sentence imposing lifetime postrelease supervision is vacated.
Reversed, sentence vacated in part, and case remanded with directions.