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O'Shea v. Littleton
414 U.S. 488
SCOTUS
1974
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*1 O’SHEA, MAGISTRATE, CIRCUIT COURT OF COUNTY, ILLINOIS,

ALEXANDER et al. LITTLETON et al. January 15, Argued October 1973 Decided 72-953.

No. *2 J., delivered White, opinion of the Court, in which Burger, J.,C. and Stewart, Powell, and RehNQüist, JJ., joined. Black- MUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and in Part I of the Court’s opinion, post, p. 504. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BrenhaN and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 505.

Robert J. O’Rourke, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen- eral of Illinois, argued the cause for petitioners. With Scott, Attorney Gen- J. William were the briefs him on General, Attorney Assistant Herzog, First Fred F. eral, General, Attorney Freels, Assistant Special W. John Attorney General. Abrams, Assistant B. Jerráld respondents. cause argued Wiseman M. Alan O’Shaughnessy B. James the brief were him on With * Seng P. Michael of the opinion delivered White Mr. Justice Court. com- who individuals named are on individually and action, rights civil

menced this Illinois, city of Cairo, of citizens class of a behalf *3 County, Alexander Attorney for the State’s of Commissioner the Police investigator, his Illinois, and Michael O’Shea here, petitioners and Cairo, of Judge Associate and Magistrate Dorothy Spomer, alleging respectively, County Court, Circuit Alexander are con- in, intentionally and engaged they have of practices and patterns various in, engage tinuing justice criminal administration in the conduct County deprive system in Alexander Thirteenth, Sixth, Eighth, by First, secured rights C. by Amendments, and Fourteenth and complaint, as and 1985. §§ early 1960’s, black since the amended, alleges number white a small with together of Cairo, citizens actively, peaceably have been behalf, on their persons and treat- opportunity seeking lawfully equality and participation housing, education, employment, ment by J. urging were filed Evelle reversal curiae *'Briefs of amici Hinz, Jr., Chief Attorney General, Assistant Edward A. Younger, O’Brien, P. Assistant General, and Edward Attorney Doris H. Maier Attorney Granucci, Deputy R. Gen- General, and Robert Attorneys Horsley California; Jack E. and eral, the State Jr., Bar Record, Illinois Assn. for the State F. Richard in governmental decisionmaking ordinary day- to-day relations with white citizens and officials of Cairo, and have, as an important part of their partici- protest, pated in, and encouraged others to participate in, an economic boycott city merchants who respondents con- sider have engaged in racial discrimination. Allegedly, there 'had resulted great deal of tension and antago- nism among the white citizens and officials of Cairo.

The individual respondents are 17 black and two white residents of Cairo. The class, classes, which they pur- port to represent are alleged to include “all those who, on account of their race or creed and because of their exercise of First Amendment rights, have in the [been] past and continue to be subjected to the unconstitutional and selectively discriminatory enforcement and adminis- tration of justice criminal in Alexander County,” as well as financially poor persons “who, on account of their poverty, are unable to afford bail, or are unable to afford counsel and jury trials in city ordinance violation cases.” The complaint charges the State’s his Attorney, investi- gator, and the Police Commissioner with a pattern and practice of intentional racial discrimination in the per- formance of their duties, by which the state criminal laws and procedures are deliberately applied more harshly to black residents of Cairo and inadequately *4 applied to white persons who victimize blacks, to deter respondents from engaging in their lawful attempt to achieve equality. Specific supporting examples of such conduct involving some of the individual respondents are detailed in the complaint as to the State’s Attorney and his investigator.

With respect to the petitioners, the county magis- trate and judge, a continuing pattern and practice of conduct, under color of law, is alleged to have denied and to continue to deny the constitutional rights of respondents and members of their in class respects: three to according criminal cases in bond set petitioners (1) facts to the regard without schedule bond an unofficial defendant individual of an circumstances of a case Amendments; Fourteenth and Eighth the of violation higher they set sentences belief” and information (2) “on mem- and respondents conditions harsher impose and they (3) and persons, for white class than of their bers when class of their and members respondents require carry city ordinances of violations with charged paid, cannot be if the fine jail penalties possible fines and Sixth, the of in violation by jury' a trial pay for to these of Each Amendments. and Fourteenth Eighth, out carried have been alleged practices is continuing of class and their deprive respondents intentionally system justice county criminal protections the boycott and similar in their engaging from them to deter there that alleges further complaint The activities. prac- requests remedy at law adequate no against sought were damages No enjoined. tices be any specific instances nor were case, petitioners this forth respondents set individually named involving officers. judicial these against claim of for want the case dismissed District Court The for and prayed injunctive to issue jurisdiction from suit immune were petitioners ground on the judicial of their in the course done respect to acts with Appeals reversed, holding duties. Court which the (1967), on Ray, 547, 554 Pierson v. issuance forbid the did relied, Court District alleged and officers if it is judicial injunctions against in conduct they knowingly engaged have proved that class cognizable discriminate intended race; remedy Absent sufficient on the basis persons in the event ruled that Appeals Court law, at Court the District proved allegations, injunctive relief appropriate fashion proceed to should

493 prevent petitioners from depriving others of their con- stitutional rights the course of carrying out judicial duties in the future.1 granted We certiorari. 411 U. S. 915 (1973).

I We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The complaint failed to satisfy the requirement threshold imposed by Art. Ill of the Constitution that those who seek to invoke power of federal courts must allege an actual case controversy. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 94-101 Jenkins (1968); v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, (1969) 421-425 (opinion of J.). Plaintiffs Marshall, in the federal courts soxpe “must allege threatened or injury actual resulting from the putatively illegal action before a federal court may jurisdiction.” assume Linda S.R. D., Richard 617 614, (1973).2 There 1While the Court Appeals did not attempt specify exactly type what injunctive might relief justified, it suggested at least might it requirement include a “periodic reports of various types of aggregate data on actions on bail and sentencing.” 468 2d, F. at 416. The dissenting judge urged that a federal district court has power no supervise regulate by mandatory injunc tion the discretion which state court judges may exercise within the limits of powers vested in them by law, and that contemplated by the majority holding might be applicable to pattern practice alleged, if proven, subject would peti tioners to the continuing supervision of the District Court, necessity of defending their motivations in each instance when the fixing of bail or sentence was challenged by Negro as defendant inconsistent equitable with the relief granted, and possibility of a contempt citation for comply failure to with the relief awarded. Id., at 415-417. 2We have previously noted that “Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though injury no would exist without the statute. See, g., e. Metropolitan Co., Traficante Ins. U. S. (1972) Life J., concurring); Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 (White, U. S. (1968).” Linda R. S. v. D., Richard *6 494 toas such outcome” in the stake “personal abe

must the sharpens which adverseness concrete that “assure largely so the court upon issues of presentation ques- constitutional difficult of illumination for depends Nor (1962). Carr, 204 186, 369 U. S. Baker v. tions.” are statutory issues where different principle is the 687 SCRAP, 412 669, S. States v. U. United Cf. raised. must be It enough. not is injury (1973). Abstract immediately or is “has sustained plaintiff the that alleged as the result injury” direct sustaining some of danger Massachu conduct. or official challenged statute the of injury (1923). The Mellon, 447, 488 262 setts v. immediate,” “real and be both injury must of or threat Zwickler, Golden v. “hypothetical.” or “conjectural” not Co. v. Casualty Maryland (1969); 109-110 394 U. S. (1941); 273 Co., 312 U. S. Coal & Oil Pacific Mitchell, 75, 89-91 S.U. Public Workers United plaintiffs the named none of if Moreover, (1947). requisite the class establishes a represent purporting may none defendants, controversy with the or case of a member any himself or other on behalf seek Patterson, 32-33 Bailey class.3 the right to purport not to bestow do (1973). such statutes But 3n. statutory invasion absence of indication sue 1983, in C. likely Title S. occur. U. right § or is has occurred injured” action at “party in an liability provides to the particular, Per- redress. proceeding for equity, proper or law, other suit controversy requirement actual case force, the constitutional injury show actual or threatened Respondents still must remains. sense. standing in the constitutional ldnd to establish of some complaint this case determination in as no class There was require determination did grounds which dismissed on was standing lack of Petitioners assert to be made. by the the class claim is buttressed respondents to raise named represent. incongruous seek to nature of class complaint as in the those variously defined incompatibly and class boycotted Negro white, have Cairo, who both residents of Indiana Employment Division v. Burney, (1962); U. S. 540 (1973). See 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice, ¶ n. 23.10-1, (2d8 ed. 1971).

In the complaint that began this action, the sole allegations of injury are that petitioners “have engaged in and continue to engage in, pattern practice conduct ... all of which has deprived and continues to deprive plaintiffs and members of their class of their” *7 constitutional rights and, again, that petitioners “have denied and continue to deny plaintiffs and members of their class their constitutional rights” by illegal bond- setting, sentencing, and jury-fee practices. None of the plaintiffs named is identified as himself having suffered any injury in the manner specified. In sharp contrast to the claim for relief against the State’s Attorney where specific of instances misconduct with respect to particular

individuals are alleged, the claim against petitioners alleges injury in only the most general terms. At oral argument, respondents’ counsel stated that some of the named plaintiffs-respondents, who could be identified name if necessary, had actually been defendants pro- ceedings before petitioners and had suffered from the alleged practices.4 unconstitutional Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief, however, if certain businesses in city and engaged in similar activities for the purpose of combatting racial discrimination, as a class of all Negro citizens suffering racial discrimination application the of the justice criminal system in Alexander County (though two white persons are named respondents), and poor as all persons unable to bail, afford counsel, jury or trials in city ordinance cases. The absence specific of claims of injury as a any result of wrongful the practices charged, in light of the ambiguous and contradictory class definition proffered, bolsters our conclusion that respond- these ents cannot invoke jurisdiction federal to hear the they claims present in support of request injunctive relief. 4Tr. of Arg. Oral 21, 23, 26. adverse present continuing, by any unaccompanied counsel respondents’ nor complaint Neither effects. time at the plaintiffs named any suggested an al- serving themselves filed were was complaint awaiting trial or on trial were or illegal sentence legedly were respondents any Indeed, if petitioners. before com- sentence, assertedly unlawful serving then or from seeking be inappropriately would plaint Preiser custody. See current, existing modification if Furthermore, (1973). Rodriguez, 411 U. S. proceedings, trial state awaiting on trial were then that a injunctive relief seeking would complaint Harris, 401 Younger v. provide. should court do thus II, also Part We see (1971); infra. the con- into meaning inappropriate to read not strain complaint. this allegations clusory on bearing evidence are wrongs course, past Of repeated threat a real and immediate whether there injury rests on future prospect of here the injury. But be arrested again will likelihood that *8 and law criminal violations with charged for and trial, or proceedings, to bond subjected will be again this assess- Important petitioners. before sentencing any relevant that allegations ment absence unconstitu- of Illinois is criminal State statute respondents have applied or as or tional on its face improperly violating with charged be been or will be might possibly If criminal law. the statutes if laws, and are valid enforced improvidently made these statutes are charges under perceived any whether question becomes pressed, sufficiently real immediate respondents is threat controversy simply they because existing an to show being statutes and anticipate violating lawful criminal may appear offenses, they for their which event tried they if will petitioners and, do, before be affected allegedly illegal conduct charged. Apparently, the prop- osition is that respondents proceed to violate if unchallenged law and they are charged, held to answer, if and tried proceedings before petitioners, they will be subjected to the discriminatory practices that peti- tioners are alleged to have followed. But it seems to us that attempting to anticipate whether and when these respondents will be charged with crime and will be made to appear before either petitioner takes us into the area of speculation and conjecture. Younger See v. Harris, supra, at 41-42. The nature of respondents’ activi- ties is not described in detail and no specific threats are alleged to have been made against them. Accepting they are deeply involved in a program to eliminate racial discrimination in Cairo and that tensions are high, we are nonetheless unable to. conclude that the case-or- controversy requirement is satisfied by general assertions or inferences that in the course of their activities re- spondents will prosecuted for violating valid criminal laws. We assume that respondents will conduct activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction as well as exposure to the challenged course of conduct said to be followed by petitioners. “ As in Golden v. we Zwickler, doubt that there is ‘suffi- ”

cient immediacy reality’ to respondents’ allegations of future injury to warrant invocation of jurisdiction of the District Court. There, “it was wholly conjectural that another occasion might arise when Zwickler might be prosecuted for distributing the handbills referred to in the complaint.” 394 U. S., at 109. Here we can only speculate whether respondents will be arrested, either again or for the first time, for violating a municipal ordi- *9 nance or a state statute, particularly in the absence of any allegations that unconstitutional criminal statutes are being employed to deter constitutionally protected conduct. Cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 101-102 Zwickler though Even J.). of (opinion Brennan, (1971) previously- he had which under specific a statute attacked was not prosecution a new of the threat prosecuted, been require- jurisdictional satisfy to sufficiently imminent here respondents Similarly, courts. ments contem- prosecutions imminent any to pointed have they naturally number and their any of against plated to violate expects of them any one not suggest do to the vulnerability Yet laws. criminal valid sought is is which injury from threatened alleged prosecutions of bringing upon the necessarily contingent circumstances, these Under them. more one or of right any constitutional not claim do where presumably by therefore proscribed in conduct engage to is otherwise it or indicate laws, state permissible of the threat themselves, conduct to so their intention they attack of course conduct alleged from the injury case-or-controversy re- satisfy the remote simply too to court. by a federal adjudication permit quirement and Court (1971), the Landry, Boyle In insufficiency of its for dismissed complaint a ordered inferring “that no basis was where there allegations suit is brought this who citizens more of the one if the injury irreparable suffering any jeopardy the intimidation under prosecute free left State is expressed Court manner.” normal statute prose- criminal course state normal “the the view that on the basis or blocked disrupted be cannot cutions nothing analysis amount in the last charges Ibid. A future.” about speculation than more alleged uncertainty about whether similar element case, in this present .occur is likely injury will opera- normal with the to interfere similar reluctance in the criminal laws its administration of state tion conclusion strengthens the by respondents sought manner

499 in allegations complaint this are too insubstan- tial to warrant federal adjudication of the merits of respondents’ claim.

The foregoing considerations obviously shade into those determining whether the complaint a states sound basis for equitable relief; and even if we were inclined to consider the complaint presenting as an existing case or controversy, we would firmly disagree with the Court of Appeals that an adequate basis for equitable relief against petitioners had been stated. The Court has recently reaffirmed the “basic doctrine of equity juris- prudence that courts of equity should not act, and par- ticularly should not act to restrain a prosecu- criminal tion, when the moving has party an adequate at remedy law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equi- table relief.” Younger Harris, v. 43-44 (1971). Additionally, recognition of the need for a proper balance the concurrent operation of federal and state courts counsels against restraint of injunc- issuance against tions state engaged officers in the administration of the State’s criminal laws the absence of a showing “ of irreparable injury which is Toth great and imme- ” Id., diate.’ at 46. See, e.g., Fenner Boykin, U. S. 240 (1926); Douglas v. City Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943). In holding that 42 U. C. § S. is an Act of Congress that falls within the “expressly authorized” exception to the absolute bar injunctions directed at state court proceedings provided U. S. C. § 2283, the Court expressly observed that it did not intend “question qualify any way the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding.” Mitchum Foster, 407 U. S. 243 (1972). Those principles preclude equitable inter- vention in the present circumstances here. state single a down to strike not seek do

Respondents they seek nor do applied; or as on its face statute, either brought might prosecutions criminal enjoin fact, In law. criminal challenged *11 under brought will be prosecutions contemplate that apparently an they seek is laws. What state valid seemingly under occur- the preventing or controlling aimed at injunction in the place take might that events specific of rence the The order criminal trials. future state of course respond- if be available should thought Appeals of Court only operative be would allegations proved ents pending are prosecutions state permissible where injunction. of the beneficiaries of the more or one , interruption of contemplate order the would Apparently noncompli- of adjudicate assertions to proceedings state less than nothing to us This seems by petitioners. ance proceedings criminal of audit state federal ongoing kind of inter- indirectly accomplish the would which Harris, and related cases supra, v. Younger ference sought prevent. to establish the court should intervene

A federal be intrusive so future intervention would for basis injunctive relief concluding In and unworkable. inter- it would not in this case because available would be under chal- to be commenced prosecutions fere with the Appeals of misconceived statutes, the Court lenged equitable withholding basis for federal underlying proceedings in the course of criminal normal when the objec- disrupted. would otherwise state courts in the anticipatory interference to unwarranted tion is piece- process state criminal means continuous by litigation state interruptions proceedings the meal object federal the sustain courts; “[t]he delicacy adjustment preserved to be special administra- power federal equitable between State Minara, 342 S. of its own law.” U. tion Stefanelli Cleary Bolger, See also (1951).5 (1963); v. Schnettler, Wilson 365 U. 381 (1961); S. Pugach v. Dollinger, (1961); U. S. 458 cf. Rea v. States, United 350 U. An (1956). injunction S. type contemplated by respondents and the Court of Appeals would disrupt the normal course of proceedings in the state via courts resort federal suit for initio, determination the claim ab just as would the request injunctive relief from an prose- state ongoing cution against the plaintiff found to be was in Younger. unwarranted it Moreover, require would for its enforcement supervision by continuous federal court over petitioners the conduct of the in the course of future criminal trial proceedings involving respondents’ members of the broadly defined class.6 *12 Appeals Court of any disclaimed requir- intention of ing the District Court to in sit day-to-day constant supervision of judicial these officers, but “periodic the system reporting” it thought might be warranted would constitute a form of of monitoring operation the of state court functions antipathetic prin- established ciples of comity. Cf. Greenwood Peacock, 808 (1966). Moreover, injunction because against acts which might occur in the course of future criminal would proceedings necessarily impose continuing obliga- tions of compliance, the question arises of compliance how might be enforced if the injunction beneficiaries of the were to charge that it had been disobeyed. Presumably, any respondents’ member of class who appeared as an 5It was noted brought in suits under 42 U. S. C. Stefanelli 1983 “we have withheld § in equity even recognizing when that comparable facts would create a cause of for damages. action Compare Giles v. Harris, 189 with Wilson, Lane v. U. S. 268.” S., 342 U. at 122. 3, supra. See n. 1, supra. See n. adjudi- have allege could petitioners before accused of the contempt were petitioners claim that cated of adverse review with injunction order, court’s federal in this perhaps, Appeals and, of in the Court decisions defining inherent difficulties from the Apart Court. might claims which such proper the standards non- proving of problems significant the measured, and continuing major such a cases, in individual compliance into federal courts of the power equitable of intrusion is in proceedings criminal of state daily conduct restraint of principles equitable conflict with sharp pre- in the decisions recognized has which this Court viously noted. establish moreover, failed, have

Respondents relief in these equitable issuance of requisites basic immedi- likelihood of substantial circumstances —the inadequacy remedies and the irreparable injury, ate necessarily con- already canvassed the have at law. We to which injury jectural of the threatened nature if And .subjected. allegedly are they or if prosecuted trial, and face respondents are ever state and there are illegally sentenced, are available relief from the procedures provide which could victim dis- alleged. Open conduct to a wrongful law under state are the criminatory practices asserted judge change venue, or a right a substitution 114-6 review Stat., (1971), §§ Rev. c. 114-5, Ill. *13 appeal postconviction on direct or on collateral re view, opportunity and the demonstrate judicial prejudicial of officers is so to the conduct these justice disciplinary pro administration of that available possibility including suspension or ceedings, Ill. VI, (e). are warranted. Art. 15 removal, Const., § appropriate circumstances, In habeas moreover, undoubtedly be available. relief would Nor is it true that unless injunction sought available federal law will exercise no deterrent effect in these Judges circumstances. who would willfully dis- ground criminate on the of race or otherwise would willfully deprive the citizen of his rights, constitutional as this complaint alleges, must take account of 18 U. S. C. § 242. See Peacock, Greenwood v. supra, at 830; United States Price, v. 793-794 (1966); United Guest, States v. 383 U. S. 745, 753-754 (1966); Screws States, United 101-106 (1945); United Classic, States v. S. 299 (1941). U. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. (1961). S. That provides: section

“Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordi- nance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of State ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or pro- tected the Constitution or laws the United States, or to different punishments, pains, pen- alties, on account such inhabitant being alien, byor reason his color, or race, than are prescribed the punishment of citizens, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . .” may

Whatever be the case with respect to liability civil generally, see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. (1967), or liability civil for willful corruption, Johnson, see Alzua v. 231 U. S. 106, 110-111 (1913); Bradley Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347, 350, 354 we (1872), have never held that performance of the duties judicial, legislative, or execu- tive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise deprivations criminal of constitutional rights. Cf. parte Ex Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1880). On the con- trary, the- judicially fashioned doctrine of official immu- nity does not reach “so far as to immunize criminal proscribed conduct by an Act of Congress . . . .” Gravel v. United States, 408 S. 606, U. 627 (1972).

504 relief other avenues availability of the

Considering they assert, conduct for serious respondents the open intercession unmanageable and the abrasive con- represent, we they would seek injunctive case existing absence of an from the that, apart clude adjudication, by for controversy presented or District in deciding erred Appeals the Court claim. respondents’ entertain Court should

Reversed. part. concurring Blackmun, Justice Mr. I of and Part I the Court join judgment complaint opinion the Court’s which holds imposed satisfy requirement “failed to threshold who seek Ill of the Constitution those Art. allege an actual must power invoke the of federal courts controversy.” Ante, at 493. case it seems conclusion, follows, we at that it When arrive any other precluded considering are from me, that we additional presented Thus, issue for review. the Court’s question equitable whether a case for discussion of the advisory opinion relief was stated amounts to an 2 Dall. Rayburn’s Case, powerless that we are to render. Evans, v. 301 (1792); 409 United States States, Muskrat v. 219 360-361 (1909); United U. S. Wood, (1911); (1915); Stearns v. 75 U. S. Coffman Public Breeze United Corps., (1945); 323 U. S. 316 Mitchell, Workers v. Paschall (1947); U. S. 75 Christie-Stewart, Inc., ante, at 101-102.

Mr. applicable principle Justice Frankfurter stated the speaking Longshoremen’s the Court International & Warehousemen’s Boyd, Union v.

(1954): appeal, appellee

“On this contends that the Dis- trict Court should not have reached statutory questions and constitutional it should have —that *15 dismissed the suit for want of a 'case or controversy/ of standing lack on the part union’s to bring this action, .... the first objection Since is conclusive, there end of the matter.” I would adhere to principle. Either there is no case or controversy and that is end of the matter, or there ais case controversy and the Court may go on to a decision on the my merits. In view, may the Court have it both ways.

Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Bren- nan and Mr. Justice Marshall concur, dissenting.

The respondents in this case indigent are black and citizens of Cairo, Illinois. Suing in federal court, they alleged that since the early 1960’s black citizens Cairo have been actively seeking equal opportunity and treat- ment in employment, housing, education, and ordinary day-to-day with relations the white and citizens officials of Cairo. In this quest, blacks have in a engaged boycott of local merchants deemed to have engaged in racial discrimination.

Alleging that quest this for equality generated has sub- stantial antagonism from governmental white re- officials, spondents brought a class action under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1982, 1983, and 1985, seeking to represent citizens of Cairo who have been subjected in the past, and continue to be subjected, to the allegedly discriminatory and unconstitu- tional administration of criminal justice in Alexander County, Illinois, which includes Cairo. Among their other claims, respondents alleged petitioners Michael O’Shea and Dorothy Spomer, both now judges in Alex- ander County,1 engage in acts which deprive them and 1O’Shea, Magistrate of County Alexander Circuit Court when this suit was instituted, became an Judge Associate county on July 1, 1971. rights. their constitutional of their class members without in criminal cases set bond allegedly judges These punishment, and as facts of individual cases to the regard at of defendants merely appearance to assure and not and sentences harsher conditions impose higher trial; require and citizens; white on black than on sentencing charged when class, members of carry fines ordinances which city violations of with if the by jury trial pay for a possible jail penalties, paid. fine cannot be

I The conduct. injunction sought against An was this jurisdiction, want of obliquely District Court referred to re- sought complaint that but, focusing on the fact that discretion, concluded judicial view of matters of magis- and judges the action should be dismissed because per- in done liability trates are immune from acts remanding reversing formance of their In duties. Appeals the case to the District the Court of Court, by held that the doctrine of action was not barred judicial held that immunity. Appeals The Court of also the complaint aver- sufficiently specific contained factual satisfy ments to Fed. Rule (a). Civ. Proc. 8 468 F. 2d 389.

This Court now decides for the first time in the course litigation this that complaint is because deficient it does not state a “case or controversy” within the meaning of Art. III. party

The fact no that raised in has issue this closely contested case is no barrier, of course, to our consideration of it. But the reasoning and result reached by the Court are say the least a tour de force quite inconsistent with the allegations the complaint, which are within requirements. constitutional argument

We know from the record and oral boiling with racial conflicts. This class Cairo, Illinois, action under U. C. brought §§ S. rights. vast of civil remedy

and 1985 is invasions says or contro- Court, it is not a “case however, alleged versy” plaintiffs because none of named has infringement rights and the mem- of his fact that other may bers of injured enough. the class have been is not Patterson, Bailey As to the latter, 31, 32-33, 369 U. S. is cited in support. Bailey persons But the named were given standing sue, the statement that “[t]hey represent cannot a class of whom are not they part,” id., 32-33, being at dictum and only authority being its Atchison, Co., McCabe v. T. & S. F. R. 151, 162-163, which was not a class action. Nor question was the on case is made to turn re Employment solved Indiana Division v. Burney, 409 only U. S. 540. For we held that where the named plaintiff had received relief and appeared nothing as relief, to the if any, granted to members the class, possible question of mootness should be resolved the District Court. so, Even there were dissents. The upshot is that one crucial issue on which the Court makes *17 this turn case has not been decided by the Court and was never argued here. At the very least we should have a full-dress argument on point. that

IBut do press point, the for the amended com- plaint sufficiently is specific to warrant a trial. respects

As O’Shea, the Magistrate, Spomer, and Circuit Judge, the charges concerning named plaintiffs are as follows:

(1) that excessive bonds have been required in vio- lation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because petitioners follow an unofficial bond schedule without regard to the facts of individual cases; set petitioners belief, and information on (2) for conditions harsher impose and sentences higher white than class of their members and persons; fined been have plaintiffs named that, where

(3) fines, pay cannot jail and to at sentenced and times a trial pay for to them required have judges these jury- O’Shea alleges complaint the amended

Moreover, prac- and pattern in a engage “continue to Spomer and deprive” continues and deprived “has tice” which con- class their of their members and plaintiffs named since alleged it Moreover, rights. stitutional whites and of Cairo some the blacks the 1960’s early to end dis- seeking peaceably actively and have been have those activities and that in Cairo crimination antago- and tension generate continue and generated nism in Cairo. in Cairo commissioner police alleged that

It is also and mem- deny plaintiffs continues to denied “has and in the rights their constitutional bers of their class ways: following be made or caused to Defendant has made

“(a) filing and the making of arrests cooperated or their plaintiffs and members charges against and are warranted charges where such are not class to dis- and merely purpose for the of harassment class from prevent and their courage plaintiffs rights. exercising constitutional or caused to be made “(b) has made Defendant cooperated filing in the of arrests and the making plaintiffs of their charges against members may class there some basis to where colorable *18 charge, arrest the crime defined but much charge harsher than is warranted facts and is far more than like severe charges would be against a person.” white These allegations support the likelihood that plaintiffs named well as as members will class arrested the future and therefore will be brought before O'Shea Spomer and be subjected to the alleged discriminatory practices in the administration of justice.

These allegations past and continuing wrongdoings clearly state case or controversy in the Art. Ill sense. They are specific as as those alleged in Jenkins McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, Bolton, and Doe 179, where we held that cases or controversies were presented.

Specificity proof may not be forthcoming; but specificity charges is clear.

What has been alleged here is not only wrongs done to named plaintiffs, but a recurring pattern of wrongs which establishes, if proved, that legal regime under control of the whites in Cairo, Illinois, is used over and over again to keep the blacks from exercising First Amendment rights, to discriminate them, to keep from the blacks protection of the law in their lawful activities, to weight the scales justice repeatedly on the side of white prejudices and against black protests, fears, and suffering. This is a pervasive more scheme for suppression of blacks and their civil rights I than have ever seen. It may not survive a trial. But if this case does present a “case or controversy” in- volving the named plaintiffs, then that concept has been so watered down toas be no longer recognizable. This please will the white superstructure, but it does violence to the conception of evenhanded justice envisioned by the Constitution.

Suits under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 are exceptions to the absolute bar against injunctions directed at state *19 2283.2 See C. § in 28 U. S. provided proceedings court much It will be Foster, 225. Mitchum any equi- nature of pass on to appropriate more been case has after be granted relief to table no ended, case is when may be that It tried. asked will be proceeding state injunction relief injunctive theOr appropriate. will seem for or very narrow down to may come analysis in final practices. precise prohibiting discrete orders and state federal audit “ongoing this an Court labels we regime course is a That of criminal'proceedings.” supreme is Federal Constitution But the do not foster. Cairo, in power-structure if of the white power and extraordinary disregard it, Illinois, great is so as only remedies bridge I cross the is demanded. would been problem have contours of the precise when after a trial. established allegations there are case, in the instant repeat,

To willfully discriminating are judges state lower-court and imposing determinations are sentencing may of such well bail. The effects results excessive under- disposition from the persist quite aside appeal, at trial or on charges substantive lying functionally The Court may well be unreviewable. F. individual Appeals observed, 2d, at that the find it if not difficult, defendant criminal case will obtain review of a sentence within statu- impossible, unjustified, tory manifestly limits unless it is harsh or citing “imposition the Illinois rule of sentence of a judicial discretion, a matter the absence manifest abuse of that it will not be altered discretion provides Title 28 U. S. C. 2283 that: § may grant injunction stay

“A court of the United States proceedings except expressly in a court as authorized Act State Congress, necessary jurisdiction, pro- or where in aid of its or to judgments.” tect or effectuate its

by a reviewing Bonner, People court.” 37 Ill. 2d 563, 229 E.N. 2d (1967), cert. 392 U. denied, S. 910 (1968).

Furthermore, respondents do not primarily allege individual instances of excessively harsh on treatment, an absolute scale, of black and indigent but defendants, *20 rather a pattern of discriminatory treatment, in especially prosperous favor of white defendants. Such allegations would amount to denials of equal protection even if blacks and poor whites were subject sentences were so they excessive constituted manifest abuses of dis- cretion, as as wealthy long whites were at the same time receiving relatively lenient sentences from the judges. same A single instance of sentencing by itself might not strike conscience of a reviewing court, but when coupled pattern with a of discriminatory treatment could well justify the equitable intervention of a federal A court. class suit where evidence could be developed showing pattern of discriminatory bail and sentencing by decisions petitioners would be the one appropriate vehicle in which these claims could be developed.

Whether respondents could come forward with such evidence, and whether the Federal District in Court exercise of its equitable discretion could frame suitable relief are, of course, questions which can be answered only after a trial on the merits. The resolution of those issues would then properly reviewable. But the principles of abstention and comity should not bar this ab suit initio.

II I Because believe that the complaint is sufficient to an state actual “case I controversy,” would reach further on question, the merits, whether equitable relief may be warranted the circumstances of this case. I agree, nonetheless, with my Brother Blackmun that the whether II of its opinion, in Part discussion Court’s advisory is an stated, was equitable a case no there is has determined Court since the opinion III sense. controversy” in the Article “case or DOUGLAS, J., OF OPINION APPENDIX TO DISSENTING 42 U. C. S. statutes addition are seven There “express constitute recognized has which the Court § in state of nonintervention exceptions” policy to the anti-injunction statute: by the proceedings enunciated seq., specifi- 1 et Bankruptcy Act, § U. S. C. (1) C. exception to 28 U. S. cally Congress as recognized Foster, 233. 225, Mitchum v. 407 U. S. 2283. § See allow- C. Interpleader § Act of (2) The court prosecution of state federal courts to restrain ing interpleader property involved involving suits Co., Mining Treinies 308 U. v. Sunshine S. actions. See *21 liability shipowners limiting Act the (3) 74. The 1851 against them by providing proceedings cessation of the to value of they deposit equal have made a when 46 ships court, § with a federal U. S. C. 185. See Co., Mfg. Hill Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. v. 109 U. S. (4) Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage 599-600. 578, (1958 11 Act, (s)(2) ed.). S. C. See Kalb v. § 203 U. Feuerstein, U. 433. The Federal (5) Corpus 308 S. Habeas stay a permitting 28 C. court § U. S. state Act, 2251, when a habeas action is proceedings pending. See all, 117 Roy (6) Ex Parte 248-249. 241, U. S. Section Price Control Act of (a) Emergency 1942, 205 56 Dicken, U. 252, Stat. 33. See Porter v. 328 S. 255. (7) Legislation providing litigation for the removal to federal courts and the cessation of simultaneous state (e). court C. 1446 § U. S. See French proceedings, Hay, v. 22 Wall. 250.

This Court has also recognized power of a federal stay court to proceedings a prevent state court already of an relitigation issue pro decided a federal Supreme Tribe Cauble, Ben-Hur v. ceeding. See Julian Central Co., Trust 356; U. S. v. U. S. 112. It has recognized power of a enjoin federal court to state court proceedings protect jurisdiction a federal already court has res. See acquired over Kline v. Burke Construction Co., Toucey 260 U. 226; S. Co., New York Ins. 135-136. And Life we have found proper it for a federal court directly enjoin state when proceedings injunction was sought by either the United States, Leiter Minerals, Inc. States, United a federal agency asserting superior federal interests, see NLRB v. Nash- Finch Co., 404 U. 138. S.

Case Details

Case Name: O'Shea v. Littleton
Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States
Date Published: Jan 15, 1974
Citation: 414 U.S. 488
Docket Number: 72-953
Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS
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