*1 Pennsylvania, COMMONWEALTH
Appellee Qu’eed BATTS, Appellant 45 MAP 2016
No. Pennsylvania. Supreme Court 7, December ARGUED: DECIDED: June
Angela Vigil, Esq., C. for Children’s Ad- vocacy Sentencing and Youth Network Reentry Amicus Project, Curiae. SAYLOR, TODD, C.J., BAER, n DONOHUE, WECHT, DOUGHERTY, MUÑDY, JJ.
OPINION
JUSTICE DONOHUE (“Batts”) Qu’eed convicted of first-degree murder he committed he His when was fourteen old. case returns time on second discretion ary review for this determine imposed court whether illegal it him sentence when resentenced Jr., Hugh J. Esq., Burns Terence Pat- life in Houck, Kulik, rick Esq., Rebecca J. Esq., careful, review, conclude, parole. After we Morganelli, Esq., John Michael Com- findings based the' made sen Pennsylvania, monwealth of Appellee. tencing evidence Bradley Bridge, Esq., Philip D. Steven relied, illegal light that the sentence is Lauer, Sletvold, P.C., Esq., Lauer Mar- & *6 Alabama, of Miller v. U.S. Levick, Center, Esq. Juvenile sha Law (2012) L.Ed.2d 407 (holding Ward, Alexander Lauer Ésq., Owen & mandatory that a sentence of life Fulmer, Batts, for Qu’Eed Appellant. imposed without the parole, Austin, Firm, Esq., Sara A. Law Austin juvenile a without consideration of L.L.C., Fine, Esq,, David R. James C. age the defendant’s and the attendant Sargent Jr., McErlane, PC, Esq., Lamb youth, prohibited characteristics un Jr., Esq., Thomas Cozen G. Wilkinson Eighth der the Amendment to United O’Connor, Pennsylvania for Bar Associa- Constitution), Montgomery States and tion, Amicus Curiae. — Louisiana, -, (2016) Goldberger, Peter Of- 193 Esq., (holding David Law L.Ed.2d that the Goldberger, Pennsylvania fice Peter for Miller decision announced a new substan Lawyers, Association rule of applies Criminal Defense tive constitutional law retroactively Amicus clarifying Curiae. and the limited cir life-without-parole cumstances which a Long, Esq., Pennsylva- Richard Walter sentence is for com permissible a crime Association, Attorneys nia District for juvenile). mitted when the defendant was a Pennsylvania Attorney’s District Associa- tion, Amicus Curiae. grant to our Pursuant of allowance
Kathryn Rimpfel, Esq., appeal, Baker conclude that to Elizabeth we further effectu- McKenzie, L.L.P., Montgom- for & Children’s Advo- ate mandate and Miller cacy Sentencing procedural safeguards ery, required Network Youth and are and Reentry Project, life-without-parole Amicus Curiae. ensure that sentences He juve- thirteen-year-old fre- only rarest female resident. out to “the
are meted “per- reflect into at school quently got fights whose crimes because nile offenders” “irreparable cor- incorrigibility,” manent him about his circum- children would tease depravity,” however, as ruption” all, “irretrievable Through it Batts stances. by Montgomery. required Miller academically well performed excelled Thus, Opinion, fully developed as sports. several against recognize presumption we childhood, point during his At some of a of life imposition sentence developed relationship with his Batts juvenile To for a rebut the offender. father, jail during who was in and out bears presumption, the Commonwealth relationship years. formative That Batts’ proving, beyond reasonable burden ended, Batts abruptly though, when was doubt, incapa- that the offender as his was eight, father sentenced ble of rehabilitation. on incarceration federal twelve I. Facts no drug charges provid- visitation time, briefly Batts Around same ed. Although does not generally this Court mother, to the care of his but he returned of an provide an exhaustive recitation of- again him in she struck was removed when history prior commission of to the fender’s of school officials and said she no front crime, greater detail explain we longer wanted him. Opinion, requires in this later Miller sentencing court to the details of consider Batts, struggled According he with when de- offender’s background rejection feelings of be- abandonment termining eligible if he or she is of his familial circumstances. He cause de- such, As life without we mother, only to live with his but she sired lengthy of Batts’ life provide account requirements comply failed murder, preceding his commission county reunification established largely findings on fact based made paternal agency. It was once Batts’ only resentencing sup- are grandfather, caregiver who been his had by the ported record. years, expressed on and off over April prematurely was born adopt him that Batts’ mother desire to a mother thirteen-year-old required for finally completed the tasks *7 seventeen-year-old A victim of his father. regain to of her son. custody her neglect, mother’s Batts was shuffled twelve, age At the Batts to returned ages from system the foster care around New Phillipsburg, mother’s care in Jer- his through During that five twelve. time- sey. apartment They resided an with his (as frame, he lived eleven homes well as sister, boyfriend, younger mother’s Batts’ youth) located in a homeless shelter for eventually, baby and brother. Batts re- states, and two and nine cities transferred mother and portedly bonded his her with (although there schools eleven times were happy to be home. He boyfriend and was that, stretches several months because Phillipsburg Middle School attended transiency, not Batts attend his did football, grade, played he seventh where all). physical He to exposed school at was academically to began he and but decline subjected by parents, foster to violence suspended fighting. times was several and on physical peers, violence his one in the sexually active sev- occasion, sexually by He became was victimized eleven, eighth began drinking age grades, At while enth and older cousin. shelter, experimented to virginity smoking his and with homeless he lost alcohol that, It at this met marijuana. Bradley was time he was aware that had previously Evans, . , an older teen was killed people. Jerome who three other gang. Batts member the Bloods He told Bradley instructed the to stop driver family gang group that took was vehicle. He asked Batts and two other other, of each Batts en- care found young teenagers in the back the car who associating ticing. began Batts with to going put was in “work.” None of the gang when he in middle school and was passengers responded. The record reflects drugs for them. sold Bradley Batts, then turned to handed family Batts and his him gun mask, relocated across and a put and told to him Easton, Pennsylvania, to on glove “put river but he con- and Upon work in.” receiv- directive, in Phillipsburg, ing car, tinued attend school Batts exited the played up where he basketball and football. walked the house and shot Clarence head, early him, his January late December or twice in the killing Edwards grade year, Corey ninth Batts was into shot initiated Hilario the back as once house, getting “jumped the Bloods ritu- in”—a Hilario into the causing fled him required fight bodily injury. al that him to five different serious Edwards and Hilario thirty-six old, gang eighteen years members for seconds each. were sixteen re- spectively. At time of the shooting, grades Batts’ his plummeted, prompting Batts did know either victim. him from mother withdraw basketball. car, argued mother gave He with his about his fail- When Batts to the he returned began skip- do his gun Bradley. Although ure to school work and back to Batts 2, 2006, February nothing at ping school. On Batts indicated that he felt the time evening pulled immediately out in and did not he the trigger, went return after shooting regretted home until 2:00 When he arrived he that he a.m. stated home, angry his struck Bradley mother was what he had done and was scared. fourteen, result, age him. As a at the he pleased stated that was “work” with clothes, done, thereafter, packed his Batts left school the Batts Batts had was morning of February promoted higher and never returned to a rank within stayed girlfriend’s According He his home. house Bloods. Batts’ statement trial, testimony partici- in the police homes other friends in both he Phillipsburg. stopped He at- pated shooting Easton and in the because he was tending if comply school. he did not afraid Brad- demands, ley’s Bradley kill him. February night
On Batts night Bradley’s in a several spent vehicle with members Batts house gang. Bradley, following the Bloods day, Phillips- Vernon senior and the went 10, 2006, burg, Jersey. February whom had member the Bloods New On *8 recently “assigned,” police been was car located at a house there. the Batts Batts talking initially attempted about his to kill to his identity desire rob and shield police, Bradley ultimately someone. the from but he was directed driver the brought interroga- the to block of an- Spring vehicle the 700 arrested and Easton, tion, Pennsylvania, stepfather Garden Street his and mother his Miranda present. where he saw Clarence Edwards Co- were He and waived rey preceding days, rights attempts Hilario after to outside. In the and two disclaim Bradley shooting, on his Batts con- told Batts several occasions involvement the that he kill going was Edwards. Batts fessed. the History of the evidence that preponderance
II. Procedural by served decerti- would be public interest charged with Commonwealth Batts court. See juvenile the matter fying homicide, criminal attempted criminal 6322(a). § In its consideration Pa.C.S. homicide, assault, two aggravated and factors,2 trial statutorily required the criminal As ex the conspiracy.1 we counts prior of this plained in our consideration crime “horren- court found that the was case, charge age, his despite the homicide impacted commu- negatively the dous” and jurisdiction the matter from the removed constituted “severe nity; Batts “ required juvenile of the court and Batts’ ‘streetwise,’ public” to the and threat filed criminal court. cáse adult mentality well-developed criminal ‘a with Batts, Commonwealth Pa. necessary to maturity degree of the and (2013) (“Batts I”); 42 Pa. ” I, acts.’ Batts criminal audacious commit (excepting § from the murder C.S. (quoting 288-89 Trial A.3d at act). filed, Batts delinquent definition 5-6). 2/21/2007, Order, The trial court requesting the alia, pretrial motion inter that Batts rejected Tepper’s Dr. conclusion juvenile of his court. The transfer case age of by the twen- could be rehabilitated hearing on motion Batts’ trial court held (the jurisdiction of age the ty-one at which In January support 2007. on and terminates, see the court motion, expert presented the Batts “child”); (defining Pa.R.J.C.P. C.S. report of testimony forensic written and 630), crediting the conclusion instead Tepper; Allan the Dr. M. psychologist experts by the Commonwealth’s shared expert tes countered Commonwealth rehabilitation, occurs, if it ever will “that timony psychol from forensic reports only treatment and a psy forensic occur after ogist Dr. Steven Samuel Timothy part Michals. Both sides Batts to willingness on the Mr. chiatrist Dr. testimony. presented lay rehabilitation, also some- seek treatment that their clinical evaluations indicate thing present- considering the evidence After accept.” Trial ready is not Mr. Batts ed, concluded that the trial court 2/21/2007, Order, at 6. proving by a Court satisfy his burden failed Pa.C.S, 2501(a), 901(a), 2702(a)(1), (G) child is amenable to treat- whether the §§ ment, ju- supervision as a 903(a)(2). or rehabilitation considering by following factors: venile (I) age; transferring determining whether (II) capacity; mental serve juvenile court would to the case (III) maturity; interest, re- public court was (IV) degree sophistica- (cid:127) criminal quired to consider: child; by exhibited tion (A) offense on the victim impact records, (V) any; previous if victims; or (VI) any prior extent of the nature (B) com- impact the offense including delinquent history, success munity; any attempts by previous or failure (C) safety public of the or child; the threat to the rehabilitate the court to child; any posed (VII) individual child can be rehabili- whether the (D) circumstances of the juve- the nature prior expiration of the tated child; allegedly committed jurisdiction; offense nile , (E) culpability; (VIII) degree reports, child’s probation institutional (F) disposi- adequacy any; duration if (IX) any *9 factors[.] available under other relevant tional alternatives 6355(a)(4)(iii); § see 42 justice Pa.C.S. chapter adult criminal 42 Pa.C.S. and in the 6322(a). § system;
419
n
Batts,
to a
proceeded
jury
2008, 12-16,
The case
trial before
766 EDA
determination life in without defendant 1102.1(d). 18 Pa.C.S. (a), under subsection I, Batts we rendering our decision findings to consider make required 1102.1, ultimately took note of section but following fac- record related on the inapplicable concluded that it was because tors: I, conviction. of the date Batts’ (1) on each offense impact The brief supplemental at 293. In Batts’ victim, victim including oral and written Court, argument to this he contended or submitted impact statements made Miller, Pennsylvania’s sen- that, light detailing family members the victim murder, tencing first-degree scheme for economic physical, psychological of life mandatory sentence requiring on the victim and the crime effects in its unconstitutional parole, family. impact A victim victim’s that his entirety. He asserted sentence on the may include comment statement to “the most severe should thus revert of the defendant. sentence offense, namely, thud-de- lesser included (2) on the impact The the offense Id. found gree We murder[.]” community. pre- case law argument, inapposite (3) safety pub- to the of the The threat unavailing. support, to Rath- sented in any posed by lic or individual the defen- er, agreed we with the Commonwealth dant. amicus, At- Pennsylvania District its Association, (4) torneys nature and circumstances murder, first-degree juvenile convicted offense committed the defendant. Batts, pending appeal), such as juris- on direct Under conventional cial determinations. to benefit from its judgments have been entitled prudence, individuals whose Dickson, holding. See Commonwealth v. yet were not final on the date (2007). (i.e., still Pa. 918 A.2d those with cases Miller decision *11 found, striking prohibition the sentencing against if the court after consid- paroling an factors, ering requisite that the life-with- individual to prison sentenced serve life in appropriate, out-parole was not sentence 6137(a)(1) in applied section as to these problematic portion first-degree the the offenders. severable, sentencing murder scheme was This rejected Court further argu- the remaining portion the and we could save ment advanced Batts legislative and his amici6 the offend- enactments without ing pronouncement in I, the Miller our that Article Pennsylva- Section of13 the statutory interpretation. rules of See id. at requires nia categorical Constitution ban Specifically, 295-97. the Court noted that imposition on the life-without-parole required, 1102 of section the Crimes Code for crimes sentence committed when the in relevant part, individual convicted juvenile. defendant was a The Court found first-degree to be “to a murder sentenced that in “nothing arguments presented the imprisonment.” term of life Pa.C.S. suggests Pennsylvania’s history favors 1102(a)(1). aspect § parole” The “without a broader proportionality rule than what is arose from section required by United States 6137(a)(1) Code, pro- Parole Court.” Id. 299. at We therefore vacated any person hibited release Superior in Court’s decision Batts I imprisonment. sentenced life Pa.C.S. sentencing remanded case 6137(a)(1). proceedings court for consistent with the We therefore held convict- opinion. of first-degree prior to Miller ed murder could, sentencing after court’s evalua- Concurring Justice Baer authored a Miller,5 tion the criteria identified be Opinion. fully joined Majority’s He subjected to a sentence life pronouncement, but separately wrote without the Batts suggest, uniformity purposes “for I, 66 For 296. those defendants sentencing,” that courts tasked resen- whom the court determines a tencing juveniles prior to convicted life-without-parole inappropri- sentence is decision look section Miller should ate, “it they is our here determination for guidance setting 1102.1 a defen- subject mandatory are to a maximum sen- dant’s minimum sentence “follow required by as imprisonment tence policy encompassed determinations” [sjection 1102(a), accompanied by a mini- (Baer, J., the statute. Id. at 300 concur- mum the common sentence determined ring). pleas id. at resentencing,” history, ability juve- police, We concluded that when his to deal with facing life-without-parole nile potential attorney, sen- capacity his assist his his men- tence, requires examination of the fol- Miller history, potential tal his for re- health lowing factors: habilitation. juve- [A]t a minimum it should I, consider (quoting at 297 66 A.3d Common offense, age nile's the time his (Pa. Knox, Super. wealth v. 50 A.3d culpability capacity 2012)). diminished crime, change, the circumstances of the crime, participation extent of his his Batts’ amici the Juvenile Law Cen- included family, neighborhood home environ- ter, Philadelphia, Association of Defender ment, maturity develop- his emotional Jacobson, professors and law Sara Michelle ment, peer that familial extent and/or Leighton, Foley De La Brian J. and Constance him, pressure past may have affected his Vega. See id. 297 n.4. violence, exposure drug and his alcohol that was belief Resentencing Dr. Michals testified
C. people change generally do sentencing court May On' that, age; they- can “Characteristics hearing be- convened second n *12 change, very but it’s difficult make Koury J. fore Honorable Michael changes to the per of our basic structure retired). The (Judge since Moran had at 59; sonality.” Id. see also id. at 60. testimony of presented the Commonwealth admitted, however, say that he “can’t He Serbin, Security Lieutenant at Thomas they change,” he pre that won’t “can’t Retreat, Institution State Correctional only the future.” dict Id. He could conclude housed, where Batts was then Lieutenant “highly unlikely” it that that Batts was identi- that had been Batts Serbin stated change. at 71-72. Id. being part security threat fied as the time regard- At he evaluated Batts on Batts’ when group admission he based ing juve- his motion to prison that he was a member transfer his entered the case court, Bloods, opinion it was Dr. that his association nile continued Michals’ in was not to treatment “validated” Batts and with other amenable interaction system; in prison, seeing changes in no of the members Bloods while he,continued personality, in found Batts’ Batts’ hold and items contraband opinion resentencing hear- prison cell that indicated that at lieutenant Batts’ N.T., ing. aeknowledgedj Bloods. 57. with Id. at Dr. were associated Michals 172-73, 188-94, however, 5/1/2014, 179, 184, yet at 197- that Batts had received Howell, grandmoth- psychological any counseling treatment Delores Edwards’ caregiver age er from the primary the adult and that and Batts system, six, testimony. provided impact advantage victim taken programs See had that had 50, 57, at id. at 86-91. been Id. made available him. 72. presented The Commonwealth further report testimony
an updated' prior Dr. Also consistent Dr. Michals’ and with expert resentencing an psychia- opinion, Michals as forensic he at the testified try. hearing 42. Based his evaluations purposeful Id. at that “made a upon Batts de- (both prior prepara- get cision to go Batts trial and involved in the ahead and resentencing hearing) tion for the and recog- his crime.” Id. at 51. Dr. While Michals records,' Batts following of various nized that the instruc- review included was member, psycho- an and tions of a gang results 'of examination senior and the testing expert, logical organization may conducted Batts’ violence that have Dr, Dattilio, Frank it played was Dr. Michals’ role Batts’ decision commit opinion develop- murder, personality that “is Batts’ Dr. Michals believed that change. mental nature” and will not doing Id. Batts “knew he when what was he Michals, According at “Batts 49. Dr. committed He that crime.... made engine who and he is it’s the that drives choice and decision acted that and Although his behavior.” Id. at 50. Dr. Mi- choice and Id. at 60-61. Dr. Mi- decision.” recognized psychological agreed chals that chals that Batts’ childhood— abuse, testing “really is im- by physical parental revealed that Batts ne- marked pulsive,” poor judgment” “acting glect, repeated “has moves within the foster behavior,” opinion system early out was Dr. Michals’ during care his childhood and “just unfortunately these traits that are have affected his deci- adolescence—could part making murder, he is” that this is at who his sion the time but didn’t,” “biological genetic makeup.” at Dr. opinion, Id. 50-51. “it as the Michals’ rewards, op- forth, him .“an risks so on and simply provided gang- with versus so very so he very, tion.” Id. at -was 67. that vulnerable point. presented testimony Batts likewise Factoring Id. at Batts’ 107-08. low- in. report expert—forensic psychol average IQ his young age resentencing
ogist Dr. Dattilio—at childhood, Dr. opined difficult Dattilio Michals, hearing. Dr. Dr. Dattilio Unlike judgment profoundly compro- Batts’ to be found Batts’ tumultuous childhood shooting. Id. mised time significant in this Id. at 99- highly matter. Although agreed Dr. Dattilio with Dr. shooting knew Michals opinion Dr. also Dattilio was *13 killing wrong, found that someone was he which sophistication[,] Batts’ “level was making by the Batts’ was skewed decision very high,” ability affected his not also to in of a role model his traditional absence make a Id. at 108. sound' While decision. during early Dr. Dattilio his childhood. streetwise, Batts’ seemingly judgment was ability to that Batts opined thus lacked “being part by clouded idea weigh options appropriate his and make an gaining acceptance. Id. Ac- crowd” and was a senior he directed Dattilio, when decision cording ap- to Batts not Dr. did something to do he gang member knew preciate having to shortcomings “the 101-02, wrong. 156-57. Accord was Id. at doing in put work he told or and what was Dattilio, to ing Dr. of “attach absence fact, consequences are serious.” Id. family parents bonds” and ment with despite Evans, the fact that his friend and young Batts child members when was member, for jailed crim- fellow Bloods was self-worth, re affected his self-esteem and activity prior joining inal to Batts sulting in personality “hardened character Bloods, not Dattilio stated this did Dr. that istics,” particularly and left him vulnerable explain To “compute” for Batts. Id. at 109. 100, 104-05; gang to involvement. Id. at disconnect, ostensibly inexplicable Dr. (“[A]ntisocial see also id. at 105 behavior courtroom, those in the Dattilio reminded in activity only go[ not ] ... hand and from “en- who had “level heads” and came he was raised hand with environment in tact and [sic] vironments that were bal- in, certainly which gang but then ... anced,” entirely Batts dif- was family in had become is oriented his age of his ferent mindset because direction.”). “horrible environment” from he whence Id. came. complicating
Further Batts’ decision view, in making, Dattilio’s was Batts’ Dr. psychological testing From the he con shooting, age at the time ducted, Dr. concluded that Batts Dattilio major role”: played “a had matured since the mental status initial 14-years-old just forming performed At examination that was [sic] we’re when self, teenager. of use of Batts 104. It our our sense Id. was sense process opinion only Dr. Dattilio’s judgment and reason. It’s Batts capacity change, he development as is the brain. We had but has know genu anatomically expressing doesn’t that capacity brain still exhibited 110, 161. stop developing until for his an individual is ine remorse actions. Id. age, Dr. Dattilio testified that therapy, sometimes so beyond With things regard there’s a lot of with to his Batts be able “the dis address reason, ruptive attachment of his ability judgment, bonds” childhood use use new, healthy assertiveness, balancing out learn rela- sense of how -find question night 111. Dr. actions on as out connections. Id. at tionships and accepted further Batts’ statement person Dattilio he from had known character gang no longer to him that he was years. over several Id. at preceding view, his the evidence ad member—in 80-82. the con by Lieutenant duced Serbin Batts’ was also prison record considered unconvincing and unclear. Id.
trary was It court. revealed that 113-14, 145-53, 161. disciplined Batts infrac- has been five mem- presented also Batts post-sentence tions his throughout incar- M.S., Cook, expert Dana L. from orandum ceration, physi- one of which was for a only of The Atlantic Center Deputy Director inmate fight during cal another with concluded, Capital Representation. She May game basketball Id. at records, on her review interviews based 118-20; N.T., 5/2/2014, Apart at 34-35. family Batts she conducted discipline-related from suspen- several as it relates (particularly members sions, employed has remained while experiences childhood Batts’ traumatic participates various maturity) the brain his current level sports, personal fitness and enrichment upon by the United science relied States *14 GED, programs (including leadership de- Roper progeny, in Supreme Court and its offenders, velopment, long-term extraordinary “has an amount violence law-abiding to be a member potential prevention, job creation and appli- resume surely by society, courses) will be enhanced N.T., [which] cation to him offered there. loving family.” and Dana now stable 5/2/2014,at 33-34. 12/31/2013, at 4. In her Report, Cook’s following On its May consider- view, for “potential Batts’ rehabilitation record, sentencing ation of the the entire understated,” as cannot be her interactions by parties, submitted the an memoranda him that “[h]e with show understands presentence investigation October 2013 re- way things capable in he [a] now wasn’t from port, reports psycho- the various Id., years age.” at 14 at 3. Addendum logical to which Batts evaluations had been mother, Batts, Shaniqua Batts’ testified case, subjected the life of the over regarding positive changes she has prepared sentencing memorandum in son. already seen her Id. at 165-67. Cook, sentencing provided Dana court testified, responsibili- accepting Batts also lengthy explanation findings. its It actions, ty apologizing for his Delores deciding appropriate in indicated Howell, assuring sentencing court that Batts, it took into account sentence for decade, preceding he over the has matured 9721(b) general factors section that he denying continued Code,7 Sentencing the Miller factors and Id. gang. member at 169-71. His identified factors Pa.C.S. principal, Gregory high former school A. 1102.1(d), § concluding sentencing that its Troxell, letter to the sent unsolicited “balancing advocating required decision of the fac- sentencing court for a term-of- Batts, 5/2/2014, N.T., portraying for Batts’ tors” at at 56. sentence issue. sentence, community, imposing a is re- and on and the rehabilitative general quired principle “the needs The court to adhere to of the defendant. shall also imposed any guidelines sentencing for con- consider that the should call resentencing adopted by Pennsylvania protection is consistent finement that with the Sentencing gravity taking public, the the offense as it Commission on effect 9721(b). impact on the of the victim under 2155.” 42 Pa.C.S. relates to the section following court found the question of whether he could be “weigh leniency”: against amenable to treatment. (cid:127) nature “the and circumstances” of Id. at 56-60. As to factors weighing crime, i.e., that Batts committed favor his capacity change, the sen- premeditated attempt- murder and tencing court found: ed boys” murder “two defenseless (cid:127) experiences”—in- Batts’ “childhood promotion achieve a within the cluding repeated his moves in the gang; system foster care throughout his (cid:127) committing he alone in kill- acted years, formative the absence of an ing; attachment to a stable and trusted (cid:127) justification no there was for the adult, exposure his violence
crimes; court found mother sys- the foster care his assertion that he reprisal feared tem, as well as his sexual victimiza- incredible, by Bradley to be and that tion by his cousin—all of which led peer pressure his claim of did not him to seek out a cohesive caring merit Batts “sought consideration as family, and made him vulnerable peer out pressure and embraced the the attractiveness of a gang, street by seeking membership which the court found gang”; Bloods suggested that he could “benefit from psychotherapy (cid:127) other forms the victims were unarmed and unsus- rehabilitation”; pecting teenagers; (cid:127) (cid:127) scientific concluding ju- Batts failed to studies cooperate police venile culpable *15 that he the offenders are less “fled state” and at- adults; however, tempted to than the identity hide his when court him, age found that police only slightly Batts’ during located lied the culpability lessened his interrogation only initial here “be- and confess- prod- cause were the police [his] ed when he the al- crimes realized recklessness, him; poor judgment, uct ready implicating had evidence foresight, lack of susceptibility to (cid:127) impact the the crimes have had peer pressure impulse or weak con- Hilario, family, Edwards’ and the trol,” “were and instead deliberate community; acts”; premeditated and (cid:127) sentencing the court’s desire not to (cid:127) remorse, showing Batts’ recogni- minimize the seriousness of the wrongfulness tion of con- the his crimes; duct, victims; compassion and for his (cid:127) uncertainty of “the amenabil- [Batts’] (cid:127) although to treatment,” underage Batts admitted ity noting to “[although marijuana drinking, selling use you and may ultimately prove to be ame- Bloods, drugs for treatment, prior he had no experts nable to have record, criminal generally did well any indicated rehabilitation will academically and at various excelled require years of psychotherapy”; sports; (cid:127) (cid:127) protect to public need from employed prison, he is has taken
Batts because of the crimes commit- leadership classes on and violence ted, violence, “history his aggres- prevention, engaged in pre-voca- law,” disrespect sion training; for the tional Superior Appeal (cid:127) relationship with his D. he has a close Second attempts positive to be a family and Superior A panel divided brother; younger his role model Of rel- judgment of sentence. affirmed bar, majority the case at to evance (now by then-Judge Jus- opinion, authored (cid:127) that, age given his expert opinions tice) claim Mundy, found Batts’ insights gained he and the has since to him permit insufficient to evidence was crimes, years of committing psy- life-without-parole sen- subjected to “psy- his improve could chotherapy discretionary to challenge tence was chological condition.” sentencing. aspects Commonwealth 2015). (Pa. Batts, Super. Id. at 60-63. The court did not 125 A.3d a concise state- Batts failed file may Because consider evidence have Superior Court for the ment reasons his members continued association with discretionary of his sen- aspects review no gang, the Bloods as it found there was 2119(f) tence, required Rule engaged any violent evidence that he Proce- Pennsylvania Appellate Rules gang activity prison. Id. dure, objected and the Commonwealth found, “weighing The court omission, majority concluded factors[,] not in all the ... that the factors the claim. at 44. Batts had waived Id. significantly outweigh the favor [Batts’] majority request impose Batts’ declined favor,” that the factors in crimes proof the Commonwealth a burden of yet question “reflect unfortunate did not seeking impose life-without-parole 64-65. In immaturity.” Id. at transient apply for a or to found, stead, review, “On appellate heightened standard 7, 2006, you commit evening February requested relief would concluding that the Assembly calculated, come from the callous General ted and cold-blooded have pursuant rule- from our this Court yourself judge, jury made murder. You 43; see making Id. at Pa. Const. power. and, of Clarence Edwards and executioner V, 10(c). It further found meritless art. God, you grace if not for would also juveniles convicted of first- his claim that Corey Hilario.” Id. at have killed *16 to degree are entitled the same murder thereafter, sentencing Immediately the facing protections as constitutional adults pris- of life in a sentence court reinstituted Batts, 125 44- penalty. at the death A.3d parole for on without 45. conviction, first-degree murder and Batts’ (now Judge) Fitz- Former Justice Senior him to a concurrent
further resentenced
finding of
disagreed with the
waiver
gerald
twenty years of incarcera-
to
term ten
claim based
his
Batts’
Id.
attempted murder.
at 67.
tion for
2119(f), giving
comply
to
with Rule
failure
how,
on to
Judge
then.went
recount
Koury
First,
for
three reasons
his dissent.
mur-
that Batts should serve
after he decided
“felony
is not-a
or misdemeanor” sub-
der
murder, he
parole
life
for the
without
process.
discretionary
to
review
ject
replayed
crime scene and
drove
106(a) (listing
types
§
See 18 Pa.C.S.
three
head,
in his
February
murders,
events
felonies, and
misde-
crimes:
coming out
imagining
meanors).
Delores Howell
to
jurisdictional
require-
As
grandson
seeing
Superior
her
for the
Court to consider
porch
ments
sentencing discretionary aspects of
his
to
head. Id.
68.
gunshot
two
wounds
9781(b)
§
only to
apply
according
Fitzgerald,
42 Pa.C.S.
Judge
felonies
to
sen
misdemeanors, he found a
tencing
sentence
court’s
a
that
belief
less
sentence
not “subject
murder
was
for a
conviction
parole
life
than
without
would constitute
n discretionary
process.” Batts,
review
“leniency” represents
an act of
a misun
J.,
(Fitzgerald,
concurring
125 A.3d
derstanding
of “the nature
.
our indeter
§
dissenting);
9781(b)
see 42
Pa.C.S.
Id.;
minate
scheme.”
see Com
(“The defendant or the Commonwealth
Daniel,
monwealth
may
petition
appeal
file a
for allowance of
(1968) (“the
maximum sen
discretionary aspects
a sentence
tence
...
is
sentence
only
real
felony
ap-
for a
a
misdemeanor
portion of the
legal
sentence which has
pellate
jurisdiction
court
initial
that has
for validity”).
”). Second,
appeals
for
such
Ill,
Raised
Issues
juvenile
first-degree
convicted
murder
Code,'
Sentencing
does
arise from the
Batts filed
for
petition
allowance of
removing appellate
further
thus
review of
Court,
appeal
granted
to this
we
the sentence from the strictures
section request
following
questions:
answer the
9781(b).
(citing
Id. at 49-50
Pa.C.S.
Alabama,
In Miller v.
the U.S. Su
9781(b)
(providing
review a chal-
preme
mandatory
outlawed
life
lenge
discretionary aspects
to the
of sen-
],
parole
without
in
juveniles [
tencing requires
petitioning party
discretionary imposi
structed that
question
show a substantial
that the sen-
tion of this sentence should-be “uncom
imposed
not appropriate
tence
under the
mon” and reserved for the
“rare
Code)). Third,
Sentencing
Judge Fitzger-
irrepara
offender whose
reflects
crime
ald believed
the issue under consider-
corruption.”
ble
ation,
imposition of
involving the
a sen-
currently
i.
no procedural
There
juvenile,
tence of
parole
without
ensure
mechanism
extraordinary legal
“a
was
sufficiently
parole] will
[life without
be “uncom-
question to
despite
pro-
warrant review
in Pennsylvania.
mon”
Should this
cedural
default.” Id. at
authority
exercise
its
under
Judge Fitzgerald would have decided
Pennsylvania
promul-
Constitution
and, in
doing,
the claim on its
so
merits
gate
safeguards including
procedural
would have
the decision
concluded
(a) presumption against juvenile
[life
possi-
resentence
to life without the
(b)
requirement
parole];
bility
unsupported
by both
(c)
competent
testimony;
expert
prevailing
the record and the
law. See id.
“beyond a
doubt”
reasonable
standard
view,
49-54. In his
proof?
improperly
choice
“framed its
as two ex-
*17
ii. The
court reviewed [Batts’]
lower
tremes:
the Commonwealth’s recommen-
customary
sentence under the
abuse
that
dation
be sentenced to
[Batts]
of discretion standard. Should the
parole,
request for a
and [Batts’]
Court
court’s
reverse
lower
appli-
of twenty-five
to life as
cation of
highly
this
deferential stan-
suggested by
1102.1.” Id. at
18 Pa.C.S.
light
dard in
of Millerl
56).
N.T., 5/2/2014,
(citing
54
The sen-
Miller,
In
tencing
meaningful
gave
no
U.S.
consider-
basis for its individual-
imposing
ation
term of
stated that the
minimum
in-
ized
twenty-five-year
requirement
carceration
Gra-
above
Further,
comparison
rejected.
minimum
ham’s
with-
[life
sentence it
Id.
sociological
dren, as well as scientific and
penalty. [Batts]
to the death
parole]
out
studies,
mature and
juveniles are less
that
due
objectively
procedural
less
received
responsibili-
developed sense of
a less
pun- have
facing capital
than an adult
process
impetuous
ty,
result[s]
which “often
the Court address
ishment. Should
Id. at
and decisions.”
actions
ill-considered
resentencing
constitutionality of [Batts’]
omitted).
(citations
569, 125
S.Ct.
proceeding?
vein,
that “adoles-
the Court observed
that
256,
Batts,
v.
Commonwealth
statistically in
overrepresented
are
cents
curiam).
(2016)(per
A.3d 176
category of reckless behav-
virtually every
Arnett, Reckless Behav-
(quoting
ior.” Id.
Precedent
IV.
Per-
Developmental
A
ior in Adolescence:
engaging in a
Prior to
discussion
Rev. 339
spective,
Developmental
necessary
first
presented,
is
arguments
(1992)).
that “[t]he
The Court thus found
legal precedent upon
to examine the
for us
juveniles to immature and
susceptibility of
rests.
decision
their
means
irresponsible behaviors
Roper
morally
v.
is not as
irresponsible
A.
Simmons
conduct
Id. at
as that of an adult.”
reprehensible
the United States Su-
begin with
We
(citation
570,
quotation
had
on
juvenile
average
offender
associated
serve
bery, possessed
will
firearm and
years
greater percentage
ac
engaged
and a
individuals
in
more
with
criminal
sought
prison
the
an
life
than
adult offender.”
tivity. Although
prosecution
an
Further,
years of
Id. at
aggregate
forty-five
S.Ct. 2011.
because
incarceration,
permanence
punishment
inves
of the
of the
presentence
and
and
the
differentiating
ju-
a sen
tigation report only
characteristics
recommended
(namely,
an
impetuousness,
venile
under-
imprisonment,
of four
tence
developed
responsibility,
lessened
sense
court
Graham life
sentenced
greater
capacity for
culpability,
and a
without
adults),
reasoned,
change
“esca
than
on Graham’s
rehabilitation
based
court
conduct,”
penological justi-
Court concluded that the
lating pattern of criminal
he
be-,
suppoi’t
imposition
fications to
of life
engage
continue to
criminal
havior,
requiring
“protect the without
sentences
non-homicide
the court to
by juveniles—retribu-
Gra
actions.
crimes committed
community” from Graham’s.
tion, deterrence,
ham,
incapacitation
2011.
and reha-
U.S. at
130 S.Ct.
71-74,
not
See id. at
met.
bilitation—were
certiorari,
Following
grant
its
2011.
S.Ct.
Supreme
United
Court found
States
that
The United States
juveniles
the differences
between
held
of a
therefore
that the absence
lawful
Roper applied
adults observed
sentence,
justification for the
“the
limited
equal force
issue
circumstances
juvenile
of
culpability
non[-]homicide
no
The Court
basis to
Graham.
identified
and the
of life
severity,
without
Roper
fenders
its conclusions
about
reconsider
parole sentences all lead
the conclusion
immaturity
impetuous
the inherent
sentencing practice
under
consid
juveniles;
contrary,
ness of
“devel
unusual,”
cruel
eration
forbid
opments in
brain science
psychology and
by the
Eighth'
to show
den
Amendment
continue
differences
fundamental
United States Constitution. Id. at
Id.
between
and adult minds.”
Eighth
2011. The
re
Observing
Amendment
S.Cit.
defen
quires
into
commit non-homicide
take
dants who
offenses
youthfulness
generally
deserving
are
less
account a defendant’s
most
time
committed
offense. Id. at
punishments
severe
those who com
than
he/she
76, 130
murder,
mit
the Court concluded that
S.Ct. 2011.
“a
offender who
not kill
intend
did
explained
although
The Court
its
culpa
to kill has
twice
moral
diminished
holding
require
guaran
does
State to
compared
bility” as
adult
murderer.
juvenile’s
tee a
conviction
following
release
69, 130
Id. at
S.Ct. 2011.
offense,
for a non-homicide
a court must
provide the
with “some mean
defendant
The Court further recognized that life
ingful opportunity to obtain release based
parole,
most
without
severe
second
maturity
rehabilita
demonstrated
punishment, shares
unique
some
charac-
Id. at
tion.”
capital punishment, including
teristics with
irrevocability
truly
associated forfei-
Those
horrifying
who commit
liberty
deprivation
ture and
crimes as
out
may
without
turn
Moreover,
irretrievable,
hope
deserving
for its restoration.
of in-
and thus
pa-
carceration
Graham
identified
for the.
their
duration
*20
Roper
Graham,
Eighth
Amendment
lives.
does not
and
the Court reasoned
‘juvenile
that
a
possibility
persons
that
that
“[deciding
foreclose
offender
forever
non[-jhomicide
danger
society’
will be
of
crimes com-
convicted
require ‘mak[ing]
judgment
[he]
will remain be-
mitted before adulthood
incorrigible’—but ‘incorrigibility
incon
prohibit
bars for life. It
hind
does
States
”
472-73,
youth.’
sistent with
Id. at
making
at
judgment
from
the outset
Graham,
(quoting
S.Ct.
at
U.S.
those
will be fit
offenders never
2011).
72, 130 S.Ct.
society.'
reenter
In
contravention of
“foundational
Id.
principle”
Roper
Graham,
set forth in
and
C. Miller v. Alabama
the mandatory
statutes at issue
Miler
most
imposed
the States’
severe
later,
Alabama,
Two
Miller
treating
imprisonment,
term of
him as
the United States
Court consid-
adult,
though
“removing youth
he
anwas
proportionality
life-without-pa-
ered the
“prohibiting]
from the
balance” and
sen
role sentences for
convicted
tencing authority
assessing
from
whether
concurrently
homicide
It
offenses.
consid-
imprisonment
the law’s harshest
term
juveniles—Kuntrell
the cases
two
ered
proportionately punishes a
offend
Jackson,
fourteen,
age
par-
who at the
Id.
again
at
2455. Once
er.”
S.Ct.
ticipated
robbery
in a
failed armed
likening
life-in-prison
ju
for a
sentence
during
accom-
convenience
which his
store
penalty,
to.
venile
the death
the Miller
clerk;
plice shot and killed the
store
juve
for
Court concluded that
Miller,
fourteen,
age of
Evan
who at the
niles must be individualized. See
at
id.
bludgeoned
intentionally
incinerated
474-78, 132
This requires
con
neighbor,
he
been
adult
with
had
whom
age
sideration
defendant’s
at the
smoking marijuana,
neighbor
after
offense,
time
well as “its
as
hallmark
him
caught
stealing
from his
money
wallet.
features,” including:
eases,
they
for which
both
the offenses
immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to
(capital felony
for
were convicted
murder
appreciate
consequences[;]
risks and
...
course of
Jackson
murder in the
arson
the family and
environment that
home
Miller),
mandatory
for
carried a
surrounds him—and
can-
from which he
of life in
without the
usually
not
extricate himself—-nomatter
dysfunctional^]
how brutal or
...
Relying
findings
Roper
made in
offense,
circumstances
the homicide
and Graham and the scientific studies
including
extent of
participation
his
based,
they
upon which
were
United
way
familial
conduct and
Supreme Court
“that
reiterated
States
peer pressures may
him[;]
have affected
youth
distinctive attributes
diminish the
...
might
that he
charged
have been
justifications
imposing
penological
lesser
if
convicted
offense
offenders,
harshest sentences on
incompetencies
associated with
they
even when
commit terrible crimes.”
youth—for
example,
inability to deal
Miller,
471-72,
at
In holding, pains so the Court took he was ment officer seventeen when differentiate the considerations (without observed confirm- old. The Court required from a court’s resolution of incarcerated, ing) Montgomery that while request juris- to transfer a matter to the reportedly had transitioned “from a trou- diction of the court. The Miller bled, youth to a question misguided model member observed hearing community.” at a transfer Id. determined mark- at 736. (1989) Montgomery pro- (plurality), The decision overturned L.Ed.2d 334 that the procedural, decision v. Cun- Court’s Commonwealth nouncement in Miller not (2013), ningham, substantive, nature, apply and thus did held, majority of wherein a this Court based judgments were final time at the Teague the framework announced in Cunningham, 81 4-11. Miller. See A.3d at Lane, decision, for its explaining basis out the of parole imposed upon Montgomery Court stated that the le- offender is if unconstitutional gal principles Roper and established the crime juvenile’s reflected the “tran- Miller, Graham, applied in regarding immaturity.” sient Id. juve- the differences between adults and Despite reserving to the States the task juvenile’s niles resultant “diminished of prescribing the procedure for imple- culpability greater prospects for re- Miller, menting High observed, generally applicable juve- form” are to all rather than relitigating the sentence of niles. See id. at 732-33. penological “[T]he every juvenile, affected States could sim-
justifications for life without col- *22 ply juvenile entitle all homicide offenders lapse in of light the ‘distinctive attributes eligible to be for parole. This would “en- ” youth.’ Miller, of Id. at (quoting that that sure[] whose crimes 2455). at U.S. 132 S.Ct. The Court only reflected transient immaturity—and requires clarified Miller that far more who have since matured—will not be than of mere consideration an offender’s to disproportionate forced serve a sentence age prior imposing to life-without-parole a in violation of Eighth the Amendment.” Id. sentence, such a “still as sentence violates at 736. Should offenders exhibit an inabili- Eighth the Amendment for a child whose reform, ty they to will “continue to serve yet crime reflects ‘unfortunate transient ” their sentences.” Id. Miller, immaturity.’ (quoting Id. 2455). at Life without Batts’ Sentence Y. parole disproportionate “is a sentence for Turning to the issues children, ap- raised this all but the rarest of those whose peal, begin by addressing we Batts’ sen- irreparable corruption,” crimes reflect tencing challenge. He “permanent contends that al- incorrigibility,” and ir- “such though sentencing depravity the court retrievable that rehabilitation is considered thereby factors his impossible,” excluding relating age develop- “the vast ment, majority juvenile of from facing offenders” this insufficient to satisfy a of in prison sentence life without Montgomery. mandates Be- Miller 726, 733, Id. at found, sentencing court cause the based (internal omitted). quotation marks upon expert testimony, that “Batts has capacity change,” demonstrated some for requires “Miller a sentencer consider possible “sig- and that was at least that juvenile youth a offender’s attendant change” nificant could occur with determining characteristics before that life therapy, precluded this of a institution parole proportionate without is a sen- life-without-parole sentence. Brief at Batts’ Although tence.” Id. at Montgom- (citing, part, Sentencing 29-30 Court ery acknowledged that Miller con- 8/27/2014, 54, 58-59). Opinion, at Batts em- factfinding requirement” tains no “formal phasizes that the United States prior to a sentencing imposing court a require sentencing a did court sentence of life the possibility without positive that the parole capable defendant is juvenile, the Court stated that fact, change; this rehabilitation and he as- purposeful per- omission was so to as serts, true, opposite mit is as sovereignly the sentenc- States administer justice systems ing them criminal make a finding and establish must procedure proper implementation irreparably corrupt before is. holding. of Milled s empha- parole Id. 735. It sentence life im- without can be sized, however, that a sentence of posed. life with- pa- of life non-mandatory without sentence sentence
Batts states his sentencing illegal-, as the upon is an issue imposed role the dictates of court’s decision violates this For impression before Court.10 first Montgomery. contends that He Miller and to a purposes, challenges appellate review employ must novo we de standard fall typically into'one criminal sentence sentencing of the court’s appellate review le- categories, implicating either the two legal regarding eligibility conclusion discretionary gality life-without-parole Id. sentence. aspects of the sentence. This distinction review He further asserts we should critical, encom- also determination novo the factors de each considered preservation, passes matters of issue court based the evi- question jurisdiction Court’s decide presented. dence id. 41-57. óf presented, and the level deference the amicus, and its The Commonwealth reviewing give to the decision court must Pennsylvania Attorneys Asso District court. (“DAA”), They disagree. ciation assert court adhered re challenge legality A *23 order, required all of the mand considered may be reviewed particular sentence that factors, properly found Batts was not it need be any appeal; court on direct subject prison to a sentence of life with to courts be review preserved the lower possibility Common out appel an may be even raised by able 52-53; at DAA’s at
wealth’s Brief Brief sponte. v. late court sua Commonwealth pro that They 14-15. contend further _ 121, Barnes, Pa. _, _, 151 A.3d im life-without-parole of a sentence priety (2016); Montgomery, 136 124 see also juvenile question is a of the posed not a con (stating “[a] at 731 S.Ct. that because sentence, legality of the as the imposed in or sentence violation viction of the the discretion sen decision rests just is not but a rule erroneous substantive therefore, tencing appellate re court and result, void[, and, a contrary i]t law using an abuse view should be conducted follows, court general principle, as a that a standard.9 Commonwealth’s discretion authority place a convic has no leave 39-44; (stating 20 at Brief at Brief DAA’s tion or that violates a substantive sentence applicable for a is de novo review rule”) Siebold, (citing parte 100 Ex U.S. law, present are questions 371, (1879)). As we have L.Ed. 717 life-without-parole aof appellate review pertain explained, our decisions previously juvenile a offend imposed upon sentence sentencing illegality ing questions er). . smooth,” always been “com “have not Scrutiny for A. Batts’ Level “from arising disagreement plexities” Sentencing Claim among of the Court concern the members particular implicates ing a claim whether appropriate of the question of a sentence.” Commonwealth appellate legality a scrutiny review level _ Pa. _, _, Safka, merely 141 A.3d is not wealth v. 9. abuse discretion "[A]n 1239, (2016). reaching 1249 judgment, if in a conclu- error of but misapplied, or or sion law is overridden law, manifestly question for which our judgment is unrea- is a exercised This sonable, partiality, prejudice, of review is de novo. standard Commonwealth dr the result 512, ill-will, 1268, Eisenberg, 626 98 A.3d 1276 v. Pa. bias or as shown evidence (2014). record, is abused.” Common- discretion
435 453, 299, 460-61 trievable Spruill, depravity 80 is v. A.3d rehabilitation however, (2013). impossible”). no-dispute, is that a There challenging sentencing legal court’s claim a Montgomery, Miller Under impose particular sentence authority no sentencing court has sen discretion to sentencing legality. presents question tence a juvenile offender to life without
See,
560
v. Vasquez,
Commonwealth
e.g.,
it finds that
is
unless
the defendant
1280,
(2000)
381,
(ques
1282
Pa.
744 A.2d
of the “rare” and
chil
one
“uncommon”
tion of
trial
had the
court
“whether-the
possessing
dren
the above-stated charac
authority
impose
statutorily
mandated
teristics, permitting its imposition. Mont
legality);
challenge
fíne” is a
726,
Miller,
gomery,
734;
136 S.Ct.
567
478,
Shiffler,
Pa.
Commonwealth
583
479,
Graham,
U.S.
2455;
see
S.Ct.
185,
(claim
(2005)
regarding
2011;
Roper,
impose
authority
particular
the court’s
572-73,
U.S. at
A
sentence
implicates
of the
legality
sentence
sen
of life in
without the
tence);
M.W.,
In re
Pa.
725 A.2d parole for a murder
committed when
(same).
(1999)
defendant
awas
dis
otherwise
proportionate and unconstitutional under
The United
States
Eighth
Montgomery,
Amendment.
that control
this matter unam
decisions
S.Ct. at
permit the
of a
biguously
life-
imposition
without-parole
Thus, in the absence of the sen
only if the
committed
offender'
crime
conclusion,
tencing
reaching
sup
permanent
in
indicative
offender’s
evidence,
by competent
ported
the crime
not the
corrigibility;
incorrigible,
will forever
defendant
*24
yet
transient
result’
“unfortunate
hope
any
rehabilitation,
for
a life-
without
juveniles.
of all
immaturity” endemic
See
juve
without-parole
imposed
sentence
on a
734;
726,
136
at
Montgomery,
Mil
illegal,
beyond
S.Ct.
is
it
nile
as
is
the court’s
2455;
479,
ler,
see
567
at
132 S.Ct.
at
power
impose.
Vasquez,
U.S.
A.2d
744
Graham,
73,
1282;
189;
560
at
130
also
S.Ct.
In re
Shiffler, 879 A.2d at
M.W.,
2011;
573,
by
543 U.S. at
A.2d at
As
Roper,
725
stated
Court,
Therefore, for
with
en
Montgomery
a-sentence of life
“when a State
proportional
proscription
penalty
forces a
barred
parole
applied
out
be
as
Constitution,
murderer,
sentencing
conviction
resulting
is,
find,
by definition,
on
or sentence
unlawful.”
competent
must first
based
evi
such,
dence,
136
at
Montgomery,
the offender
unable
729-30. As
entirely
is
It
change.
is no
court’s le
must find
there
we must review
eligible
that the
that Batts is
re
possibility
gal
could
reha
conclusion’
offender
life,
parole pur
of life
any point
at
his
no ceive
bilitated
later in
novo
plenary
much
to a de
spends
how
time he
suant
standard and
matter
therapeu
v.
regardless
scope
the amount of
review. Commonwealth
and
465,
1241,
McClintic,
receives,
589
tic
he
that the
Pa.
909 A.2d
interventions
and
(2006).
juvenile’s
legal
crime committed reflects
Because this
conclusion
unchangeable personality
upon the
of testi
premised
-presentation
and
true
credibility
mony
sentencing court’s
Montgomery,
character.
experiences “suggest
{id.
[he]
sentencing
May
ings made at the
opinion pursuant
Rule
it
In its
written
reader, we cite
1925(a)
hearing.
ease of the
Pennsylvania
Appel-
For the
Rules of
Procedure,
sentencing
opinion in our
quotes
only to the
court’s
sentencing
court
late
analysis
arguments
raised.
lengthy
extensively
and detailed find-
from the
ample posi-
Our review the record finds
al murders. The Miller
emphasized
support
potential
tive
to Batts’
for
relative
that “the
youth
distinctive attributes of-
supra, pp.
rehabilitation. See
422-24.
diminish
penological justifications
for
imposing the harshest
juve-
As
sentences on
sentencing
opin-
we
court’s
read
ion,
offenders,
it
nile
even
they
becomes clear
its
when
that
conclusion
commit ter-
Miller,
that Batts’
rible
actions were not the
crimes.”
result
567 U.S. at
yet
immaturity”
his “unfortunate
transient
S.Ct. 2455. “Miller's central intuition” is
exclusively
based
the fact that the
“that children who commit even heinous
murder
premediated.”
was “deliberate and
crimes are capable
change.” Montgom-
Sentencing
8/27/2014,
Opinion,
736;
also,
ery, 136
Miller,
S.Ct. at
see
e.g.,
sentencing
62. The
court went on to
The view
severe
*26
Miller,
court contravenes
the relevant United
567 U.S. at
S.Ct. 2455
Graham,
68, 130
Supreme
precedent.
(quoting
States
Court
Miller
at
U.S.
S.Ct.
2011).
Montgomery directly
legal
and
the sen-
This
on
address
conclusion was based
tencing
(1)
juveniles
of
who commit intention-
the determination that
lack
findings
12.
appeal
The
court issued its
to the issues raised on
before the Su-
record,
instances,
perior
its
decision
the
which
Court. In
the
both
sentenc-
span
pages
transcript,
ing
of
specifics
and further au-
court
included
about Batts’
childhood, academics, athletics,
127-page opinion pursuant
thored a
provided
to Pa.
and
1925(a) thoroughly detailing
testimony
R.A.P.
what it
a detailed account of the
received
response
parties
resentencing hearing.
considered when
from both
at the
N.T.,
crimes.
to commit these
underdeveloped
choice”
maturity
have “an
and
Michals,
5/1/2014,
however,
at
Dr.
53.
results in
responsibility,”
sense
that
no basis
provided
for his conclusion
reckless,
unnecessary risk-
impulsive and
sound, rea
to make
ability
Batts had
behaviors; (2)
highly vulnerable
taking
are
age
soned
at
decisions
.fourteen—a
negative influence
peer pressure
to
and
Court
Supreme
skill the
determined
inability
control
their
to
resulting from
by
impetu
eclipsed
juvenile’s
generally
(3)
environments;
have charac
and
their
fact,
immaturity.
Dr. Mi-
ousness and
fully
that
not
personalities
and
ters
are
(cid:127) opinion
that
not
only
chals was
fixed,
figure out
struggle to
and
formed-or
personality
likely fully
was
formed
Batts’-
(citing Roper, 543 U.S.
Id.
their identities.
fourteen,
age but
at
fixed
and
1183).
569-70, 125 S.Ct.
at
are not
people
general
personalities
to
any
differen
providing
basis
Without
change. Specifically, Michals
subject
Dr.
making
typi
from the
tiate Batts’ decision
testified,
change
can
but
“Characteristics
Roper, Gra
contemplated in
teenager
cal
changes
to make
to the
very
it’s
difficult
Miller,
sentencing- court
the'
ham and
personality.”
structure
Id.
our
at
basic
fourteen,
Batts,
age
at
found
59, Though
acknowledged
he
that he “can’t
choice to
out of
purposeful
move
“made a
future,”
opinion
he
predict
was
join gang,
parents’ home” and to
with
his
personality
“somebody
that the
who
criminal
knowledge
it
a violent
“was
likely
change
not
time. Id. He
14”
over
will
organization
that he
be asked
change
say
on to
that “it’s difficult
went
Sentencing
commit
criminal' acts.”
violent
traits,”
underlying personality
our
8/27/2014,
49-50. The
Opinion,
at
everybody.”
Id.
opinion, this.“applies
his
although Batts
found that
further
60;-:
(Dr.
at
see
at
Michals
also id.
at the
subjected
peer pressure
time
was
as a
opining that
are
we are
.“we
who
murder,
“peer
n
not
pressure
was
biological
makeup
genetic
result
Batts”;
he
imposed upon [ ]
instead
per
merely
experiences
...
[sic]
“sought
gang member
out and embraced
is a
sonality is
character
definition
therefore,
pressure did
peer
ship,” and
ourselves,”). Indeed,
.Supreme
despite the
culpability.
not
Id.
diminish
50-51.
contrary,
Mi-
Court’s conclusion
Dr.
.to
'
findings
These
contravene
that,
dealing
chals
“research
maintained
unambiguous instruction
Court’s
de
behavioral and brain
with adolescent
adults,” pro
treat
“miniature
juveniles as
inconclusive,
velopment” is
“research
ceeding
though they not
children.
findings
progress.” Dr. Michals’
... still
Miller, 567
3/12/2014,
Miller,
Report,
see
19; but
Roper,
ignore
principal
tenet
They
(“The
n.5, 132
440 (2016), imper Pa. _, it is 651 first-degree A.3d in the case
hibiting parole
judiciary to “rewrite”
for the
juvenile from the missible
by a
committed
murder
statute)
conform
consti-
make
parole
of the
statute
remainder
of United
use of our sever-
commands
impermissible
constitutional
tutes an
because, according
authority. This is
PACDL’s
ance
Court decision.
States
PACDL,
remaining portion
(citing Hopkins,
117 A.3d at
Brief at 13-14
‘incapable of
662).
or
“‘incomplete’
261, 262; Wolfe,
statute
A.3d
executed,’
of another statu-
being
because
penalty for a
is no lawful
there
Because
that a term
tory requirement
murder,
first-degree
convicted
that is
sentence
have a minimum
current sen-
that Batts’
PACDL asserts
maximum
half of the
than
greater
not
be resen-
illegal, and he must
tence is
impossibility
mathematical
sentence—a
charge
third-degree
mur-
on the
tenced
of incarceration
term
the maximum
when
penalty of
der,
a maximum
carries
10-11;
see
Pa.C.S.
is life. Id.
15-16;
Id. at
forty years of incarceration.13
9756(b)(1)
minimum
(requiring that a
§
1102(d).
support
§
of this
18 Pa.C.S.
not exceed
imprisonment “shall
term of
contention,
upon the
relies
same
PACDL
im-
maximum sentence
of the
one-half
presented
sup-
in his
that Batts
case law
posed”).
in Batts I.
to this Court
plemental brief
fails,
according to
also
Severance
(citing Rutledge
Brief at
See PACDL’s
PACDL,
Assembly
because
General
States,
v.
517 U.S.
United
convictions from the
pre-Miller
excluded
(1996);
Common-
134 L.Ed.2d
scheme announced
section
Story,
Pa.
wealth v.
1102.1,
presume
therefore cannot
and we
(1981);
Bradley,
Pa.
v.
Commonwealth
Assembly would have enacted
the General
(1972)).
19,
wealth ex rel. v. Cunningham, Varronne state: (1950) (indicat 365 Pa. A.2d [parole] The may parole subject board to ing penalty without a conduct that guidelines consideration of established proscribed by is Assembly the General § under 42 2154.5 (relating Pa.C.S. to see also Characteristics crime); there is no adoption of guidelines parole) Law, Substantive Criminal Subst. may parole any release on inmate 1.2(d) (2d ed.). § Crim. L. argument whom power granted is implicates legality sentence, by except chapter, board this an Barnes, subject therefore is not to waiver. serving inmate or condemned death 124; Commonwealth v. 151 A.3d Dick imprisonment, whenever in its son, (2007). 918 A.2d opinion: Moreover, noted, Batts and PACDL (i) argue against legality The best the sentence interests the inmate based, part, justify require decisions of this or the inmate be Batts I. rendered after our decision paroled. Thus, we believe that our conclusion on the (ii) It not appear does the inter- I issue Batts war
legality ests the Commonwealth be in- will rants development.14 further by jured the inmate’s 6137(a)(1) added). § (emphasis Pa.C.S.
A. Severance
raised,
It
is
argument
the law
this Common
is no
There
every provision
wealth that
of every
perceive
conclude,
stat- we can
of no reason to
Moreover,
granted
we
question.
properly
since
allowance of
It is thus
before this Court
appeal,
1115(a)(3)
part,
appropriate
(“Only
fashion an
for review. Pa.R.A.P.
procedure
questions
to sentence
petition,
fairly
convicted of
set forth in the
or
murder,
Batts,
first-degree
therein,
comprised
see
ordinarily
will
be consid-
l(i),
¶
validity
legality
appeal
of our deci-
ered
court in the
event
allowed”).
fairly encompassed
sion Batts I is
Pa.C.S.
imposed.”
against paroling an
prohibition
is correct that there
PACDL
pris-
9756(b)(1).
life in
serve
condemned
individual
half of a
way
accurately
no
calculate
to the
from essential
inseparable
ison
*30
not, however,
Rather,
ren-
This does
as
statute.
sentence.
parole
of the
remainder
6137(a)
of
by-
Batts I’s severance
section
above,
argument presented
der
stated
baldly claims.
as PACDL
impermissible,
is
this
PACDL
Batts and
not
parole statute does
prohibition,
6137(a)
interplay between section
The
by
General Assem-
operate as
intended
9756(b)(1)
by
not
raised
and section
bly.
in Batts
parties nor addressed
I. How-
ever,
holding implicitly required sever-
our
severability
of
presumption
The
9756(b)(l)’s requirement
of section
ance
its
in
1925 finds
roots
pursuant to section
can
no more
that a minimum sentence
be
“duty to declare a
longstanding
the Court’s
sentence for
than half
maximum
if this can reasonably
constitutional
statute
first-degree
of
murder
juveniles convicted
Mills,
Hosiery
Inc. v.
Triumph
be done.”
I,
Batts
Our decisions reconceptualization do not affect in amount to our a decision wholesale Wolfe pro- years. currently parole-eligible We note there two after fifteen that are Id. The bill posed Legislature— Judiciary drafts of was referred the House Commit- statutes in our to 2016, 9, tee on June where it remained at one the Sen- from House one from writing. time of ate—pertaining sentencing this to of con- first-degree pre- of were victed murder Senate Bill 1147-eliminates the date of con- pieces sented for consideration in 2016. These requirement viction from section 1102.1 legislation go proposed of even than further authority juvenile abolishes the to sentence a parole authority I to enhance the of prison, parole. or to life in either with without board to inmates of convicted first- 1576, 1147, S.B. Printer's No. 200th Gen. 2135, degree murder. House Bill in relevant Assemb., (Pa. 2016). Instead, Reg. Sess. part, Crimes amends section 1102.1 of the first-degree convicted of murder authority completely Code of to remove the he or she was under committed when fifteen sentencing court to to thirty- would a maximum sentence of receive life without H.B. imprisonment; first-degree five Assemb., 2135, 3484, Printer’s by juvenile aged No. 200th Gen. murder fifteen committed (Pa. 2016). Reg. Sess. further amends sec- eighteen require It to would maximum sen- Code, striking forty-five years imprisonment. of the tion 6137 Parole tence of Id. against prohibition paroling to an individual On March this bill was referred Committee, prison, (ju- Judiciary serving making life in where all inmates the Senate it too adults) writing. in remained at time of this veniles sentenced to (1974), ler, incon 328 A.2d a manner that was statute leg-, existing applied this Court explicit statements sistent with wherein throughout appearing intent of individu sentencing islative to a class construct provisions To save the valid statute. from expressly had been als that excluded have had to would section sev following the Court’s applicability its place offense create a substantive from language unconstitutional erance ex created and existing statute applicable statute. In But previously Assembly. pressly the General intended ler, brought challenge under a man conclud 263 We therefore Id. at n.6. Rights statutory Equal Amendment18 [sjection ed, Alleyne, operation “By required men receive language all stripped the features has been of im terms and maximum both minimum as a it to function allow only to prisonment, permitted but women at 259. statute.” Id. prohibit a maximum sentence receive our decision Wolfe, we reaffirmed from mini giving courts woman a ed another, similarly Hopkins as it related term of confinement. Id. at 854. This mum mandatory minimum worded im discrepancy language women made statute, Wolfe, Pa.C.S. entering mediately parole-eligible again, 660-61. Once because severance required the ex prison, but men await have language would unconstitutional of them sentences be piration minimum aggra Court “to create new required pa being able, fore to be considered crimes,” vated direct contravention statutory oh scheme “[t]he role. Because' legislative intent express statements than its face men less favorably treats statute, concluded provided we women,” without, justification, a basis saving possible, the severance was Id. at unconstitutional. we found 're have any part of the statute 857-58. “beyond dur quired Court to venture authority and prescribed constitutionally clearly It the intent the General 662-63. purview.” Assembly, offending Id. it enacted the when statute, gener- from the exclude women re- Hopkins Severance in and Wolfe confine- requirement al that sentences of simply go beyond quired this'Court far *34 both maximum ment have minimum and language from a striking unconstitutional intervening develop- Because terms. statute, requires traditionally our role as law, however, no in the that was ments conduct a to instead permits, and and constitutionally permissible.' longer reconfiguration Given wholesale rewrite and striking statute, exclusively performed the choice of the a role minimum/maxi- Const, striking art Assembly, applicable See Pa. or the General mum men statute II, § I not Conversely, did create excepted Batts portion 1. the the statute that a crime or did not other- a sentence that receiving from sen- minimum women decision, but exist at the time wise our tences, the more Court found that was appropriately utilized lawfully instead and intent of the General with the consistent con- authority in a manner our severance latter, making Assembly thus strike intent,- legislative sistent with of im- subject to -minimum terms women that Court reasoned prisonment. The by the supported conclusion is This general striking But- of Commonwealth analogous case minimum/maximura of the rights Pennsylvania 18. law because of the sex "Equality shall under Const, Pa, I,'§ abridged 28. art. be or denied the Commonwealth individual.” offenders, any juvenile would men requirement required leave without as by Mont- sentence, gomery, the lan- that simply striking and the sentencing whereas overly does not guage excluding applica- emphasize its women from nature question, crime in both Batts bility sentences for lawful several maintained request his amici19 that addressing the this men and while also Court estab- women lish guidelines procedures Further, for problem. the sen- constitutional (and tencing resentencing) for “special sentencing found that statutes of first-degree convicted They murder. ar- departures women were more ... from intent, Miller, gue as Montgom- that clarified general provide equal sentencing ery, requires the institution of a presump- for men and women.” treatment Id. against sentencing tion offender Butler therefore severed in prison possibility life without thqs language, requiring unconstitutional 21-22; Batts’ Brief at Advocacy imposition prison minimum sen- 6-7; Amici’s Brief at PBA’s Brief at 4-6. tences women. Batts that proving 'of asserts burden Likewise, I, through legisla- our juvenile may subjected be to life tively-mandated power, severance .we parole placed without must Com- be statutory language struck unconstitutional establish, beyond monwealth to a reason- expanded the exist- application of an doubt, able that the crime reflects statutorily ing, provided sentence—life “irreparably corrupt,” “irre- possibility parole—to with reach trievably in- depraved,” “permanently subset of no longer individuals who could corrigible,” supported by must ex- constitutionally be sentenced in accordance pert 25-28, Brief at testimony. Batts’ 38- Although prior sentencing scheme. 39; see also PBA’s Brief 7-9. Batts Assembly the General a blanket instituted from identifies Court decisions' against prohibition paroling an individual jurisdictions several held other have murder, of first-degree which convicted further, similarly gone banning life have necessarily juveniles, include entirety sentences in their parole without Butler, too departure constituted a juvenile offenders. See Brief Batts’ general from “more intent” Gen- 22-27. Assembly, eral otherwise which treated ,juveniles It position is also Batts’ children different from adults for sentenc- facing Pa.C.S, see ing purposes, generally, e.g., 42 to a jury entitled determina- are (the Act),
§§ 6301-6375 Juvenile incor- permanently “that tion a juvenile years. in recent treatment continues corrupt”, rigible or before irreparably See, 1102.1; supra 18 Pa.C.S. e.g., note constitutionally imposed. bemay Thus, I in Batts severance decision he support of this contention Id. at 58. In stands. *35 Supreme upon relies States United Sentencing for Procedure VII. Alleyne, in as Court’s decision well Juveniles Convicted First- comparison Courts’ Graham and Miller Degree Murder juve- capital punishment facing adults facing To that a in life-without-parole ensure sen- niles on this only apparent tence is Id. reliance imposed the rarest at 57-58. tencing Reentry Project (collectively, Pennsylvania “Ad- These amici include the Bar & 19. (“PBA”), Amici”). Association Chil- Incarcerated vocacy Advocacy Sen- dren’s and the Youth Network 448 penalty pursuant Virgi- that he to Atkins v. parallel, Batts asserts death
latter
procedural
304,
to at least
same
nia,
2242,
“entitled
536
122
153
U.S.
facing
capi-
afforded
adult
process
due
(2002) (holding
L.Ed.2d
Eighth
punishment under
Amend-
tal
prohibits the
Eighth Amendment
execu-
United States Constitution]
ment
[to
intellectually
persons).
tion
disabled20
Pennsylva-
I,
13 of the
Article
Section
The
the DAA
Commonwealth and
differen-
Id. at
He thus con-
nia Constitution.”
there, however,
our
tiate
actions
based
to section
pursuant
tends
length
passed
of time that
be-
(addressing
proce-
Sentencing Code
Atkins decision
our decision
tween the
sentencing), if the Com-
capital
for
dure
Sanchez,
Assembly’s
and the General
its intention to
states
seek
monwealth
Here, they
con-
intervening failure
act.
parole
juve-
for a
of life without
tend,
Assembly
promptly act-
General
offender,
sentencing proceeding
nile
enacting
following
by
ed
Miller
section
trial, at
jury
which the
must
involve
1102.1,
obviating
ability
thus
this Court’s
proof.
bears
burden
Commonwealth
authority.
rulemaking
its
exercise
See
construct,
Additionally,
this
under
26-27;
Brief
Commonwealth’s
at
DAA’s
that a unanimous verdict
favor
contends
13-14,
(cautioning
at
Brief
this Court
the defendant to life without
“preempt
Assembly
not to
for
General
with the verdict
required,
sub-
assumption
the sake of an
jected
appellate
to automatic
review the
unfounded
at
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Id.
60-61.
sentencing courts cannot understand and
apply
Montgomery”).
Miller and
DAA
The Commonwealth
coun
inappropriate
that would be
this
ter
if
asserts that even
Commonwealth
procedures
to announce
for sentenc
Court
procedures
appropri-
Court-created
were
first-degree
ing
convicted
mur
context,
protec-
ate
the procedural
this
der,
inherently
contending that
“is
presumption
tions advanced
Batts—a
matter,”
itas
is for the
legislative
General
against
life-without-parole
sentence for
Assembly
punishments
for crimi
create
offenders;
placing the burden on
nal acts. Commonwealth’s Brief at 23-28
prove
applicabili-
Commonwealth
its
v.
(citing principally Commonwealth
De
doubt;
ty beyond
expert
a reasonable
tes-
Hart,
235,
(1986));
A.2d 656
Pa.
timony
support
applicability;
of its
13,
(same).
see also DAA’s Brief
18-19
findings
particularized
of fact—are not re-
recognize
They
that this
previously
quired by
Miller or Montgomery.
either
rulemaking
our
power
invoked
Com
28-38;
See Commonwealth’s Brief
Sanchez,
monwealth
v.
DAA’s
The Common-
Brief
20-23.
(2011),
procedures
create
deter
wealth
from several in-
mining
identifies decisions
whether
defendant convicted of
first-degree
is immune from
appellate
ju-
murder
from
termediate
courts
other
(2014),
"Intellectually
proposition
disabled” connotes the con
L.Ed.2d
for the
dition that the United
disability”
States
"intellectual
should
used
previously
"mentally
referred to as
retardation”).
retarded.”
place of "mental
"Intellectual
Compare
Virginia,
generally
Atkins
replaced
disability” also
retardation”
“mental
(2002),
122 S.Ct.
prove belongs protected (1985), that he to the nom., A.2d 354 sub McMillan aff'd Pennsylvania, class individuals that cannot be sen 477 U.S.
tenced to life (1986)). DAA’s Brief contrast, L.Ed.2d 67 (citing Montgomery, question solely pertains here to the . 735) procedures implement the sentence for convicted of first-degree mur Further, required because there no (as der. It argued by does the Com finding, fact states that Commonwealth DAA) monwealth and the require us to Alleyne-related there is no problem with a create the sentence itself. The resolution of judge-only sentencing proceeding. Com- presented the issues here squarely falls monwealth’s Brief at 53-54. The sentenc- authority. within our constitutional ing simply required to balance factors procedural postures and take into account other relevant sen- considerations, tencing case and Sanchez routinely strikingly are similar. In Sanchez, faced, alia, does as a matter of this Court was discretion other inter matters, challenge Pennsylvania imposition capi criminal both in to the upheld punishment tal on a under similar defendant circumstances who other appellate ineligible states’ claimed he was intermediate courts. receive the Id. at penalty pursuant 54-58. death to Atkins v. Virgi nia. We nine years observed Authority
A. Constitutional following decision, that elapsed the Atkins reject To begin, silent, we the Common Assembly the General had remained argument pro wealth’s that the failing creation to enact a statute to how address cedures to implement a substantive person rule courts should if a is in determine Rather, law falls to Assembly. tellectually the General disabled such that he is im Pennsylvania clearly Constitution and mune from execution under Atkins. San chez, Further, unambiguously bestows this Court as Miller *37 only percent around one the in cable to Montgomery, the Atkins, at 309 large. at 536 U.S. population for procedure forth Atkins did not set n.5, 122 the 2242. It follows then that S.Ct. disability, instead determining intellectual not majority of adults are constitu vast of devel the the task “leaving] to States exempt penalty tionally from the death the con ways to oping appropriate enforce Precisely opposite is under Atkins. the upon their execution restriction stitutional facing po for offender true Atkins, Id. (quoting of sentences.” serving life in tential 2242). 317, 122 S.Ct. at U.S. exceeding parole, as it is the possibility proce the absence stated We juvenile whose ly rare and uncommon assessing a defendant’s claim for dures permanent incorrigibility crime reflects capital disability in cases was intellectual may constitutionally sen therefore who “uncertainty courts creating lower to life without tenced practitioners,” among criminal law (cit Montgomery, at 726 lead to different standards “could which 479-80, Miller, S.Ct. ing at U.S. being employed in differ procedures Miller, 2455). See also 567 U.S. throughout the Common ent courtrooms relatively propor small (“only S.Ct. no Id. are sub there wealth.” “Because engage illegal ] tion of who adolescents[ restrictions stantive constitutional patterns of activity develop entrenched At procedures implementation decide behavior”) (quoting Roper, problem claims,” pro kins concluded that “the we 1183). Thus, unlike proper announce ... are cedures we Atkins, Miller consequences the rare authority of our exercise constitutional Montgomery impact every juvenile (cit administration.” Id. judicial over first-degree murder. convicted Const, 10(c)). V, § art. there ing Pa. We year passed has More than a since constitutionally-pre our fore exercised decision, Montgomery it been five has authority necessary scribed devise High Court decided Miller. years since the Atkins implementing for procedures Assembly any not has taken General Pennsylvania, including adjudi must who separate appreciable steps to create sen- cate an Atkins (judge jury), claim or when existing tencing statute to revise (pre-trial be made must determination applies convicted so law that sentencing phase), party or at the which Miller. prior to first-degree murder of proof, must bear the burden meantime, hundred several individuals required. Sanchez, proof level of 36 A.3d at prisons serving il- Pennsylvania remain 52-53, 62-72. legal life-without-parole sentences Contrary to the Com- positions they juve- when were crimes committed DAA, monwealth and that we waited niles. Pennsylvania Department promulgating procedures nine before Information, Corrections, Lifers Juvenile holding in implementation of the http://www.cor.pa.gov/General%20Infor- Atkins speaks propriety of this mation/Pages/Juvenile-Lifers-Informa- sooner, (last authority to Court’s have but tiomaspx#. WJTznqAo5aT acted visited 2017). infrequency prisoners, rather with which Each of those June question concerning imposition they commit- for the crimes incarcerated As the Atkins resentencing. It is question juveniles, awaits arose. ted as observed, meeting abundantly clear that the exercise our an individual required to set intellectually authority clinical definition of disabled constitutional resentencing the manner extremely diagnosis appli- forth rare—it is
451 proof of fact proceed will in the courts this Common- based of or “eviden “basic” tiary” Childs, 830; wealth. fact. 142 City A.3d at of Pittsburgh W.C.A.B., 345, v. 620 Pa. 67 position in the We are now undesirable 1194, (2013). 1204 presumption For a yet having of to again remand case Batts’ warranted, to be basic elemental and resentencing, for This will be the third “truly must facts See Common coincide.” Batts, twenty-six time that is who now Kelly, v. wealth 555 Pa. A2d 724 old, sentencing. The DAA’s will face (1999). question whether, The here is protestations notwithstanding, argu- Batts’ to pursuant Montgomery, Miller and we ment that courts would benefit adopt presumption against should sen guidance application from our of to tencing without Montgomery Miller and decisions is hard- possibility parole. Using ly Childs certainly and is not “unfounded” construct, the issue is whether the court “assumption.” See DAA’s Brief at 16. De- must find the spite ultimate fact that an offend best' court’s efforts here, er lengthy capable as is that reflected its and thor- rehabilitation ough of the recitation evidence consid- crime was the im result transient resentencing upon ered when Batts and it's rec- maturity proof the basic fact that ognition controlling United States the offender eighteen years was under precedent, the lack of pro- age he or when she the murder. committed failing cedural in it to safeguards resulted its Commonwealth and amicus not properly apply the Batts’ law to resentenc- only argue against a that presumption result, ing. As without a Batts remains rehabilitable, juvenile is but go to further judgment final sentence this matter urge that Mont- Miller and pursuant Therefore, decade after his as conviction. gomery, offender bears Sanchez, will exercise our “we constitu- of proving burden that he or she not judicial power tional administration to eligible for a life-without-parole sentence. procedure” implementa- devise a for the 29-31; Commonwealth’s Brief at DAA’s Montgomery tion of the Miller deci- reject 20-22. Brief at both prongs We Pennsylvania. sions in argument. Certain Commonwealth’s Presumption B. in the isolated statements Miller interpret- Montgomery might decisions be presumption is a stan “[A] suggest ed to that offender should practice, under which certain dardized bear he is proving the burden of facts are call uniform held treatment among great who majority respect proof their as to effect _ constitutionally are for a sen- eligible Childs, other v. facts.” Commonwealth See, e.g., of life _, (2016) tence Mil- _, Pa. 142 A.3d (refer- ler, al., U.S. at Broun, S.Ct. (quoting 2 Kennet et S.h ring (7th youth to the characteristics as McCormick on Evidence ed. 676-76 factors”); arises, 2013)). alia, “.mitigating Montgomery, A presumption inter if a (stating sentencing, fact firmly constitutes “a conclusion based “Montgomery pres- opportunity had no generally known results of wide. mitigation justify ent a less experience.” human evidence Watkins Prudential Am., sentence”), (referring Ins. Co. severe 173 A. (1934). mandatory youth “sentencing fac- presumption characteristics of A tors”), (stating Montgomery requires the factfinder find the 736-37 existence of an or “ultimate” have similarly “elemental” and others must situated pro- without the crime commit- to show the opportunity juvenile.21 Id. at portionate cor- irreparable their not reflect
ted did
Thus,
no doubt
there can be
ruption).
*39
Supreme Court
pursuant
established
However,
placing
of
any suggestion
(that
fact here
an
precedent, the ultimate
is belied
juvenile offender
on the
burden
of
capable
rehabilitation
offender.
Graham,
Roper,
premise of
by the central
of transient
the result
that the
crime
matter
as a
Montgomery—that
Miller
to the basic fact
immaturity) is connected
cul
law,
categorically less
juveniles are
of
(that
age
of
is under
the offender
premise
This central
than adults.
pable
Childs, 142
at 830.
A.3d
eighteen). See
firmly based
from “a conclusion
arises
of wide
generally known results
upon the
Court ex-
The United States
vast
experience,”
human
left it to the States
determine
pressly
change
they age
as
of
majority
adolescents
imple-
holding in
to be
how the
Miller was
and,
illegal
in
despite their involvement
Mont-
proceedings.
in
mented
state
“develop
pat
entrenched
activity,
not
do
at
therefore
gomery, 136
735. We
S.Ct.
Miller, 567
problem
behavior.”
terns
a faithful
Pennsylvania,
in
conclude
(referring to
at
132 S.Ct.
Miller,
holding in
as
application of the
“common sense” and
this conclusion as
the cre-
Montgomery, requires
clarified
knows”) (citing Roper,
any parent
“what
against
presumption
ation of a
1183);
569-70, 125
at
S.Ct.
Wat
543 U.S.
life
without
a
offender to
kins,
at 648. The Miller Court
173 A.
possibility of parole.
High
longstanding
Court’s
reiterated
that the distinctive attributes
conclusion
of Proof and Notice
C. Standard
finding
that a
generally preclude
youth
incorrigible, espe
juvenile will forever be
Supreme Court
The United States
great difficulty even
light
cially
in prison
of life
a sentence
did
outlaw
making
have
professional psychologists
all
possibility
during
person’s
that determination
murder;
first-degree
juveniles convicted
479-80,
472-73,
Miller, 567 U.S. at
youth. See
(illegal) sen
only a disproportionate
it is
2455.
S.Ct.
may
who
be ca
for those offenders
tence
Miller,
Millet’s,
567 U.S.
pable of rehabilitation. See
pa-
holding, “that life without
2455;
479-80,
Montgomery,
at
S.Ct.
for children
role is an excessive sentence
Therefore,
pre
at
136 S.Ct.
734.
immatu-
transient
crimes reflect
whose
imposition
sumption against
rule of constitution-
rity,” is
“substantive
Common
punishment is rebuttable
Montgomery, 136
735.
al law.”
juvenile is re
upon proof that the
wealth
This,
means
according
Montgomery,
recognized
generally
from this
class
moved
“the rarest of
offenders”
only
potentially
rehabilitable offenders.
of life
eligible
receive
are
Rush,
Pa.
Only Commonwealth
Id.
without the
(1989)
(reciting the “well
life A.2d
“exceptional
will
circumstances”
all,
fact,
ings
Montgomery,
136 S.Ct.
leaving
proce-
while
the ultimate
This,
States,
require
proposed, would
resentencing
Mont-
the Court
to the
dure for
inability to
"prisoners
juveniles serv-
who have shown
gomery
suggested
that all
complete
but
their life sentences
reform”
ing illegal mandatory
sentences across
opportunity for release to offenders
afford
country
given
opportunity
could be
ability
course,
their
who have demonstrated
disposing
parole as a matter of
change. Id.
resentencing hear-
convene
need for States to
principle of the law
evi
should have in the
established
correctness
factual
presumption places
particular
bur
type
adjudi-
dence” that
conclusions for
Sanchez,
proof
production
and the burden of
den
cation.”
at 65 (quoting
pre
to rebut the
party
Oklahoma,
348, 362,
on the
seeks
Cooper v.
517 U.S.
fact); Kelly,
(recog
(1996)).
sumed
their
be released
on,
Supreme
held that
therefore
Expert Testimony
D.
dispro
is
is an
appeal
There
undeniable
portionate
illegal
juvenile
for a
offend
expert
Batts’ contention that
testimony is
unless
er
that defendant
such
“exhibits
necessary for a court to determine that a
depravity
irretrievable
that rehabilitation
permanently
offender is
incorrigi
impossible.”
Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at
Graham,
ble.
S.Ct.
U.S.
Miller,
479-80,
(citing
.at
(“It
expert
difficult even for
psy
2455)
added).
(emphasis
chologists to
ju
differentiate between the
Pursuant
to our
consideration
at-
offender
crime reflects
venile
whose
unfor
process
tendant due
concerns and the de-
yet
immaturity,
tunate
transient
and the
language
finitive
used
rare
offender whose crime reflects
Court, we
conclude that
overcome the
irreparable corruption.”) (quoting Roper,
*42
presumption against
imposition of a
the
572,
1183); Miller,
at
543 U.S.
125 S.Ct.
parole
juve-
sentence
life
for a
without
479-80,
567
at
U.S.
thereof thus within the discretion con- the fact Delbridge, court. reasonable doubt is whether Wilson, ‘ingredient’ stitutes an ‘element’ also Commonwealth v. 44. See offense.”) (2007) charged (citing United States v. (recog- 934 A.2d Pa. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 130 S.Ct. admissibility of evidence at nizing that (2010); 530 U.S. Apprendi, L.Ed.2d 979 is left to the hearing discre- n.10, 2348); court). Apprendi, tion of the 495-96, (referring presumption against with- Given finding to enhance required to the bur- parole out and the Commonwealth’s sentence in that case “an maximum beyond a reasonable doubt rebut den offense,” which in element essential presumption, it is difficult conceive independent turn constitutes “an substan- Commonwealth of a case where the offense”). A finding “permanent in- tive expert testimony and proffer where corrigibility” cannot to be an be said ele- expert not find testi- the sentencer would committed; crime it is of the instead ment Nonetheless, wheth- mony necessary. to be of the an immutable characteristic required rebut expert testimony er To these offender. render characteristics presumption permanent incor- against contradict crime-specific would the entire will rigibility beyond reasonable doubt be decisions, premise Supreme Court’s on a case-by-case basis determined prohibit finding from sentencer sentencing court. is unable that a offender Right Jury crime on the itself. E. Determination rehabilitated based plainly Montgomery, particular, re- Review Automatic post-crime a court to quires consider in determining conduct of defendant disagree We further with Batts permissi- life without is a whether jury finding regard must that a make (stating See id. at ble sentence. evi- juvenile’s ing eligibility to be sentenced evolved Montgomery dence has from relies, part, to life without youth prisoner to a a troubled model *43 upon Alleyne, wherein the United States rehabilitable). to show that he is relevant “any Supreme Court that fact held that Further, mandatory Montgomery minimum is an increases stated directly ‘element’ that must be submitted that the decision whether to Alleyne, juvenile parole 2155. without jury.” 133 at Howev sentence a to life S.Ct. er, principle Alleyne by judge. Montgomery, the central and could be made a based, (“Miller requires Ap the decision which was 733 that sentencing juvenile New to life prendi Jersey, 530 U.S. 120 a without before (2000),24 sentencing judge take parole, S.Ct. into L.Ed.2d different, that an in ‘how finding a factual that increases account children are against punishment is an element those counsel irre- dividual’s how differences different, aggravated vocably sentencing than to a lifetime in offense them ”) added, charged Alleyne, (emphasis crime. 133 S.Ct. at citation to prison.’ held, jury, Apprendi proved beyond a the Court "Other than mitted to a reason- conviction, prior any the fact of a fact Apprendi, 530 U.S. at able doubt.” beyond penalty increases for a crime S.Ct. 2348. prescribed statutory must maximum be sub- omitted); Miller, protections. Miller see also process It is our intention that (stating judge “a procedures S.Ct. adherence to these will curtail jury” specific must consider the attributes imposition illegal sentences life juvenile prior sentencing offender parole by sentencing courts. We Thus, parole). him to High life without expect proper employment of recognize juvenile Court itself did not life procedures these will result in courts sen- imprisonment governed by cases Al- tencing juveniles to life without parole in leyne. only circumstances, the rarest of as con- templated prescribed by the United capital Batts’ contention sen States Court. tencing procedures apply, should including a jury determination before sentenc Discretionary Sentencing F. ing juvenile parole life without Determination automatic review sentence before If, hearing after a consideration Court, likewise fails. He bases this all of presented, the evidence the sentenc- argument solely comparison on the made ing court finds that the Commonwealth by the Miller Graham Courts between has satisfied burden of proving beyond its juvenile in prison life and adult capital juvenile a reasonable doubt that the is so punishment. Although question is no there permanently incorrigible that rehabilita- that the Miller and Graham Courts com tion of the offender impossible, would be pared juvenile life-without-parole sen against sentencing the bar juvenile of- tence to capital punishment and that the fender to life without possibility similarities, punishments many have parole is Despite lifted. the certainty of its above, Montgomery stated Miller and both conclusion that the offender can never be appropriate judge found that it is for a rehabilitated, however, it is left to the sen- make decisions tencing court’s discretion to im- whether facing a possi sentence life without the pose life-without-parole or to bility of parole. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at impose a instead sentence that would allow 733; Miller, 567 U.S. an opportunity have parole consideration. suggestion appeals Batts’ from the imposition of a sentence of life without When directly should be taken to this with the of parole necessarily fails. This Court does (regardless of a life-without-pa whether jurisdiction have over direct appeals sought by role sentence was the Common from entry life-without-parole of a sen- wealth), court should be pleas. tence a court of common Such 1102.1(a) guided by determining section *44 appeals exclusively within jurisdic- are imprisonment. the minimum of Al term Superior tion of the 42 Court. See Pa.C.S. though not directly applicable juveniles to 722, §§ It beyond scope is of this first-degree prior convicted of to murder authority Court’s to interfere with “the Miller, in recognized as Justice Baer right Assembly of the to General deter- I, ignore concurrence in Batts we cannot jurisdiction any mine the of court.” Pa. policy by determination made the Gen Const, 10(c). V, § art. Assembly eral as to the minimum sentence procedures pro-
The we have juvenile first-degree established of convicted murder I, vide facing potential 66 sentence must receive. See Batts A.3d (Baer, J., of parole heightened life concurring). without due Our instruction Sentencing other applicable in- Guidelines from the statute guidance seek crimes, 1102.1 will sentencing upon a we believe section to intrude tended judgment appro- of “help frame the exercise to determine discretion court’s imposing in a sentence” and given sentence for a the court priate, individualized offender, long- starting point provide to advance the an essential “may but instead uniformity consid- goals respected and certain- ... must recognized be id.; Walls, sentencing determining appropriate ty in See decisions. ered” when 964; n.3, juvenile Commonwealth for convicted A.2d minimum sentence 140, A.2d Riggins, first-degree prior to the Miller murder (1977) sentencing Walls, in is one (“Disparity 964-65. n.22 926 A.2d at See decision. aspects of the sen- of the most criticized first-degree juvenile of the For some see also Common- tencing process.”); cases, only appreciable differ murder Martin, 466 Pa. 351 A.2d wealth v. will be the date ence between offenders (Nix, J., (1976) dissenting) 650, 660-61 Therefore, promote uniformi conviction. Pennsylva- in (recognizing that sentences sentencing pre- post-Miller ty in individualized, stating be but nia must appropriate cases, determining when significant no there are differences “where pre- of incarceration for minimum term crime of the and the back- the nature to life being sentenced Miller offenders a con- ground the offender dictate parole, with the uniformity result,” in sentences is a trary guided by minimum be courts should oc- goal). two defendants “[W]hen laudable 1102.1(a) contained sentences section roughly position cupy same terms first-degree for a murder twenty-five years severity on the factors bear those less when the defendant was committed sentence, suspect nothing be there can years thirty-five than old and fifteen sen- imposition identical about first-degree committed when murder Chestnut, 347 tences.” Commonwealth v. ages between the defendant (1985). Pa.Super. eighteen.25 18 fifteen and Pa.C.S.A. particularly legislative guidance is 1102.1(a). § Sentencing Guidelines useful because the Other G. States Pennsylvania Commission adopted presumption against of a adoption Our guideline Sentencing not include a do offenders for an convicted individual high- in the decisions of the support finds first-degree prior to Miller. murder See (amended courts in other states that appellate §§ 204 Pa. Code 303.15-303.16 est 2015). 2013, 2014, question.26 Mis- have been faced with Similar argued party section 1102.1 concur Neither has Like the caveat Justice Baer’s pre-Miller I, applied offend- must rence in Batts directive that our Further, 1102,1 is no chal- there ers. constitutional guided by courts should be section statute, lenge prospective to the nature does not result from review the constitu challenge, we absence such I, tionality of the statute. A.3d at authority the effective to strike are without (Baer, J,, concurring). 300 n.1 Such consider impedi- 1925. There no Pa.C.S. date. challenge, any ation if must await a should ment, however, Statutory Con- under the arise, Rather, in another our decision case. otherwise, instructing Act or our struction policy is based determination here legislative use the new courts to *45 legislative and intent embodied in section guidance making it provision as without goal uniformity 1102.1 and of in sentenc the mandatory. ing. among Our the trend research reveals that
459 juvenile a to prohibits sentencing life souri VIII. Conclusion proves the be parole unless State without sentencing purposes, For pre- there is a the Miller doubt that yond a reasonable sumption against of a imposition the sen- imposition of the sen allow the factors parole of life tence without for a defendant Hart, 232, tence. State v. 404 235 S.W.3d first-degree of convicted commit- murder- (Mo. 2013). respective legis to their Prior juvenile. as a The must ted Commonwealth eliminating parole as a latures life without give its to reasonable intention .notice of offender, High for juvenile a sentence a of possibil- sentence life seek without the to (pursuant in Utah a stat Courts both of ity parole. To presumption, rebut n ute) to be and found there a Connecticut the Commonwealth has to the burden presumption against sentence for a doubt, beyond a prove, the. reasonable that the Houston, State v. juvenile offender. juvenile permanently incorrigi- is offender (Utah 2015); State 55, v. P.3d 69-70 353 and thus is unable to ble be rehabilitated. 637, Riley, 1205, 110 1214 315 Conn. A.3d Miller Consistent with and mandate (2015). The like Court Iowa Montgomery, for a life-without-parole sen- initially presump to found there be a valid, wise to constitutionally tence be the sen- sentencing against juvenile a to life tion tencing juvenile court must find subsequently parole, but without outlawed is permanently incorrigible offender and to com applied as sentence impossible. rehabilitation would be Seats, 545, See State v. 865 pletely. N.W.2d The Commonwealth’s evidence and the Sweet, (Iowa 2015); State v. 879 take into court’s decision must (Iowa 2016). Miller in account factors announced N.W.2d entirely Nearly impact have sister is to outlaw the sen- all considered the our states states juvenile parole Montgomery tence for of- on of life without Miller and their practices. specif a states District of have concluded that fenders. Seventeen and Some finding currently prohibit juvenile permanent ic is re incorrigibility offend- Columbia quired prison permissible before sentence a being ers from sentenced to life to See, parole. parole. e.g., possibility of Prior life Veal to Mil- v. without without Colorado, ler, (Alaska, Kansas, State, only 298 Ga. six states S.E.2d (2016). simply required Kentucky, Oregon) banned Others have courts to Montana Miller, Following nine more states consider the Miller factors at a sentence. Delaware, Hawaii, See, Henderson, (Connecticut, hearing. e.g., parte Massachu- Ex However, setts, Nevada, Texas, Vermont, (Ala, 2013). Virginia West So.3d 1283-84 I, Wyoming) the District for this Batts the circumstance Columbia punishment. ques yet Another have eliminated the two state courts not faced these Utah) (Iowa presumption against a instituted ban after states a tion whether punishment Montgomery. required. bar to the sentence Our further research through majority highest states came that none courts of these reveals legislatures; only requires Iowa other have actions their states ruled Miller expert testimony jury Massachusetts reached this or determina determination either through Although Apprendi progeny pursuant Batts in- tion its decisions. constitutionality challenge constitutionally cluded a be sentenced to discretionary life-without-parole im- see But life without Skinner, 1925(b) posed upon juvenile People in his 889 N.W.2d Pa.R.A.P. Mich. statement, (2017) challenge (Michigan Supreme granted rejected a similar we Pennsylvania grounds appeal consider “whether the constitutional allowance I, age person at 297-99. Batts did I. Batts decision to sentence under again petition raise in his this claim term allow- argument jury appeal any ance of include under MCL 769.25 must made beyond Ap support pursuant before this We there- Court. a reasonable doubt” thereof ). question. prendi fore do not revisit *46 183 L.Ed.2d 1102.1(d) 132 S.Ct. Code. of the Crimes and section _ Louisiana, (2012), Montgomery v. its satisfies if the Commonwealth Even U.S. _, L.Ed.2d is sentencing court proof, burden (2016), directing life without life-without-pa- impose required not (“LWOP”) juveniles should sentences offender. upon role sentence uncommon, only imposed rare and be sentencing In offender Maj. “exceptional circumstances.” traditional parole, with the (quoting Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. Op. at 452 apply. See sentencing considerations 736).1 9721(b). court The C.S. incar- fashion the minimum term should of Batts’ sentence Our reversal section using, guidance, complexities ceration instant case illustrates 1102.1(a) Code. of the Crimes and difficulties associated Here, trial juveniles this context. is Superior decision of expended significant amount case remand the hereby reversed. We contemplating the testimo- time and effort proceed- sentencing court for further Batts, expert evaluations of ny and Opinion. this Jurisdic- ings consistent with judgment what reached a considered relinquished. tion correct believed was the sen- the court then authored for Batts. The court Todd, tence Saylor, Justices Chief Justice detailing its factual opinion comprehensive join opinion. Dougherty, and Wecht for sentenc- and its bases determinations Concurring files a Justice Wecht ing Batts to life without joins. in which Justice Todd Opinion notwithstand- diligent All of these efforts Concurring Baer files a still fell short ing, Justice the trial court Opinion. a routine Dissenting constitutional standard. new trial court’s decision appeal, the in the Mundy participate not Justice did In this sin- nearly unassailable. would be matter. decision consideration context, however, the sentence must gular WECHT, concurring JUSTICE unconstitutional, despite the trial be ruled efforts. court’s commendable Majority’s opinion join I the learned full. that, while the agree Majority I with the Com- require jurispru- Constitution does Eighth Amendment
Recent testimony in expert to present tri- monwealth imposes challenging task dence evidentiary pre- to overcome the order upon to sentence al courts called LWOP, Maj. Op. see well, sumption against it cannot be of murder. As convicted 455-56, situa- conceive” burden “difficult gainsaid that the Commonwealth’s can tions where Commonwealth rebut overcoming presumption announced testimony. But, presumption such Majority high. by the decision, today’s Following Id. at 456. its United has made States (and I likely believe Alabama, will U.S. Commonwealth in Miller v. will clear _ Arizona, _, immatu- whose crimes reflect transient child 1. See also Tatum 11, 13, (2016) rity rare children whose (per or is one those 196 L.Ed.2d J., corruption curiam) irreparable (explain crimes reflect (Sotomayor, concurring) may parole sentence a life without "very meaningful whom ing task for (internal quota- citations and deciding appropriate”) carry out” involves lower courts omitted). marks it is a tion juvenile offender before "whether the *47 should) expert an in present by retain and the cided in this Batts I. Additional- majority vast resentencing ly, Appellant LWOP hear- failed to raise the issue in ings, if not in being petition all of them. That the his current for of ap- allowance case, equity peal, resulting that trial ex- in demands courts waiver under Pa.R.A.P. 1115(a)(3) provide ju- (“Only ercise their discretion to such questions set forth in expert, petition, veniles with their in the or fairly comprised own event there- in, that the ordinarily cannot afford one his will by be considered only or her This in own. not would ensure the event that an appeal is al- lowed”). Moreover, evenhandedness in the but after acknowledging proceeding, provide also his failure to would trial court with raise the in petition issue complete perspective of for juvenile, appeal allowance of asserting which necessary in to correctly navigate order the issue constitutes a legali- non-waivable ty issue, the framework that today by is established Appellant fails this Court. develop the issue his initial brief to this
Court; indeed, in contravention of Pa. joins concurring Justice Todd this 2119(a) (requiring R.A.P. discussion and opinion. authorities), of pertinent citation he did not even identify statutory provision, BAER, concurring JUSTICE he Instead, which now claims is violated. dissenting attempts he incorporate argument join I Majority Opinion substan- developed in by the brief filed amicus part tial separately write distance curiae, the Pennsylvania Association of myself regard to one issue. (PACDL), Criminal Lawyers Defense VI, Majority rejects Ap- Section violation of this longstanding Court’s dec- pellant legality of Batts’ sentence claim in “[ajmicus larations that cannot raise is- which resentencing he seeks for third-de- ... preserved sues not have been gree based murder his assertion by parties,” raised Commonwealth Pennsylvania’s first-degree murder sen- Allshouse, v. 36 A.3d tencing juveniles scheme for is unconstitu- (2012), “incorporation by n.18 and that tional. I objection While have no to the reference is unacceptable manner of Majority’s issue, analysis merits appellate advocacy.” Commonwealth v. expands which tracks and this Court’s Briggs, 608 Pa.
analysis
similar issue
Common-
(2011) (internal quotations and citations
Batts,
wealth
Pa.
Preliminarily, the constitu- issue ble and fact can be raised a court sua tionality of sponte, I recognize scheme also that a court is first-degree required every unpreserved murder was de- address le- Appellant only page third-degree devotes one of his over should sentenced to murder. sixty page brief Appellant attempts "adopt” argu- to this issue. While most of then Appellant’s page contending discussion on this addresses' ment the PACDL that his sen- issue, why Ap- illegal decide this should tence is for failure to abide pellant explain statutory fails requirement what the issue is or that a minimum term provide any analysis beyond baldly imprisonment may relevant not exceed one-half of asserting that we should reconsider our hold- maximum term under 42 Pa.C.S. 9756(b)(1). in Batts I ing rejecting his claim that he Brief case, I In this
gality of sentence issue. denying review have recommended *48 it in Appellant had raised this issue given appeal petition for allowance very issue re- similar we addressed 2013; Likewise, I gard this defendant merits declined address have opinion. in this Court’s the issue issue, I Although I limited differ including majority large part, join the I fur adopted in this case. procedure that, procedure, under this ther observe be will nearly all offenders for rehabili potential have deemed tation, given high bar which Com Indeed, I believe meet.
monwealth must
the Common
a rare case where
will be
pre
overcome
able
wealth will
of proving
meet the burden
sumption and
beyond a
of rehabilitation
impossibility
I
doubt, high
reasonable
standard
agree
required under
wholeheartedly
Alabama,
Miller v.
(2012),
and Mont
IN M.W., Appeal Birth Mother of: M.Z.T.W., a Minor In re: M.W., Mother Appeal of: Birth No. WDA No. WDA Pennsylvania. Superior Court March Submitted May Filed