Ira v. JaneckaIra v. Janecka
CHÁVEZ, Justice.
{1} During the last thirteen years the Supreme Court of the United States, relying on neuroscientific evidence of adolescent behavior, issued three opinions declaring that certain sentences imposed on juvenile offenders violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for a crime committed by a juvenile); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding that no juvenile could be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for a nonhomicide offense); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (striking down a statute that required courts to sentence a juvenile convicted of murder to life without parole). These cases created a special category under the Eighth Amendment for juvenile offenders whose culpability is mitigated by adolescence and immaturity. The cases recognize that a juvenile is more likely to be rehabilitated than an adult and therefore should receive a meaningful opportunity to obtain release by demonstrating maturity and rehabilitation. In Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 136 S.Ct. 718, 736-37 (2016), the Supreme Court endorsed the principles in Roper, Graham, and Miller and held that Miller applies retroactively because it announced a substantive rule of constitutional law.
{3} Ira petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to make the central argument that his sentence is equivalent to a life sentence without parole and therefore constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
{4} Other courts are split on whether to apply Graham when a juvenile receives a a multiple term-of-years sentence for the commission of multiple crimes. We conclude that Graham applies when a multiple term-of-years sentence will in all likelihood keep a juvenile in prison for the rest of his or her life because the juvenile is deprived of a meaningful opportunity to obtain release by demonstrating his or her maturity and rehabilitation. In this case, Ira can be eligible for a parole hearing when he is 62 years old if he demonstrates good behavior under the EMDA. Therefore, based on the record before us, we conclude that Ira has a meaningful opportunity to obtain release by demonstrating his maturity and rehabilitation before the Parole Board. We find the remaining issues raised in the petition to be without merit and therefore deny the petition.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{5} The underlying conduct for which Ira pled no contest is discussed extensively
{6} The district court had the discretion to invoke an adult sentence or a juvenile disposition.
{8} In his special concurrence, Chief Judge Bosson expressed concern over the length of Ira’s sentence. Since the earliest Ira can be eligible for a parole hearing is after serving 45 years of his sentence, Chief Judge Bosson noted, “[f]or one so young, this is effectively a life sentence. One who goes into prison a teenager and comes out a man at the age of retirement has forfeited most of his life.” Id. ¶ 45 (Bosson, C.J., specially concurring).
[i]f [Ira] had eventually killed his victim, perhaps to protect himself from prosecution for his other crimes, he could have received a life sentence as an adult, but would have become eligible for parole after a “mere” thirty years. Thus, although [he] commits crimes which, however gruesome, are less than first degree murder, he receives a sentence that is effectively fifty percent longer.
{10} Ira filed a writ of habeas corpus in the district court that sentenced him pursuant to
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Eighth Amendment Forbids a Term-of-Years Sentence That Deprives a Juvenile of a Meaningful Opportunity to Obtain Release
{11} Ira’s argument that his 91½-year sentence is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Section II, Article 13 of the New Mexico
{12} The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The United States Supreme Court looks beyond a historical interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment and instead looks to “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). The Court emphasizes that “[e]mbodied in the Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments is the ‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.’” Graham, 560 U.S. at 59 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)). The Eighth Amendment “does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence but rather forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 59-60 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Some punishments are so grossly disproportionate that the Court has imposed “categorical bans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of the penalty.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 470.
{13} The Supreme Court has imposed several categorical bans on juvenile sentencing. In Roper, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars the death penalty for an offender who committed his or her offense before the age of eighteen. 543 U.S. at 568. In Graham,2 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits juvenile offenders from being sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for a nonhomicide offense. 560 U.S. at 74. In Miller, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a mandatory sentence of life without parole for juvenile offenders. 567 U.S. at 470.
{14} The first issue we address is whether the analysis of juvenile sentencing in Roper, Graham, and Miller should be applied to multiple term-of-years sentences.
{15} Other jurisdictions reject the narrow interpretation espoused by these aforementioned courts, largely concluding that such a narrow interpretation is inconsistent with Graham’s requirement that a juvenile be given a meaningful opportunity for release based on the juvenile’s demonstrated maturity and
{16} Other jurisdictions applying Graham to term-of-years sentences offer different rationales for doing so. See State v. Boston, 363 P.3d 453, 457 (Nev. 2015) (permitting courts to sentence a juvenile non-homicide offender “undermine[s] the
{17} Some jurisdictions have applied Graham when the sentence may provide for release before the juvenile’s death but forecloses the opportunity for the juvenile to have a meaningful life outside of prison. See State v. Moore, 2016-Ohio-8288, 76 N.E.3d 1127, cert. denied, Ohio v. Moore, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 138 S. Ct. 62 (2017) (determining that a sentence that allows juvenile offenders to “breathe their last breaths” outside the prison walls is not the “meaningful opportunity” envisioned by the Graham Court). The Supreme Court of Connecticut articulated the same concern:
A juvenile offender is typically put behind bars before he has had the chance to exercise the rights and responsibilities of adulthood, such as establishing a career,
marrying, raising a family, or voting. Even assuming the juvenile offender does live to be released, after a half century of incarceration, he will have irreparably lost the opportunity to engage meaningfully in many of these activities and will be left with seriously diminished prospects for his quality of life for the few years he has left. A juvenile offender’s release when he is in his late sixties comes at an age when the law presumes that he no longer has productive employment prospects. * * *
The United States Supreme Court viewed the concept of “life” in Miller and Graham more broadly than biological survival; it implicitly endorsed the notion that an individual is effectively incarcerated for “life” if he will have no opportunity to truly reenter society or have any meaningful life outside of prison.
Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1046, 1047 (Conn. 2015).
{18} Some courts have held that the Eighth Amendment only requires courts to consider the constitutionality of each individual sentence as opposed to the cumulative impact of consecutive sentences, see e.g. Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). Other courts disagree particularly when the consecutive sentences involve juvenile offenders. See Moore, 2016-Ohio-8288, ¶ 73 (“Whether the sentence is the product of a discrete offense or multiple offenses, the fact remains that it was a juvenile who committed the one offense or several offenses and who has
{20} We conclude that the analysis contained within Roper and its progeny should be applied to a multiple term-of-years sentence. Taken together, Roper, Graham, and Miller reveal the following three themes regarding the constitutionality of juvenile sentencing.
{21} First, juveniles’ developmental immaturity makes them less culpable than adults because juveniles have an “underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” and an inability “to appreciate risks and consequences,” meaning juveniles’ violations are likely to be a product of “transient rashness” rather than “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, 472, 477 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{22} Second, juveniles have a greater potential to reform than do adult criminals which makes it essential that they have a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and reform. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. Although the Eighth Amendment does not require a state to release juveniles during their natural lives, it prohibits states from making the judgment at the outset that juveniles will never be fit to reenter society. Id. The Miller Court emphasized that “none of what [Graham] said about children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits
{23} Third, no penological theory—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—justifies imposing a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide crime because juveniles are less culpable and more amenable to reformation. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71-75.
{24} With respect to retribution, the Graham Court explained that “[s]ociety is entitled to impose severe sanctions on a juvenile nonhomicide offender to express its condemnation of the crime and to seek restoration of the moral imbalance caused by the offense.” 550 U.S. at 71. “The heart of the retribution rationale,” the Court reassured, focuses on “a criminal sentence [that] must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But in the case of juvenile offenders, the “case for retribution is not as strong . . . as with an adult,” and “becomes even weaker with respect to a juvenile who did not commit homicide.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{25} Deterrence was similarly insufficient to justify a life without parole sentence on a juvenile. The Graham Court emphasized that “the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest . . . that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.” Id. at 72. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (omission in original). A juvenile’s “lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (omission in original)). As a result, juveniles are “less likely to take a possible punishment into consideration when making decisions.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 72. Although a life without parole sentence may deter some juvenile offenders, “any limited deterrent effect provided by life without parole is not enough to justify the sentence.” Id.
{26} Incapacitation also does not justify a life-without-parole sentence because a sentencing court would have to decide that a “juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society.” Id. However, a sentencing court is not equipped to make such a judgment because, as the Graham Court explained, even expert psychologists encounter difficulty distinguishing between a crime that reflects on a juvenile’s
{27} Rehabilitation does not support a life-without-parole sentence because it “forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.” Id. at 74. The sentence reflects “an irrevocable judgment about [the juvenile offender’s] value and place in society,” a judgment that is inconsistent with a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s “capacity for change and limited moral culpability.” Id.
{28} Just as the Graham Court found no penological theory that justified the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, we find no penological theory that supports a term-of-years sentence that in all likelihood will keep the juvenile in prison for the rest of his or her life without a meaningful opportunity to obtain release.
{29} What the Graham Court explained in establishing a bright-line rule prohibiting life without parole for a nonhomicide juvenile offender, is that although “[a s]tate is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime,” it must “give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id. at 75. The Court made clear that “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the
{30} In this case, the district court sentenced Ira to an adult prison, stating:
Ordinarily, the young age of the defendant would tend to influence a judge toward leniency, based upon the inference that the crimes were motivated in part by youthful impulsiveness and immaturity, and that converting a large amount of incarceration to probation will allow the youth to show that the lesson has been learned and he can now benefit rather than attack society. That analysis does not apply here, first because of the inability to convert first degree felony incarceration to probation . . . and, second, because Joel Ira is not the typical young defendant. The evidence shows that he is almost certain to be the same threat to society upon his release as he is today because humanity has not developed a way to implant a conscience once the period for its natural growth has passed.
* * *
This Court would like to fashion a sentence that will guarantee, or even offer hope, that Joel Ira can be released after a period of time as a rehabilitated person, able to be a valuable part of, rather than a threat to, his community. There is no such sentence.
This Court would like to fashion a sentence that will assure Joel Ira‘s victims that he will not be a serious threat
to them if released before he reaches an advanced age. There is not such sentence. This Court must then fall back upon a sentence that will protect society from a man without a conscience until such time as his physical ability to cause harm is less than the likelihood that he would attempt it. To assure that result, in consideration of the crowded conditions of our prisons and the ability of the Department of Corrections to grant credit of up to half of an adult sentence in order to relieve overcrowding, the Court must impose twice what it intends to be the effective term of incarceration.
{31} The district court relied on “the most experienced and qualified experts in the field of juvenile corrections and psychotherapy” at the time. These experts informed the court that Ira “is a child devoid of conscience and devoid of empathy for other human beings . . . . ” The court further explained that
[t]he experts say that each human being must develop these tools at a young age, for personalities become fixed before the teenage years and it is very hard, if not impossible to implant a conscience in a sixteen year old where none existed before. These experts looked, in this case, for evidence of remorse or empathy that would provide the slightest glimmer of hope that Joel Ira could defy the odds and become rehabilitated, and they found none . . . . The experts told this Court that New Mexico simply does not have a program that offers even a slight hope of protecting the public if Joel Ira were released from custody.
{32} The court‘s sentiment that no hope existed for Ira to be rehabilitated because
{33} The Miller Court recognized that some youths, despite their status as adolescents, may be different from the norm, and therefore declined to consider whether the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical ban on life without parole for juveniles. Id. Stated differently, the Supreme Court recognizes the need for individualized sentencing. Thus, the juvenile‘s attorney will introduce mitigating evidence, perhaps through a forensic mental health expert, that the juvenile conforms to developmental norms, which should dissuade the district court from imposing a sentence that in all likelihood will condemn the juvenile to prison for the rest of his or her life without a meaningful opportunity to obtain release. The prosecution will introduce evidence that the juvenile is not the norm and therefore the crime was not
B. Ira‘s Term-of-Years Sentence is Constitutional Because it Does Not Deprive Him of a Meaningful Opportunity to Obtain Release
{34} Ira does not contest the evidence introduced against him during his sentencing or habeas corpus hearing. Instead he seeks a declaration that his sentence is categorically unconstitutional because it is the functional equivalent of a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Based on the record before us, we cannot agree with this contention.
{35} In this case the district court arguably found that Ira is that rare juvenile who is irreparably corrupt. Regardless, the sentence imposed on Ira does not deprive him of a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. Presuming that he demonstrates his good behavior, he will be parole eligible when he is approximately 62 years old. Had Ira been sentenced to 91½ years without the opportunity to reduce his sentence with good behavior, our analysis would be different. But, with demonstrated good behavior, Ira will have the opportunity to make his case before a parole board.
(a) the circumstances of the offense;
(b) mitigating and aggravating circumstances;
(c) whether a deadly weapon was used in the commission of the offense;
(d) whether the inmate is a habitual offender;
(e) the [presentence and prerelease] reports filed under [
NMSA 1978, Section 31-21-9 (1972)]; and(f) the reports of such physical and mental examinations as have been made while in an institution[.]
{37} The parole board will be tasked with performing these duties during Ira‘s
{38} Certainly the fact that Ira will serve almost 46 years before he is given an opportunity to obtain release is the outer limit of what is constitutionally acceptable. See People v. Contreras, 2018 WL 1042252, at *9-10, ___ P.3d ___ (Cal. 2018) (citing cases holding that 50-year-long sentences are the functional equivalent of life without parole, and citing legislation enacted in the wake of Graham requiring parole as soon as 15 years but no later than 40 years after the start of the juvenile‘s sentence). The New Mexico Legislature is at liberty to enact legislation providing juveniles sentenced to lengthy term-of-years sentences with a shorter period of time to become eligible for a parole eligibility hearing. At the time of Ira‘s sentencing, a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment in a New Mexico institution would have been eligible for parole after serving a thirty-year sentence. See
{39} Other jurisdictions, in the wake of Graham, have amended their parole eligibility time frames for juveniles. Nevada enacted such a statute in 2015 providing a juvenile offender with a parole eligibility hearing after serving fifteen years of incarceration if the juvenile was convicted of an offense that did not result in the death of a victim. See Nev. A.B. 267 (codified as
C. Ira‘s Remaining Claims Lack Merit
{41} The fifth issue raised by Ira requires more elaboration. Ira asserts that the district court erred in failing to set aside his plea agreement because neither he, his attorney, the prosecutor or the judge understood the sentence that could be imposed on Ira and therefore the judge initially imposed an illegal sentence on Ira. Ira argued
III. CONCLUSION
{42} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court‘s denial of Ira‘s habeas corpus petition.
{43} IT IS SO ORDERED.
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EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
WE CONCUR:
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CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice
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BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice (joining in dissent and concurrence)
{44} The categorical rule announced in Graham precluding states from imposing a sentence of life without parole upon juveniles convicted of a nonhomicide offense does not extend to Joel Ira. Ira perpetrated multiple nonhomicide offenses over a lengthy period of time and was sentenced to multiple term-of-years sentences to be served consecutively. Ira, 2002-NMCA-037, ¶ 14. There is a meaningful distinction between juveniles sentenced to life without parole for the commission of a single offense and juveniles sentenced to multiple consecutive sentences for a series of offenses committed over a period of time. This is amply illustrated by comparing Ira‘s case to Commonwealth v. Donovan, 662 N.E.2d 692 (Mass. 1996), a Massachusetts case involving a defendant who was sentenced as a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole for a single criminal act and who was paroled in the wake of Graham and Miller. Although Donovan was convicted of a homicide offense, the comparison is still apt: Donovan committed one offense, Ira committed multiple offenses. As will become clear, this critical difference between Donovan‘s and Ira‘s cases should inform our reading of Graham.
{45} Joseph Donovan was seventeen years old on the night of September 18, 1992. Joseph Donovan, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Public
{48} Ira was charged with ten counts of first-degree criminal sexual penetration and various other counts. Id. ¶ 2. He pleaded no contest to all of the charges except one. Id. ¶ 4. At sentencing, the testimony indicated that Ira did not feel remorseful about his conduct, refused to take responsibility for his actions, and believed that “he did not do anything wrong.” Id. ¶¶ 8, 10. A mental health expert testified that Ira has “a severe conduct disorder, with tendencies towards violent sexual behavior and domination, that would require intensive, secured, long-term treatment.” Id. ¶ 10.
{50} First, the text of Graham itself compels the conclusion that the rule articulated in Graham does not extend to Ira. In Graham, the Supreme Court made clear that the categorical rule announced applies only to “juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole solely for a nonhomicide offense.” 560 U.S. at 63 (emphasis added); id. at 74 (“This Court now holds that for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole.” (emphasis added)). The Court emphasized that a sentence of “life without parole” is unique. See id. at 69 (“[L]ife without parole is the second most severe penalty
{51} Justice Alito made clear in his dissenting opinion in Graham that “[n]othing in the Court‘s opinion affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole.” 560 U.S. at 124 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas pointed out, in his dissenting opinion in Graham, that the majority did not count juveniles “sentenced to lengthy term-of-years sentences (e.g., 70 or 80 years’ imprisonment)[,]” when surveying the number of juvenile offenders serving life without parole sentences in the United States—that survey revealed that there were 123 juvenile offenders serving life without parole nationwide. Id. at 113 n.11 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The number of juveniles with multiple, lengthy, term-of-
{52} Second, a lengthy, aggregate, consecutive, term-of-years sentence for multiple offenses is not the functional equivalent of life imprisonment for a single crime. An aggregate, consecutive, term-of-years sentence for multiple offenses is just that: it is an aggregate punishment for multiple offenses. Our case law already acknowledges this important distinction. See State v. Juan, 2010-NMSC-041, ¶ 40, 148 N.M. 747, 242 P.3d 314 (“Life sentences have always been understood to be different from a sentence for a term of years.” (alteration, internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
{53} Third, “it is wrong to treat stacked sanctions as a single sanction. To do so produces the ridiculous consequence of enabling a prisoner, simply by recidivating, to generate a colorable Eighth Amendment claim.” Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). Moreover, and as the Supreme Court recognized long ago, “[i]t would scarcely be competent for a person to assail the constitutionality of the statute prescribing a punishment for burglary on the ground that he had committed so many
{54} Fourth, “if the sentence for a particular offense is not disproportionately long, it does not become so merely because it is consecutive to another sentence for a separate offense or because the consecutive sentences are lengthy in aggregate.” State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378, 384 (Ariz. 2006) (en banc). “This proposition holds true even if a defendant faces a total sentence exceeding a normal life expectancy as a result of consecutive sentences.” Id. “[A] separate [Eighth Amendment] proportionality review must be completed for each sentence imposed consecutively, rather than considering the cumulative total of such consecutive sentences. [This is b]ecause each sentence is a separate punishment for a separate offense[.]” Lucero, 2017 CO 49, ¶ 23 (second alteration in original); accord Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1285 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The Eighth Amendment analysis focuses on
{55} Fifth, “it is constitutionally permissible to punish a person who commits two, three, four or even more crimes (including murder) more severely than a person who commits a single crime.” Ali, 895 N.W.2d at 243. Under New Mexico law, “[a] sentencing judge has discretion in determining whether sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently.” State v. Deats, 1971-NMCA-089, ¶ 24, 82 N.M. 711, 487 P.2d 139. The sentencing judge‘s “discretion in this area will not be interfered with unless he has violated one of the sentencing statutes.” Id. This Court has observed that “the imposition of separate sentences to run consecutively is lawful and violates no federally protected right.” State v. Padilla, 1973-NMSC-049, ¶ 14, 85 N.M. 140, 509 P.2d 1335. Moreover, this Court has recognized that “imposition of multiple valid sentences to run consecutively does not, as such, constitute cruel and unusual punishment as contemplated by the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” Id. ¶ 15.
{56} Sixth and finally, there are strong penological rationales to justify application of consecutive sentencing upon juveniles who commit multiple nonhomicide offenses. Contra Graham, 560 U.S. at 71 (“With respect to life without parole for
{57} Graham is the law; juveniles convicted of a nonhomicide offense cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. 575 U.S. at 74. But this proposition does not answer the issue here: whether Graham extends to defendants like Ira who have committed many crimes over a period of time and who have been sentenced to multiple, consecutive, lengthy, term-of-years sentences. Policy concerns that are all
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JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Chief Justice
I CONCUR:
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PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice