DON JUAN TORRES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. R. O‘QUINN; D. TATE; D. MUNCY, Defendants-Appellees. DON JUAN TORRES, a/k/a Donald Hautz, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENE JOHNSON; LARRY HUFFMAN; TRACY RAY; JOHN JABE; R. ROWLETT; M. MULLINS, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 06-7770(L)
No. 07-7340
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Filed: August 31, 2010
PUBLISHED. Argued: December 1, 2009. Decided: July 13, 2010. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Glen E. Conrad, District Judge. (7:06-cv-00576-GEC; 7:07-cv-00398-GEC).
Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
The Court amends its opinion filed July 13, 2010, as follows:
On page 4, line 6 -- “twenty percent of” is added following “an initial payment of.”
On page 11, lines 3 and 4 -- the word “filling” is corrected to read “filing.”
For the Court - By Direction
Patricia S. Connor
Clerk
PUBLISHED
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Glen E. Conrad, District Judge. (7:06-cv-00576-GEC; 7:07-cv-00398-GEC)
Argued: December 1, 2009
Decided: July 13, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit
2 TORRES v. O‘QUINN
Judge Davis authored a Supplemental Opinion Denying Appellant‘s Post Judgment Motion for Partial Refund of Filing Fees in which Judge Gregory joined. Judge Niemeyer wrote a dissenting opinion.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Tonya T. Robinson, WILMERHALE, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Mark R. Davis, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: June Shih, WILMERHALE, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. William C. Mims, Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
OPINION
DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Don Juan Torres, a/k/a Donald Hautz (“Torres“), while an inmate at a Virginia prison, filed two civil actions against prison officials in federal court; each case was promptly dismissed for failure to state a claim. When he appealed to this court, we ordered, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Title VIII of Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), amending
TORRES v. O‘QUINN 3
For the reasons that follow, we conclude, in agreement with Torres, that
I.
Torres was an inmate at the Red Onion State Prison (“ROSP“) in Virginia. He filed two civil actions in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia against prison officials during his imprisonment. In the first case, Torres complained that prison officials failed to repair a malfunctioning night-light in his prison cell, resulting in a disturbing “strobe” effect. J.A. 4-7. The district court promptly dismissed the action sua sponte pursuant to
In connection with each of his two appeals, as an indigent prisoner, Torres proceeded under the relevant sections of the 4 TORRES v. O‘QUINN PLRA, filing an Application for Leave to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees, a Consent to Collection of Fees from Trust Account, and a copy of his trust account statement. J.A. 124-33, 189-91. On November 6, 2006, and February 20, 2008, respectively, we granted each of Torres‘s applications, ordering that an initial payment of twenty percent of the greater of his average monthly deposits or monthly balance from the six months before filing of each appeal be collected as an initial payment. J.A. 135-37, 192-94. In each such order, in accordance with the PLRA, we directed prison officials to withhold and forward to the clerk of the district court, twenty percent of Torres‘s monthly deposits when his income exceeded $10 until the full filing fee was discharged. Id. In March 2007, ROSP officials began withdrawing money, at the twenty percent rate, from Torres‘s account to pay the filing fee for his first appeal. Beginning on June 26, 2008, however, after they received our February 20, 2008, order for the second appeal, ROSP officials began withdrawing forty percent, i.e., twenty percent per appeal. When, periodically, the district court received the funds so withheld,
On September 23, 2008, Torres sent a letter to the district court challenging the propriety of the excessive withdrawals. In this letter, he insisted that there must have been an error in the collection of fees from his prison account. J.A. 175-77. On October 28, 2008, the district court (through its pro se law clerk) responded to Torres and advised him that all the money that had been withheld from his account was being applied to the fee related to the first appeal, and that after that fee is paid in full, the money withheld would then be applied to his second appeal. J.A. 174. The district court also advised Torres that any objection to the amount of withholding should be addressed to this court. Id. We construed Torres‘s objection as a motion for return of fees and appointed counsel to present argument on his behalf. The Attorney General of Virginia has entered an appearance to defend the prison‘s practice of withholding twenty percent of an inmate‘s account (or income, as TORRES v. O‘QUINN 5 the case may be) for each and every appeal for which an inmate owed fees, without regard for the twenty percent exaction mentioned in the PLRA. We have jurisdiction to review the propriety of the implementation of our prior orders.1
II.
The PLRA, enacted in 1996, changed the landscape of prisoner litigation. Congress required that indigent prisoners filing lawsuits be held responsible for the full amount of filing fees. Section 1915(b) sets forth the requirements for the payment of fees by prisoners filing suit in federal court. If an indigent inmate is unable to pay the full fee at once, he may be ordered to make an initial “partial payment” of the filing fee. After the initial partial payment, such a prisoner goes on a “monthly payment plan” until the filing fee is fully discharged. The portions of
(b)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee. The court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a partial payment of any court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of—
6 TORRES v. O‘QUINN
(A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner‘s account; or
(B) the average monthly balance of the prisoner‘s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal.
(2) After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month‘s income credited to the prisoner‘s account. The agency having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the prisoner‘s account to the clerk of the court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.
A.
Although the question is an open one in this circuit, there is a split of authority among our sister circuits: the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have interpreted
1.
The Fifth Circuit has concluded that
The Fifth Circuit‘s concern for consistency is misplaced: although the statute mentions that “the court shall assess and collect,” the clerk of the court is responsible for collecting the filing fees only in the sense that the clerk “receives” the fees. Plainly, it is the agency having custody of the prisoner that “collects” the fees, in the sense that the agency “gathers together” the money to make payment to the court clerk. See Random House Unabridged Dictionary 402 (2d ed. 1993) (defining “collect“). Under a per inmate collection scheme, a prison would collect the funds to pay the fees accrued by a specific inmate, and then distribute those funds to the appropriate court until that court‘s fees are paid in full. After satisfying the first court, the prison would continue to collect funds and use them to pay the next court in sequence. There is no “confusion” in such a scheme requiring “elimination.”
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit‘s casual dismissal of the inchoate constitutional impediment to its interpretation of the PLRA filing fee provision is deeply troubling. It simply is not true that “[t]he Supreme Court has held that indigent persons have no constitutional right to proceed in forma pauperis.” Atchinson, 288 F.3d at 181. The very case cited by the Fifth Circuit for that proposition reaches exactly the opposite hold- TORRES v. O‘QUINN 9 ing. Specifically, the Supreme Court concluded that a mother in Mississippi could not be denied appellate review in a termination of parental rights action solely because she could not pay the fees to compile the record necessary for appeal, stating, “we hold that Mississippi may not withhold from M. L. B. a record of sufficient completeness to permit proper [appellate] consideration of [her] claims.” M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 128 (citing Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 198 (1971)) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, as the Supreme Court has made clear, there are indeed certain fundamental rights whose vindication in a judicial forum are sufficiently profound that the government may not deny access to that forum on the basis of poverty. Id.
2.
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has correctly noted that the difficulty
We agree with the Seventh Circuit that the PLRA is not ambiguous; rather, it is simply silent. (“The statute does not tell us whether the 20 percent-of-income payment is per case or per prisoner.“). Still, the Seventh Circuit‘s reasoning leaves much to the imagination, and does little to advance the necessary statutory analysis. The court employs a number of highly debatable assumptions: (1) that prisoners only file suits that are “frivolous,” “malicious,” or “fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” see
TORRES v. O‘QUINN 11
(2) that most prisoners who file numerous suits are serving relatively short sentences, and thus will be released before all unpaid filing fees can be collected from their trust accounts; and (3) that Congress is powerless to collect unpaid filing fees from prisoners after they are released.7 We decline to engage in such factfinding under the circumstances here.8
3.
The Second Circuit has held that the collection of filing fees under
B.
1.
On the issue of whether fees are to be collected simultaneously or sequentially, we are called upon to determine what Congress would have done had it thought about the problem, not interpret an ambiguous statute. Cf. Newlin, 123 F.3d at 436. We think the most valuable interpretive clue arising from a focus on the “plain text” of the filing fees provisions of the PLRA is the one urged by counsel for Torres, namely, that
2.
But here, as in many statutory interpretation exercises, reliance on text alone can lead to a dead end. Cf. Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (“As we have repeatedly stated, ‘“the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.“‘“) (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (quoting King v. St. Vincent‘s Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991))). Unlike the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth 14 TORRES v. O‘QUINN Circuits, we are not persuaded by the concern that prisoners would no longer be held liable for the payment of their filing fees if “only” required to pay a twenty percent maximum of their monthly income regardless of how many suits are filed or appeals noted, and would start filing suits against prison officials willy nilly. First, the “per inmate” reading of
Furthermore, under a “per case” interpretation, inmates may find themselves in situations where they no longer have any income after the fees are paid. If, for example, the inmate had $10.02 in his account, the prison may start deducting fees since he has a balance over $10. See
3.
We conclude that the admittedly meager legislative history of the PLRA points to the Second Circuit‘s approach, that a TORRES v. O‘QUINN 15 “per inmate” interpretation is the correct interpretation and both satisfies Congress’ intent
Congress put a limit on garnishment from an inmate‘s (already meager) income, understanding that a “chilling effect” on litigation was not the same as a complete bar on filing suits, which may occur if close to one hundred percent of an inmate‘s income is taken to pay his filing fees. When enacting the PLRA, Congress was explicit that the intention of the statute was to provide prisoners with “an economic downside to going to court.” 141 Cong. Rec. S7525 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole). Congress sought to provide initial deterrents against suits, but not to punish prisoners for electing to litigate. See 141 Cong. Rec. S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“The modest monetary outlay [in § 1915] will force prisoners to think twice about the case and not just file reflexively.“). The garnishment of more than twenty percent of an indigent inmate‘s already meager income crosses the line from deterrence to punishment and was not the intent behind
Furthermore, Congress indicated that the timing of recoupment was not the intended disincentive, but that prisoners would be deterred simply by the requirement that they pay the costs at all. See 141 Cong. Rec. S14413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (emphasis added) (“[W]hen prisoners know that they will have to pay these costs — perhaps not at the time of filing, but eventually — they will be less inclined to file a lawsuit in the first place“) (emphasis added).
Congress never intended
4.
Finally, adopting a “per case” regime for
Because prisoners who have had “three strikes” under
18 TORRES v. O‘QUINN
or she holds.” (quoting DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 446 (7th Cir. 1988))).
III.
Our good colleague dissents on three grounds. First, the dissent contends that we have misinterpreted the applicable provisions of the PLRA. Second, the dissent contends that the case is moot and that we lack “subject matter jurisdiction.” Finally, the dissent asserts this court lacks the power to order a refund of filing fees. We address these contentions in turn.
A.
The dissent‘s boldly-stated and confident application of its version of “plain meaning” statutory analysis is as unpersuasive as it is formalistic, consisting of little more than reproducing the statute. The approach bespeaks the kind of mechanical statutory interpretation that can lead a court to stray from the full achievement of congressional goals. See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (rev‘g 70 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that “plain meaning” of statutory term “employee” absolutely excludes from its compass a “former employee“)); Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409 (2005) (rev‘g 367 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 2004) (concluding that one statutory subsection “plainly applie[d]” to another subsection)); United States v. Hayes, 129 S.Ct. 1079 (2009) (rev‘g 482 F.3d 749, 752 (4th Cir. 2007) (determining what statutory provision “plainly require[d]“)). By deeming
The dissent categorizes the payments mandated by § b(1) and § b(2) as “two types of installment payments” that must be collected and paid simultaneously in every case; but in fact, they are materially distinct in purpose and effect.13 Indeed, the record here discloses a telling fallacy in the dissent‘s unwarranted assumptions. Although corrections officials sua sponte withheld 40% of Torres‘s income for the payment of fees in the two appeals before us, the district court applied all the funds it received only to the first case. Thus, the actual implementation of the statute in this instance resulted in a deviation from the clear congressional mandate the dissent asserts is unavoidable in a “plain meaning” reading of the statute: that no more than 20% of an inmate‘s income be withheld per case. In fact, Torres (now released from custody) has paid 40% of his monthly income in “a [single] case.”
It is also worth noting that, in keeping with the sensible practice of many district courts around the country, the district court in these cases promptly determined that the complaints failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and dismissed each case pursuant to
status.14 Accordingly, Torres quickly earned
The dissent scolds us because we forthrightly acknowledge (in agreement with Judge Easterbrook, see Newlin, 123 F.3d at 436, but in disagreement with the per curiam decision of the Fifth Circuit, see Atchison, 288 F.3d at 180) that the PLRA is in a material respect “silent,” requiring us to fathom (unexpressed) congressional intent regarding the sequencing (or not) of the monthly payments assessed pursuant to
Indeed, members of the Supreme Court have noted that at least one provision of the PLRA itself is “silent” in a material respect. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 358-59 (2000) (“There is no logical inconsistency in saying both (1) a motion (to terminate) ‘shall operate as a stay,’ and (2) the court retains the power to modify or delay the operation of the stay in appropriate circumstances. The statutory language says nothing about this last-mentioned power. It is silent. It does not direct the district court to leave the stay in place
We respect, but take a different view from, the dissent‘s credulous observation that governmental appropriation of virtually the entirety of an inmate‘s monthly income for the payment of court filing fees does not rise to the level of “punishment.” Congressional and judicial disapprobation of frivolous claims instituted by too-idle prisoners is entirely appropriate; we honor Congress’ goal to reduce the incidence of frivolous claims by our holding.17 On the other hand, only a little more than a fortnight ago, the Supreme Court reminded us that there are limits to official hostility to prisoner litigation. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S.Ct. 1175 (2010) (per curiam) (abrogating Fourth Circuit rule that allegation of only de minimus injury precludes Eighth Amendment excessive force claim). As mentioned above, we believe that Congress intended to inflict an economic “sting” on inmates as a disincentive to the filing of meritless claims, not to impose a regime in which an inmate has access to federal district court only at such an oppressive cost as the dissent is willing, if not anxious, to impose.
B.
The dissent also contends that because Torres has been released from prison, see supra n. 1, the PLRA no longer applies to him and therefore, the case is moot. It is said that we are merely issuing an advisory opinion. In their joint post-argument submission to the court, counsel for the parties disagree with the dissent, as do we.
The merits of these appeals have long been decided and there is no unadjudicated “claim” against the named defendants here. The question now before us is whether Torres should get a partial refund of the filing fees paid on his behalf from his prison trust account, not simply whether Torres should only have 20% deducted from his prison account at all times. We ultimately conclude (consistent with Judicial Conference Policy) that he is not entitled to a refund of fees under the circumstances. See infra pages 24-25. Contrary to the assertions in the dissent, however, federal courts plainly and unmistakably have the power to refund a litigant‘s payment of an excessive or mistaken filing fee
Relatedly, the dissent suggests that because we have decided to deny a refund of the excessive filing fees paid on behalf of Torres, it follows that any discussion of the harm itself is merely gratuitous. Surely, this is not true. Our constitutional tradition traces at least to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), the notion that a court should determine, first, whether there was a legal harm before it undertakes consideration of a remedy. We conclude that the decision whether to refund fees requires of this court an exercise of discretion, but we could no sooner exercise our discretion not to order a refund of fees without first deciding whether there was an “overpayment” in the first instance.
C.
The dissent also claims that, based on sovereign immunity, we have no discretion to fashion a remedy and thus we lack power even to consider whether a legal injury occurred. The dissent is clearly mistaken. First, as we have discussed, federal courts have the authority to refund an overpayment of filing fees, and in fact, have ordered the refund of excessive filing fees. See West, 2001 WL 563818 at *5. Second, sovereign immunity bars claims against the United States for money damages, but has never been interpreted to bar a request to a governmental agency or department simply to recover property or the fair-value of that property erroneously delivered to the government. The difference between the analysis we would conduct in the sovereign immunity context and the discretion afforded us by the policies of the Judicial Conference of the United States to refund excessive filing fees necessitates an analysis of whether the fees were wrongly collected. Manifestly, the refund request in this case illustrates the difference between an analysis of a claim that would not be redressable in the sovereign immunity context, and a request that we clearly may remedy at our discretion. In short, this case does not call into question our Article III powers to adjudicate the merits of Torres‘s motion for a partial refund of filing fees.
IV.
We hold that
Torres has now been released from custody and during his imprisonment, he fully complied (indeed, under our holding, more than fully complied) with his PLRA payment obligations for these appeals. Accordingly, under our precedent, he is absolved from further payments. See DeBlasio, 315 F. 3d at 397. Nevertheless, under the circumstances, although federal courts have the authority to order a refund of excessive filing fees, we decline
****
For the reasons set forth, the motion for partial refund of fees is
DENIED.
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Torres, having proceeded in forma pauperis in two separate actions that he filed, now owes fees for those actions.
In a remarkably proactive approach to statutory interpretation, the majority holds that, even though
Reacting to statutory “silence,” the majority answers a “call” “to determine what Congress would have done had it thought about the problem.” Ante at 12 (emphasis added). To do this, it focuses on selective statements of Senators in the legislative history about what the bill would accomplish, concluding that “Congress sought to provide initial deterrents against [prisoners‘] suits, but not to punish prisoners for electing to litigate.” Ante at 15 (emphasis in original). From that intuitive conclusion, which, in fact, is unsupported by the legislative history, it reasons that “[t]he garnishment of more than twenty percent of an indigent inmate‘s already meager income crosses the line from deterrence to punishment and was not the intent behind
The majority crowns its analysis with the conclusion that its cap on filing fees is necessary because requiring the prisoner to make the required monthly payment for each action or appeal filed “could present a constitutional problem of access to courts for prisoners.” Ante at 16. Indeed, it refers to the reading of the statute that requires a prisoner to pay the full filing fee in each case that he chooses to file as a “pyramiding” scheme. See ante at 18, 21. Without the citation of authority, the majority concludes that the requirement that payment be made for each action or appeal filed would mean that “prisoners under a [fee] ‘per case’ regime may be completely barred from filing meritorious claims,” ante at 16 (emphasis added), and that the bar created from the prisoner‘s financial burden would violate the Constitution, despite our court‘s earlier conclusion to the contrary. See Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 231-33 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that a prisoner simply has to make a financial choice, as does everyone else, of how to spend his money).
While there may be a textual analysis of
Aside from the merits of the dispute, I also submit that this case became moot when Torres was released from prison, and therefore it should be dismissed. Because of this and because the interpretation of
I
The issue in this case arises from a letter sent by Torres to the Clerk of the district court and forwarded to the Clerk
In the first case, Torres sued prison officials, claiming that their failure to repair a flickering night light in his cell violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the suit under
When Torres noticed that 40% of his prison account income was being withheld to pay filing fees, he sent a letter to the Clerk of the district court asking why 40% was being withheld and requesting that he be “stopped being charged 40%” to pay his filing fees. The Clerk of the district court forwarded the letter to the Clerk of this court, where the Clerk docketed the letter as a motion for refund of fees, which is now before us. The question presented, accordingly, is whether the terms of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA“)—particularly
The PLRA was enacted in 1996 in response to Congress’ conclusion that prisoners were flooding the courts with mostly frivolous litigation. See Roller, 107 F.3d at 230-31. “Finding that the proliferation of prison litigation was due significantly to the lack of economic disincentives to filing meritless cases,” the Act imposed the requirement that inmates pay the full amount of filing fees. See
Under the PLRA, prisoners are required to make two types of installment payments on their filing-fee debts. Subsection (b)(1) of
The majority concludes that the PLRA imposes a sequential payment plan by which a prisoner pays installments for his first case through deductions of 20% of his monthly income and starts to pay installments for a second case only when the fees for the first case are paid in full. It thus holds that the 20% withholding requirement provided in the Act is a “cap,” regardless of the number of cases filed by the prisoner. This holding gives prisoners, in effect, a free ride after they file their first piece of litigation.
Fairly read, however,
Subsection (a) of
Addressing that same action or appeal for which the prisoner must make a down payment, subsection (b)(2) requires that the prisoner pay the remainder of the fees in installments consisting of 20% of his monthly income until the full fee is paid. See
It makes no textual sense to conclude that subsection (b)(1) imposes a down payment (“initial partial filing fee“) in each action that a prisoner files and then somehow conclude from the text that subsection (b)(2), providing for the payment of the remainder of the filing fees, applies only to the first action that the prisoner files, and not to any subsequent action that the prisoner files, until the fees in the first action are paid in full. Nothing—not even logic—supports such an interpretation. Yet, that is precisely what the majority holds is appropriate. As an additional indicator that subsection (b)(2) applies to each action filed, subsection (b)(2) directs prison officials to forward the installments “to the clerk of the court,” obviously referring to the Clerk of the court where the action or the appeal was filed. See Atchison v. Collins, 288 F.3d 177, 181 (5th Cir. 2002). Thus, if the prisoner files his first action in the Eastern District of Virginia, he makes the down payment and forwards it to the Clerk of the district court in the Eastern District of Virginia, as well as the installment payments for the remainder. If the prisoner files his second action in the District of Maryland, he must again make the down payment, but this time to the Clerk of the district court in the District of Maryland, and likewise he must forward the remainder of the filing fee in installments to that Clerk.
Finally, it is clear from the rest of
Despite these indications from the statute‘s text, Torres argues—and the majority accepts—that the word “any” in subsection (b)(1) somehow imposes a limit on the fees that can be collected under subsection
Both Torres and the majority also argue, without identifying textual support for their interpretation, that statements in the legislative history suggest that Senators were sensitive to charging excessive costs and that those statements somehow support imposing a limit or cap on the statute‘s requirement that the prisoner pay filing fees in each action or appeal he files. A more complete reading of the references cited from the legislative history, however, suggests that the Senators did not speak of an accumulative cap on fees, but rather intended that prisoners make a choice each time they file a lawsuit about whether the “lawsuit [is] worth the price.” See 141 Cong. Rec. S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
Finally, both Torres and the majority argue that if the court were to interpret the statute as requiring the prisoner to pay the monthly installments on the filing fees in each case or appeal filed, serious constitutional problems could arise when the prisoner files multiple actions because the required payments would impose a financial burden that denies the prisoner access to the courts. This argument, however, is advanced without legal support. Indeed, we have held to the contrary, as explained in Roller:
Requiring prisoners to make economic decisions about filing lawsuits does not deny access to the courts; it merely places the indigent prisoner in a position similar to that faced by those whose basic costs of living are not paid by the state. Those living outside of prisons cannot file a lawsuit every time they suffer a real or imagined slight. Instead, they must weigh the importance of redress before resorting to the legal system. If a prisoner determines that his funds are better spent on other items rather than filing a civil rights suit, ‘he has demonstrated an implied evaluation of that suit’ that the courts should be entitled to honor.
107 F.3d at 233; see also Atchison, 288 F.3d at 181.
Moreover, the statute expressly guards against any access problem in
Accordingly, I would affirm the collection of the filing fees from Torres for each action filed, as has been done, and deny his motion for a refund.
II
Quite apart from the merits, as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, which was not briefed by the parties but which arises by reason of the fact that Torres has now been released from custody, I respectfully suggest that this case is moot and that, accordingly, we must dismiss it.
“It goes without saying that those who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Art. III of the Constitution by alleging an actual case or controversy.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983). “[A] federal court has neither the power to render advisory opinions nor ‘to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.‘” Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)); see also Hayburn‘s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). Rather, “[t]o be cognizable in federal court, a suit . . . ‘must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.‘” Rice, 404 U.S. at 246 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937)).
In order to ensure that federal courts do not issue unconstitutional advisory opinions, the Supreme Court has established several justiciability doctrines that must be satisfied to confer jurisdiction on a federal court, including the doctrines of standing and mootness. Along with injury and causation, the “irreduceable constitutional minimum of standing” requires a party seeking relief in federal court to establish that the injury complained of is “redress[able] by a favorable decision.” See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Thus, if relief from the injury is not “‘likely’ to follow from a favorable decision,” the party seeking relief has no standing and has not presented a justiciable case or controversy. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Likewise, because “[m]oot questions require no answer,” Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Ferris, 179 U.S. 602, 606 (1900), federal courts “[are] not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions,” California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.R., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893).
The relief that Torres sought in this case was to “stop” withholding 40% of his prison account income to pay his filing-fee
The majority rests its jurisdiction on a phantom claim for a refund for “overpayment” of filing fees. In fact, however, Torres makes no such claim. Torres asked simply why 40% of his prison account income was being withheld and requested that he be “stopped being charged 40%” to pay his filing-fees indebtedness.
Moreover, there is no suggestion that Torres does not owe the full amount of the filing fees charged in the two cases. The applicable statute requires that he pay the full amount of filing fees in each case that he files. See
The majority provides no legal justification for the judicial power it gratuitously exercises over a moot dispute other than to conclude, “We, however, find it appropriate for the guidance of the courts and corrections officials in this circuit, to explain why, while Torres was in custody, withholding of 40% of his monthly income was inconsistent with our orders and, ultimately, with the PLRA.” Ante at 5 n.1. This desire “to explain,” however, provides no basis to render this a justiciable case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution.
The majority opinion is, therefore, nothing more than an unconstitutional advisory opinion on the operation of
Because any relief requested is beyond the powers of this court, the case must be dismissed.
Notes
See Julia Colaruso, Comment, Out of Jail But Still not Free to Litigate? Using Congressional Intent to Interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1915(B)‘s Application to Released Prisoners, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 1533, 1544 n. 61 (2009) (citations omitted):
[S]ome courts review the petitioner‘s IFP application while simultaneously deciding the merits of his claim . . . . Under this approach, the court automatically denies IFP status upon a finding that the claim is frivolous or malicious and thereby dismisses the case . . . . Courts utilize the one-step procedure in part because it “helps minimize the drain on public funds and judicial resources that in forma pauperis litigants might otherwise cause.”
Even if we grant the existence of a few of the dissent‘s hypothetical inmates who, like the Fifth Circuit‘s hypothetical Texas inmate, are “free to file a § 1983 action against the President in the District of Columbia,” see Atchison, 288 F.3d at 181, and who thus file cases in different federal district courts, such speculation provides scant reason to apply the statute as the dissent would. As we observe, supra p. 8, corrections officials are suitably equipped to handle such outliers by remitting withheld inmate funds to the appropriate courts sequentially.
The dissent‘s reliance on Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 231-33 (4th Cir. 1997), is misplaced. Unlike the appellant in that case, Torres does not contend that the imposition of filing fees on inmates violates the constitution. Rather, he contends, as the Second Circuit has found, that the pyramiding of the monthly payments required by
Notably, in enacting the PLRA to address the increase in litigation arising in the prison setting, Congress imposed not only (1) filing fees and (2) the “three-strikes” rule already discussed, but it also (3) “invigorated the exhaustion prescription” required of prisoners bringing claims under
Upon receiving funds from Torres’ prison account, the district court erroneously applied the full 40% withheld to the filing-fee debt from Torres’ first suit. Consistent with
