*1 ATTORNEY, KELLY, CHIEF STATE’S CONNECTICUT et al. v. ROBINSON Argued No. 86-1033. October 1986 Decided November *2 Powell, J., opinion Court, Rehnquist, delivered the in which J., Brennan, White, Blackmun, O’Connor, Scalia, JJ., C. joined. Marshall, J., Stevens, J., dissenting opinion, filed a in which joined, p. post, 53. Attorney Assistant Schuman, Connecticut,
Carl States’ argued petitioners. the cause and filed briefs for argued the and filed a brief for Francis X. Dineen cause * respondent. opinion delivered the of the Court. Powell Justice granted in this whether restitu- review case decide We probation obligations, imposed state conditions of tion proceedings proceedings, dischargeable in under are Chapter 7 Code.
HH Carolyn larceny pleaded guilty m Robinson degree. charge wrongful was based her the second receipt from welfare benefits the Connecti- $9,932.95 Department of Income Maintenance. On November cut *3 Superior Court sentenced Robinson to 1980, Connecticut year prison of not less than one nor more than three term suspended years. The court execution of sentence and urging filed *Briefs of amici curiae reversal were for the State of Crump Crump, by Attorneys et Susan and David and Alabama al. respective for their States as follows: Charles K. Graddick of General Arizona, Alabama, Alaska, M. Brown of Robert K. of John Harold Corbin California, Colorado, de of M. Kamp K. Van Duane Woodard of Charles Delaware, Florida, Oberly III K. A. of Jim Smith of Corinne Watanabe of Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Hartigan Linley T. F. of E. James Jones of Neil Indiana, Iowa, Stephan T. Pearson of Thomas J. Miller of Robert of Guste, Jr., Kansas, Kentucky, Steven L. Beshear of William J. of Louisi- ana, Stephen Maryland, Kelley Michigan, of Frank of Hubert H. Sachs J. Minnesota, Missouri, Humphrey L. of T. III of William Webster Michael Nevada, Montana, McKay E. Greely Stephen of Brian of Merrill of New Hampshire, Jersey, Irwin I. Paul Bardacke of Kimmelman of New New Mexico, Thornburg Carolina, Spaeth Lacy H. of North Nicholas J. of Oklahoma, Frohnmayer B. Dakota, Turpén David North Michael C. of of Pennsylvania, Arlene Oregon, LeRoy Zimmerman of Violet of Rhode S. Carolina, Island, Cody T. of Travis Medlock South W. J. Michael Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, David L. John J. Easton of Wilkinson Eikenberry Mary Terry Virginia, Kenneth Washington, Sue 0. Wisconsin, A. Wyoming; C. La Follette of and McClintock of Bronson G. al. Benna Ruth and for National Governors’ Association et Solo- Lacovara, mon, Bloch, A. L. Philip Beate Susan Thomer. years. probation As a condition placed for five Robinson judge resti- probation, to make ordered Robinson Proba- of Adult Office the State of Connecticut tution1 to Office) (Probation per com- month, at the rate of $100 tion continuing January of her mencing until the end 16,1981, probation.2 voluntary petition February filed a Robinson 5, 1981,
On Bankruptcy Chapter et 11 U. C. 701 Code, S. 7 of the under Bankruptcy seq., for the District Court in the United States obliga- petition the restitution That listed of Connecticut. February Bankruptcy Court 1981,the 20, On tion as a debt. peti- agencies of Robinson’s of the Connecticut notified both April 1981,was the deadline them that and informed tion agencies discharge. objections filing did not file apparently discharge, objections proofs because claim or they position affect would not that the took the agencies probation. Thus, the conditions of Robinson’s participate estate. of Robinson’s the distribution did not granted May Robinson Court 1981, the On discharge. See 727. discharge in her bank- received time Robinson
At the May paid ruptcy, 20, 1981, On in restitution. she had $450 attorney that she believed Office wrote the Probation her probation, of Robinson’s the conditions had altered pay voiding restitution. Robinson that she the condition payments. further made no *4 respond did not to this Office
The
Probation
Connecticut
February
it informed Robinson that it
until
when
letter
(1985)
a trial
sets out the conditions
53a-30
Gen. Stat.
Connecticut
section
probation. Clause
of that
may impose
on a sentence
court
fruits
“make restitution of the
the defendant
a condition that
authorizes
pay
restitution,
he can
to
or
in an amount
afford
make
of his offense or
thereby
manner,
damage
or
caused
the loss
provide in a suitable
for
performance.”
the manner of
may fix
thereof and
the amount
the court
Robinson was or
uncertainty
the total amount
about
There is some
imposed
a total amount
judge
restitution
pay. Although the
dered to
only $6,000.
total
at
a month
$9,932.95,
years
payments
$100
five
nondischarge-
obligation
pay
the
restitution
considered
adversary
responded by filing
proceeding
an
able. Robinson
seeking
Bankruptcy
that the
in the
a declaration
res-
Court,
injunc-
discharged,
obligation
an
had been
as well as
titution
forcing
prevent the
officials from
Robinson
tion to
State’s
pay.
Bankruptcy
a
the
Court entered memoran-
trial,
After a
concluding
proposed
that the 1981
order,
dum and
had not
the conditions of
altered
Robinson’s
(1984).
McGuigan,
probation.
The court then examined statute under judge pay which the had the debtor to Connecticut sentenced appears as one restitution. Restitution of the conditions (1985). §53a-30 probation enumerated in Gen. Stat. Conn. payments section, Under that sent to the are Pro- payments bation Office. then are to the forwarded vic- Although penal provide tim. the Connecticut code does not probation for enforcement of victim, conditions it the trial does authorize court to issue a warrant for the arrest proba- defendant has of criminal who violated a condition of tion. 53a-32. does
Because the Connecticut statute not allow the victim right payment, to receive court enforce concluded *5 “right the victim nor the Probation Officehad a that neither payment,” and hence neither was owed a “debt” under the argued: obligation Bankruptcy It “Unlike an which Code. statutory duty, contractual, out of a or common law arises obligation responsibility is rooted the traditional here protect by enforcing a state to its citizens its criminal stat- by imposing utes and to rehabilitate an offender a criminal purpose.” 42 R., intended for that B. at 133. The sanction acknowledged the tension between its conclusion and court expansive excep- debt, definition of but found an the Code’s statutory long-standing definition “the tradition tion to by federal courts from interference with tradi- of restraint governments.” Id., functions of state at 134. The tional probation if the condition was a that, court concluded even bankruptcy jurisdiction, nondischarge- subject to it was debt provides under of the Code. That subsection able that that a does not affect debt penalty, payable fine, a or forfeiture to and for the “is for governmental compensation unit, and is not for benefit of pecuniary loss.” actual purpose also concluded that the of the restitution
The court promote offender, “to the rehabilitation of the condition was specifi- compensate 42 R., the victim.” B. at 137. It not to cally rejected argument that the restitution must be precisely compensatory the amount matched deemed because It noted that the state statute allows an the victim’s loss. “make restitution of the fruits of his offense or offender to pay pro- he can restitution, an amount afford to or make damage manner, for the loss or caused in a suitable vide 53a-30(a)(4) (1985). thereby,” In its Conn. Gen. Stat. “upon focuses the offender and the Connecticut statute view, part of the criminal and . . . restitution is victim, not on the penalty compensation actual loss.” for victim’s rather than held 42 B. Court R., Thus, at 137. bankruptcy discharge the conditions of had not affected Pellegrino’s probation. District The United States Court *6 adopted Bankruptcy of Court’s the District Connecticut Pellegrino proposed dispositions and this case without alteration. Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
The Court
(1985).
Robinson,
Having obligations that debts, concluded are question dischargeability. to the the court turned The appropriate agency proba- stated that the Connecticut court discharge bly objected avoided if it could have debt had 523(a)(2) 523(a)(4) §§ objec- or of the Code.3 As no under discharge court filed, were concluded that the tions § only 523(a)(7), rely pro- the subsection State could that nondischargeability for certain vides for automatic debts.4 523(a)(2)(A) protects discharge obtaining Section from debts “for services, extension, renewal, credit, money, property, or an or refinance of pretenses, representation, . . . a false or actual fraud.” Section false 523(a)(4) protects discharge from debts “for fraud or defalcation while 523(c), § fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, larceny.” acting or Under 523(a)(4) protected only by § § that are from or debts discharged objection discharge during unless the creditor files an are larceny, bankruptcy proceedings. Because was convicted of one Robinson 523(a)(4), likely § quite Bankruptcy listed in it is the debts “debt,” Court, obligation to be a would have found it non- if it had found dischargeable under that subsection. object discharge is requirement that creditors limited on its The (6) 523(a). ¶ (4), there, (2), ¶¶ Because 7 is not listed debts face to to the text of the Connecticut statute court then looked probation condition was determine whether Robinson’s
“compensation pecuniary meaning loss” within the for actual 523(a)(7). Court had consid- But where system, Appeals probation the Court of ered the entire state only language that allows a restitution order focused on the damage [by crime],” caused to be assessed “for the loss or 53a-30(a)(4) (1985). thought The court Conn. Stat. Gen. probation language compelled that the this the conclusion *7 pecuniary “compensation for actual loss.” It condition was particular that this condition of Robinson’s held, therefore, 523(a)(7). §by protected probation was not from Accordingly, it reversed the District Court. granted petition of certiorari. the State’s for a writ
We (1986). jurisdiction to review 1009 We have 475 U. S. Appeals judgment of under 28 U. S. C. of the Court 1254(1). § reverse. We
II Appeals’ primarily on the decision focused The Court §§101 language course, and 523 of Code. Of every involving “starting point of a stat in case construction Chip Stamps language Manor itself.” Blue v. ute is the (1975) Drug Stores, 421 756 concur 723, U. S. (Powell, J., only starting point. ring). As Justice But the text is “ ‘ expounding explained “In statute, Term: a last O’Connor guided by single or member of a must not be a sentence we provisions and to law, to the of the whole sentence, but look Logistics, object policy.”’” Inc. Tallen v. its Offshore (1986) (quoting Mastro Plastics tire, 207, 477 U. S. (1956) (in quoting Corp. NLRB, turn 270, v. 350 U. S. (1849))). Boisdoré, 8 How. 113, v. Heirs United States §§ language 101and 523 consider the case, In this we must automatically nondischargeable, under the paragraph are described that 523(a) (providing § opening clause of that a prescribed in the general rule discharge an individ- of this title does not “discharge under section 727 ... follow). paragraphs listed in the from debt” ual debtor light history bankruptcy of the court deference to crimi- judgments light nal of the interests of the States un- justice systems. fettered administration of their criminal A traditionally interpret
Courts have been reluctant to fed judgments. eral statutes to remit state criminal present commonly 11, text of Title referred to as the Bankruptcy replace Code, was enacted in 1978to Bank ruptcy Act of ch. 30 Stat. 544.5 The treatment of judgments under the Act of 1898informs our under standing language of the Code. category 57 of the Act
First, established the of “allowa- (14th 1977). ¶ ble” debts. See 3 Collier on ed. Only if a debt was allowable couldthe creditor receive a share bankrupt’s assets. See 65a. case, For this it is im- portant 57j to note that excluded from the class of allowable penalties government debts owed to entities. That section provided: owing county,
“Debts to the United States, State, a municipality penalty district, or a as a or forfeiture shall *8 except pecuniary not allowed, be for the amount of the proceeding loss sustained the act, transaction, or out penalty of which the or forfeiture arose.” 30 Stat. 561. §63 separate category “prov- Second, established the (14th ¶63 Bankruptcy able” debts. See 3A Collier on ed. 1975). provided discharge bankruptcy Section 17 that a in “release[d] bankrupt provable subject from all of his debts,” exceptions §17. portions to several listed later Al- though specificallyexcepted types four of debts from dis- charge, penalties it did not mention criminal kind. The most natural construction of the Act, therefore, would
5Congress amended Bankruptcy the Act several times between 1898 Congress and 1978. also made numerous technical changes to the Code the Amendments and Judgeship 1984, Federal Act of Pub. L. 98-353, 98 Stat. 380. None of changes those are relevant to this decision. discharged penalties in bank- to be allowed criminal have though government ruptcy, not entitled to a was even the Congress bankrupt’s had considered of the estate. share clearly passed penalties made the itAct; it criminal when expressly make them The failure them nonallowable. sup- nondischargeable time offered substantial at the same penalties. discharged port those the Act view that for the way. interpret Act in this courts did not But the statutory language, refused Despite most courts clear judgment to affect allow a leading the court case, court. criminal of a state reasoned: might 17 of the sections 63 and admitted that
“It be provisions only bankrupt be letter of those if act, penalties]; [criminal but it is embrace to, looked would may such literal be cases which that there well settled say may suffice to ... It is not admissible. construction ruling higher nothing would con- from a court but a that bankrupt by any provision congress, of the me that vince opera- discharge, permit under its intended to act, any judgment or federal rendered a state tions, of imposing in the enforcement of a fine court bankrupt provisions act have refer- laws. . . . between debtor as demands liabilities, to civil ence alone punishment inflicted not to such, creditors, Moore, publico In re pro committed.” for crimes bono 1901).6 (WD Ky. 148-149 111 F. exception, particu the boundaries differed as to Although courts imposed in sanctions, nonmonetary or sanctions involving
larly in cases See, g., e. widely accepted. was reasoning of Moore proceedings, civil 1946) (CA1 (citing Moore and States, 153 F. 2d v. United Parker Congress that the federal contemplation of in the was not noting “[i]t bankrupt the con pardon a from employed be bankruptcy power should *9 Freeman, 110, 116 F. 2d offense”); v. 373 Zwick sequences of a criminal are not 1967) “governmental sanctions (CA2 stating that and (citing Moore monetary payments”). We they require even when regarded as debts discharge under the allowing a decision only federal-court one have found 46 by reasoning widely accepted Congress was so the time
This leading the new Code that a commentator could state enacted flatly penalties are not a dis- that “fines and affected pp. charge.” 1A 1609- ¶17.13, See Collier on (14th 1978). n. 10 1610, and ed. obliga-
Moreover, those few courts faced with restitution part imposed applied the same tions reasoning of criminal sentences discharge prevent bankruptcy a from affect- ing such a condition a criminal sentence. For instance, years Congress the Code, four enacted a New York before Supreme Court stated: discharge has whatsoever
“A no effect upon a of criminal sentence. A a condition restitution bankruptcy proceeding is civil nature and is intended his an honest and unfortunate debtor of debts to relieve begin permit him his financial life anew. A and to probation in a is of restitution sentence of a condition judgment part of conviction. not create It does relationship per nor a debtor-creditor debt between making receiving sons restitution. As with probationary condition it is other sentence intended means to as a insure the lead a law- defendant will abiding life Mosesson, thereafter.” State v. 78 Misc. 2d (1974) (citations 356 N. 217, 218, Y. S. 2d 484 omitted).7 Congress against
Thus, enacted the Code 1978 the back- ground judicial exception of an established including exception sentences, an orders, created in the face of a statute drafted with considerable care specificity. Alderson, imposed In re Act a sentence to affect a criminal court. 1899). (W. F. Va. People Topping reasoning, adopting For other decisions this v. see Bros., (Crim. 260, 262, 2d 1974); 79 Misc. 359 N. Y. S. 2d 987-988 Ct. Washburn, People 621, 625-626, App. Rptr. 822, v. 3d Cal. 158 Cal. (1979).
47 to hold that the new Bank last Term we declined Just exception by silently abrogated ruptcy another created Code construing National Bank old Act. Midlantic courts Dept. Jersey Protection, 474 Environmental U. S. v. New of (1986), bankruptcy us 494 asked to hold that a trustee implicitly repealed exception an to trust 1978 Code had power. exception Courts had created that ee’s abandonment safety regulations, to a con out of deference state health implicated by comparable to the interests sideration States’ case. We stated: this statutory if
“The rule of construction is that Con- normal legislation change interpretation gress intends spe- judicially concept, it makes that a created intent particular this rule The Court has followed with cific. bankruptcy construing scope codifications. care extraordinary grant Congress the trustee an If wishes to nonbankruptcy exemption law, from ‘the intention would expressed, clearly or inferred not left be collected be disputable of convenience admin- from considerations bankrupt.’” (quot- istering Id., 501 at the estate of the (1904))(cita- ing Hammer, U. v. S. Swarts omitted). tions
B interpretation also must reflect basis of the Code Our deep judicial exception, that federal conviction for this invalidate the results state not courts should right proceedings. The formulate and enforce criminal aspect sovereignty important penal re- is an sanctions emphasized repeatedly has This tained Court States. against policy federal interference with “the fundamental Younger Harris, 401 prosecutions.” v. U. S. state criminal (1971). sup- Appeals found nevertheless Court port holding officials in the fact that Connecticut for its probably their continued enforcement have ensured could they against judgment ob- Robinson had court’s 523(c). may Although jected this be under hardly justifies interpretation many an cases, true it contrary long-prevailing view that Act that is to the discharge,” penalties 1A are not affected “fines *11 1978). (14th Bankruptcy p. ed. ¶17.13, Collier object right appear to dis- reliance on a to and Moreover, impose charge and undue burdens would create uncertainties require pros- In it state officials. some cases would on state judgments particular state criminal before ecutors to defend bankruptcy courts.8 As Justice has federal Brennan adjudication already in of matters at issue noted, federal proceedings can “an state criminal be unwarranted and un- seemly adjudicative duplication process.” own State’s (1971) (opinion Ledesma, 82, Perez v. 401 U. S. concur- ring part dissenting part).9 in in and attorney argument, conceded at oral
Also, as Robinson’s protected not restitution orders would be from dis- some charge appear objection if the an even State did enter to discharge. example, judge negligent in For homicide might probation, case sentence the defendant to conditioned paying compensation on the defendant’s victim’s husband for the loss the husband sustained when the defendant killed his wife. It is not clear that such a restitution order would eases, course, many principles In preclusion of issue would obviate bankruptcy questions, the need for the court to reexamine factual or inter pret But state law. differences between the elements of crimes and the provisions frequently might application pre of 523 hinder the issue Moreover, apart following from clusion. the burden on state officials of participating bankruptcy unseemly in proceedings, require it is prosecutors judgments to submit the state of their criminal courts to fed bankruptcy courts. eral course, duplicate adjudicative processes federal courts often Of state they petitions corpus. explicit consider for the writ of habeas But when Constitution, I, § reference in the Art. cl. as well as several federal statutes, importance corpus. Here, testifies to the of the writ habeas relitigation only rests ambiguous the ease for the federal courts on the words of the Code. exceptions listed
fit the terms 523(a)(7). interpretation of Thus, 523 other than this prosecutors than state to defend would do more force Code judgments bankruptcy In in federal court. state criminal judgments cases, some it could lead federal remission of imposed by judges. criminal state hamper prospect, flexibility turn,
This would state choosing judges imprisonment, the combination of likely to and restitution most further the rehabilitative fines, goals justice systems.10 of state criminal We and deterrent Congress lightly limit the not think would rehabilitative do options judges. and deterrent available state criminal interpreting Douglas Act, our cases one of Justice statutory “[W]e do not read these words with the remarked: overriding computer. an of a There is consideration ease govern equitable principles the exercise of *12 England, jurisdiction.” Marin S. Bank v. U. of (1966). recognized that the States’ interest This Court has justice systems administering from free fed- their criminal powerful of consider- is one of the most eral interference equitable considering influence a court ations that should Younger supra, types Harris, v. at 44-45. of See relief. federalism also must influence our reflection of our This interpretation in this of the Code case.11 because it forces the penalty rehabilitative is an effective Restitution terms, have confront, the harm his actions caused. in concrete defendant differently fine, than a traditional defendant penalty will affect the Such entity, impersonal often and calcu as an abstract and to the paid State Similarly, has harm the defendant caused. regard without lated punishment gives restitution a the harm and between relation direct Note, fine. than a traditional See Victim effect precise deterrent more Analysis, A 97 Harv. L. Process: Procedural in the Criminal Restitution (1984). 931, 937-941 Rev. interpretation approach a similar advocated Justice Frankfurter important interests: infringe upon state regulatory statutes that of assertions of new federal between as “The task is one of accommodation legisla- Federal individual states. authority and historic functions I—I l-H I—I light of the established state of the law—that bank-
ruptcy discharge judgments courts could not criminal —we Congress have serious doubts whether intended to make penalties §101(4).12 meaning “debts” within the question But we need not address that in this case, because 523(a)(7) preserves discharge any we hold that from condi- imposes part tion a state criminal court of a criminal sentence. 523(a)(7) portion protects
The discharge relevant from any debt penalty,
“to the extent such debt is for a fine, or forfeit- payable governmental ure to and for the benefit of a compensation pecuniary unit, and is not for actual loss.” language subject interpretation. This is On its face, certainly compel does not the conclusion reached Appeals, the Court of that a voids imposed probation orders as conditions of state Reports courts. Nowhere the-House and Senate is there language indication that this should be read so intru- tion of this character cannot therefore be construed regard without to the implications system government. our dual . . . The underlying as- sumptions of government, our dual form of consequent presupposi- legislative tions of draftsmanship expressive which are history of our habits, cut might across what implied otherwise be the range legislation. history congressional legislation justifies] . . generalization . that, when the Federal Government takes over such local radiations *13 vast network of our enterprise national economic thereby radically and re- adjusts the balance of state and authority, national charged those with the duty legislating of reasonably explicit.” are Frankfurter, Some Reflec- Reading tions on the Statutes, of 527, (1947). 47 Colum. L. Rev. 539-540 12 recognize, We as the Appeals Court of emphasized, that the Code’s broadly drafted, definition “debt” is legislative and that history, as priority well as the Code’s various dischargeability provisions, sup ports reading a broad of the definition. nothing But legislative his tory compels of these sections the conclusion Congress intended to change respect the state of the law with to criminal judgments.
51 523(a)(7) § sively.13 Congress by by If had intended, or provision, discharge to state criminal “we sentences, other hearings, been can be certain that there would have testi concerning consequences mony, so wasteful, and debate so important, purposes previously inimical deemed to and so outrage,” likely public Hill, v. 437 U. 153, to arouse TVA S. (1978) dissenting). J., (Powell, 523(a)(7) reading differs from that of the Second Our exception penal face, creates a for all its it broad Circuit. On they penalties, fines, denominated or sanctions, whether be Congress qualifying phrases; the included forfeitures. two governmental and for the fines must be both “to benefit pecuniary compensation for loss.” “not actual unit,” and 523(a)(7)protects it codifies fines; traditional criminal Section judicially exception to for fines. We created by major result is altered the two must decide whether the a traditional fine. Un- restitution and differences between section-by-section analysis legislative Reports, see For the (1978). (1977); 95-595, p. Rep. 95-989, p. 79 Rep. S. No. H. R. No. commentators, by see 3 on Bank explanations Collier For section (15th 1986); Norton, Bankruptcy ¶ and Practice ruptcy ed. 1W. Law 523.17 (1982). expressly fact, state that §27.37 of these commentators both by sought See intrusive Robinson. language does not have the effect 55, §27.37, ¶ 523.17, 523-123, 4; at n. 2. at n. Norton Collier 523(a)(7) likely to fines “for the It that the limitation of assessed seems prevent application of governmental was benefit unit” intended wholly private penalties punitive damages. See such that subsection (1973). 93-137, 116, pt. 2, pp. As for the reference to H. R. Doc. No. loss,” Report “compensation pecuniary indicates that for actual the Senate being language prevent this was from purpose main 95-989, Rep. supra, at applied penalties. No. 79. tax S. hearings the Bank- acknowledge that comments in the a few We may language that the bears the ruptcy Report suggest Laws Commission state- adopted But none of those interpretation the Second Circuit. they Congress, nor were included made a Member of ments was any significance Reports. to accord House We decline official Senate and Co., Hershey 283 U. S. McCaughn v. Chocolate See to these statements. (1931); Statutory 2A Construction Singer, Sutherland 493-494 N. (4th 1984). §48.10, ed. pp. 319 and n. *14 like traditional fines, restitution is forwarded to the victim, may by be calculated reference to the amount of harm the offender has caused. qualifying
In our neither of view, clauses of judgment allows the of a criminal that takes the justice system oper- form of restitution. The criminal is not primarily ated society for the benefit of victims, but for the benefit of only pun-
as a whole. Thus, it is concerned not with ishing rehabilitating the offender, but also with him. Al- though judgment restitution does resemble a “for the benefit imposed of” the victim, the context which it is undermines that conclusion. The victim has no control over the amount of restitution awarded or over the decision to award restitu- impose tion. generally Moreover, the decision to injury, penal goals does not turn on the victim’s but on the the State and the situation of the defendant. As the Bank- ruptcy Judge Pellegrino: who decided this case noted in “Un- obligation like an statutory which arises out of a contractual, duty, obligation or common law here the is rooted in the tra- responsibility protect ditional of a state to its citizens enforcing its criminal statutes and to rehabilitate an offender by imposing purpose.” a criminal sanction intended for that 42 R., B. at 133. point
This is well illustrated the Connecticut statute obligation imposed. under which the restitution was judge impose any statute eight specified authorizes a probation, “any conditions of as well as other conditions reasonably related to his rehabilitation.” Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-30(a)(9) (1985). (4) Clause of that section authorizes a judge require that the defendant
“make restitution of the fruits of his offense or make res- pay provide titution, an amount he can afford to or in damage suitable thereby manner, for the loss or caused may and the court fix the amount thereof and the man- performance.” ner of *15 require imposition in the of restitution not clause does
This provides a flexi- Instead, it for caused. the harm amount of remedy situation. to the defendant’s tailored ble proceedings on the State’s interests focus criminal Because punishment, rather than the victim’s and in rehabilitation compensation, that restitution orders we conclude desire operate proceedings imposed of” the “for the benefit in such compen- Similarly, they . not assessed “for . . are State. following a criminal The sentence sation” of the victim. penal necessarily and rehabilitative considers conviction are sufficient to Those interests interests of the State.14 523(a)(7). meaning place orders within restitution strong light the uniform States, of the interests century, three-quarters of a old Act over construction Congress any significant evidence that the absence of change this re- area, in this we believe the law intended to Accordingly, Congress. the will of effectuates sult best Appeals for the Second Circuit is of the Court decision
Reversed. joins, Justice Stevens Marshall, with whom Justice dissenting. timely objections dis- to the to assert
Petitioners failed charge respondent debt, Robinson’s to evalu courts have been forced only context which 14 Thisis not the they by determining are orders whether of restitution the treatment ate the con lower courts have addressed “penal.” Several “compensatory” or Act, 18 S. C. Witness Protection U. stitutionality Victim and of the federal Act, right jury trial as to have no that defendants 3579. Under require restitution, though Amendment would the Seventh even amount Note, Right in a civil case. See were decided a trial if the issue such and Witness Under the Victim Determine Restitution Jury Trial to (1984). Every Federal Court 63 Texas L. Rev. Act of Protection has concluded that question Appeals that has considered are not entitled of restitution orders contesting the assessment defendants (cit id., 672, n. 18 See at Amendment. protections of the Seventh to the eases). ing lengths majority goes this to considerable excuse default. obligation Respondent that the restitution would concedes timely discharged petitioners objected in a had not have been Arg. respond- 30.1 When notified of Tr. of Oral fashion. proceeding, petitioners bankruptcy however, did noth- ent’s They they objection ing. told that could file an Rob- were discharge, did not do so. Robinson’s counsel inson’s but (Proba- of Adult informed the Connecticut Office Probation Office) discharge tion and of Robinson’s belief of Robinson’s payments, no further but the Probation she need make years respond. almost three after Office did not Not until did the Probation Office *16 Robinson’s discharged that it did not consider the debt inform Robinson the intended to enforce restitution order. and that it charitably petitioners’ attributes inaction to the The Court petitioners position they the start took that from the fact representations at 39. But their at oral Ante, assert here. argument suggest only they object that failed to because agencies admittedly were somewhat on how “state confused Arg. perplexed Tr. of and it,” to handle Oral were “a little happened.” this was the first time it at 16. Id., because seek a Petitioners broad construction of the to excuse statute right object their confusion-induced waiver of the thereby guarantee obligation that Robinson’s restitution discharged. my opinion, not be however, would stat- fairly majority ute cannot be read to arrive at the result the today. reaches obligation
The Court concludes that a criminal restitution 523(a)(7) nondischargeable is under U. S. C. because it is 1 Robinson’s restitution debt would doubtless have come under 11 (4), respectively provide §§ U. S. C. or which that a money obtaining will not affect a debt “for . . . . . . false fraud,” pretenses, representation, a or actual or a false debt “for fraud or , embezzlement, larceny.” prevent discharge . . . or defalcation To debts, however, timely objection such the creditor must make a and the hearing. 523(c); must notice a debtor receive See U. S. C. 4007(c). Bkrtcy. Rule payable penalty, or to and for benefit of fine, “a forfeiture compensation pecu governmental actual a and is not for unit, unconvincing majority’s niary . I find loss . . Ibid. at issue here is that order conclusion pecuniary “compensation for actual loss.”2 While res not imposed probation under a condition of titution part penal it sanction, statute is in a is also Connecticut compensate injuries. The victims for intended to their stat require permits defendant, a court to a as a condition ute probation, to “make restitution of the fruits his of his pay make an amount he can afford restitution, or fense damage provide manner, in a the loss or or suitable 53a-30(a)(4) (1985) thereby . . . .” Conn. Gen. Stat. caused added). penal, purely (emphasis Were the restitution order would not connect the amount of restitution to the the statute imposed. Tying damage the amount of restitution to the damage strongly of actual sustained the victim amount compensate payment suggests is that meant theory underlying comports This with res victim. simply punishment is sanctions. Restitution not titution incidentally compensates Indeed, the victim. com pensation scheme, is an element a restitution essential wrong a crime must which to the victim of be re under *17 just by by restoring penalizing the offender but dressed not 2 precisely argue solely order fits Rather than that the restitution within 523(a)(7), appears rely part § in language of the Court to the fact Bankruptcy Code, penalties that, fines and prior to enactment of judicially in under a nondischargeable rendered created were discharge. majority “Congress that exception to The contends enacted judicial against background excep in 1978 of an established the Code sentences,” ante, 46, that discharge Congress for criminal at and tion to judicially it abrogate deemed created law unless makes should not be But, judicially abrogating intent to do far from created law explicit the so. matter, penalties nondischargeable general Congress making fines and as a 523(a)(7). that law and requirements The his has codified added negate exception of the does not the additional limitations torical basis expressed the statute.
56 possible, position [he] to “the victim, as far as that would original in if the criminal act had occurred.” have been never Hagel, Assessing R. Barnett & the Criminal: Restitution, J. Legal Assessing Retribution, Process, and the the Crimi Legal Restitution, Retribution, nal: Process (1977); also at 25-28. That the victim id., see has no control imposed or in over whether restitution will be what sum does compensation not mean that the restitution is not for actual pecuniary loss.3 accept consequences I
Nor do that we can avoid the of re- bankruptcy by finding spondent’s that the res- obligation scope First, titution was not a “debt.” expansive. debts under the Code is “Debt” is defined in 11 §101(11) “liability on a claim,” U. S. C. and “claim” is 101(4) “right payment.” legislative defined as a history given indicates Code that “claim” was to be possible Rep. the “broadest definition.” H. R. No. 95-595, p. (1977); Rep. p. (1978); 95-989, S. No. see also Ohio (1985) (“[I]t apparent v. Kovacs, U. S. is ”). Congress light desired a broad definition of a ‘claim’ scope agree the broad of “debt” under the I Code, with the qualification 523(a)(7), §in fine, 3 Theother penalty, that the or forfeit “payable must be governmental unit,” ure the benefit of a is not a consideration here because the restitution order in this case meets this re so, however, only It does quirement. because the victim of Robinson’s larceny government agency. was a private Where the victim is a individ ual, legitimately it not be payments could said that restitution destined for are made “for governmental that individual the benefit of a unit.” Res repay private titution intended to victim damage for the done to him is governmental only State, “for the benefit of a unit” in the sense that the “governmental unit,” within the definition of which comes see 11 U. S. C. every 101(21), justice time appears is benefited is served. The Court stating: system approach, justice take this “The criminal operated is not victims, primarily society for the benefit but for the benefit of as a Ante, requirement whole.” at 52. If the is to be read broadly, so how ever, fine, penalty, forfeiture for the govern or would be benefit of a *18 unit, superfluous. § making qualification mental this
57 right pay- Appeals had a to of that the Probation Office Court by notwithstanding right the “that the is enforceable ment, probation rather of of and incarceration threat revocation levy prop- by the the and execution on debtor’s than threat of obligor erty. right cognizable the less is not because upon property than loss of must suffer of freedom rather loss (CA2 pay.” re 776 F. 2d 38 Robinson, 30, to In failure 1985).4 intentionally only to is broad not
The definition of “debt” meaningful discharge guaran- but to also ensure debtor possible right many participate in as to as creditors tee property H. R. estate. See the distribution swpra, Rep. No. at 180: 95-595, “[U]nder liquidation chapters [1898] Bank- permitted ruptcy not to share certain creditors are Act, non-provable of their the estate because nature discharged debtor from those claims, and the is not incomplete, is relief for the debtor Thus, claims. given opportunity collect are not an to those creditors proposed permit a the case their claims. The law will complete bankrupt debtor, of a settlement the affairs 4 permit to Though does not the victim enforce the restitu Connecticut g., e. See, jurisdictions do. judgment, other tion order a civil 3579(h) by (any imposed a federal court order restitution U. S. C. a victim named in the order “may by be the United States or enforced action”); judgment in a in the same manner as a civil receive the restitution 17-14-13(a) (1982) (“A order enforce Ann. restitution shall be Code Ga. execution”). statutes, such Under it would judgment as is a able civil does not argue more that a criminal restitution order be even difficult Compare “right consequently and is not “debt.” payment” create a 1984) (“Since Pellegrino, re (Bkrtcy. a crime R. Ct. Conn. B. Bank payment,’ has no is not a ‘debt’ under ‘right victim Newton, (Bkrtcy. with In re ruptcy 101(11)”), B. R. Ct. Code 1981) that, provided enforcement (holding Georgia ND Ga. since law victim, is a Georgia, an order of restitution restitution orders “in debt”). *19 (footnote complete discharge a and fresh start” and omitted). Appeals observed, that the As the Court conclusion obligation produce not a debt restitution was “would right that of a restitution could anomalous result no holder to proceeding bankruptcy participate in dis or receive liquidation. There is debtor’s assets tributions Congress intended such In re no that a result.” evidence contrary, Congress On the Robinson, 2d, 776 F. at 35-36. plainly penalties, that be fines, intended and forfeitures eligible participate in the distribution of the deemed debts to provides explicitly for estate, and the statute 726(a)(4).5 very participation. See 11 U. S. C. The penalties, fines, and forfeitures are made nondis- fact that they chargeable under indicates that were deemed they they debts, if were not would not be affected “debts”; discharge, §524, 11 U. no need see S. C. there would be nondischargeable. them make wholly sympathy policy I with interests
While am opinion, system underlying “in the Court’s our constitutional separation powers to the is too funda- commitment pre-empt congressional by judicially us to action mental for public decreeing ‘common what accords with sense and the responsibilities po- such Constitution vests weal.’ Our (1978). 437 U. Hill, litical branches.” TVA v. S. might Congress have amended the Code achieve the result question, “[i]t had it is not reached here confronted but speculate, Congress act, much less us whether specific its had the events of this would have altered stance anticipated.” at 185. I affirm the Id., case been would permit Congress, judgment if it inclined, were so “claims,” payment distributed in 5 Theestate is see U. S. C. 726. history that the terms makes clear “debt” and “claim” “are legislative against debtor; creditor has a ‘claim’ the debtor owes a coextensive: (1977). 95-595, p. Rep. H. R. No. the creditor.” ‘debt’ to specifically amend the Code to make criminal nondischargeable obligations bankruptcy.6 I respectfully dissent. *20 holding that the only postpones problem: its The Court’s solution open nondischargeable under leaves obligation is Chapter 13. obligations dischargeable will be under
possibility that such 1328(a), Norton, Bankruptcy Law and Practice C. 3 W. See U. S. (15th 1986) Bankruptcy ¶ ed. (1981); §78.01 1328.01[l][c] Collier (broader perform complete for debtors to discharge intended as incentive Newton, supra, but see In re (holding Chapter plans); at 710 ance under 1328). opinion nondischargeable under The Court’s restitution order in coordi lay to rest the difficulties the courts will have therefore does not criminal restitution statutes. nating Code with state