STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT HONSCH
(SC 20742)
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D‘Auria, Mullins, Ecker, Dannehy and Moll, Js.
July 19, 2024
The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publiсations, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
State v. Honsch
Syllabus
Convicted of murder in connection with the disappearance and death of his daughter, E, the defendant appealed to this court. In September, 1995, E‘s body was discovered in New Britain. E‘s remains were wrapped in trash bags and sleeping bags, and, although the police were initially unable to identify E, they collected hairs from E‘s body, as well as a hair and palm prints from the trash bags. At about the same time the police discovered E‘s body, the defendant told a family member that he was leaving the country imminently to take a job and that E and the defendant‘s wife, M, had already departed the country. In October, 1995, M‘s body was found in Massachusetts, and the police were unable to identify her remains at that time. In October or November, 1995, E and M were reported missing, but authorities were unable to locate them. In 2014, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at the defendant‘s home in Ohio, where he was using his new wife‘s last name, and collected samples of his DNA and hair, as well as his finger and palm prints. DNA tests linked the defendant to, among other things, palm prints on the trash bags used to wrap E‘s remains. The commonwealth of Massachusetts subsequently charged the defendant with, and he was convicted of, M‘s murder. Thereafter, the state of Connecticut charged the defendant with murdering E in Connecticut. Before trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the case for lack of territoriаl jurisdiction because the state, which conceded that the actual location of E‘s murder was unknown, had failed to establish that E was murdered in Connecticut. The trial court, however, applied a permissive presumption, consistent with
1. The trial court properly denied the defendant‘s motion to dismiss for lack of territorial jurisdiction:
The state has territorial jurisdiction to enact criminal laws and to enforce them when the criminal conduct, or the result of the criminal conduct, occurs within its territorial limits, and, to temper the state‘s burden of proving territorial jurisdiction in murder cases, the common law recognizes a permissive presumption, set forth in
This court embraced that presumption as a rule of criminal procedure and concluded that the trial court properly applied the presumption in light of the robust public policy supporting it and its widespread use around the country.
Specifically, the рresumption ensures that the state‘s interests in enforcing its criminal laws and in pursuing justice for its citizens and the victim‘s family are vindicated, while also providing the defendant with the opportunity to rebut the presumption with evidence establishing that the murder did not occur within the state.
Contrary to the defendant‘s contention that the adoption of the presumption set forth in
Moreover, the presumption did not violate the defendant‘s due process rights by shifting to him the burden of disproving an element of a charged offense, as the location of E‘s death was not an element of the crime of murder, and the presumption applied to the trial court‘s preliminary determination of where the murder occurred, which was separate from the subsequent determination of whether the defendant committed the murder.
2. The evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant‘s identity as the person who murdered E:
The state offered an abundance of consciousness of guilt evidence from which the jury could have reasonably determined that the defendant had murdered E, as the jury could have inferred that certain fabricated statements by the defendant were designed to conceal the fact that he had murdered E, including those in which he deflected responsibility away from himself for the disappearance of E and M and claimed to have selective memory or amnesia preventing him from remembering where he was and what he was doing around the time the bodies were discovered.
Moreover, the jury could have inferred consciousness of guilt because, two months after E‘s murder, the defendant fled the country for almost four years, when he returned, he assumed the last name of his new wife and began a new life with a new family, and, despite claiming to have loved E, he took no action for twenty years to locate her, which could have led to a reasonable inference that he knew she was not missing because he had murdered her.
Furthermore, there was direct physical evidence that tied the defendant to E‘s body, insofar as the defendant admitted that he owned the sleeping bags used to wrap E‘s remains, his palm prints were on the trash bags, and his DNA was concordant with DNA from hairs that were discovered on E‘s body and one of the trash bags.
3. The trial court properly declined to provide the jury with the defendant‘s proposed instruction that the presence of his palm prints could not establish his connection with the crime unless it was demonstrated that they could have been impressed only аt the time that the crime was perpetrated, as such an instruction was not reasonably supported by the evidence adduced at trial:
This court has held that such a jury instruction is appropriate only when the fingerprint or palm print constitutes the only or the principal evidence of connection to the crime, and, in the present case, evidence of the defendant‘s palm prints was not the only evidence that connected him to E‘s body, as there was an abundance of consciousness of guilt evidence, as well as certain other physical evidence.
(One justice concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
Argued March 18—officially released July 19, 2024*
Information charging the defendant with the crime of murder, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain, where the court, Baldini, J., denied the defendant‘s motion to dismiss; thereafter, the case was tried to the jury; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
James B. Streeto, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state‘s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Christian M. Watson, state‘s attorney, and Christopher A. Griffin, former deputy assistant state‘s attorney, for the appellee (state).
State v. Honsch
Opinion
D‘AURIA, J. In this appeal, we must consider the extent of the state‘s territorial jurisdiction to prosecute a defendant when the defendant disputes whether the crime occurred within Connecticut‘s geographical boundaries. The defendant, Robert Honsch, appeals from his conviction of murder in violation of
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. At approximately 1 a.m. on September 28, 1995, New Britain police officers responded to the rear parking area of a strip mall in New Britain to investigate the report of a dead body. Upon arriving, the police officers discovered the remains of a recently deceased young woman, identified two decades later as the defendant‘s then seventeen year old daughter, Elizabeth Honsch (victim). The victim‘s body was wrapped in two partially zipped sleeping bags, one pulled over her head, the other pulled over her feet. After removing the sleeping bags, the police officers observed black trash bags covering the victim‘s head and feet. The victim was fully clothed, warm to the touch, and wearing a watch that displayed the correct time. The police officers observed a gaping head wound above the victim‘s right temple and air bubbles around her mouth evincing the escape of residual air from her lungs, a condition that remains visible only within several hours after death. Bloodstains on the sleeping bags and the victim‘s clothes were in various stages of drying, some already coagulated and dry, others still wet.
The police officers did not find any weapons, guns, shell casings, or other physical evidence where the body was found. But they collected several hairs found on the victim‘s thigh, backside, and wrists, as well as one present on the trash bags, which, along with the sleeping bags, trash bags, and the victim‘s clothing, they retained for future scientific testing. An autopsy revealed that the victim had died as a result of a contact gunshot wound to the head, meaning that the gun‘s muzzle was pressed against her head when it was fired and that she died very shortly after that. From the evidence collected at the scene and further investigation into reported missing persons, the police officers were initially unable to identify the victim or the perpetrator.
The defendant had married Marcia Honsch in 1977 in New York, and their daughter, the victim, was born in 1979. The defendant, Marcia, and the victim, along with Marcia‘s four daughters from a prior marriage (Sheila, Angelina, Debra,
In September, 1995, at about the same time that the victim‘s body was discovered in New Britain, the defendant visited Debra alone at her home in New York, which was not something he had done before. Debra described the defendant‘s appearance as “unusual” because he was unshaven, “looked really stressed,” did not make much eye contact, and his shirt was wrinkled and untucked, which was “totally unlike him.” The defendant informed Debra that “his job had offered him an opportunity to work in another country,” potentially Australia, England, or in continental Africa, and that, because “he had to make up his mind right away,” he did not have time to prepare or tell anyone. He said that, of the options, he had chosen Australia and that he had sent Marcia and the victim “off without saying goodbye to anyone because there was no time . . . .” Just a few months earlier during the summer of 1995, the defendant, Marcia, and the victim made surprise visits to Angelina, Debra, Diana, and Sheila at their homes. There was no indication during any of these visits that the defendant, Marcia, or the victim had planned to move out of the country imminently. To the knowledge of Diana and Debra, Marcia did not have a driver‘s license or a passport. In October or November of 1995, Diana and Angelina reported to the authorities in Brewster that Marciа and the victim were missing,1 but the authorities were not able to locate them.
In 2009, Angelina‘s Internet searches led her to information that the defendant was living in Ohio and was married to Sheryl Tyree. After years of coordination with Sheryl, Diana finally spoke with the defendant on the phone in November, 2013. The defendant informed Diana that, when he, Marcia, and the victim traveled to Australia, Marcia “found a new man, and she left with the new man . . . and, of course, [the victim] went with her.” Diana challenged the defendant, indicating to him that she knew this explanation to be a lie, and the defendant responded, “I don‘t know if you know, but I have amnesia.” The defendant continued his conversation with Diana for approximately thirty minutes, asking about everyone else in the family, including her sisters, and had no trouble remembering their names. After receiving additional information from Diana and Angelina, law enforcement officers from New York determined that a person using the name Robert Tyree, and the defendant‘s Social Security number, was residing in Ohio, and that he might have information about what had happened to the victim and Marcia.
On the same day, the defendant voluntarily spoke with the police both at his home and at an Ohio police station, and provided the police with a handwritten statement.2 In his interviews and statement, the defendant generally had a clear memory of his life, including his time with Marcia and the victim, but his recollection was “hazy” about events that occurred between July and September, 1995, when Marcia and the victim were murdered. He told the police that he had fond memories of Marcia and the victim, and that he cared for them and loved them. He provided the police with the specific locations where they had lived in New York and other locations that Marcia had traveled to, and he recalled that he and Marcia were separated for a time but that they reunited in 1995. When asked what they enjoyed doing together as a family, the defendant responded that they often went camping together with tents and sleeping bags.
To the best of the defendant‘s recollection, the last time he had seen or spoken to Marcia and the victim was at some point between June and September, 1995, most likely in Brewster. He could not remember how they became separated or what happened to them. He said that neither Marcia nor the victim had attempted to contact him in the past twenty years, and he did not attempt to locate, contact, or report them as missing.
He did not independently recall a job transfer to Australia, traveling to Australia himself, sending Marcia and the victim to Australia, or telling Debra that is what happened to Marcia and the victim. Rather, he told the police that, in 1995,3 for some reason he could not recall, he left his job as a door-to-door vacuum salesman for Electrolux in Brewster to traverse the African continent. He said that, for four years, he “wander[ed] around” thirty countries in Africa working “odd jobs” whilе struggling to converse with the residents. He “vivid[ly]” recalled his time in Africa
Upon his return to the United States in 1999, the defendant began a new life in a new place with a new name and a new family. In 1999, the defendant began working at a truck stop in Illinois, where he met Sheryl Tyree, whom he married in April, 2000. The defendant told the police that he had changed his last name to Tyree because he could no longer stand the last name Honsch. The defendant and Sheryl had three sons, born between 2001 and 2008. The jury reasonably could have believed, from his interview with the police, that the defendant had falsely told his new wife, Sheryl, that he had never been married, had no children or siblings, and that both of his parents were deceased.
The defendant claimed that, after his trip to Africa, he had no memory of Marcia and the victim, and was reminded of their existence only when Debra called asking about their whereabouts twenty years later, a conversation that prompted him to begin piecing together “[c]ertain early memories” of them prior to 1995. For instance, the defendant was able to recall the years, brands, makes, and colors of many cars that he owned prior to 1995 but was unable to remember how or why he lost contact with Marcia and the victim. He told the police that his memory with respect to Marcia and the victim “just stop[s]. That‘s where everything—we hit this dead end hеre, where everything just blacks out.” When the officers questioned the defendant‘s selective memory, he responded that, although not officially diagnosed, “it‘s not actually amnesia, but it‘s a form,” and he said someone in South Africa had told him that his narrow loss of memory was the result of his deteriorating health caused by his minimalist diet while he was in Africa. The defendant was unable to explain why he did not search for Marcia and the victim for twenty years, and he admitted that, if one of his current children went missing for one day, “[o]f course” he would begin searching for them.
The officers also pressed the defendant to explain his connection to the physical evidence found on the victim‘s body. Regarding his palm prints on the trash bags, the defendant explained that, because the trash bags were his property, it was not surprising that his prints were on them, and he detailed the precise method he used to take out trash in 1995. Specifically, the defendant said that his practice was to remove the trash bags from their box, flap them open, roll them back up again, and leave them on the kitchen counter until he used them to wrap other paper garbage bags containing trash in case of rain. When shown the photographs of the victim‘s body wrapped in the sleeping bags, the defendant instantly recognized the sleeping bags as “[d]efinitely” belonging to his family. He said he must have slept in them one thousand times and that he kept them in a closet at their house in New York. With respect to the presence of hairs found on the victim‘s body that had a DNA profile concordant with his DNA profile, he explained that was not unexpected because he spent a great deal of time with her. The defendant said it was possible that someone had come into his house, killed Marcia and the victim, used his trash bags and sleeping bags to wrap the victim, and then left their dead bodies in different states.
After the defendant was charged with and convicted of murdering Marcia in Massachusetts; see footnote 1 of this opinion; the state of Connecticut charged the defendant with murdering the victim in Connecticut. A jury found the defendant guilty, and the court sentenced him to sixty years of imprisonment. The defendant appealed directly to this court pursuant to
The defendant first claims that the trial court incorrectly denied his pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of territorial jurisdiction because the state had failed to establish that the victim was murdered in Connecticut. The defendant‘s main contention is that the trial court erred by applying a permissive presumption consistent with
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge against him for lack of territorial jurisdiction on the ground that the state could not establish that the victim was murdered in Connecticut. He argued, and the state later conceded, that the location where the victim was murdered was “unknown.” For this reason, the state advocated that the court apply a presumption, not yet applied in Connecticut, but applied by many courts across the country, that the murder occurred in the state where the body was found. The state contended further that this presumption, combined with evidence establishing that the victim‘s body was deposited in New Britain shortly after she was murdered, was sufficient to establish territorial jurisdiction.
After a two day evidentiary hearing, the court issued a memorandum of decision in which it denied the defendant‘s motion to dismiss. The court found that, “[a]lthough the evidence conclusively established that [the victim] died of a gunshot wound to her head, the evidence available does not establish precisely where or when she was shot. Specifically, the location where her body was found was devoid of evidence such as blood splatter, a weapon, footprints, drag marks, or shell casings; i.e., evidence that would tend to support a finding that the murder took place where her body was located.” Nevertheless, the court found that the victim‘s body was discovered in Connecticut, which triggered a permissive presumption, applied in many other jurisdictions, thаt she was murdered within the state. The court held that, in addition to the presumption, there was “compelling and persuasive evidence to indicate that the victim had recently been killed” before she was discovered, including the “condition of her body (intact, warm to the touch, bubbles emanating from her mouth and nose, and blood in various stages of drying),” and that her body was found in New Britain, a city centrally located in Connecticut. The court further held that the state had met its burden despite the defendant‘s contrary evidence—testimony by the state‘s chief medical examiner that rigor mortis was fully developed when he examined the victim‘s body several hours after she was discovered, and testimony by a detective that it was possible the victim was murdered with Marcia in the Tolland State Forest in Massachusetts.
On appeal, the defendant contests the trial court‘s application of the presumption to deny his motion to dismiss. He argues that adopting such a presumption is a question strictly reserved for the legislature, that the statute establishing the jurisdiction of our courts,
Under the common law, a state has “territorial jurisdiction” to enact criminal laws and to enforce them when the criminal conduct takes place, or the result of the criminal conduct occurs, within its territorial limits.4
See, e.g., State v. Cardwell, 246 Conn. 721, 739, 718 A.2d 954 (1998); 4 W. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure (4th Ed. 2015) § 16.4 (c), pp. 925–26; A. Spinella, Connecticut Criminal Procedure (1985) pp. 18–19. “[I]t is well established that jurisdiction over a criminal offense is determined by the place where the crime was committed. . . . The extent of a sovereignty‘s jurisdiction to enforce its civil and criminal laws has long been viewed as being coterminous with its territory.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lee, 229 Conn. 60, 77, 640 A.2d 553 (1994). For more than 250 years, we have recognized that the state has territorial jurisdiction to prosecute a defendant if the conduct, or the result of that conduct, occurs, at least in part, inside Connecticut.5 In contrast, there is no territorial jurisdiction if both the criminal conduct and its results occur outside the
In Connecticut, whether territoriаl jurisdiction exists to prosecute a defendant for the crime of murder is an issue for the court to decide. In State v. Beverly, 224 Conn. 372, 618 A.2d 1335 (1993), the defendant claimed “that the jury, not the trial court, should have made the decision concerning the sufficiency of the facts proven to establish territorial jurisdiction in Connecticut.” Id., 378. We rejected this claim, holding that the trial court is required to ” ‘submit to the jury all controverted questions of fact relating to an element making up [the] crime,’ ” but “that the location of the site of the victim‘s death is not an element of the crime of murder.” Id., 378–79; see also State v. Weinberg, 215 Conn. 231, 232, 251–52, 575 A.2d 1003 (location of death is not essential element of murder), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967, 111 S. Ct. 430, 112 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1990). Consequently, we concluded that, “[a]lthough some authorities have held otherwise . . . we agree with the decisions holding that the question of where a murder occurred generally is not an element of the offense, but is merely an issue of territorial jurisdiction to be decided by the court. . . . A defendant‘s constitutional right to a jury does not extend beyond the factual issues that are relevant to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence under the relevant statute.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Beverly, supra, 379.6
It is well established that the state bears the burden of proving territorial jurisdiction.7 See State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 195, 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165, 115 S. Ct. 1133, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (1995); State v. Beverly, supra, 224 Conn. 375. It is not disputed in the present case that the criminal conduct and the result of that conduct occurred in the same location because the victim died very shortly after sustaining a contact gunshot wound to the head. Therefore, to establish territorial jurisdiction tо prosecute the defendant for murder, the state had to prove that the victim had been shot within Connecticut‘s territorial boundaries.
To temper the state‘s burden of proving territorial jurisdiction in murder cases, the common law recognizes a permissive presumption, or a permissible inference, that the murder took place where the body was discovered. See, e.g., People v. Kamaunu, 110 Cal. 609, 613, 42 P. 1090 (1895); Breeding v. State, 220 Md. 193, 200, 151 A.2d 743 (1959); Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 265 Mass. 382, 388, 163 N.E. 251 (1928); State v. Fabian, 263 So. 2d 773, 775 (Miss. 1972); State v. McDowney, 49 N.J. 471, 475, 231 A.2d 359 (1967); State v. Williams, 321 S.C. 327, 334, 468 S.E.2d 626, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 891, 117 S. Ct. 230, 136 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1996); Reynolds v. State, 199 Tenn. 349, 350, 287 S.W.2d 15 (1956). This common-law permissive presumption, recognized by courts for many years, eventually was engrafted in
No Connecticut court has yet had occasion to apply this presumption.8 We embrace the presumption and conclude that the trial court properly applied it here because of the robust public policy supporting
To conceal a murder, a criminal defendant may transport the body of the victim from the scene of the murder to a different location, sometimes across state borders. See, e.g., State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 192, 195 (defendant murdered victims in Rhode Island and returned their bodies to Connecticut); State v. Gojcaj, 151 Conn. App. 183, 192–93, 92 A.3d 1056 (defendant murdered victim in Connecticut and later left victim‘s body in New York), cert. denied, 314 Conn. 924, 100 A.3d 854 (2014). Because a murder victim is unable to provide an account of the offense, the defendant‘s actions to coverup a murder may create inherent and even insurmountable difficulties for the state to prove the location where the murder occurred. The presumption “endeavors to prevent abortion of the prosecution in cases where the body of the victim is found within the state but it is unclear where the death, injury, or conduct occurred. It may be provable, for example, that the body was thrown from a car driven by the defendant at a place near the state line and that the defendant owned the lethal weapon. That alone might make a circumstantial case of murder, without establishing a locus for jurisdiction.” (Footnote omitted.)
In the absence of this presumption, a murderer may succeed in avoiding prosecution simply by moving the body of the victim. This outcome is unjustifiable. We repeatedly have recognized that, when “the fact that the place of death is unknown or that there may be a variance in the proof thereof . . . [n]o person should escape punishment for murder because he is so clever as to conceal . . . the place where the victim was killed or died.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Weinberg, supra, 215 Conn. 252; State v. Morrill, 197 Conn. 507, 552, 498 A.2d 76 (1985). We also recognize the conundrum, applicable in some situations, that, “[i]f . . . the defendant cannot be effectively prosecuted in Connecticut, she cannot be prosecuted at all.” State v. Stevens, 224 Conn. 730, 738, 620 A.2d 789 (1993). The presumption ensures that the state‘s interests in enforcing its criminal laws and in pursuing justice for its citizens and the victim‘s family are vindicated, while also providing the defendant with the opportunity to rebut the presumption with evidence establishing that the murder did not occur within the state. See
A majority of the states apply this presumption. The legislative bodies of at least twenty states have codified some form of a presumption or inference in favor of territorial jurisdiction that is congruent with
the presumption as a matter of their common law.10 To murder victim is found within the state, the death is presumed to have occurred within the state“);
our knowledge, the presumption has not been squarely rejected in any jurisdiction that has considered it.
That twenty state legislatures have codified the presumption statutorily does not persuade us, as the defendant argues, that the adoption of the presumption is a question strictly reserved for the legislature. At the outset, we observe that, contrary to the defendant‘s argument, the legislature has not yet considered whether to adopt the presumption contained in Model Penal Code § 1.03 (4). In 1963, the legislature established the Commission to Revise the Criminal Statutes (commission) “to revise and codify the criminal statutes of the state,” in light of the then recently drafted Model Penal Code and the New York Penal Law, and to “report its findings and specific recommendations for substantive and clarifying changes in said statutes to
Notwithstanding that many states have codified this presumption by enacting a form of § 1.03 (4) of the Model Penal Code; see footnote 9 of this opinion; although the legislature has not taken up the question, legislation is not the exclusive way for a jurisdiction to recognize the presumption. As we have stated, the permissive presumption that a murder occurred where a body is found was a recognized common-law principle that existed prior to the promulgation of the Model Penal Code in 1962 and its subsequent adoption in many states. See, e.g., People v. Kamaunu, supra, 110 Cal. 613; Breeding v. State, supra, 220 Md. 200; Commonwealth v. Knowlton, supra, 265 Mass. 388; Reynolds v. State, supra, 199 Tenn. 350; see also Conn. Code Evid. § 3-1 (presumptions are governed by principles of common law except as otherwise required by federal and Connecticut constitutions or any rule of practice adopted before June 18, 2014).
Even if the issue of territorial jurisdiction were considered a principle of substantive criminal liability, as opposed to an issue of criminal procedure, “the savings clause to the Penal Code, [
In the past, when faced with an absence of legislation governing an issue presented to us, we have found it prudent to adopt other procedural provisions of the Model Penal Code. See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 202 Conn. 443, 450-51, 521 A.2d 1034 (1987) (adopting Model Penal Code § 1.06 (5) concerning tolling of statute of limitations). We also have gone further, as expressly permitted by the statutory savings clause, and recognized principles of criminal liability and defenses in the absence of applicable language in our Penal Code. See, e.g., State v. Terwilliger, 314 Conn. 618, 654, 104 A.3d 638 (2014) (self-defense); State v. Courchesne, supra, 296 Conn. 622, 679-88 and n.44 (born alive principle); State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32, 45, 630 A.2d 990 (1993) (vicarious liability of conspirator). We are once again compelled to recognize in our law a rule of criminal procedure that ensures that justice is done.
Nor are we persuaded that the absence of the presumption in the language of
Finally, we reject the defendant‘s contention that the presumption violates his due process rights by shifting the burden to him to disprove an element of a charged offense. As we have recognized, the location of the victim‘s death is not an element of the crime of murder; see State v. Beverly, supra, 224 Conn. 378-79; State v. Weinberg, supra, 215 Conn. 232, 251; and, therefore, the presumption in no way relieves the state of the burden to prove any essential element to the satisfaction of the trier of fact. Compare State v. Francis, 246 Conn. 339, 354, 717 A.2d 696 (1998) (“‘[m]andatory presumptions . . . violate the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause if they relieve the [s]tate of the burden of persuasion on an element of an offense’ “), with State v. Palmer, 206 Conn. 40, 47-48, 536 A.2d 936 (1988) (describing permissive presumption as suggesting or allowing—but not requiring—possible conclusion to be drawn if state proves predicate facts), and State v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 545-46, 679 A.2d 902 (1996) (same). The presumption applies to the court‘s preliminary determination of where the murder occurred, an issue entirely separate from the subsequent determination of whether the defendant committed the murder. The permissive presumption, which places no burden of proof on the defendant, allows but does not require the court to find territorial jurisdiction if the state proves that the victim‘s body was located in Connecticut. The defendant has not provided us with a case from any of the almost thirty states that have applied the presumption, holding that it is unconstitutional, even in the jurisdictions that submit the question of territorial jurisdiction to the jury as an element of the offense. See, e.g., State v. Trusty, 326 S.W.3d 582, 599-601 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010) (rejecting claim that jury instruction permitting inference in favor of territorial jurisdiction violated defendant‘s due process rights), appeal denied, Tennessee Supreme Court, Docket No. M2008-02653-SC-R11-CD (September 27, 2010); see also State v. Liggins, 524 N.W.2d 181, 185 (Iowa 1994) (same).
We recognize that the permissive presumption may impose a burden of production on defendants to present rebutting evidence to establish that the murder did not occur in Connecticut, but we are not persuaded that any difficulty they might encounter in meeting this burden is sufficient to overcome the important policy
Even if the burden of production would require the defendant to consider proffering less than exculpatory evidence—an undertaking the defendant might choose strategically to avoid—the defendant has advanced no authority for the proposition that such a burden of production violates due process.
In sum, we disagree with the defendant that the trial court improperly applied the presumption in favor of territorial jurisdiction. We agree with the trial court that the presumption, coupled with evidence establishing that the victim‘s body was recently deposited in New Britain, was sufficient to establish territorial jurisdiction.
II
The defendant next claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the person who murdered the victim. He concedes that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the victim was killed intentionally, but he argues that the state‘s circumstantial evidence—“consciousness of guilt and fingerprint evidence on the garbage bags, a common household item“—was insufficient to prove that the defendant had committed the murder.12 We are not persuaded.
“[W]e must focus on the evidence presented, not the evidence that the state failed to present . . . . [W]e do not draw a distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence so far as probative force is concerned . . . . Indeed, [c]ircumstantial evidence . . . may be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence. . . . It is not one fact . . . but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts [that] establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Abraham, 343 Conn. 470, 477, 274 A.3d 849 (2022).
We conclude that the evidence the state offered was more than sufficient to establish the defendant‘s identity as the person who murdered the victim. Primarily, the state presented an abundance of consciousness of guilt evidence, consisting of the defendant‘s own statements and his actions following the murder, from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant murdered the victim. “[T]he state of mind that is characterized as ‘guilty consciousness’ or ‘consciousness of guilt’ is strong evidence that a defendant is indeed guilty.” State v. Moody, 214 Conn. 616, 626, 573 A.2d 716 (1990); see also State v. Rodriguez, 337 Conn. 175, 201, 252 A.3d 811 (2020) (“‘a jury may infer guilt based on consciousness of guilt evidence in conjunction with other evidence’ “); State v. McClain, 324 Conn. 802, 819, 155 A.3d 209 (2017) (consciousness of guilt is “indirect evidence of the defendant‘s guilt“).
Jurors reasonably could have concluded that several of the defendant‘s statements constituted inconsistent or partial truths manifesting his participation in the crime or evidencing his consciousness of guilt. See State v. Moody, supra, 214 Conn. 626 (consciousness of guilt evidence may include ” ‘misstatements of an accused, which a jury could reasonably conclude were made in an attempt to avoid detection of a crime or responsibility for a crime or were influenced by the commission of the criminal act’ “). For example, the state presented evidence of the defendant‘s statements to Marcia‘s and his own family members that the jury could have found to be lies told to deflect responsibility away from himself for the disappearance of Marcia and the victim. Specifically, he told Debra in 1995 that he took a new job in Australia and sent the victim there ahead of him; he told Diana in 2013 that Marcia ran off with a new man in Australia and that the victim followed her; and he told Sheryl that he had never been married, had no children or siblings and that both of his parents were deceased. Further, the state presented evidence that the defendant had told the police that, unlike other parts of his life that he could recall, he had no recollection of the fall of 1995
The jury also could have inferred the defendant‘s consciousness of guilt because he had fled to Africa two months after the victim was murdered and her body was discovered. See, e.g., State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 577 (” ‘[F]light, when unexplained, tends to prove a consciousness of guilt. . . . The flight of the person accused of a crime is a circumstance [that], when considered together with all the facts of the case, may justify an inference of the accused‘s guilt.’ “). The defendant offered no reason why, just after their disappearance and the discovery of their bodies, he suddenly left his wife and child (Marcia and the victim), whom he claimed to care for very deeply, as well as his home and job, to “[wander] around” Africa for almost four years. In the absence of an explanation, it was permissible for the jury to infer that the defendant‘s flight showed a consciousness of guilt caused by his murder of the victim. Although the defendant contends that the evidence of flight was insignificant because he waited two months to fly to Africa, it was the responsibility of the jury to weigh the significance of that evidence. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 57, 770 A.2d 908 (2001) (“it is the province of the jury to sort through any ambiguity in the evidence in order to determine whether the defendant‘s flight warrants the inference that he possessed a guilty conscience“).
When he returned from Africa, the defendant shed his last name and took the last name of his new wife, Sheryl, which also could constitute evidence of consciousness of guilt. See, e.g., State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115, 130, 646 A.2d 169 (1994) (consciousness of guilt can be proven by “use of aliases upon [defendant‘s] return to the United States“); State v. Avis, 209 Conn. 290, 310, 551 A.2d 26 (1988) (evidence that defendant used “number of aliases . . . supported the inference that he was conscious of his guilt“), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1097 (1989). Although the defendant claimed that he changed his last name because he did not like the name Honsch, the jury reasonably could have inferred that he did so to avoid detection by the authorities investigating the victim‘s murder. He began a new life with a new family, never actively searching for the whereabouts of the victim, his own daughter. These actions and inaction reasonably could have led the jury to infer a consciousness of guilt. The defendant claimed to have loved the victim, but he never noticed her disappearance from his life and took no action for twenty years to locate her or to determine what had happened to her. In contrast, the defendant admitted that, if one of his current children went missing for one day, “[o]f course” he would begin searching for them. The defendant‘s failure to take any action to locate his daughter could have led to a reasonable inference that he knew the victim was not, in fact, missing for twenty years because he had murdered her in 1995.
The state also presented direct physical forensic evidence that tied the defendant
The defendant nevertheless contends that the existence of his palm prints on the garbage bags is explicable because he owned them, and that fact alone was not sufficient to convict him of murder. In contrast to the defendant‘s contention, the jury was free to reject as fаrfetched his explanation that his palm prints were present on the bags because he removed, opened, and then rerolled all of the trash bags in his home prior to use. See, e.g., State v. Gray, 221 Conn. 713, 721, 607 A.2d 391 (1992) (jury is entitled to reject defendant‘s theories), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 872 (1992).
In short, construing the evidence as favorably as possible to sustaining the guilty verdict, we conclude that the state‘s case was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had murdered the victim.
III
The defendant finally claims that the trial court erred by declining to provide the jury with defense counsel‘s requested instruction on fingerprint evidence. We do not agree.
Prior to the final charge conference, defense counsel requested, in accordance with State v. Santangelo, 205 Conn. 578, 598, 534 A.2d 1175 (1987), that the court provide the jury with a fingerprint evidence instruction, stating that, “[u]nless it can be shown that the circumstances are such that the fingerprints could have been impressed only at the time the crime was perpetrated, the presence of the defendant‘s fingerprints does not establish his connection with the crime charged.” At the charge conference, defense counsel acknowledged that Santangelo contained the “caveat” that this instruction is appropriate only when the fingerprint evidence is the primary or principal evidence of the defendant‘s connection to the crime. Defense counsel argued that the instruction was appropriate because, although some hairs on the victim‘s body were concordant with the defendant‘s DNA, the palm print evidence was “really the only evidence establishing [the defendant‘s] connection to the [victim‘s] body . . . .” The state responded that the instruction was inappropriate pursuant to Santangelo because the palm print evidence was not “the only evidence, or the principal evidence,” that the jury could use to find the defendant guilty since the state had presented evidence that he had a guilty conscience, his DNA profile was concordant with
“In determining whether the trial court improperly refused a request to charge, [w]e . . . review the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to supporting the . . . proposed charge. . . . A request to charge [that] is relevant to the issues of [a] case and [that] is an accurate statement of the law must be given. . . . If, however, the evidence would not reasonably support a finding of the particular issue, the trial court has a duty not to submit it to the jury. . . . Thus, a trial court should instruct the jury in accordance with a party‘s request to charge [only] if the proposed instructions are reasonably supported by the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ashby, 336 Conn. 452, 497-98, 247 A.3d 521 (2020). Whether the evidence supported defense counsel‘s requested charge is a question of law over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Brown v. Robishaw, 282 Conn. 628, 633-34, 922 A.2d 1086 (2007).
We have repeatedly held “that a conviction may not stand on fingerprint evidence alone unless the prints were found under such circumstances that they could only have been impressed at the time the crime was perpetrated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santangelo, supra, 205 Conn. 598; see also State v. Edwards, 325 Conn. 97, 139, 156 A.3d 506 (2017); State v. Payne, 186 Conn. 179, 184, 440 A.2d 280 (1982); State v. Mayell, 163 Conn. 419, 426, 311 A.2d 60 (1972). In Santangelo, we held that an instruction in accordance with this principle “is germane where the fingerprints of an accused constitute the only evidence, or the principal evidence to convict.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Santangelo, supra, 599; see also State v. Lytell, 206 Conn. 657, 663, 539 A.2d 133 (1988) (upholding trial court‘s refusal to provide jury with Santangelo instruction because, in addition to fingerprint evidence, jury also had evidence that witness had positively identified defendant as perpetrator of robbery, and defendant knew that victims “kept a large sum of money in the cafe to cash payroll checks“).
We agree with the trial court that the defendant‘s requested Santangelo instruction was not warranted because the palm print evidence was not the only or principal evidence against him. As we explained in part II of this opinion, there was an abundance of consciousness of guilt evidence, including the defendant‘s false statements to Marcia‘s family members and the police, his unexplained flight to Africa after the murders, his adoption of a new life and identity when he returned to the United States, and his failure for twenty years to search for the whereabouts of his purportеdly missing child. There also was physical evidence that the defendant‘s DNA was concordant with the hairs found on the victim‘s body, and he admitted that she was wrapped in sleeping bags that belonged to him. Consequently, “the trial court was under no obligation to give the requested fingerprint instruction because of the significant other evidence in [the] case.” State v. Lytell, supra, 206 Conn. 663. Therefore, we conclude that the court properly declined to give the jury a Santangelo instruction because the evidence did not reasonably support that instruction.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion ROBINSON, C. J., and MULLINS, ECKER, DANNEHY and MOLL, Js., concurred.
Notes
See, e.g., State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 192, 195, 646 A.2d 1318 (1994) (territorial jurisdiction existed to prosecute defendant for capital felony charges when victims were kidnapped in Connecticut but murdered in Rhode Island and their bodies were returned to Connecticut), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165, 115 S. Ct. 1133, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (1995); State v. Beverly, 224 Conn. 372, 373, 375–78, 618 A.2d 1335 (1993) (territorial jurisdiction existed to prosecute defendant for murder of Massachusetts victim found dead in Connecticut); State v. Pambianchi, 139 Conn. 543, 546–47, 95 A.2d 695 (1953) (territorial jurisdiction existed to prosecute defendant for stolen automobile received in New York and subsequently taken to Connecticut); State v. Ellis, 3 Conn. 185, 186 (1819) (territorial jurisdiction existed to prosecute defendant for horse stolen in Rhode Island and taken to Connecticut); Rex v. Peas, 1 Root 69, 69 (1774) (territorial jurisdiction existed to prosecute defendant for horse stolen in New York and taken to Connecticut).
In the trial court in the present case, the state again took the position that the correct standard of proof should be a preponderance of the evidence, but it does not on appeal renew that argument or otherwise contend that the burden of proof should be less than beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor does the defendant argue that, with the benefit of the presumption, the trial court‘s finding of territorial jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt was improper. Rather, the defendant limits his challenge to whether the trial court properly applied a presumption when determining territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, as in Beverly, we uphold the trial court‘s decision applying the higher standard—beyond a reasonable doubt—and have no occasion to decide whether, with the benefit of the presumption, the state should nonetheless be able to satisfy its burden by proving territorial jurisdiction under a lower standard.