STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. SHARON HOLMES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CASE NO. 1-18-52
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT ALLEN COUNTY
June 24, 2019
[Cite as State v. Holmes, 2019-Ohio-2485.]
OPINION
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CR2017 0226
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: June 24, 2019
APPEARANCES:
Kenneth J. Rexford for Appellant
Jana E. Emerick for
PRESTON, J.
{1} Defendant-appellant, Sharon Holmes (“Holmes“), appeals the September 7, 2018 judgment of sentence of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{2} This case arises from a March 6, 2017 stop of Holmes‘s vehicle on Interstate 75 in Allen County, Ohio. (Mar. 21, 2018 Tr. at 18-19). On approaching Holmes‘s vehicle, the law enforcement officer who stopped the vehicle detected the odor of raw marijuana emanating from within the vehicle and proceeded to conduct a probable cause search for marijuana. (Id. at 19-20). During the search, law enforcement officers discovered a prescription pill bottle that contained a quantity of multicolored pills enclosed in a knotted plastic bag. (Id. at 28). The pills were seized and later identified as pentylone and methamphetamine. (Doc. No. 1).
{3} On July 13, 2017, Holmes was indicted on four counts: Counts One and Three of aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of
{4} On January 5, 2018, Holmes filed a motion to suppress evidence. (Doc. No. 17). A hearing on Holmes‘s suppression motion was conducted on March 21, 2018. (Doc. No. 30). On March 27, 2018, Holmes filed her written closing arguments. (Doc. No. 32). On April 6, 2018, the State filed its written closing arguments. (Doc. No. 34). On April 9, 2018, Holmes filed her reply to the State‘s written closing arguments. (Doc. No. 35). On April 17, 2018, the trial court denied Holmes‘s motion to suppress evidence. (Doc. No. 38).
{5} On April 13, 2018, Holmes filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 36). On April 16, 2018, the trial court denied Holmes‘s motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 37).
{6} On July 11, 2018, Holmes, under a negotiated plea agreement, withdrew her not guilty pleas and entered a plea of no contest to Count One of the indictment. (Doc. Nos. 47, 48). In exchange, the State agreed to recommend dismissal of Counts Two, Three, and Four of the indictment. (Doc. Nos. 47, 48). The trial court accepted Holmes‘s no contest plea, found her guilty, and ordered a presentence investigation. (Doc. No. 48). In addition, the trial court dismissed Counts Two, Three, and Four of the indictment. (Id.).
{7} On September 6, 2018, the trial court sentenced Holmes to five years in prison. (Doc. No. 52). The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence on September 7, 2018. (Id.).
Assignment of Error No. I
The Trial Court should have dismissed the Indictment for insufficient number of jurors because Crim.R. 6(A) is unconstitutional, in violation of Article I, Section 10, of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. §2939.02.
{9} In her first assignment of error, Holmes argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to dismiss. Specifically, Holmes argues that the indictment against her should have been dismissed because the indictment “was (and remains) voidable for lack of a sufficient number of grand jurors.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 7). As Holmes notes, the
{10} With respect to the right of indictment by grand jury, the
[N]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous, crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury; and the number of persons necessary to constitute such grand jury and the number thereof necessary to concur in finding such indictment shall be determined by law.
{11} In addition, the
The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. * * * All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.
{12} The Supreme Court of Ohio has addressed the conflict between
{13} Holmes acknowledges Brown but argues that ”Brown resulted in an errant result because the Ohio Supreme Court did not consider (perhaps because not argued) that no true conflict of laws exists.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 11). She argues that the court would never have been required to reconcile
{14} We disagree and conclude that
{15} Holmes urges us to assume that
{16} However, Holmes also argues that
{17} In sum, we conclude that
{18} Holmes‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. II
The Trial Court should have suppressed the fruits of a warrantless search of Mrs. Holmes’ pill bottle.
Assignment of Error No. III
The Trial Court should have suppressed the fruits of a warrantless stop of Mrs. Holmes’ vehicle.
{20} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. See State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, “an appellate court must accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). With respect to the trial court‘s conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must independently determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997).
{21} The
{22} Because our decision with respect to Holmes‘s third assignment of error could affect whether we address her second assignment of error or the manner in which we would do so, we will first consider Holmes‘s third assignment of error, in which she argues that the stop of her vehicle was not constitutionally permissible. “Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning” of the
{23} Concerning the stop of Holmes‘s vehicle, the trial court found, in relevant part, as follows:
[O]n March 6, 2017 in Allen County, Ohio, State Highway Patrol Trooper Ann Malone [(“Trooper Malone“)] was in uniform and in a marked cruiser when the events of the traffic stop occurred.
* * *
On Interstate 75 * * * outside of Beaverdam, Trooper Malone saw a Volkswagen Jetta considered by her to be a possible rental. Malone indicated that as the Volkswagen passed her vehicle the driver did not look over but changed lanes. Malone indicated that the Jetta was one and one-half car lengths behind another vehicle, a commercial vehicle, and the approximate speed of the vehicle was 60 to 65 miles per hour.
Malone stopped the vehicle * * *
* * *
Trooper Malone indicated that she was of the opinion that there had been a violation of
Ohio Revised Code Section 4511.34 , commonly known as “following too close” as [Holmes‘s] vehicle proceeded southbound on Interstate 75.
(Doc. No. 38).
{24} We conclude that competent, credible evidence supports the trial court‘s findings with respect to the circumstances surrounding the stop of Holmes‘s vehicle. At the March 21, 2018 suppression hearing, Trooper Malone testified that while on patrol on Interstate 75 in Allen County, Ohio on the afternoon of March 6, 2017, she observed a silver Volkswagen Jetta traveling southbound in the left lane. (Mar. 21, 2018 Tr. at 11, 14-16). She stated that the vehicle aroused her suspicions because the vehicle appeared to be a rental vehicle, the driver of the vehicle did not look toward her patrol car as the vehicle passed, and the vehicle changed lanes immediately after passing her position for “no apparent reason.” (Id. at 16-17). Trooper Malone testified that these observations prompted her to “pull[] out from the crossover to further observe the driving behavior of the Volkswagen and also run a registration check of the Volkswagen.” (Id. at 17).
{25} Trooper Malone testified that by the time she caught up to the Volkswagen, it had started to rain. (Id.). According to Trooper Malone, once she caught up to the Volkswagen, she “noticed that the [vehicle] was traveling approximately one and a half car lengths behind a commercial vehicle in the right lane, traveling at an approximate speed [of] about sixty-five miles an hour in a seventy mile an hour zone.” (Id.). She testified that based on the “general rule” that “for every ten mile an hour you need one car length,” it was her assessment that the Volkswagen was following the commercial vehicle too closely. (Id. at 18). Trooper Malone said that there needed to be “at
{26} In addition to Trooper Malone‘s testimony concerning the stop of Holmes‘s vehicle, the State offered as evidence the video recording from Trooper Malone‘s dashboard camera. (State‘s Ex. 7). The recording begins as Trooper Malone‘s patrol vehicle pulls out from the crossover and enters the left lane of Interstate 75. (Id.). After approximately 40 seconds, a silver vehicle driving in the right lane comes into view. (Id.). Once the silver vehicle comes into view, Trooper Malone follows the vehicle for approximately 50 seconds before activating her overhead lights and effecting a stop of the vehicle. (Id.). The video recording depicts the silver vehicle closely following a commercial truck during the time that Trooper Malone followed the vehicle. (Id.). In addition, the recording reflects that in the moments preceding the stop of the silver vehicle, it was raining lightly and the windshield wipers of Trooper Malone‘s patrol vehicle were activated. (Id.).
{27} Therefore, competent, credible evidence supports the trial court‘s factual findings concerning Trooper Malone‘s stop of Holmes‘s vehicle. See State v. Craw, 3d Dist. Mercer No. 10-17-09, 2018-Ohio-1769, ¶ 36, citing State v. Thompson, 7th Dist. Jefferson Nos. 98 JE 28 and 98 JE 29, 2001 WL 69197, at *5-6 (Jan. 24, 2001).
{28} Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that the stop of Holmes‘s vehicle was constitutionally permissible because Trooper Malone had probable cause to stop Holmes for a violation of
{29} We conclude that the trial court did not err by holding that Trooper Malone had probable cause to stop Holmes‘s vehicle for a violation of
The operator of a motor vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley shall not follow another vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley, and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.
{30} Here, the record supports the trial court‘s findings that Trooper Malone observed Holmes‘s vehicle following a commercial vehicle at a distance of less than two car lengths and that Holmes‘s vehicle was traveling in excess of 60 miles per hour as it trailed the commercial vehicle. Moreover, the record supports that it was raining at the time. Given that Trooper Malone observed Holmes‘s vehicle following the commercial vehicle at a very close range and at a high speed while it was raining, Trooper Malone possessed enough information to determine that, when considering the speed of Holmes‘s vehicle and the condition of the highway, there was a sufficiently high probability that Holmes was not following the commercial vehicle at a reasonable and prudent distance. Therefore, because the stop of Holmes‘s vehicle was supported by probable cause, the trial court did not err by concluding that the stop was constitutionally valid.
{31} Having concluded that the trial court did not err by holding that probable cause supported the stop of Holmes‘s vehicle, we next determine whether the trial court erred by holding that the warrantless seizure and search of the prescription pill bottle was constitutional.
{32} Competent, credible evidence supports the trial court‘s findings of fact with respect to the circumstances surrounding the search of Holmes‘s purse and the seizure and search of the prescription pill bottle. At the March 21, 2018 suppression hearing, Trooper Malone testified that when she approached Holmes‘s vehicle, she detected the odor of raw marijuana. (Mar. 21, 2018 Tr. at 19-20). She testified that she was able to identify the scent of raw marijuana in part because she had received specialized training to recognize the odor. (Id. at 21). In addition, Trooper Malone stated that she observed marijuana residue “on the cup holder.” (Id. at 19, 21). Trooper Malone stated that although Holmes initially denied that she was in possession of marijuana, she eventually admitted that there was a “blunt of marijuana” in the vehicle. (Id. at 25-26).
{33} According to Trooper Malone, after her partner, Trooper Ryan Stewart (“Trooper Stewart“), arrived at the scene, the two proceeded to search Holmes‘s vehicle. (Id. at 27). Trooper Malone testified that a search of Holmes‘s purse “revealed a small baggy inside of a cigarillo packet, containing green leafy plant material that was later identified as marijuana.” (Id.). She further stated that inside Holmes‘s purse she discovered “a prescription bottle with the name of Sharon Holmes on it with the prescription on the outside saying that is was hydrocodone/acetaminophen.” (Id.). Trooper Malone testified that she “could clearly see through the bottle that there was a plastic baggy with multicolored pills inside of the prescription bottle, not your typical prescription pills. They were round, multicolored pink, blue and purple.” (Id. at 28). She also testified that she did not need to open the prescription pill bottle in order
{¶34} Trooper Malone then identified State‘s Exhibits 1-6, various photographs depicting Holmes‘s purse as it was first encountered, the position of the prescription pill bottle in the purse, the pill bottle as it appeared before it was opened and after it was opened, and the contents of the pill bottle once they were removed. (State‘s Exs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). In particular, State‘s Exhibit 3 depicts the prescription pill bottle after it was removed from Holmes‘s purse but before it was opened. (State‘s Ex. 3). State‘s Exhibit 3 depicts that the prescription pill bottle is made of a transparent orange material. (Id.). The label on the pill bottle identifies Holmes as the patient for whom the prescription was written and indicates that the prescription was for 120 hydrocodone/acetaminophen tablets. (Id.). Furthermore, in State‘s Exhibit 3, a single round blue pill is visible contained inside a plastic bag which is itself enclosed within the pill bottle. (Id.). The plastic bag is also visible at the top of the pill bottle. (Id.). When discussing the State‘s Exhibits, Trooper Malone testified that she did not need to open the pill bottle to view its contents and that she was able to observe that the plastic bag was knotted prior to opening the pill bottle. (Mar. 21, 2018 Tr. at 30-31). She also testified that portions of the pill bottle were not covered by the label. (Id. at 31); (See State‘s Exs. 5, 6).
{¶35} Finally, Trooper Malone testified that, based on her training and experience, she knew that some people store marijuana and other illegal drugs in prescription pill bottles. (Mar. 21, 2018 Tr. at 32-33).
{¶36} Next, Trooper Stewart testified that when he arrived to assist Trooper Malone on March 6, 2017, Trooper Malone informed him that she had detected the “plain smell of marijuana” emanating from Holmes‘s vehicle and that they were going to conduct a probable cause search. (Id. at 53). Trooper Stewart testified that they then proceeded to search the vehicle, and he confirmed that during the search of Holmes‘s purse, they located “a cigar type wrapper bag that contained some marijuana.” (Id.). Furthermore, Trooper Stewart stated that inside Holmes‘s purse, he noticed “a couple prescription pill bottles that are frequently seen to hide other contraband, other than what there [sic] intended use is for.” (Id.). He testified that he removed the unopened pill bottles from the purse to determine whether they contained contraband. (Id. at 53-54). He stated that after removing the bottles from the purse, he observed “a knotted plastic bag” within one of the prescription pill bottles. (Id. at 54). Trooper Stewart testified that, from his experience, “knotted plastic bags are not commonly how prescriptions are administered or issued from a pharmacy” and “the pills or tablets that were within that prescription pill bottle [did not] match the description of the prescription drug that should [have] be[en] in that bottle.” (Id.).
{¶37} Trooper Stewart then examined State‘s Exhibit 3 and observed that a “knotted plastic bag with some type of a tablet within that bag” was clearly visible inside the unopened pill bottle and that the visible tablet did not “match the description of hydrocodone/acetaminophen to [his] experience.” (Id. at 56-57); (See State‘s Ex. 3). He further testified that he was able to observe the pills and the knotted plastic bag inside the pill bottle before the bottle
{¶38} On cross-examination, Trooper Stewart testified that he, rather than Trooper Malone, was the one who opened the pill bottle and removed the knotted plastic bag. (Id. at 58). He stated that he was looking for marijuana throughout the search of Holmes‘s purse and its contents. (Id. at 59). He testified that although he found some marijuana in the cigarillo wrapper, there could have been more marijuana in the vehicle. (Id.). However, Trooper Stewart conceded that he did not observe marijuana in the pill bottle when he opened it. (Id. at 59-60).
{¶39} Trooper Stewart reiterated that he observed a plastic bag contained within the prescription pill bottle. (Id. at 62). He could not recall whether he observed the distinctive imprinting on the pills from the outside of the container. (Id. at 62-63). He testified that his basis for opening the pill bottle was that the pills inside were inconsistent with the labeling on the pill bottle and that, based on the color and thickness of the pills, they were consistent with ecstasy tablets he had encountered in the past. (Id. at 63). He stated that the pills he observed in the pill bottle were not consistent with “prescription or over the counter medication.” (Id. at 64).
{¶40} On redirect-examination, Trooper Stewart testified that, based on his training and experience, he knew that people occasionally stored marijuana and other illegal drugs in prescription pill bottles. (Id. at 66-67). Finally, he testified that “based on the appearance [of the prescription pill bottle], the knotted bag, * * * what was available to [him] to see through the bottle itself,” and his training and experience dealing with illegal street drugs, he immediately recognized that the prescription pill bottle contained contraband. (Id. at 68).
{¶41} Thus, competent, credible evidence supports the trial court‘s findings of fact with respect to the search of Holmes‘s purse and the seizure and search of the prescription pill bottle. See Craw, 2018-Ohio-1769, at ¶ 36, citing Thompson, 2001 WL 69197, at *5-6.
{¶42} Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that Troopers Malone and Stewart conducted a constitutionally valid search of Holmes‘s purse and that the pill bottle was validly seized and searched. (Doc. No. 38). First, the trial court concluded that Trooper Malone was qualified to recognize the odor of marijuana and thus the detection of the odor of raw marijuana supplied her with probable cause to search Holmes‘s vehicle for marijuana. (Id.). As to the search of the pill bottle, the trial court concluded that “the multi-colored pills * * * [were] there to see in [Holmes‘s] purse * * *.” (Id.).
{¶43} Initially, we note that Holmes appears to concede that the search of her vehicle generally and the search of her purse were not constitutionally suspect. (See Appellant‘s Brief at 18-21). We agree. “‘A warrantless search of an automobile, where police officers have probable cause to believe such vehicle contains contraband, is one of the well-recognized exceptions to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant.‘” State v. Parsons, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-16-08, 2017-Ohio-1315, ¶ 24, quoting State v. James, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2015-0059, 2016-Ohio-7660, ¶ 23. “‘This “automobile exception” allows a police officer to conduct a warrantless search of portions of a motor vehicle provided he or she has probable cause to believe it contains evidence
{¶44} Here, the trial court found and the record supports that Trooper Malone was qualified to detect the odor of raw marijuana and that she detected the odor of raw marijuana emanating from Holmes‘s vehicle. Trooper Malone‘s detection of the odor of raw marijuana, by itself, would have been sufficient to supply probable cause to search Holmes‘s vehicle for marijuana. See State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47 (2000), paragraph one of the syllabus (“The smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to conduct a search.“). However, in addition to identifying the odor of raw marijuana, Trooper Malone also observed marijuana residue on the cup holder in Holmes‘s vehicle, and Holmes admitted that her purse contained marijuana. Accordingly, Troopers Malone and Stewart had ample probable cause to search Holmes‘s vehicle for marijuana. Because Troopers Malone and Stewart had probable cause to search Holmes‘s vehicle for marijuana, they were also permitted to search any movable container or package in Holmes‘s vehicle that could logically conceal marijuana. Blevins at ¶ 41. Holmes‘s purse could be, and was in fact, used to conceal marijuana, and thus, Troopers Malone and Stewart were able to search Holmes‘s purse for marijuana along with any containers therein that could conceal marijuana.
{¶45} While Holmes does not challenge Trooper Malone‘s and Trooper Stewart‘s general authority to search her vehicle and its contents for marijuana, she argues that they lacked probable cause to search the prescription pill bottle because the “semi-clear pill bottle * * * plainly did not contain marijuana such that a search of the [pill bottle] for marijuana [was] unreasonable.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 19). For the sake of argument, we assume without deciding that Holmes is correct that Troopers Malone and Stewart were divested of probable cause to search the pill bottle for marijuana once they removed it from her purse and observed that it contained a bag of pills, rather than raw marijuana. Nevertheless, we conclude that the seizure and search of the pill bottle were valid under the plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment‘s warrant requirement.
{¶46} “It is well established that law enforcement officers do not need a search warrant to seize incriminating evidence discovered in a place where they have a right to be under the plain-view exception to the search-warrant requirement.” Parsons, 2017-Ohio-1315, at ¶ 29, citing State v. Bazrawi, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-1043, 2013-Ohio-3015, ¶ 32,
{¶47} Holmes admits that the seizure and search of the pill bottle would be valid so long as the contents of the pill bottle “were essentially contraband in plain sight.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 20). However, she argues that the contents of the pill bottle were not “essentially contraband in plain sight” because “the only observation was that the pills were multi-colored” and “[m]ulti-colored pills are not obviously contraband.” (Id. at 19-20).
{¶48} Holmes‘s argument is without merit. As discussed above, Troopers Malone and Stewart were lawfully present in Holmes‘s vehicle pursuant to their probable cause search for marijuana. In addition, as part of this search, they were lawfully permitted to enter Holmes‘s purse. Furthermore, in searching Holmes‘s purse, Troopers Malone and Stewart had the authority to remove any containers enclosed therein that could conceal marijuana and search any such containers for marijuana. Troopers Malone and Stewart were permitted to remove the prescription pill bottle containing the multicolored pills from Holmes‘s purse, which brought the contents of the transparent bottle into plain view. Therefore, Troopers Malone and Stewart also had a right of access to the pill bottle itself. Consequently, the first and second prongs of the plain-view exception are satisfied.
{¶49} The third prong of the plain-view exception is also met. Contrary to Holmes‘s argument that “the only observation was that the pills were multi-colored,” Trooper Stewart, who ultimately searched the seized pill bottle, testified to numerous additional factors demonstrating that the incriminating character of the contents of the pill bottle was immediately apparent. Trooper Stewart testified that, based on his training and experience, pharmacies do not dispense prescription medications in knotted plastic bags and that the pills inside the plastic bag did not match the description of the prescription drug listed on the pill bottle‘s label. (Mar. 21, 2018 Tr. at 54, 56-57). He also testified that, based on the color and thickness of the pills, the pills were similar to ecstasy tablets he had encountered in the past and inconsistent with prescription or over the counter medications. (Id. at 63-64). Finally, Trooper Stewart testified that based on all of these factors, he immediately recognized that the prescription pill bottle contained contraband. (Id. at 68).
{¶50} Trooper Stewart was entitled to rely on his specialized knowledge, training, and experience in determining whether there was probable cause to believe that
{¶51} The applicability of the plain-view exception to the facts of this case is not affected by the fact that Trooper Stewart needed to open the pill bottle to secure the bag of pills instead of seizing the bag of pills directly. Typically, “[i]n cases involving closed containers, * * * the plain view doctrine may support the warrantless seizure of a container believed to contain contraband but any subsequent search of the concealed contents of the container must be accompanied by a warrant or justified by one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.” (Emphasis sic.) United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 725 (10th Cir.1992), citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 749-751, 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) and Horton, 496 U.S. at 141, fn. 11. However, “when a container is ‘not closed,’ or ‘transparent,’ or when its ‘distinctive configuration * * * proclaims its contents,’ the container supports no reasonable expectation of privacy and the contents can be said to be in plain view.” United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1437 (10th Cir.1991), quoting Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427, 101 S.Ct. 2841 (1981), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764, 99 S.Ct. 2586 (1979), fn. 13, abrogated on other grounds, California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982 (1991). Hence, “where the contents of a seized container are a foregone conclusion, [the] prohibition against warrantless searches of containers under the plain view doctrine does not apply.” Corral at 725.
{¶52} Here, Holmes‘s prescription pill bottle was made of a transparent material and a portion of the bottle was not covered by the label. As a result, Trooper Stewart was able to see into the bottle and determine that it likely contained contraband without needing to open it. Accordingly, the contents of the pill bottle were effectively in plain view, and Holmes did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in the container that would have prevented Trooper Stewart from opening and searching the bottle.
{¶53} In conclusion, the trial court did not err by holding that Trooper Malone had probable cause to stop Holmes‘s vehicle and that the seizure and search of Holmes‘s prescription pill bottle was valid under the plain-view exception. Thus, the trial court did not err by denying Holmes‘s motion to suppress evidence. Accordingly, Holmes‘s second and third assignments of error are overruled.
Assignment of Error No. IV
The Trial Court denied due process and the effective assistance of counsel by refusing to allow fair cross-examination of the State witness.
{¶54} In her fourth assignment of error, Holmes argues that the trial court erred by limiting her ability to cross-examine Trooper Malone at the suppression hearing. Specifically, Holmes suggests that Trooper Malone testified that there are exceptions to the car-length standard. (Appellant‘s
{¶55}
(A) Control by Court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
(B) Scope of Cross-Examination. Cross-examination shall be permitted on all relevant matters and matters affecting credibility.
{¶56} We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Holmes‘s ability to cross-examine Trooper Malone about exceptions to the car-length standard. Trooper Malone‘s knowledge about possible exceptions to the car-length standard was, at best, marginally relevant. Trooper Malone was a fact witness at the suppression hearing. Her testimony related to the observations that she made on the afternoon of March 6, 2017, the actions she took in response to those observations, and why those observations prompted her to act in the manner that she did. In contrast, it was the trial court‘s responsibility to determine whether there was probable cause to stop Holmes‘s vehicle for violating
{¶57} In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Holmes‘s ability to cross-examine Trooper Malone regarding her basis for knowledge of the car-length standard. During cross-examination, Trooper Malone testified repeatedly that through her training and experience, she had learned that the car-length standard could be used to evaluate probable cause to stop a vehicle for an
{¶58} Holmes‘s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶59} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur.