Minghao Lee v. William J. ClintonMinghao Lee v. William J. Clinton
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- Posner
The plaintiff, Lee, filed two insane complaints charging the United States and China with a conspiracy to “bio-chemically and bio-technologieally infect and invade” various people including Lee with a mind reading and mental torture device that Lee calls “Mind Accessing and Torturing via Remote Energy Transferring (MA-TRET).” To elude MATRET, Lee claims to have developed a variety of space technologies, oddly including an email system and nanny services, that will enable the victims of MATRET to relocate to MA-TRET-free planets. The district judge dismissed the suits as frivolous, but granted Lee leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act was intended to reduce, not increase, the number of frivolous suits, and although the concern was with frivolous suits by prisoners and Lee is not a prisoner, it is hardly likely that Congress took the occasion to expand the rights of nonprisioner frivolous filers — a particularly pertinent observation since Lee filed five suits in 1999 and an unknown number previously (and no doubt subsequently). Moreover, the PLRA did not change a word in the standard for denial of in forma pauperis status on appeal, but merely shifted it to a different subsection of
Odd, not impossible. For the PLRA changed another subsection of
But we find this statutory analysis, which seems to us the strongest and indeed the only argument that can be made in support of Newlin, unpersuasive. Without the words “or appeal” it would be apparent that Congress had not made any material change in the standard for allowing an appeal to be taken in forma pauper-is. It is unrealistic to suppose that the words were added in order to make that standard looser, so that more frivolous appeals could be taken. An interpretation more consistent with the thrust of the PLRA is that “or appeal” was added to make clear that just because the district court may have certified that the appeal was taken in good faith (that is, was non-frivolous), the court of appeals could make its own determination that the appeal was frivolous and so dismiss it, as we did in Tolefree v. Cudahy, supra, for example. This was implicit in the old subsection (d); the new subsection (e)(2)(B)(i) merely makes this explicit. There is no reason why obviously frivolous appeals such as Lee’s, appeals bound to be dismissed as soon as the appellate judges get hold of them, should have to be authorized by the district judge just because the appellant is a lunatic in the literal sense of the word.
Because we are overruling so much of Neiulin and Hyche as is inconsistent with our interpretation of the statute, we have circulated the opinion to the entire court in advance of publication, in accordance with 7th Cir. R. 40(e). No judge in regular active service voted to hear the case en banc.
Lee should not have been permitted to appeal in forma pauperis, but since his suits as well as the appeals are frivolous, we summarily affirm their dismissal by the district court.