In Re: WALTER ENERGY, INC. et al., Debtor. UNITED MINE WORKS OF AMERICA COMBINED BENEFIT FUND, UNITED MINE WORKS OF AMERICA 1992 BENEFIT PLAN, Plaintiff - Appellants, versus ANDRE M. TOFFEL, As Chapter 7 Trustee for WALTER ENERGY, INC., STEERING COMMITTEE OF FIRST LIEN HOLDERS, WARRIOR MET COAL, INC., Defendant - Appellees.
No. 16-13483
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
December 27, 2018
[PUBLISH] D.C. Docket Nos. 2:16-cv-00057-RDP; 15-bkc-02741-TOM11
(December 27, 2018)
Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
Coal companies in the United States long ago promised in wage agreements to provide their employees with health care benefits at no cost to the employees and to continue to provide these benefits even after the employees’ retirement. A quarter century ago, Congress turned this contractual obligation into a statutory one. See
In this case we confront the question of what happens to a coal company‘s statutory obligation to fund retiree health care benefits when the company files bankruptcy and pursues liquidation under Chapter 11. To answer this question, we must consider the interplay of two federal statutes, the Coal Act and the Retiree
The question before us is whether the RBBPA authorizes a bankruptcy court to terminate a debtor‘s statutory obligation under the Coal Act to pay premiums to the Funds when the bankruptcy court finds that such termination is necessary for the coal company to sell its assets as a going concern and avoid a piecemeal liquidation. This difficult question requires a nuanced analysis of both bankruptcy law and the unique system that Congress created to fund health care benefits for coal retirees.
On appeal to our Court, the Funds advance three reasons why the bankruptcy court lacked the authority to terminate Walter Energy‘s obligation to pay premiums. First, they argue that the Anti-Injunction Act,
* * *
To address the very important and complex issues in this case, our opinion today necessarily is lengthy. In Part I, we provide a history of retiree health care benefits in the coal industry to explain how Congress came to transform coal companies’ contractual obligation to provide retiree health care benefits into a statutory mandate. In Part II, we discuss the factual background and procedural history of this case. In Part III, we identify the applicable standard of review. In Part IV, we explain that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the bankruptcy court from terminating Walter Energy‘s obligation to pay premiums owed under the Coal Act. In Part V, we hold that the RBBPA authorized the bankruptcy court to terminate Walter Energy‘s obligation to pay premiums, even though the premiums were imposed by statute and Walter Energy was pursuing liquidation under Chapter 11, not a classic reorganization.
I. RETIREE HEALTH CARE BENEFITS IN THE COAL INDUSTRY
Working in a coal mine is extremely dangerous. There is the risk of fire, flood, explosion, or mine collapse. There is also the unseen risk that the dust in the coal mine may cause long-term health problems including respiratory diseases. Given the dangers inherent in their work, coal miners sought and secured lifetime health care benefits from their employers. The coal industry struggled with how to pay for these benefits, with some coal companies filing bankruptcy in an attempt to shed this obligation. In response to the bankruptcy filings, Congress passed the RBBPA to limit when companies could rid themselves of the obligation to fund retiree health care benefits. Congress also passed the Coal Act, guaranteeing certain coal retirees health care benefits for life.
A. Coal Employees, Including Retirees, Initially Secure Health Care Benefits in Wage Agreements.
In the early twentieth century, coal workers paid their own health care costs. Some coal companies used a prepayment system in which workers paid for health care through payroll deductions. But the quality of this employer-provided health care was poor and led to worker unrest. After miners organized nationwide strikes to demand health care benefits, President Harry Truman directed the federal government to take possession of all coal mines and to negotiate an agreement with the United Mine Workers of America (“UMWA“). The Secretary of Interior and the UMWA ultimately agreed that miners would be provided health care benefits.
About 30 years later, the coal companies and the UMWA agreed in the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974 (“1974 NBCWA“) to expand the scope of these benefits by agreeing that coal workers and retirees would be guaranteed health care benefits for life.2 The 1974 NBCWA also restructured the multiemployer fund that provided these benefits to comply with the
The new plans quickly encountered difficulty in covering the cost of retiree health care benefits. The royalties paid to the plans decreased as coal production declined. At the same time, the plans’ expenses increased due to a growing number of beneficiaries and rising health care costs. To address this problem, the UMWA and the coal companies agreed to restructure the system for health care benefits for coal employees and retirees in the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1978 (“1978 NBCWA“). They agreed generally to move from a centralized, multiemployer health care benefit plan to individual employer plans for current employees and recent retirees. Under this system, each coal company was required to establish and finance its own individual health benefit plan, which would cover its employees, certain recent retirees, and future retirees. The 1978 NBCWA represented a “shift[] from a defined contribution obligation, under
The 1978 NBCWA did not eliminate the multiemployer plans entirely, however. The 1950 Benefit Plan continued to operate and cover those retirees who were already enrolled in the plan—that is, miners who had retired before 1976. The 1974 Benefit Plan was restructured to provide health care benefits to “orphaned” retirees—that is, retirees whose last employer was no longer in business. The 1950 Benefit Plan and 1974 Benefit Plan were funded by contributions from the coal companies that signed the 1978 NBCWA.
Despite this restructuring, the 1974 Benefit Plan continued to operate at a severe deficit. Some coal companies refused to renew their wage agreements with the UMWA. The decisions of these coal companies not to sign the 1978 NBCWA or subsequent wage agreements affected the 1974 Benefit Plan in two ways. First, when a company chose not to renew its collective bargaining agreement, it was no longer obligated to provide health care benefits to its retirees.4 Its retirees then became orphaned and eligible for benefits under the 1974 Benefit Plan, increasing
B. Coal Companies Attempt to Shed Retiree Health Obligations by Filing for Bankruptcy, Leading Congress to Amend the Bankruptcy Code.
Desperate to reduce their expenses, some coal companies looked to reorganization under Chapter 11 as a way to rid themselves of the cost of retiree health care benefits. In 1986, a coal company known as LTV petitioned for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and immediately announced it would no longer pay for health care benefits for its approximately 78,000 retirees. Despite promising in wage agreements to provide its retirees with health care benefits for life, LTV stopped paying for the benefits, leaving its retirees as unsecured creditors whose only option was to try to recover the value of the promised benefits from LTV‘s bankruptcy estate. To protect LTV‘s retirees from having their health care benefits terminated, Congress quickly passed temporary legislation that required companies who petitioned for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, including LTV, to continue to pay their contributions for retiree health care benefits after filing for bankruptcy.
The RBBPA narrowly circumscribes when a bankruptcy court may enter an order modifying or terminating a debtor‘s obligation to make payments for retiree health care benefits. A bankruptcy court may issue such an order only after (1) the debtor and the retiree‘s authorized representative negotiated and failed to reach an agreement and (2) the bankruptcy court finds that the modification or termination is necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor, treats all affected parties equitably and fairly, and is clearly favored by the balance of the equities.
C. Congress Passes the Coal Act to Address Funding for Retiree Health Care Benefits in the Coal Industry.
The 1950 and 1974 Benefit Plans remained in a precarious financial position. In 1989, they were on the brink of insolvency, causing coal miners to strike. In response, the Secretary of Labor convened the Coal Commission to study issues associated with retiree benefits in the coal industry. See Sec‘y of Labor‘s Advisory Comm‘n on United Mine Workers of Am. Retiree Health Benefits, A Report to the Secretary of Labor and the American People, 1-4 (1990), available at Coal Commission Report on Health Benefits of Retired Coal Miners: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Medicare & Long-Term Care of the S. Comm. on Fin., 102d Cong. 142-277 (1991).
The Coal Commission report accepted that retired coal miners were entitled to lifetime health care benefits: “Retired coal miners have legitimate expectations
In response to the Coal Commission report, Congress passed the Coal Act, which turned coal companies’ contractual obligation to provide health care benefits to workers who retired before October 1, 1994 into a statutory requirement.9 The legislation was intended to “remedy problems with the provision and funding of health care benefits with respect to the beneficiaries of multiemployer benefit plans that provide health care benefits to retirees in the coal industry.”
1. Individual Employer Plans
Since 1978, the coal companies and the UMWA agreed in national wage agreements that the coal companies would provide health care benefits to their
2. The Combined Fund
The Coal Act again reorganized the multiemployer plans. Congress created the Combined Fund by merging the 1950 and 1974 Benefit Plans so that the beneficiaries of the 1950 and 1974 Benefit Plans received their benefits from the Combined Fund.11
The Combined Fund is funded primarily by premiums collected from coal companies and money received from the federal government.
A signatory operator must pay premiums to the Combined Fund for as long as it has assigned beneficiaries and “conducts or derives revenue from any business activity, whether or not in the coal industry.” See
Under the rules set forth in the Coal Act, certain retirees of the Combined Fund cannot be assigned to a signatory operator. These orphaned retirees may include retirees who never have had an employer who signed the 1978 NBCWA (or any subsequent wage agreement) or whose employer ceased all business activities and left behind no related person. The Coal Act nevertheless “provid[es] stable funding for the health benefits of these `orphaned retirees.‘” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 154 (2003). Benefits for these orphaned retirees are funded by three different sources. First, when the Combined Fund was created, it received a total of $210,000,000 from a UMWA pension plan.
3. The 1992 Benefit Plan
The Coal Act also created the 1992 Benefit Plan, another new multiemployer plan.
Like the Combined Fund, the 1992 Benefit Plan is funded by premiums from coal companies and transfers from the Abandoned Mine Fund. But the premiums owed to the 1992 Benefit Plan are assessed in a different manner. A smaller group of coal companies is required to pay premiums to the 1992 Benefit Plan—only those coal companies that signed the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1988 (“1988 NBCWA“).
Many beneficiaries of the 1992 Benefit Plan are unassigned to any signatory operator and are instead orphaned retirees. Several sources contribute to fund benefits for these retirees. First, companies that signed the 1988 NBCWA are required to provide security, such as a letter of credit, to the 1992 Benefit Plan to cover a portion of the projected future costs of health care benefits.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Walter Energy Files Bankruptcy Amid a Global Downturn in the Coal Industry.
Walter Energy, the debtor in this case, produced and exported coal from underground and surface mines located in Alabama, West Virginia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Beginning in 2011, the global coal industry experienced a sharp downturn, which caused coal prices to plummet. Facing sharp declines in revenue, Walter Energy tried to reduce its expenses by cutting costs, idling or closing mines, selling assets, laying off workers, and suspending dividends to investors. Even so, Walter Energy‘s revenue still was insufficient to cover the interest payments on its debt and its labor costs, which included wages set by collective bargaining agreements as well as benefits to its employees and retirees, including pensions and postretirement healthcare. Running out of the cash needed to continue operations, Walter Energy filed a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
B. The Bankruptcy Court Permits Walter Energy to Sell Most of Its Assets in a Going-Concern Sale.
In the bankruptcy proceedings, Walter Energy sought to sell substantially all of its assets in a going-concern sale pursuant to
Despite taking on approximately $115 million in liabilities, Warrior Met was willing to acquire the assets only if it would not be bound by Walter Energy‘s collective bargaining agreements, not be required to provide retiree health care benefits, and released from any obligation to pay premiums to the Funds. At the time Walter Energy filed for bankruptcy, it provided health care benefits to 572 retirees and dependents through its individual employer plan. In addition, 32 other beneficiaries assigned to Walter Energy were covered by the Combined Fund with
To complete the sale, Walter Energy negotiated with the UMWA and a retiree committee about the status of the collective bargaining agreements and retiree benefits. Walter Energy proposed amending the collective bargaining agreement so that it would not bind Warrior Met, terminating health and welfare benefits for retirees, and coordinating with the UMWA and the 1992 Benefit Plan to transition retirees covered by Walter Energy‘s individual employer plan to the 1992 Benefit Plan. Walter Energy‘s proposal, then, would result in its retirees being treated as orphaned retirees for the Combined Fund and the 1992 Benefit Plan. The UMWA rejected this offer, insisting, among other things, that Warrior Met provide retiree health care benefits.
The negotiations having failed, Walter Energy sought approval from the bankruptcy court to conduct a sale of substantially all of its assets under
The bankruptcy court entered an order allowing Walter Energy to reject the collective bargaining agreements and terminating its obligations to provide retirees insurance through an individual employer plan as well as to pay premiums to the Funds (the “1113/1114 Order“). In addition, the bankruptcy court ordered that Walter Energy was not obligated to pay premiums for retiree health care benefits to
The bankruptcy court also entered an order approving the sale of substantially all of Walter Energy‘s assets to Warrior Met (the “Sale Order“). Warrior Met acquired the property free and clear of all liens, claims, interests, and encumbrances; was not subject to the terms of Walter Energy‘s collective bargaining agreements; and was not required to provide retiree health care benefits or pay premiums to the Funds. Shortly after the sale was completed, Walter Energy stopped paying premiums to the Funds.
C. The District Court Affirms the Sale Order and 1113/1114 Order.
The Funds appealed to the district court both the Sale Order and the 1113/1114 Order. They also filed a motion asking the district court to stay the sale
First, the district court affirmed the Sale Order, rejecting the Funds’ argument that the bankruptcy court lacked the power to authorize a sale of assets free and clear of Walter Energy‘s obligation to pay premiums under the Coal Act. UMWA Combined Benefit Fund v. Walter Energy, Inc. 551 B.R. 631, 640 (N.D. Ala. 2016). The Funds argued that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to authorize the sale under the Anti-Injunction Act. Id. at 637. The district court disagreed, concluding that the Coal Act premiums were not taxes for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, and thus the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to enter the Sale Order.22 Id. at 637-40.
Second, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court‘s 1113/1114 Order. The district court concluded that the bankruptcy court had the authority under
D. Walter Energy Converts Its Bankruptcy Case to a Chapter 7 Petition.
While this appeal was pending, Walter Energy continued to wind down its operations. It filed a motion in the bankruptcy court to convert its bankruptcy petition to a proceeding under Chapter 7, explaining that after consummating the sale transaction, it had transferred or obligated itself to transfer every asset it owned and thus there was no compelling need to further administer the case in Chapter 11. The bankruptcy court granted the motion.24
The Funds claim that the amount Walter Energy owes them continues to increase. They assert that, through April 2017, Walter Energy owed premiums of approximately $3.6 million to the 1992 Benefit Plan and approximately $104,000 to the Combined Fund. Furthermore, they contend that each month the amount that Walter Energy owes to the 1992 Benefit Plan increases by approximately $347,000 to reflect an additional monthly premium that Walter Energy failed to pay.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When we review an order of a district court entered in its role as an appellate court reviewing a bankruptcy court‘s decision, we independently examine the bankruptcy court‘s factual and legal determinations, applying the same standards of review as the district court. In re FFS Data, Inc., 776 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2015). We review de novo conclusions of law whether by the bankruptcy court or the district court. See In re Bilzerian, 100 F.3d 886, 889 (11th Cir. 1996). We review the bankruptcy court‘s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. Id.
IV. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT‘S JURISDICTIONAL BAR
Before turning to the Funds’ arguments about whether the bankruptcy court was permitted under the RBBPA to terminate Walter Energy‘s obligation to pay premiums to the Funds, we must be sure that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to modify the premiums.
The Anti-Injunction Act generally prohibits suits challenging the assessment or collection of a tax before the tax is collected. See
The Funds contend that the premiums Walter Energy owed under the Coal Act qualify as taxes for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act and that as a result the bankruptcy court lacked authority to terminate Walter Energy‘s obligation to pay future premiums. To determine whether the premiums owed to the Funds qualify as taxes for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, we look to the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in NFIB, which recognized that even when an exaction qualifies as a tax for purposes of the Constitution, it does not necessarily qualify as a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 544-46.
Applying NFIB, we conclude that premiums owed to the 1992 Benefit Plan do not qualify as taxes for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. The analysis for
A. In NFIB, the Supreme Court Addressed When an Exaction Qualifies as a Tax for Purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.
The Anti-Injunction Act bars a lawsuit only when the exaction being collected qualifies as a tax. See
The Court explained that the inquiry into whether an exaction qualifies as a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, a statute, is separate and distinct from whether the exaction qualifies as a tax for constitutional purposes. Id. at 544. To determine whether an exaction qualifies as a tax for purposes of the Constitution, courts apply a “functional approach,” looking at the “substance and application” of the exaction, as opposed to the label that Congress used to describe it. Id. at 566 (internal quotation marks omitted). This functional approach ensures that “Congress may not . . . expand its power under the Taxing Clause, or escape the Double Jeopardy Clause‘s constraint on criminal sanctions, by labeling a severe financial penalty a ‘tax.‘” Id. at 544. But the Court refused to apply such a functional approach to determine whether the exaction imposed by the Affordable Care Act qualifies as a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. Id.
Because both the Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act “are creatures of Congress‘s own creation,” the Supreme Court explained that the way “they relate to each other is up to Congress, and the best evidence of Congress‘s intent is the statutory text.” Id. To determine whether Congress intended for an exaction to be treated as a tax under the Anti-Injunction Act, the Supreme Court
Looking to the statutory text of the Affordable Care Act, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend for the penalty imposed for failing to comply with the individual mandate to be a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. Congress decided to describe the exaction imposed on individuals who chose to forgo health insurance “not as a ‘tax’ but as a ‘penalty.‘” Id. at 543. The Court treated this decision as “significant” because “[t]here is no immediate reason to think that a statute applying to ‘any tax’ would apply to a ‘penalty.‘” Id. at 543-44. The Court further regarded the fact that Congress labeled as taxes other exactions under the Affordable Care Act as evidence that Congress did not intend the penalty for failing to comply with the individual mandate to be a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. Id. at 544.
The Supreme Court accepted that in narrow circumstances Congress could “describe something as a penalty but direct that it nonetheless be treated as a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.” Id. The Court used as an example
After accepting that Congress could indicate indirectly that an exaction should be treated as a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, the Court considered a second potential argument about why the penalty for failing to comply with the individual mandate should be treated as a tax. The provision setting the penalty for failing to comply with the mandate stated that the penalty shall be “assessed and collected in the same manner” as an assessable penalty under subchapter 68B,
B. An Exception to the Anti-Injunction Act Applies When No Alternative Remedy Is Available to Challenge the Tax.
Even when an exaction appears to qualify as a tax under the Anti-Injunction Act, a party still may be permitted to challenge the exaction before it is collected. The Supreme Court has held that the Anti-Injunction Act will not bar a claim if its application would “entirely deprive [a party] of any opportunity to obtain review of its claims.” South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 380 (1984).
In Regan, the Court recognized this exception and allowed South Carolina to sue the Secretary of Treasury when there was no alternative means for the State to challenge a federal tax imposed on the State‘s bearer bonds. Id. at 370-71. A provision of the Internal Revenue Code generally exempted from a taxpayer‘s gross income interest earned on any state bond. Id. at 370 (citing
The Supreme Court concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the action and allowed South Carolina to file its complaint. Id. Although South Carolina was attempting to enjoin the collection or assessment of a tax, the Court concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit because the State had no alternative means for challenging the tax. Id. at 379-80. The Court explained that the “circumstances of [the Anti-Injunction Act‘s] enactment strongly suggest that Congress intended the Act to bar a suit only in situations in which Congress had provided the aggrieved party with an alternative legal avenue by which to contest the legality of a particular tax.” Id. at 373. South Carolina had no alternative remedy because the bondholders, not the State, were liable for the tax on the interest earned on the bonds. Id. at 378-80. Because South Carolina did not owe the tax on the bonds, it could not pay the disputed tax and then file suit for a refund, raising its constitutional challenge to the tax. Id. Given that South Carolina was “unable to utilize any statutory procedure to contest the
C. The Anti-Injunction Act Did Not Bar the Bankruptcy Court from Modifying the Premiums Owed to the 1992 Benefit Plan.
With this background about the scope of the Anti-Injunction Act in mind, we turn to whether the Anti-Injunction Act deprived the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction to modify the premiums that Walter Energy owed the Funds. We begin with the premiums owed to the 1992 Benefit Plan. Applying the Supreme Court‘s reasoning in NFIB, we conclude that these premiums do not qualify as taxes for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.
The Funds’ primary argument is that the premiums owed to the 1992 Benefit Plan qualify as taxes for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act because the premiums are functionally similar to taxes. Although this argument may explain why the exactions qualify as taxes for purposes of a constitutional inquiry, the Court made clear in NFIB that we do not use such a functional approach to determine whether an exaction qualifies as a tax under the Anti-Injunction Act. Because both the Anti-Injunction Act and the Coal Act “are creatures of Congress‘s own creation,” the way that these statutes “relate to each other is up to Congress.” NFIB, 567 U.S. at 544. We thus look to the text of the Coal Act to determine whether Congress
Applying the proper approach from NFIB, we are convinced that Congress expressed no intent for the premiums owed to the 1992 Benefit Plan to be treated as taxes for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. We must treat as “significant” Congress‘s decision to label the exactions owed to the 1992 Benefit Plan not as taxes but as premiums. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 544. We have “no immediate reason to think that a statute applying to ‘any tax‘,” that is the Anti-Injunction Act, would apply to an exaction labeled a premium. Id. at 543.
D. The Anti-Injunction Act Did Not Bar the Bankruptcy Court from Modifying the Premiums Owed to the Combined Fund.
We now turn to a more difficult question: whether the premiums owed to the Combined Fund qualify as taxes for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. Congress may have indirectly indicated that the premiums should be treated as taxes for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. But even if we assume that
1. Congress May Have Indicated Indirectly that the Combined Fund Premiums Should Be Treated as Taxes for Purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.
As with the 1992 Benefit Plan, Congress did not directly indicate that the exactions owed to the Combined Fund should be treated as taxes because it labeled the annual exaction as a “premium,”
If Congress intended for the penalties owed to the Combined Fund to be treated as taxes for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, then the Anti-Injunction Act also would bar a pre-enforcement suit challenging the assessment of the premiums owed to the Combined Fund. The Anti-Injunction would bar such a suit because a bankruptcy court order relieving a coal company of its obligation to pay Combined Fund premiums would effectively restrain the assessment and collection of a “tax” by making it impossible for the Combined Fund to assess or collect a tax—that is, the penalty imposed by the Coal Act for a company‘s failure to pay its premiums. See Fla. Bankers Ass‘n v. U.S. Dep‘t of Treasury, 799 F.3d 1065, 1071-72 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (treating lawsuit raising challenge to regulation imposing a reporting requirement as “a challenge to the tax imposed for failure to comply with that reporting requirement” because “[i]nvalidating the reporting requirement would necessarily ‘restrain’ the assessment and collection of the tax“). We thus also assume for purposes of this appeal that Congress indicated that the premiums owed to the Combined Fund should be treated as taxes for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.
2. An Exception to the Anti-Injunction Act Applies Because Walter Energy Has No Alternative Avenue to Seek to Terminate Its Obligation to Pay the Combined Fund Premiums.
Even assuming that the premiums and penalties owed to the Combined Fund qualify as taxes for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, we are persuaded that an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act applies here because Walter Energy had no available alternative remedy. Walter Energy could not obtain relief by waiting to be assessed Combined Fund premiums, failing to pay those premiums, being assessed a penalty, and then bringing a suit in district court against the Secretary of the Treasury seeking to be relieved from the obligation to pay retiree benefits pursuant to
Congress indicated in the Bankruptcy Code that the relief offered in
Because Walter Energy has no alternative remedy to seek relief under
V. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Coal Act mandated that Walter Energy provide its retirees with retiree health care benefits or pay the Funds premiums to cover the cost of those benefits. See
Under the RBBPA, a debtor company may not unilaterally terminate payments that qualify as “retiree benefits,” but a bankruptcy court may enter an order terminating the debtor‘s obligation to make such payments if the court finds,
is necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor.
retiree benefits,
and (2) the termination was not necessary to permit Walter Energy‘s reorganization because Walter Energy sought to sell substantially all its assets in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, not engage in a classic reorganization. We address these arguments in turn.
A. The Bankruptcy Court Had Authority to Terminate Walter Energy‘s Obligation to Pay Premiums to the Funds Because the Payments Qualify as Retiree Benefits.
The Funds first argue that the bankruptcy court lacked authority under retiree benefits
under retiree benefits
as:
payments to any entity or person for the purpose of providing or reimbursing payments for retired employees and their spouses and dependents, for medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death under any plan, fund, or program . . . maintained or established in whole or in part by the debtor prior to filing a petition commencing a case under this title.
retiree benefits.
But the Funds challengemaintain[]
the Funds as required by
To address when Walter Energy maintained
the Funds under where courts should always begin the process of legislative interpretation, and where they often should end it as well, which is with the words of the statutory provision.
CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a statute does not define a term, we look to the common usage of words for their meaning.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine the ordinary meaning of a term, we often look to dictionary definitions for guidance. Id. at 1223. But we must be mindful that to ascertain the plain meaning of a statute, [w]e do not look at one word or term in isolation, but instead we look to the entire statutory context.
United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999). The canons of construction also serve as interpretative tools to assist us in understanding the broader statutory context. CBS, 245 F.3d at 1225.
We begin by looking to the ordinary meaning of the term maintain.
The parties agree that the term generally means to keep in a state of repair, efficiency,
Maintain, Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 1362 (2002). The Funds concede that the premium payments are an important source of money for the Funds. The Funds nonetheless contend that Walter Energy did not maintain the Funds because it did not voluntarily incur the obligation to pay premiums.29 They assert that the statutory context and canons of construction indicate that a company does not maintain
a fund when its payments are required by statute rather than a voluntary contractual agreement. They also contend that the Coal Act shows that Congress did not intend for bankruptcy courts to be able to exercise their authority under
1. The Statutory Context Supports the Conclusion That Making Payments Arising from a Statutory Obligation Constitutes Maintaining
a Plan.
The Funds assert that when a company is obligated by a statute to make payments for health care benefits, it does not maintain
the plan or fund. Their argument rests on the assertion that, because an employer generally undertakes a voluntary contractual obligation to make payments for retiree benefit plans or funds, a payment must be made under a voluntary obligation to qualify as maintaining
a plan.
Certainly, the Funds are correct that Walter Energy‘s obligation to pay premiums to the Funds is different in nature from payments for other retiree benefits because Walter Energy has a statutory obligation to pay the premiums, instead of a contractual obligation. But it is not enough for the Funds to point out this difference. They must show that Congress intended to limit the definition of retiree benefits
to payments made under a plan or fund only when the debtor voluntarily undertook the obligation to make such payments. The Funds claim that evidence of such Congressional intent includes: (1) the remainder of retiree benefits
simply by including the requirement that the debtor maintain
the plan.31
First, the Funds assert that other provisions in retiree benefits
to obligations that the debtor canretiree benefits
only if the debtor proposed the modification to an authorized representative of the affected retirees, the debtor negotiated the modification in good faith, and the authorized representative refused to accept the proposal without good cause. retiree benefit,
and because Walter Energy‘s premium obligations are non-negotiable, they should not be treated as retiree benefits.
Although we agree with the Funds that the structure of retiree benefit,
we conclude that the obligation to pay premiums is to some extent negotiable. As Walter Energy points out, the Funds have engaged in such negotiations in the past and, in fact, have agreed to modify a debtor‘s premium obligations. See In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. 01-15288, 2004 WL 601656, at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004) (reflecting that the Funds received $10 million in exchange for, among other things, agreeing not to bring any legal action to seek funding for health care benefits that the 1992 Benefit Plan provided to the debtors’ retirees). That the Funds have agreed to modify premiums in the past shows that the obligations are negotiable.
Second, the Funds argue that maintaining
the Funds. Section 1129for the duration of the period the debtor has obligated itself to provide such benefits.
RBBPA § 2(b), 102 Stat. 613 (codified at retiree benefit
must be a payment that the debtor obligated itself to provide,
the Funds’ argument goes, Congress intended that statutory obligations cannot qualify as retiree benefits.
It is a close question, but we are ultimately unpersuaded by the Funds’ argument. The Funds are correct that coal companies never voluntarily undertook the obligation to pay the premiums due under the Coal Act. But the coal companies did in fact voluntarily obligate themselves—in earlier wage agreements—to provide the lifetime retiree health care benefits that are now delivered through the Funds. Given that coal companies did in some sense previously obligate themselves to provide the retiree health care benefits that are now delivered through the Funds, it is not inconsistent with
protect[] retiree benefits during Chapter 11 proceedings
and solv[e] the legal problem the LTV bankruptcy squarely presented.
Appellants’ Br. at 30. In considering statutory context, the general policy underpinning the law may be relevant to our analysis. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986) (In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.
(internal quotation marks omitted)). But the Funds’ argument oversimplifies Congress‘s purpose in enacting the RBBPA. True, Congress enacted the RBBPA in the aftermath of LTV‘s filing bankruptcy and attempting to unilaterally terminate all retiree health payments to its retirees. We can infer from this context that Congress intended the RBBPA to prevent a debtor from unilaterally terminating payments for retiree health care benefits after filing bankruptcy. But we cannot say from this context that Congress intended
In sum, the Funds argue that we should narrow the definition of retiree benefits
to payments made on obligations that were voluntarily undertaken andretiree benefits
should be limited in this way.
2. The Canons of Construction Provide No Support for Narrowing the Definition of Maintain.
The Funds also contend that the canons of construction direct us to narrow the meaning of maintain
to exclude obligations imposed by statute. They argue that we must apply a narrower definition of maintain
to avoid an interpretation that renders a portion of the definition of retiree benefits
meaningless and because the ordinary definition of maintain
gives the definition of retiree benefits
near infinite breadth. We disagree.
a. The Canon to Avoid an Interpretation That Renders Statutory Language Superfluous, Void, or Insignificant Is Inapplicable.
First, the Funds argue that we cannot apply the ordinary meaning of maintain
because it renders a portion of the definition of retiree benefit
meaningless and mere surplusage. They contend that if a debtor can maintain
a plan by making payments to the plan, the definition of retiree benefits
becomes circular as retiree benefits are (1) payments a debtor makes (2) under a program to which the debtor makes payments. Of course, we generally construe a statute so that no clause, sentence, or word
is rendered superfluous, void, or insignificant.
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (internal quotationretiree benefits
superfluous.
A close reading of retiree benefits
to payments made in connection with a retired employee for a specific purpose—that is, payments to any entity or person for the purpose of providing or reimbursing payments for retired employees and their spouses and dependents, for medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death.
maintained or established in whole or in part by the debtor
before the debtor filed its bankruptcy petition.
Simple examples illustrate that both prongs of the definition continue to hold meaning under our interpretation. Say a debtor company decides to give a retiredretiree benefit
under the first prong of the definition because it is a payment made for the purpose of providing the debtor‘s retired employee with health care benefits. But the payment fails to meet the second prong of the definition because it was a single payment and not made to a plan, fund, or program to which the debtor, prior to filing bankruptcy, provided ongoing support.
Conversely, say a debtor, prior to filing bankruptcy, contributes $100 each pay period to fund an employee pension plan that provides its retirees with periodic cash payments. These payments would qualify as retiree benefits
under the second prong of the definition because the debtor‘s monthly payments maintained the plan. But the first part of the definition would not be satisfied because the payments were not made for the purpose of providing . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death.
We cannot agree with the Funds that by treating a debtor‘s ongoing financial support as sufficient to maintain a plan, we are rendering the first portion of the definition of retiree benefits superfluous, void, or insignificant. A careful read of
b. The Canon to Avoid an Interpretation That Gives a Term Infinite Breadth Is Inapplicable.
Second, the Funds argue that maintain
must have a narrower meaning because applying the plain meaning would give the term maintain near-infinite breadth.
Appellants’ Br. at 24. In certain circumstances, the Supreme Court has explained that a non-hyperliteral reading is needed to prevent [a] statute from assuming near-infinite breadth.
FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass‘n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 774 (2016). But this canon of construction is inapplicable here.
In Electric Power Supply, the Supreme Court considered the scope of the authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC
). Congress authorized FERC to regulate the sale of wholesale electric energy in interstate commerce and gave it the authority to implement rules or practices affecting such rates.
Id. at 766 (internal quotation marks omitted). The case arose after FERC issued a rule regulating what power companies could pay users to encourage them to reduce their consumption during peak periods of power consumption. Id. at 771. The rule was challenged on the ground that FERC lacked the authority to regulate the sale of retail, not wholesale, electric energy. Id. at 772.
In concluding that FERC did not exceed its authority when it issued the rule, the Supreme Court interpreted the statute that gave FERC the authority to implement rules or practices affecting
the sale of wholesale electric energy in interstate commerce. Id. at 773-74. The Court explained that the statute could beimagine
that Congress intended to give FERC authority to regulate all these areas that have only indirect effects on the wholesale cost of electricity. Id.. The Court instead applied a common-sense construction
and limited FERC‘s jurisdiction to rules or practices that directly affect
wholesale rates for electric energy. Id.. The Court explained that this interpretation was consistent with earlier decisions that had given non-hyperliteral reading[s]
to phrases like relating to
and in connection with
in order to prevent the statute[s] from assuming near-infinite breadth.
Id..
Nothing in Electric Power Supply dictates that we narrow the definition of maintain
here. Unlike the terms the Supreme Court discussed in Electric Power Supply, maintain
is not a term that has a near-infinite breadth.
Id.. The term maintain
restricts the definition of retiree benefits to a specific class of payments—those made under a plan, fund, or program that the debtor, prior to filing bankruptcy, has kept in an existing state. The term maintain
limits the universe of payments that could qualify as retiree benefits under
3. In the Coal Act, Congress Did Not Express an Intent That the Premiums Should Not Qualify as Retiree Benefits.
The Funds also assert that Congress expressed in the Coal Act an intent to keep bankruptcy courts from using retiree benefits.
But after carefully considering these statutory provisions, we cannot agree that Congress expressed in the Coal Act an intent to bar bankruptcy courts from modifying these premiums.
First, the Funds point to maintain
the Funds. But they overstate the effect of establish and maintain . . . accounts for each of the premiums.
Second, the Funds assert that the Coal Act prohibits them from agreeing to—and a bankruptcy court from ordering—any modification to the premiums owed because exclusively
under the Coal Act, which indicates that a bankruptcy court lacks authority to modify the premiums that a coal company owes to the Funds. We understand
Section 9708, when read in context, in no way prohibits a bankruptcy court from modifying the premiums that a company owes to the Funds. As we discussed above, coal companies had agreed in a series of wage agreements dating back to at least 1974 to provide their retirees with health care benefits for life. Because the Coal Act transformed this contractual obligation into a statutory mandate, in Effect on pending claims or obligations,
Congress addressed the status of coal companies’ contractual obligations to the 1950 and 1974 Benefit Plans. Section 9708 states:
All liability for contributions to the Combined Fund that arises on and after February 1, 1993, shall be determined exclusively under this chapter, including all liability for contributions to the 1950 UMWA Benefit Plan and the 1974 UMWA Benefit Plan for coal production on and after February 1, 1993. However, nothing in this chapter is intended to have any effect on any claims or obligations arising in connection with the 1950 UMWA Benefit Plan and the 1974 UMWA Benefit Plan as of February 1, 1993 . . . .
This section, read as a whole, shows that Congress intended
Sham transactions,
provides that liability under the Coal Act shall continue without regard to a transaction [i]f a principal purpose
of the transaction is to evade or avoid liability
under the Coal Act.
Section 9722 applies only when the principal purpose of the transaction is to evade or avoid liability under the Coal Act. The relevant transaction here is Walter Energy‘s sale of substantially all of its assets to Warrior Met. The bankruptcy court‘s findings establish that the purpose of the sale was to provide the best possible outcome for the various stakeholders because it would allow some of Walter Energy‘s mines to continue operating. Nothing in the bankruptcy court‘s findings suggest that the principal purpose of the § 363 going-concern sale was to evade or avoid liability under the Coal Act. Given the purpose of the broader transaction, we conclude that
not favored
and will be presumed only when the legislature‘s intention to repeal or amend the earlier legislation is clear and manifest.
Nat‘l Ass‘n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, it seems particularly inappropriate to conclude that the Coal Act implicitly amended the RBBPA given the relationship between the two statutory schemes. The Supreme Court has recognized the basic principle of statutory construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum.
Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 547-48 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Stated succinctly, [w]hen two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.
Id. at 548 (internal quotation marks omitted).
retiree benefits
—or in the Coal Act—perhaps by providing that the obligation to pay premiums remained unaffected by operation of the Bankruptcy Code. But Congress included no such express statutory language.
B. The Bankruptcy Court Had Authority to Terminate Walter Energy‘s Obligation to Pay Premiums Because Walter Energy Was Reorganizing When It Pursued a Chapter 11 Liquidation.
The Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy court to modify or terminate retiree benefits only if, among other things, the court finds that such modification is necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor.
reorganization,
and so the bankruptcy court lacks authority to modify or terminate retiree benefits under reorganization
to refer to all types of debt adjustment under Chapter 11, including a sale of assets on a going-concern basis.
1. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a Corporate Debtor May Seek to Liquidate Under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 or to Restructure Under Chapter 11.
To understand what the term “reorganization” as used in
When a corporate debtor petitions for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, the trustee generally sells all of the debtor‘s assets piecemeal and distributes the proceeds from the sale to the creditors. When a corporate debtor files under
There are more options available to a corporate debtor who proceeds under Chapter 11. The debtor may elect to sell its assets piecemeal and distribute the proceeds to its creditors, sell its assets as a going concern and distribute the proceeds to its creditors, or restructure its finances and continue to operate.
When a corporate debtor files under Chapter 11, the business generally continues to operate as a going concern. Again, the company‘s assets become
In a classic reorganization or restructuring, the debtor negotiates with its creditors to reduce its debts, often by offering to exchange debt for equity in the company that emerges from bankruptcy. Squire, supra, at 14. A Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding ordinarily culminates in the confirmation of a reorganization plan. See
Chapter 11 also permits a debtor to liquidate by selling all or substantially all of its assets as a going concern under a sale pursuant to
The end result of a Chapter 11 liquidation may be that the debtor‘s secured creditors take control of the bankruptcy estate‘s assets but keep the business operating. When a debtor pursues a liquidation under Chapter 11 through a
There is an important difference between a Chapter 11 liquidation and a classic reorganization, though. A creditor may be able to take control of the debtor‘s assets much more quickly in a Chapter 11 liquidation. A
2. The Term “Reorganization” as Used in § 1114(g)(3) Refers Both to Restructurings and Liquidations Under Chapter 11.
With these background principles about corporate bankruptcy proceedings in mind, we now turn to the question before the Court: whether a bankruptcy court has authority to modify or terminate retiree benefits when a debtor who files bankruptcy under Chapter 11 intends to sell substantially all of its assets in a going-concern sale. Section 1114 permits a bankruptcy court to modify or terminate a debtor‘s obligation to fund retiree benefits only if the court finds, among other things that “such modification is necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor.”
Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define the term reorganization, we turn to dictionary definitions for guidance. See CBS, 245 F.3d at 1223. The term reorganization is defined as follows: “[A] reconstruction of a business corporation, including a marked change in capital structure, often following a failure and receivership or bankruptcy trusteeship.” Reorganization, Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1632 (2d ed. 1987); see Reorganization, Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online (2018) (“financial reconstruction of a business concern“); Reorganization, Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 1923 (2002) (“[T]he rehabilitation of the finances of a business concern under procedures prescribed by federal bankruptcy legislation.“).37
We understand these definitions to mean that to qualify as a reorganization, at a minimum, the business concern must continue to operate. A classic reorganization, then, qualifies as a “reorganization” because the business generally continues to operate while making payments to creditors over time. See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 979. Likewise, a Chapter 11 liquidation where a debtor sells substantially all of its assets as a going concern also could qualify as a
The Funds urge us to interpret the term “reorganization” more narrowly because they contend that the context of the Bankruptcy Code shows that Congress intended the terms “reorganization” and “liquidation” to be entirely distinct with no overlap. They assert that “liquidation is the opposite of reorganization.” Reply Brief at 12. But the Bankruptcy Code does not support this interpretation.
The Bankruptcy Code reflects that Congress recognized some overlap between the terms “reorganization” and “liquidation.” Congress chose to title Chapter 11 “Reorganization.”38 Because Chapter 11 permits both classic reorganization as well as liquidations, this title suggests that Congress understood that the term “reorganization” also referred to some liquidations. See
The Funds argue that a Chapter 11 liquidation cannot qualify as a reorganization because in
Section 1129(a)(11) imposes a “feasibility requirement,” meaning that a bankruptcy court should not confirm a plan if it is likely to be followed by a future liquidation or further reorganization of the debtor. In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. P‘ship, 116 F.3d 790, 801 (5th Cir. 1997); accord Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 649 (2d Cir. 1988). The purpose of this feasibility requirement is to ensure that a bankruptcy court confirms a plan only if it finds that the plan creates
Under our interpretation, the term “liquidation” is not rendered wholly meaningless or superfluous. The reference to “liquidation” in
But neither term is superfluous because each retains some independent meaning. After all, there are some “reorganizations” that are not “liquidations“—classic reorganizations under Chapter 11. And there are some “liquidations” that are not “reorganizations“—Chapter 7 liquidations. So we cannot say that treating the term “reorganization” as referring both to a classic reorganization as well as
The Funds argue that we must define the term “reorganization” more narrowly to remain consistent with the Supreme Court‘s decision in N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), superseded on other grounds by
The Funds argue next that the statutory context shows Congress did not intend for
We also observe that no other court has adopted the Funds’ interpretation. Other courts considering similar issues have concluded that a debtor who pursued a Chapter 11 liquidation was undergoing a reorganization such that a bankruptcy court could modify the debtor‘s obligation to fund retiree health care benefits
For purposes of
VI. CONCLUSION
Walter Energy long ago promised its retirees that it would provide them with health care benefits for life. We acknowledge that our decision today allows Walter Energy to break that promise. Fortunately for Walter Energy‘s retirees, they nonetheless will continue to receive health care benefits at no cost from the Funds.
We render our decision today as a court interpreting the statutes that Congress has enacted, not as policymakers. The resolution of competing policy choices to determine whether a company, after promising its employees that they would receive health care benefits for life, should be permitted to file bankruptcy, shed this obligation, and leave the federal treasury on the hook for the cost of these retirees’ health care is Congress‘s job, not ours. See Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 218 (2014) (“The role of this Court is to apply the statute as it is written—even if we think some other approach might accord with good policy.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We hold today only that
AFFIRMED.
Notes
retiree benefitsalso may refer to payments made under a plan, fund, or program
established in whole or in part by the debtor.
maintained.
We observe that prior to filing a petition
under Chapter 11.
Answering the question of whether Walter Energy maintained the 1992 Benefit Plan prior to filing bankruptcy is more complicated. At the time Walter Energy filed bankruptcy, it was paying no premiums to the 1992 Benefit Plan, but it had provided a letter of credit as security. It appears that Walter Energy‘s obligation to pay premiums to the 1992 Benefit Plan arose only after it shut down its individual employer plan, which resulted in its retirees becoming beneficiaries of the 1992 Benefit Plan. See fail[s] to raise . . . properly on appeal
).
The Funds also urge us to look to our cases interpreting the term maintain
under ERISA. In the ERISA context, we consider whether an employer maintained an employee benefit plan to determine whether ERISA preempts state laws relating to the employee benefit plan. See relate[s] to any employee benefit plan
); Metro. Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62 (1987) (holding that employee benefit plan
to include, among other things, any plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer . . . for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits . . . .
The Funds argue that our prior ERISA decisions establish that a company must do more than pay premiums to be said to maintain a plan and urge us to apply this reasoning to maintained
a plan for purposes of ERISA when it wrote the first check purchasing the policies, paid a portion of its employees’ premiums, made payroll deductions to collect its employees’ share of the premiums, and paid the premiums to the insurance company through a bank draft from its corporate account. Id. at 1551. But nothing in Randol addressed whether an employer who takes fewer actions—say, by only paying premiums—can be said to maintain a plan in whole or in part, which is the question presently before our Court. We cannot conclude from this ERISA decision that Walter Energy did not maintain the Funds.
makes no distinction between contractual and non-contractual benefits.).
maintainmust be narrowed to avoid an interpretation that would treat every person‘s tax payment as maintaining the Funds. They argue that a broader interpretation of
maintainwould mean that every taxpayer maintains the Funds
maintainthe Funds when they pay taxes, the Funds cannot show that
retiree benefits.
relate[] to pending litigation involving the UMWA Benefit Plans and certain companies.132 Cong. Rec. S34,004 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (Conference Report on Coal Act). The report explained that for period prior to February 1, 1993,
the plan documents, collective bargaining agreements[,] and litigation shall determine respective rights, duties[,] and obligations.Id.. Nothing in the conference report suggests that
the authorized representative of the retirees.
