The opinion of the court was delivered by
We have repeatedly held that the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), K.S.A. 21-4701 et seq., governs the jurisdiction of courts to impose sentences. This appeal asks us to аddress the authority of district courts to modify sentences following remand from the appellate courts. We reiterate our earlier decisions holding that, in enacting the KSGA, the legislature intended to restrict the authority of district courts to modify sentences once the sentences have been pronounсed from the bench.
Rolland D. Guder, the appellant, pleaded guilty to one count of unlawfully manufacturing a controlled substance, one count of сul
On May 9,2001, the district court sentenсed Guder to a standard drug grid box term of 162 months’ imprisonment for the manufacturing conviction; 15 months for the marijuana cultivation conviction, to run consecutive to the manufacturing sentence; 8 months for each of the weapons convictions, to run concurrent with the marijuana sentence; and 11 months for the pаraphernalia conviction, to run concurrent with the weapons sentences. The controlling term was 177 months’ imprisonment.
On May 17, 2001, Guder filed a timely notice of appeal through counsel. The appeal was not docketed, however, for nearly 7 years. On March 18, 2008, Guder filed a motion with the Court of Appeals to-docket his appeal out of time. On April 3, 2008, tire Court of Appeals granted the motion, and the appeal was finally docketed.
Guder then filеd a motion for summary disposition, which the Court of Appeals granted by an order dated June 2, 2008. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Guder’s appeal had not been timely perfected and that he was entitled to relief under State v. Phinney,
On August 19, 2008, the district court resentenced Guder. The court sentenced him in accordance with McAdam to a sеverity level 3D aggravated sentence of 32 months’ imprisonment for the manufacturing conviction. The court also imposed a sentence of 15 months for thе marijuana conviction, to be served consecutive to the manufacturing sentence; 8 months for each of the weapons convictions, to be served concurrent with the paraphernalia sentence; and 11 months for the paraphernalia conviction, to be served consecutive to the manufaсturing sentence, for a controlling term of 58 months’ imprisonment. The district court thus modified the manufacturing sentence as it was directed to do by the Court of
Guder filed a timely notice of appeal from the new sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed (see State v. Guder, No. 101,632, unpublished opinion filed February 5, 2010), and this court granted Guder s petition for review. We note that Guder may have already served his sentence imposed with the modified severity levels, but we elect to address the issue on its merits because the situation is capable of repetition and raises concerns of public importance. See State v. McKnight,
The interpretation of sentencing statutes is a question оf law over which this court exercises unlimited review. McKnight,
At the core of this appeal is whether a district court may modify a previously impоsed sentence on one conviction following a remand from an appellate court for resentencing based on a different convictiоn. Historically, Kansas district courts had considerable discretion to modify sentences following pronouncement from the bench. See State v. Anthony,
Prior to 1992, when the KSGA was enacted, district courts had the authority to modify sentences on remand. In State v. Woodbury,
Subsequent cases have cited Woodbury as controlling authority for the proposition that a district court may resentenсe on all counts after an appellate court remands for resentencing on one count. See, e.g., State v. Snow,
Statutory changes to the jurisdiction of district courts to modify sentences have superseded the Woodbury rationale. In Anthony,
The 1992 amendments to the Kansas sentencing statutes deрrived district courts of the jurisdiction to modify sentences except to correct arithmetic or clerical errors, to consider or reconsider departures from presumptive sentences, or to modify sentences by reinstating previously revoked probations. See McKnight,
When it enacted the KSGA, our legislature explicitly addressed remands following reversal. K.S.A. 21-4720(b)(5) provides that, in the event that a conviction of the primary crime is reversed on appeal, the sentеncing court is to follow all of the KSGA provisions concerning sentencing in multiple conviction cases.
Nothing in the statutory scheme, however, allows resentencing on other convictions following the vacating of a sentence on appeal. It is telling that the legislature expressly set out the authority of district courts to resentence on remand, without giving them authority to resentence on other convictions when only the sentence for the primaiy conviction is vacated. It is alsо telling that, in repealing the old statute and replacing it with a new version in 2010, the legislature retained the limitation to remands when the primary conviction is reversed. See L. 2010, ch. 136, sec. 300(b)(5). We will not add words to the statute that would provide jurisdiction to resentence on other counts when only the sentence on the primary conviction is vacated. This court ascertains the legislature’s intent
Although Guder’s sеntence was vacated, his conviction was not reversed. We find no language from the legislature allowing a district court to modify any of the sentences that were not vacated on appeal.
We therefore vacate the modification of Guder s sentence that rendered his sentence for the paraphernalia conviction consecutive to the manufacturing sentence, and we reverse the decision of the Court of Apрeals affirming the district court. In doing so, we disapprove of the holding in Snow to the extent that it is contrary to this opinion.
Guder also complains that the use of his prior convictions as a factor in cаlculating his sentence violated his right to a trial by jury. We decline to depart from our previous holding to the contrary in State v. Ivory,
We vacate the sentence imposed by the district court on August 19,2008, and remand the case to the district court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.