*1 ARKANSAS SANDERS Argued February June No. 77-1497. 1979—Decided *2 BreNNAN, Court, in which opinion of the J., delivered the Powell, J., filed an joined. Burger, JJ., C. Marshall, and White, Stewart, joined, post, J., Stevens, concurring in which opinion judgment, Rehnquist, dissenting opinion, in which filed p. J., Blackmun, 766. J., joined, post, p. 768. Arkansas, Attorney General Purvis, Deputy Joseph H. ° him on vice. With hac pro petitioner cause
argued the Clin- Bill Clark, Attorney General, Steve briefs were ton, Attorney former General. 439 U. S. Court, Lassiter, by appointment T.
Jack respondent.* brief for filed a argued the cause and 1062, the Court. opinion delivered Powell Me. Justice absence whether, presents question This case obtain a required police are circumstances, exigent properly from an automobile taken searching luggage before this case took for contraband. We searched stopped and resolve Arkansas Court of Supreme writ certiorari of our application toas misunderstanding apparent (1977), 433 U. S. v. States decision United automobiles.1 seized from of luggage warrantless searches Schmidt, P. Wayne James Carrington, Inbau, Frank W. *Fred E. Enforcement, Inc., as for Effective Law Costello filed a brief for Americans amicus curiae urging reversal. (CA9 Finnegan, 2d States v. 568 F. United Compare 1978) (CA8 Stevie, 1175, 1178-1179 States 2d 1977), with 582 F. (en banc).
I On April 23, Officer Isom David of the Little Rock, Ark., Police Department received word from an informant that at 4:35 that respondent afternoon would arrive aboard an American flight Airlines gate No. 1 Municipal Airport of Rock. Little According to the respond- informant, ent would be carrying green suitcase containing marihuana. Both Isom and the informant respondent knew inas Jan- well, uary 1976 the given informant had the Little Rock Police Department information that had led respondent’s arrest and conviction for possession of marihuana. Acting tip, Officer Isom and two other police placed officers the air- port under surveillance. As the informant had re- predicted, *3 spondent duly gate arrived at No. 1. police The as watched respondent deposited some hand luggage in a waiting taxicab, returned the baggage claim area, man and amet whom police subsequently identified as David Rambo. While Rambo respondent waited, retrieved from the airline baggage green service a suitcase matching by that described the in- formant. Respondent gave this suitcase to his companion and went outside, where he entered the taxi into which he had put his luggage. Rambo waited a in short while airport the and joined then respondent in the taxi, after the placing green suitcase in the trunk of the vehicle. respondent’s
When taxi drove away carrying respondent, Rambo, and the suitcase, Officer Isom and one of his fellow officers pursuit gave and, with help the of patrol car, stopped the vehicle several from blocks the airport. At the request of the police, the taxi opened driver the trunk of his vehicle, where the officers found the green suitcase. Without asking the permission of either respondent or Rambo, police the opened the unlocked suitcase and discovered proved what be 9.3 pounds of marihuana packaged in plastic 10 bags. On October 14, 1976, respondent and Rambo were charged with possession of marihuana with intent in deliver viola- 756 trial, Before (1976).2 § Ann. Stat. of Ark. tion the from obtained evidence suppress moved
respondent under rights his violated the search contending that suitcase, court trial The Amendments. Fourteenth Fourth suppres- and denied January 31, 1977, hearing on held convic- respondent’s After explanation. without motion sion to 10 he was sentenced February 3, by jury tion $15,000. fined and was prison years respond- reversed Arkansas Court Supreme appeal On have court should trial that ruling conviction, ent’s through obtained was because marihuana suppressed W. 595, 559 Ark. suitcase. of the search an unlawful States upon Relying 2d (1971), 403 U. S. Hampshire, New Coolidge v. supra, must generally a warrantless concluded court circum- exigent coupled with “probable cause supported In the 706. 2d, at S. W. Ark., stances.” cause probable ample was there the court found case, present contained was contraband belief that police officers’ wholly to be found court they searched. the suitcase justifying circumstance any exigent however, lacking, lug- of the for the search a warrant to secure failure officers’ and its control With gage. and its the suitcase danger no was occupants, there process. legal to due unavailable be rendered contents would in this “nothing there therefore, that concluded, court *4 assertion to an credence lend that would circumstances set of Id., at obtaining warrant.” a search impracticality 706.3 2d,W. at 559 S. suitcase, police officers found to the marihuana In addition transporting after patrol car in their heroin hidden one ounce found charged also was headquarters. Accordingly, Rambo Rambo Immediately before trial intent deliver. heroin with possession for later count heroin-possession court severed counts, both
trial. to under- immobilized, it safely was unreasonable the suitcase “With
II
Although
general
principles applicable claims
Fourth Amendment violations are well settled, litigation over
requests for suppression of highly relevant evidence continues
to occupy much of the attention of courts
all
levels
state and federal
judiciary. Courts and law enforcement
officials often
it
find difficult to discern
proper
application of
these principles to individual cases, because the circumstances
giving rise to suppression requests can vary almost infinitely.
Moreover, an apparently small difference in the factual situa-
tion
frequently
viewed as a controlling difference in deter-
mining Fourth
rights.
Amendment
present
presents
case
an example. Only two Terms ago, we held
locked foot-
locker could not lawfully be searched without a warrant, even
though it had been loaded into the trunk of an automobile
parked
aat
curb. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.
1S.
In earlier cases, on the other hand, the Court sustained
the constitutionality of warrantless searches of automobiles and
their contents under what has become known as the “automo-
bile exception” to the
requirement.
See,
g.,
e. Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U.
42S.
(1970); Carroll
States,
v. United
We commence with a summary of principles. these Fourth protects Amendment the privacy and security per- take the and greater additional intrusion of a search without a warrant.” 262 Ark., at 601, 559 S. 2d,W. at 707. The court rejected also State's contention that luggage is entitled protection lesser against warrantless searches than are private other areas, such as homes. It noted that suitcases, unlike automobiles, customarily are repositories per- sonal effects. *5 758 right guarantees ''[t]he First, it ways. important in two
sons and houses, papers, persons, in their secure to be people of the In addi- seizures.” and searches unreasonable effects, against include to Amendment interpreted this Court has tion, be property private of normally searches requirement compliance issued warrant to a search pursuant performed Arizona, 437 Mincey v. g., See, e. Clause.4 Warrant with the supra, States v. United (1978); 385, 390 S.U. Court, 407 U. S. District States United v. States 9; United 347, States, 389 U. S. United Katz (1972); v. (1925). States, 269 U. S. United v. Agnello (1967); property private a of therefore, search ordinary case, In the issued properly pursuant and to both must be reasonable assessed search, mere reasonableness warrant. a substi- is not surrounding circumstances, light of the Fourth required under warrant judicial tute for the District United States States v. Amendment. See Hamp- Coolidge New v. said As the Court Court, supra. shire, supra, at 481: our part valued has been requirement
“The
it has determined
and
decades,
law
constitutional
this
all over
in courts
of cases
and scores
in scores
result
be somehow
inconvenience
is not an
country.
It
is, or
efficiency.
It
the claims
'weighed’ against
machinery
of our
working part
important
be,
should
check the
a matter of course
as
operating
government,
executive
overzealous
mistakenly
but
'well-intentioned
system of
enforcement.”
any
law
part
who are
officers’
provides that “no
Amendment
Fourth
Warrant Clause
by
cause,
Oath or affir
supported
upon probable
but
shall issue
Warrants
per
place
describing
searched
mation,
particularly
fully
made
been
Amendment has
The Fourth
things to be seized.”
sons or
Mapp v.
See
Amendment.
the Fourteenth
applicable to the States
In
Colorado,
(1961);
338 U.
Ohio,
759
prominent
place the warrant requirement
is given in our
decisions reflects the “basic constitutional doctrine that
indi
vidual freedoms will best be preserved through
separation
of powers and division of functions among the different
branches and
levels Government.” United States v. United
States
Court,
District
supra, at 317. By requiring
con
clusions concerning probable cause and the scope of a search
“be drawn
aby
neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer
in
engaged
the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime,” Johnson
States,
v. United
333 U.
10,
14
we
(1948),
minimize
risk of unreasonable
assertions of executive authority.
See McDonald v. United
States,
Nonetheless,
there are some exceptions to the warrant
requirement. These have been established where was con-
cluded that the public
required
interest
in
flexibility
application of
general
rule
valid warrant
is a
prerequisite for a search. See United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte,
One of the circumstances police stop require a search warrant is when probable cause highway on the or because have street crime. believe it contains contraband or evidence a See Martinez-Fuerte, 561-562; United supra, United at States v. Ortiz, White, 423 (1975); States 422 v. 891, v. U. 896 Texas S. (1975). 68 in Carroll 67, S. As the Court said v. U.
States, 267 at 153: S.,U. from searches guaranty freedom unreasonable
“[T]he
been con-
seizures
the Fourth Amendment has
practically
beginning
since
strued,
Government,
recognizing
necessary
as
a
a
of a
difference between
store, dwelling
respect
house or other structure in
proper
readily may
which a
obtained,
official warrant
automobile,
search of
motor
boat, wagon
ship,
for contraband
practicable
where it is
to secure
goods,
.
...”7
7
willingness
The
of courts to excuse the absence of a warrant where
spontaneous
required
searches are
of a vehicle on the road has led to what
exception”
requirement, although
is called the “automobile
to the warrant
exception
invariably
apply
does not
whenever automobiles are searched.
Coolidge
See,
g.,
Hampshire,
(1971)
e.
v. New
443,
U. S.
(“The
presence
word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose
the Fourth
away and disappears”).
generally Moylan,
Amendment fades
See
Exception:
Automobile
What it is and
What
is not —A Rationale
Label,
Search
of Clearer
Mercer L. Rev. 987
There are essentially two reasons for the distinction between
automobiles and
private
other
property.
as
First,
the Court
repeatedly has recognized, the inherent mobility of automo
biles often makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant. See,
g.,
e.
United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 12; Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U. S.,
49-50;
Carroll v. United States, supra.
In addition, the configuration, use, and regulation of automo
biles often may dilute the reasonable expectation of privacy
that exists with respect to differently situated property.
See
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.
155 (1978) (Powell,
con
J.,
curring) ; United States v. Chadwick, supra; South Dakota v.
Opperman,
Ill
In the present case, the State argues that
the warrantless
search of respondent’s suitcase was proper under Carroll and
its progeny.8
acted properly
*8
commend-
—indeed
ably
apprehending respondent
—in
and his luggage. They
had ample probable cause to believe that respondent’s green
suitcase contained marihuana. A previously reliable informant
provided
had
a detailed account of respondent’s expected
arrival at the Little Rock Airport, which
proved
account
to be
accurate in every detail, including the color of the
in
suitcase
which respondent would be carrying the marihuana. Having
probable cause to believe that contraband was being driven
away in the taxi,
police
were justified in stopping the
vehicle, searching it on the spot, and seizing the
suitcase
suspected contained contraband.
See Chambers v. Maroney,
supra, at 52. At oral argument, respondent conceded that the
8 Respondent
concedes that
the suitcase was his property,
see Brief for
Respondent 3, and so
question
there is no
of his standing to challenge the
search.
See Simmons States,
U. S.
Cf. Rakas v. Illinois,
The State property not because proper, was respondent’s suitcase taken from an was but rather because luggage, was searched In the street. stopped and searched lawfully Carroll to allow war- extend have us would effect, State automobile, within an everything found rantless searches Supreme above, As itself. noted as of the vehicle as well virtually in Chadwick decision found our Court Arkansas however, contends, case.9 The State controlling this In respects. similar in several critical of the two cases are The facts a warrant locked, 200-pound searched without footlocker the trunk probable cause, taken it from acting with had police, after the *9 small, case, respondent’s comparatively present In the parked automobile. trunk of been placed also had unlocked suitcase cause. by police acting upon probable We without a warrant was searched and suitcase as footlocker in the sizes of the the difference do not view its respondent’s his alter here; failure to lock suitcase nor did material Chadwick does not control because that case the vehicle had remained parked at the curb where the footlocker had been placed in its trunk and that therefore no argument made that exception” “automobile was applicable. This Court has not had occasion previously to rule on the constitu- tionality of a warrantless search of luggage taken from an automobile lawfully stopped. Rather, the decisions to date have involved searches of integral part of the automo- bile. See, e. g., South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, at 366 (glove compartment); Texas v. White, 423 S.,U. at 68 (pas- senger compartment); Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, at 437 (trunk); Chambers v. Maroney, supra, (concealed at 44 com- partment under the dashboard); Carroll v. States, U. S., at 136 (behind the upholstering of the seats).
We conclude that the State has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating the need for warrantless searches of luggage properly taken from automobiles. A closed suitcase in the trunk of an automobile may be as mobile as the vehicle in which it rides. But as we noted in Chadwick, the exigency of mobility must be assessed point at the immediately before the search —after the police have seized object to be searched and have it securely within their control.10 See U. S., at 13. Once police have seized a as suitcase, here, did extent of its mobility inis no way affected the place from which it was taken.11 Accordingly, as general rule there fundamental character as a repository for private personal, effects. Cf. Note, A Reconsideration of the Expectation Katz of Privacy Test, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 10The difficulties in seizing and securing automobiles have led the Court to make special allowances for their search. See n. infra. may There cases which special exigencies of the situation justify would the warrantless search aof Cady suitcase. Cf. v. Dombrow ski, 413 U. (1973) S. 433 (police had reason to suspect automobile trunk contained a weapon). Generally, however, such exigencies depend will upon probable contents of the luggage and the suspect’s access to those upon contents —not whether the luggage is taken from an automobile. In *10 from taken luggage of searches for warrantless need greater no places.12 from other taken luggage of than automobiles stopped on from an taken suitcase Similarly, expecta- lesser by any necessarily attended not is highway the from taken luggage is associated than privacy of tion private, place inclined not less is One locations. other suitcase because the merely suitcase possessions personal transported rather than in an automobile be carried tois Indeed, the or stored. checked temporarily other means repository aas to serve suitcase is of a very purpose Accord- them.13 transport one wishes items when personal exigen- special no that there were has the State conceded present case the Arg. 16. Tr. of Oral See cies. luggage incident constitutionality of searches the do we consider Nor Robinson, 414 States v. See, g., United e. possessor. of its the arrest respondent's suitcase argued that not (1973). The State has U. S. 218 bag was not arrest, appears'that and it to his searched incident was at the time of the search. control” his “immediate within country brought into property personal that recognized haveWe that not other would under circumstances may at the border be searched Ramsey, 431 U. S. United States See justify search. a warrantless wise however, that the search assert, does not 606, 616-617 Arkansas may Moreover, be that luggage was a border search. respondent’s a warrant in some without requires to be searched public safety luggage placed onto luggage to be is about as when circumstances —such wholly Amendment questions under the Fourth presents airplane. This present case. from absent easily could have obtained question that beyond It to a taken the respondent’s bag if had suitcase to search only respondent that They believe not probable cause to magistrate. had marihuana, was contained but contraband carrying also circum- argues that under the they seized. The State suitcase been the would have to all concerned this case inconvenience stances obtained. a warrant was deferring of the suitcase until only search result of unacceptable position who find such respondent’s inconvenience Those by consenting may simply search. avoid it by police during course of packages found Not all containers Thus, Amendment. protection the full Fourth will deserve search case) by their burglar gun (for example a kit of or a tools containers ingly, the reasons for requiring not a warrant for the an automobile do apply personal searches of *11 taken police from automobiles. We therefore find no justification for the extension of Carroll and progeny its to the warrantless search personal of one’s luggage merely because it was located in an lawfully stopped by police.14 very nature support any cannot expectation reasonable privacy of because their contents can be inferred from their appearance. outward Similarly, in some cases the contents a package of open “plain view,” will be to thereby obviating the need for a States, warrant. See Harris v. United (1968) (per U. S. curiam). There will be difficulties in determin ing parcels which taken from require an automobile a warrant for their search and which do not. Our decision in only this case means that a generally required warrant personal before be luggage can searched and that the extent to which the Fourth applies Amendment to containers and parcels depends other upon not at all they whether are seized from an automobile. persuaded by areWe argument the State’s that, under Chambers Maroney, U. 42 (1970), if police were entitled to seize the suitcase, they then were entitled to search Chambers, it. In the Court upheld the warrantless search of stopped an automobile highway on the by police who occupants believed that its gasoline had robbed a station a short time recognized before. The Court “[a]rguably, because of preference for magistrate’s judgment, only the immobilization permitted car should be until a Id., search warrant is obtained Nonetheless, 51. the Court ruled that a permis- warrantless search was sible, concluding that there was no constitutional difference between the seizing intrusion of holding the automobile until warrant be could obtained, on hand, the one searching the vehicle warrant, without a on the other. view, however,
We quite seizure aof suitcase as different from the Chambers, seizure of an automobile. In required if the had Court and holding seizure vehicle, it imposed would have a constitutional requirement upon police departments country of all sizes around the to people have available the and equipment necessary transport impounded automobiles some central location until warrants could be secured. Moreover, once seized automobiles were taken highway from the responsible be would for providing appropriate they where location kept, could be regard safety with due to the of the vehicles and their contents, magistrate application until ruled for warrant. Such Fourth of the requirement that the warrant hold In we sum, auto- from an taken luggage personal applies Amendment in other luggage such applies degree to the same mobile to search entitled police are as the Thus, insofar locations. justified must actions a warrant, without their such than other requirement exception to the under some highway. on the stopped automobiles applicable to endanger- police, without case—the present Where —as lawfully have evidence, loss risking themselves ing his and secured activity criminal suspected one detained judi- until after thereof delay the search suitcase, should In constitutional way, this obtained. has been approval cial bewill review searches prior judicial suspects rights fully protected. *12 Court Supreme Arkansas judgment
Affirmed. Justice whom Mr. Burger, Mr. Chief Justice concurring judgment. in the joins, Stevens unnec- its join but cannot judgment in the Court’s I concur if it case as to treat this which essarily opinion, broad seems require- to warrant exception “automobile” involved a case. It is not such ment. to believe cause probable police
Because the officers had before contained marihuana green suitcase respondent’s that duty obtain their to taxicab, placed in the trunk of United States opening a it is clear under search warrant before holding our Chadwick, (1977). 433 U. The essence pri- legitimate expectation of in Chadwick is that there is a accompanying vacy contents of trunk or suitcase a is not expectation of being person; privacy carried a severe, requirement imposed even a therefore would have constitutional many departments. Note, See Warrant- impossible, on burdens Automobiles, 841- 87 Harv. L. Rev. Searches and less Seizures respect likely comparable to exist with No burdens are personal luggage. the seizure of simply
diminished because owner’s public arrest occurs in a place. Whether arrested in hotel lobby, a railroad airport, public or on terminal, right as owner has street, here, expect luggage contents of his without not, will his consent, exposed If not police. demand of the carrying many persons contraband, arrested in such circum- stances might choose luggage to consent to search of their any delay securing obviate if their release. even But wholly persons innocent, might prefer well not to have the contents their luggage exposed They in public place. may stand on their right privacy require and a search war- rant. The requirement is not so onerous as to com- suspension mand of Fourth guarantees Amendment once receptacle securely involved is in the control of the as police, it was here after Sanders’ arrest.
The breadth of the opinion Court’s repeated and its refer- ences to the “automobile” from which respondent’s suitcase was seized at the time his arrest, might lead the however, reader believe —as apparently the dissenters do—that this case involves the “automobile” exception to the warrant re- quirement. ante, See 14. 762-765, n. It does not. Here, as in it was the being transported by respondent at the time of the arrest, the automobile in which it was being that was suspected carried, locus contraband. The relationship between the *13 the contraband was purely in coincidental, as Chadwick. The fact that the suitcase was in resting the trunk of the automo- bile at the time of respondent’s arrest does not turn this into an “automobile” exception say case. The Court need no more.
This simply case present does not question the of whether a warrant required is opening before luggage when probable have cause to believe contraband is located some- where in they but when vehicle, do not know whether, for example, piece it is inside a in trunk, glove or compartment, concealed in part of the car’s structure. stronger weaker be a I whether that would am not sure a when to search suitcase requiring case for permissible. otherwise search of the automobile is warrantless in which case me it would better to await But it seems to be question be decided. must adopt not the Court does complains The dissent that resolving future capable of presumably “clear” one rule, lament, cause for litigation. Fourth That is not Amendment pre might desirable fashion universal however cases scription myriad Fourth Amendment governing the not might construing Constitution, that arise. We are writing a or a officers. statute manual for law enforcement My disagreement very different opinion the Court’s from Our based practice, that dissenters. institutional generally on hard from decid experience, has been to refrain ing questions presented by a case; facts of there are in formulating risks constitutional required rules broader than the facts to which are applied. Ashwander v. See A,TV 297 U. S. Me. Justice with whom Blackmun, Justice Rehn- Mr.
quist joins, dissenting.
This illustrates case the difficulties and confusion that Chadwick, United States v. 1 (1977), spawned U. S. has and will spawn. continue to For reasons stated dissent id., I 18-22 and 24, continue to feel decision wrong. today
The Court goes farther down the Chadwick road, undermines the automobile exception, while and, purporting clarify by Chadwick, confusion occasioned my creates, in only view, greater difficulties for law enforcement officers, prosecutors, for suspected those of criminal activity, and, for the courts themselves. hanging limbo, Still course, probably soon to be are the litigated, briefcase, wallet, the paper package, bag, every other kind of container. *14 I am unpersuaded by the Court’s casual ante, statement, at 762 n. Chadwick and this case are factually similar “in several critical respects.” Even accepting Chadwick as good law, which I do this, not, for me, is a different case. In the defendants were arrested, and a 200-pound, double-locked footlocker was seized, as the locker being was loaded into the open trunk of a stationary automobile. The relationship between the footlocker and the vehicle was suffi- ciently attenuated that the Government chose argue not to in this Court that the automobile exception applied. 433 S.,U. at 11. Here, contrast, Little Rock police stopped a taxicab on a busy highway at height of late afternoon traffic. They had probable cause to believe the taxi contained contraband They narcotics. opened the trunk, briefly examined the contents aof small unlocked suitcase inside. The State has vigorously contended throughout these proceed- ings that the warrantless search of the trunk and the unlocked suitcase was constitutionally permissible under the automobile exception.1
I fully agree. If “contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for without a warrant,” Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 153 (1925), then, my view, luggage and similar con- tainers found in an automobile may be searched for contra- band without warrant. The luggage, like the automobile transporting it, is mobile. And the expectation of privacy in a suitcase found in the car is probably not significantly greater than expectation privacy a locked glove compartment or trunk.
To be sure, as the dissent acknowledged in Chadwick, 433 U. S., at 19, impounding the luggage without searching it respondent Since formally not arrested until after the suitcase was searched, the State does argue that the suitcase was part 'examined as of a search incident to custodial arrest. Cf. United States v. Chadwick, S.,U. and n. 5 (dissenting opinion). *15 770 the it on searching than alternative a less intrusive be
would the between distinguished not has Court But this spot. intrusion “greater” the a seizure of “lesser” intrusion v. Chambers automobiles, respect to with either a search, of per- to respect with (1970), or Maroney, 399 U. S. Robinson, States custodial arrest. subject sons impose I reason no And see (1973).2 218, 235 414 S.U. encroachment significant the here. Given a distinction such property, personal a seizure of by entailed privacy interests on as regarded be may well aof search intrusion additional the by provided protection the additional incidental. Moreover, hy- police, the minimal. Since will be warrant search a can we property, the to seize probable cause have pothesis, forthcoming routinely be a will that warrant assume of out the Finally, carving of cases. majority overwhelming prop- type personal for one requirement special warrant a on the costs impose untoward others, will but for erty, not added country in terms of this systems justice criminal uncertainty.3 delay and S., Chambers, 51-52: 399 U. The Court stated only magistrate’s judgment, preference for a “Arguably, because of the is until a search permitted the car
the should immobilization magis- the until only permissible intrusion is obtained; arguably, the ‘lesser’ the ‘greater’ and which But which is the ‘greater.’ authorizes trate may depend question answer and the intrusion is itself debatable ‘lesser’ dif- we see no purposes, variety For constitutional of circumstances. on present- holding a car before seizing and the one hand between on ference carrying hand magistrate and on the other probable to a ing the cause issue a warrant.” search without immediate out distinguish between concurring judgment would opinion as a and its contents search the car probable where cause there is case item probable particular cause search whole, there is and a case where suggests, without Ante, opinion át 767-768. The car. within the case, might apply in the exception former deciding, privacy, and conse Surely, however, the intrusion latter. but Clause, is, anything, if protection of the Warrant quently the need including car, entire area of the search the interior when greater single suitcases, their search to a than when confine several possibly is line-drawing nature Court’s impractical position places himself focus if one brought into been has properly confronting an automobile policeman occupants, its In the vehicle approaching stopped. into three property personal world of divide the officer must occupants, cause arrest probable If there groups. may he (1969), California, Chimel v. then under U. control, immediate occupants’ objects within the *16 to cause probable If there is probable cause. or without Chambers Carroll and under then itself, automobile the searched, may be area of the the entire interior the and Chadwick under a warrant. But or without car found the is any object if suitcase-like present case, can- occupants, it control area of the the immediate outsidé with- circumstances, exigent absence of searched, be in the not a warrant. out terms “principles,” in of these opaqueness inherent
The Amend- Fourteenth the Fourth underlying and policies the concerned, for all are to be created and the confusion ments, luggage-container- Suppose portable a readily illustrated. arresting offi- Is the top the of the vehicle. is affixed rack theory the on the open spot, able to this on constitutionally cer take remove it trunk, or must he and like the car’s it is that theory it is like on the that warrant, the station for it to suppose Or there is in Chadwick? 200-pound footlocker the transferability easy from Moreover, of articles given the suitcase. vehicle, police would be entitled to as- placed in a luggage once it suspect suitcase, would not found if that contraband sume opinion possibility else in the car. likely be secreted somewhere preserve con- judgment for future decision thus concurring would first, would two-step ritual: take following templates the warrant; then, pursuant a search for to the station targeted suitcase suitcase, they return discovered in would not contraband was if luggage compartments car. other warrantless search controversy reject adjudication of a future require the not does It that result.
probable persons cause arrest seated front seat of automobile, and a suitcase rests the back seat. Is that suitcase within the area of immediate control, such that Chadwick-Sanders rules do apply? Or suppose the arrest- ing opens officer the car’s trunk and- finds that it contains an array of containers —an orange a lunch crate, bucket, attaché case, duffelbag, a cardboard box, a backpack, a tote- bag, and a paper bag. Which of may these be searched imme- diately, and which are “personal” so that must impounded for future search only pursuant to a warrant? problems of distinguishing between “luggage” and “some integral part of the automobile,” ante, at between 763; is within the “immediate control” of the arrestee and luggage that is not; and between “personal luggage” and other “containers and packages” such as those most curiously de- ante, scribed at 764-765, n. bewill legion. The lines that will be drawn will not make much sense in terms of the policies of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. And . the heightened possibilities for error will mean many con- victions will be overturned, highly relevant again evidence will *17 be excluded, and guilty persons will be set free return for little apparent gain in precise and clearly understood consti- tutional analysis.
In my view, it would be better to adopt a clear-cut rule to the effect that a warrant should not be required to seize search any personal property found in an automobile may in turn be seized and searched without a warrant pursuant Carroll and Chambers. Cf. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S., at 21-22, and 3n. (dissenting opinion). Such ap- proach would simplify the constitutional law of criminal procedure without seriously derogating from the pro- values tected by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreason- able searches and seizures.