STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JUNY OSCAR ABRAHAM
(SC 20314)
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Argued December 13, 2021—officially released May 31, 2022
McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.
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Syllabus
Convicted of home invasion, attempt to commit assault in the first degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed to this court. The victim, V, and his neighbor, M, were sitting on the front porch of the two family home in which they resided, when they saw a man dressed in black jeans and a black hoodie approach them while pulling his hood over his head and a mask over his face. The masked man pulled out a pistol, and V and M fled. V ran into the house and up the stairs to his second floor apartment. V closed and locked his front door, but the masked man kicked it open and entered the apartment while waving his pistol and yelling, ‘‘where is the little motherfucker?’’ V snuck down the stairs and yelled back at the masked man to lure him away from his wife and two sons, who also were inside the apartment. The masked man followed V down the stairs, where V, who was standing on the sidewalk, pulled out his own lawfully concealed pistol and instructed the masked man to drop his weapon. Instead, the masked man raised his pistol and shot one time. V then returned fire, striking the masked man at least once. The masked man then went around the side of the house and collapsed near a bulkhead door. V followed him but was almost struck by a gray Nissan truck that was fleeing the area. Although nobody could identify the masked man to the police, the police stopped a gray Nissan truck matching the description provided by V and M shortly thereafter. The defendant was a passenger in that truck, was wearing khaki pants and a white T-shirt, and was suffering from a recently inflicted gunshot wound. The police never recovered the masked man’s pistol, black clothing, or mask, but DNA testing revealed that blood found on the sidewalk and the bulkhead door near where the masked man collapsed belonged to the defendant. At the defendant’s trial, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that all of the eyewitnesses had identified the masked man’s clothing as black, which was not what the defendant was wearing when he was apprehended shortly after the shooting. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and defense counsel renewed the motion for a judgment of acquittal. The court denied the motion and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Held:
- The state adduced sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crimes of conviction: the defendant’s blood was found by the bulkhead door in the exact location where the masked man collapsed after being shot, the defendant was apprehended only five minutes from the scene of the shooting while suffering from a recently inflicted gunshot wound, and the truck in which he was apprehended was registered to the defendant, was seen by V and M driving past their house multiple times earlier that day, and matched the description V and M provided of the vehicle fleeing the scene immediately after the shooting; moreover, the jurors were permitted to rely on their common knowledge and experience that criminals often discard inculpatory evidence when they flee the scene of a crime to infer that the defendant had discarded the black clothing, mask, and pistol used in the commission of the crimes as he fled; furthermore, the fact that were was no evidence of the defendant’s motive was inconsequential, as it is well established that motive is not an element of the crimes charged and that proof of motive is not necessary to support a conclusion of guilt that is otherwise sufficiently established.
- The jury’s verdict of guilty of the crimes of attempt to commit assault in the first degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree was notlegally inconsistent, as the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant’s conduct constituted two different criminal acts, each of which was committed with a distinct and mutually exclusive mental state: the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant first acted with the conscious objective to inflict serious physical injury on V when he chased V up the stairs, broke down his door, and entered his apartment while yelling and waving a pistol; moreover, based on the change in location, the amount of time separating the acts, and V’s intervening conduct, the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant committed a second, discrete criminal act when, after exiting the apartment, he fired a single shot at V after V confronted him, as the jury could have found that V’s act of pulling out his own pistol and V’s refusal to comply with the defendant’s demands prompted the defendant to modify his own intention and to fire a warning shot at V in reckless disregard of the risk of inflicting serious physical injury on V.
- The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his convictions of home invasion and attempt to commit assault in the first degree violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, as those offenses do not constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes: although the defendant’s convictions of home invasion and attempt to commit assault in the first degree were both necessarily predicated on the defendant’s conduct in chasing V up the stairs, breaking down his door, and entering his apartment while brandishing a pistol, and, therefore, arose from the same act or transaction, home invasion, which requires proof that the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a dwelling while a person other than a participant in the crime was present, and attempt to commit assault in the first degree, which requires proof that the defendant took a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to cause serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument, each contain an element that the other does not; accordingly, it was possible to commit one of those offenses without committing the other.
Procedural History
Amended information charging the defendant with two counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child and with one count each of the crimes of home invasion, attempt to commit assault in the first degree, and reckless endangerment in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and tried to the jury before E. Richards, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Megan L. Wade, assigned counsel, with whom was Emily Graner Sexton, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Brett R. Aiello, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Ann P. Lawlor, senior assistant state’s attorney, and Joseph T. Corradino, state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The victim, Israel Alvarez, lived with his wife and four children in the second floor apartment of a two family home located at 903 Kossuth Street in Bridgeport. At approximately 5 p.m. on September 21, 2017, the victim and his first floor neighbor, Israel Martin, were sitting on the front porch of the home when they noticed a light-skinned man dressed in black jeans and a black hoodie approaching them. As he approached, the man pulled his hood up over his head and a black mask over his mouth and nose,
Martin jumped off the porch and ran around to the back of the building, while the victim ran into the house through the front door and up the stairs to his second floor apartment. As he ran upstairs, the victim encountered his eight year old son walking downstairs. The victim told his son to run, and, seeing the masked man chasing his father, he complied. The victim’s eight year old son ran upstairs to his room and hid under the bed.
The victim entered his apartment and locked the door behind him, but, moments later, the masked gunman kicked it open. The victim hid behind the open door, while the masked gunman entered the living room of the apartment waving his pistol and yelling, ‘‘where is the little motherfucker . . . .’’ Curious about the commotion, the victim’s wife and fourteen year old son entered the living room and saw the masked gunman. During the ensuing tumult, the victim snuck halfway down the stairs and yelled, ‘‘I’m right here, motherfucker,’’ in an effort to lure the gunman away from his family. The gunman exited the second floor apartment and followed the victim down the stairs.
The victim ran out of the building onto the sidewalk, where he withdrew his lawfully concealed .40 caliberpistol from its holster and repeatedly instructed his pursuer to drop his weapon.1 The masked gunman, who was standing in the doorway of the building at this point, raised his own pistol and said, ‘‘get over here now, motherfucker.’’ The masked gunman then shot his pistol once, and the victim returned fire, shooting toward the masked gunman three or four times. At least one of the victim’s bullets struck the masked gunman, who stumbled off the porch, went around the side of the house, and collapsed by the bulkhead door.
After hearing gunshots, the victim’s wife and fourteen year old son ran outside to check on the victim. The victim embraced his wife and then walked toward Shelton Street to look for the masked gunman. On Shelton Street, a charcoal gray Nissan Titan truck almost struck the victim as it fled the area. The victim could not see who was inside of the truck, but both he and Martin recognized it as the same truck that had driven by their building multiple times earlier in the day.
The police responded to the shooting at 903 Kossuth Street within minutes. Neither the victim, his family, nor Martin was able to identify the masked gunman, but the victim and Martin provided the police with a description of the gray truck that had fled the scene. Shortly thereafter, the police stopped a gray Nissan Titan truck at the intersection of Barnum and Central Avenues, which is approximately five minutes from 903 Kossuth Street. The defendant, who was wearing khaki pants and a white T-shirt, was a passenger in the truck and the registered owner of the vehicle. The defendant was suffering from a recently inflicted gunshot wound and was transported by ambulance to Bridgeport Hospital for immediate medical treatment.
The police never recovered the nine millimeter pistol wielded by the masked gunman or the black clothing and mask that he wore. During their investigation at 903 Kossuth Street, however, the police discovered four .40 caliber shell casings, all of which had been fired by the victim’s pistol.2 One nine millimeter shell casing also was found. Additionally, the police found
The defendant was arrested and charged with home invasion, attempt to commit assault in the first degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, and two counts of risk of injury to a child. At the defendant’s jury trial, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that all of the eyewitnesses had identified the clothing worn by the masked gunman as black but that the defendant was wearing khaki pants and a white T-shirt when he was apprehended by the police shortly after the shooting. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The jury found the defendant guilty of the crimes charged. Prior to sentencing, defense counsel renewed the motion for a judgment of acquittal, again arguing that the evidence of guilt was insufficient because the defendant’s clothing did not match the clothing of the perpetrator. The trial court denied the motion, rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict, and sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of thirty years of incarceration.3 This appeal followed.4
I
The defendant first claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because none of the eyewitnesses identified him as the perpetrator, no evidence was produced as to his motive for the commission of the crimes, and he was not wearing black clothing or armed with a pistol when he was apprehended by the police shortly after the shooting. We reject this claim.
‘‘[T]he question of identity of a perpetrator of a crime is a question of fact that is within the sole province of the jury to resolve.’’ State v. Jackson, 257 Conn. 198, 206, 777 A.2d 591 (2001). To determine whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the essential element of identity, ‘‘we apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . In doing so, we are mindful that the trier of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . . The trier [of fact] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hughes, 341 Conn. 387, 397–98, 267 A.3d 81 (2021).
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must ‘‘focus on the evidence presented, not the evidence that the state failed to present . . . .’’ State v. Davis, 324 Conn. 782, 798, 155 A.3d 221 (2017). Additionally, we do not draw a ‘‘distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence so far as probative force is concerned . . . . Indeed, [c]ircumstantial evidence . . . may be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.’’ (Citation
We conclude that the evidence adduced by the statewas more than sufficient to establish the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the crimes of conviction. The defendant’s blood was found outside of 903 Kossuth Street in the exact location where the masked gunman collapsed after he had been shot.5 The defendant was apprehended only five minutes away from the shooting suffering from a recently inflicted gunshot wound. Additionally, the defendant was found in a gray Nissan Titan truck, which matched the description of the vehicle seen fleeing the scene immediately after the shooting. The Nissan Titan truck was registered to the defendant and was observed driving past 903 Kossuth Street multiple times earlier that day.
Notwithstanding the foregoing evidence, the defendant contends that the jury could not reasonably have found that he was the masked gunman because it was speculative for the jury ‘‘to infer that the defendant, who had no connection to [the victim] and no motive to commit these crimes, was shot by [the victim], got into his truck parked nearby, and at some point between 903 Kossuth Street and the intersection of Barnum and Central Avenues (less than five minutes away), despite suffering a gunshot wound, was able to remove black pants, a black hooded sweatshirt, and a black facial covering, and dispose of the clothing and weapon . . . .’’ This argument is without merit. ‘‘In deciding cases . . . [j]urors are not expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observations and experiences, but rather, to apply them to the facts as presented to arrive at an intelligent and correct conclusion. . . . Indeed, [i]t is an abiding principle of jurisprudence that common sense does not take flight when one enters a courtroom.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Otto, 305 Conn. 51, 70 n.17, 43 A.3d 629 (2012). Common knowledge and experience inform us that people often discard inculpatory evidence, such as distinctive clothing or weapons, when they flee the scene of a crime. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 314 Conn. 354, 384, 102 A.3d 1 (2014) (‘‘[the defendant] discarded his clothing and mask while being closely pursued by a police officer’’); State v. Hazard, 201 Conn. App. 46, 56, 240 A.3d 749 (evidence was sufficient to establish identity in part because police found abandoned clothing near site of robbery, which matched clothing worn by perpetrator, and ‘‘[a] forensic analysis revealed [that the abandoned clothing contained] the defendant’s ‘entire genetic profile’ ’’), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 901, 242 A.3d 711 (2020). The jury was permitted to rely on this common knowledge and experience to infer that the defendant discarded the black clothing, mask, and pistol used to commit the charged crimes as he fled 903 Kossuth Street in his gray Nissan Titan truck.6
it is well established that ‘‘[m]otive is not an element of the crime[s] charged [and, therefore] . . . [p]roof of motive is never necessary to support a conclusion of guilt otherwise sufficiently established, however significant its presence or absence, or its sufficiency, may be as bearing [on] the issue of guilt or innocence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Copas, supra, 252 Conn. 337. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the masked gunman who committed the crimes of home invasion, attempt to commit assault in the first degree, reckless endangerment, and risk of injury to a child.
II
The defendant next claims that the jury returned a legally inconsistent verdict in connection with the crimes of attempt to commit assault in the first degree and reckless endangerment because it necessarily found that the defendant acted with two different and mutually exclusive mental states with respect to the same conduct, victim, and statutory result. Specifically, the defendant argues that the jury’s factual finding that he intended to cause serious physical injury to the victim, in violation of the statutes prohibiting attempt to commit assault in the first degree; see
The following legal principles govern our review. ‘‘A claim of legally inconsistent convictions, also referred to as mutually exclusive convictions, arises when aconviction of one offense requires a finding that negates an essential element of another offense of which the defendant also has been convicted. . . . In response to such a claim, we look carefully to determine whether the existence of the essential elements for one offense negates the existence of [one or more] essential elements for another offense of which the defendant also stands convicted. If that is the case, the [convictions] are legally inconsistent
In Alicea, we identified the circumstances under which a conviction of a crime involving an intentional mental state is legally inconsistent with a conviction of a crime involving a reckless mental state. We explained ‘‘that the statutory definitions of intentionally and recklessly are mutually exclusive and inconsistent’’ because ‘‘[i]ntentional conduct requires the defendant to possess a conscious objective . . . to cause the result described in the statute defining the offense,’’ whereas ‘‘reckless conduct requires that the defendant is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result described in the statute will occur. . . . Thus, a reckless mental state is inconsistent with an intentional mental state because one who acts recklessly does not have a conscious objective to cause a particular result.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 391–92. At the same time, ‘‘[w]e have held . . . that convictions involving both intentional and reckless mental states are legally consistent in certain circumstances. For example, when each mental state pertains to a different act, a different victim . . . a different injury,’’ or ‘‘a different result.’’ (Emphasis altered.) Id., 392.
In the present case, the state does not dispute that the defendant’s convictions of attempt to commit assault in the first degree and reckless endangerment pertain to the same victim and the same statutory result; instead, the state argues that they pertain to ‘‘different act[s] . . . .’’ Id. We agree. The analysis is straightforward. If the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant’s conduct amounted to two different acts, each of which was committed with a separate and distinct mental state, then the jury’s verdict is not legally inconsistent. See, e.g., State v. King, 321 Conn. 135, 144, 136 A.3d 1210 (2016) (defendant’s convictions of reckless and intentional assault were not inconsistentbecause ‘‘the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant’s conduct amounted to two separate acts’’); State v. Rios, 171 Conn. App. 1, 13, 16, 156 A.3d 18 (defendant’s convictions of assault in first degree, assault in second degree, and reckless endangerment were not inconsistent because ‘‘the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant’s conduct amounted to two distinct criminal acts in which he possessed otherwise mutually exclusive mental states’’), cert. denied, 325 Conn. 914, 159 A.3d 232 (2017); State v. Kuranko, 71 Conn. App. 703, 714–15, 803 A.2d 383 (2002) (defendant’s convictions of assault in third degree and reckless endangerment were not inconsistent because jury reasonably could have found that defendant’s mental state changed between first attack on victim and subsequent assault); State v. Jones, 68 Conn. App. 562, 566, 569, 792 A.2d 148 (defendant’s convictions of attempt to commit murder, assault in first degree, conspiracy to commit murder, and reckless endangerment were not inconsistent because ‘‘the jury reasonably could have found that [the defendant] committed one act or group of acts with one mental state and a second act or group of acts with a different mental state’’), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 917, 797 A.2d 515 (2002); State v. Mooney, 61 Conn. App. 713, 718, 722, 767 A.2d 770 (The defendant’s convictions of assault in the first degree and robbery in the first degree were not inconsistent because ‘‘the jury . . . was not required to find that the different acts committed by the defendant were in effect one act, with one mental state. The jury was free to conclude that the defendant’s actions constituted different crimes that occurred on an escalating continuum. Indeed, there is a compelling case for finding that the defendant committed multiple criminal acts against the same victim.’’), cert. denied, 256 Conn. 905, 772 A.2d 598 (2001).
In the context of our assault statutes, whether a defendant’s illegal conduct constitutes a single continuous course of criminal conduct or discrete, severable criminal acts is a fact intensive inquiry. See State v. Ruiz-Pacheco, 336 Conn. 219, 238–39, 244 A.3d 908 (2020); see also State v. Nash, supra, 316 Conn. 663 (‘‘courts reviewing a claim of legal inconsistency must closely examine the record to determine whether there is any plausible theory under which the jury reasonably could have found the defendant guilty of both offenses’’). In conducting this inquiry, we consider the following factors: ‘‘(1) the amount of time separating the acts; (2) whether the acts occurred at different locations; (3) [evidence pertinent to] the defendant’s intent or motivation behind the acts; and (4) whether any intervening events occurred between the acts, such that the defendant had the opportunity to reconsider his actions.’’12 State v. Ruiz-Pacheco, supra, 241; see State v. King, supra, 321 Conn. 144 (concluding that there were two different criminal acts because
intervening event precipitated change in defendant’s intent); State v. Kuranko, supra, 71 Conn. App. 714–15 (concluding that there were two different criminal acts due to change in location that precipitated change in defendant’s intent); State v. Jones, supra, 68 Conn. App. 569–70 (concluding that there were two different criminal acts because ‘‘there was a pause in the shooting’’ that precipitated change in defendant’s intent).
Applying these factors to the facts of the present case, we conclude that the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant committed two different criminal acts with two distinct mental states. First, the defendant chased the victim upstairs, broke down the door to the victim’s apartment, and entered the apartment yelling, ‘‘where is the little motherfucker,’’ while waving a loaded and cocked pistol. On the basis of this conduct, the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant committed the crime of attempt to commit assault in the first degree because the defendant had the conscious objective to inflict serious physical injury on the victim, in violation of
III
Lastly, the defendant claims that his convictions of home invasion and attempt to commit assault in the first degree violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because they arose from the same act or transaction and constitute the same offense under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932). The state responds that the defendant’s double jeopardy claim lacks merit because ‘‘[t]he charges of home invasion and attempt to commit first degree assault arose out of separate transactions and, alternatively, [because] each crime requires proof of an element that the other does not’’ under Blockburger.
The defendant did not preserve his double jeopardy claim in the trial court, so he seeks to prevail under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). We conclude that the defendant’s claim is reviewable
It is well established that ‘‘[d]ouble jeopardy prohibits not only multiple trials for the same offense, but also multiple punishments for the same offense.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ruiz-Pacheco, supra, 336 Conn. 226. ‘‘Double jeopardy analysis in the context of a single trial is a [two step] process, and, to succeed, the defendant must satisfy both steps. . . . First, the charges must arise out of the same act or transaction [step one]. Second, it must be determined whether the charged crimes are the same offense [step two]. Multiple punishments are forbidden only if both conditions are met. . . . At step two, we [t]raditionally . . . have applied the Blockburger test to determine whether two statutes criminalize the same offense, thus placing a defendant prosecuted under both statutes in double jeopardy: [When] the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact [that] the other does not.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Tinsley, 340 Conn. 425, 432, 264 A.3d 560 (2021).
As we explained in part II of this opinion, the defendant’s criminal conduct can be separated into two different acts, each involving a distinct mental state: (1)the act of chasing the victim up the stairs and invading the victim’s apartment with the specific intent to inflict serious physical injury; and (2) the act of shooting toward the victim outside of 903 Kossuth Street with reckless disregard to the risk of serious physical injury to the victim. See, e.g., State v. Ruiz-Pacheco, supra, 336 Conn. 238–39 (‘‘[t]o determine when one course of conduct ends (or is ‘completed’) and another begins for double jeopardy purposes, our case law looks to whether the defendant’s acts took place at different times or locations, whether the defendant was motivated by different criminal intents, and whether the acts were interrupted by intervening events or circumstances’’). Given the manner in which the case was charged, tried, and decided by the jury, the defendant’s convictions of home invasion and attempt to commit assault in the first degree both necessarily were predicated on his conduct during the first sequence of events, involving the entry into the victim’s home while brandishing a loaded and cocked pistol. See footnote 13 of this opinion and accompanying text; see also State v. Porter, 328 Conn. 648, 661–62, 182 A.3d 625 (2018) (to determine whether criminal conduct arises from same act or transaction at step one of double jeopardy analysis, courts may consider evidence adduced at trial, state’s theory of case, and charging instrument). We therefore conclude that these two convictions arose from the same act or transaction.
We next examine the statutory elements of home invasion and attempt to commit assault in the first degree to determine whether each crime requires proof of an essential element that the other does not under Blockburger. See State v. Tinsley, supra, 340 Conn. 432. In conducting a Blockburger analysis, we consider only the statutory elements of the two offenses, as opposed to the evidence
To prove the defendant guilty of home invasion in violation of
The defendant argues that the two crimes are the same offense under Blockburger because attempt to commit assault in the first degree was charged as the predicate offense for the defendant’s home invasion conviction.15 To support his
The defendant’s reliance on Greco is misplaced because attempt to commit assault in the first degree is not a lesser included offense of home invasion. To be a lesser included offense, it must be impossible ‘‘to commit the greater offense, in the manner described in the information or bill of particulars, without having first committed the lesser . . . .’’ State v. Whistnant, 179 Conn. 576, 588, 427 A.2d 414 (1980); see State v. Tinsley, supra, 340 Conn. 442 (under Blockburger test, charging documents may be ‘‘relevant to the court’s analysis insofar as [they] identif[y] [a] predicate [offense]’’). Although the state alleged in its charging document that the defendant had the specific
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.