HORTON v. CALIFORNIA
No. 88-7164
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued February 21, 1990—Decided June 4, 1990
496 U.S. 128
Juliana Drous, by appointment of the Court, 493 U. S. 952, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Martin S. Kaye, Supervising Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General,
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we revisit an issue that was considered, but not conclusively resolved, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971): Whether the warrantless seizure of evidence of crime in plain view is prohibited by the
I
Petitioner was convicted of the armed robbery of Erwin Wallaker, the treasurer of the San Jose Coin Club. When Wallaker returned to his home after the Club‘s annual show, he entered his garage and was accosted by two masked men, one armed with a machine gun and the other with an electrical shocking device, sometimes referred to as a “stun gun.” The two men shocked Wallaker, bound and handcuffed him, and robbed him of jewelry and cash. During the encounter sufficient conversation took place to enable Wallaker subsequently to identify petitioner‘s distinctive voice. His identification was partially corroborated by a witness who saw the robbers leaving the scene and by evidence that petitioner had attended the coin show.
Sergeant LaRault, an experienced police officer, investigated the crime and determined that there was probable cause to seаrch petitioner‘s home for the proceeds of the rob-
Pursuant to the warrant, LaRault searched petitioner‘s residence, but he did not find the stolen property. During the course of the search, however, he discovered the weapons in plain view and seized them. Specifically, he seized an Uzi machine gun, a .38-caliber revolver, two stun guns, a handcuff key, a San Jose Coin Club advertising brochure, and a few items of сlothing identified by the victim.1 LaRault testified that while he was searching for the rings, he also was interested in finding other evidence connecting petitioner to the robbery. Thus, the seized evidence was not discovered “inadvertently.”
The trial court refused to suppress the evidence found in petitioner‘s home and, after a jury trial, petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. App. 43. It rejected petitioner‘s argument that our decision in Coolidge required suppression of the seized evidence that had not been listed in the warrant because its discovery was not inadvertent. App. 52-53. The court relied on the California Supreme Court‘s decision in North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P. 2d 1305 (1972). In that case the court noted that the discussion of thе inadvertence limitation on the “plain-view” doctrine in Justice Stewart‘s opinion in Coolidge had been joined by only three other Members of this Court and therefore was not binding on it.2 The California Supreme Court denied petitioner‘s request for review. App. 78.
Because the California courts’ interpretation of the “plain-view” doctrine conflicts with the view of other courts,3 and because the unresolved issue is important, we granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 889 (1989).
The
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
The right to security in person and property protected by the
The criteria that generally guide “plain-view” seizures were set forth in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). The Court held that the police, in seizing two automobiles parked in plain view on the defendant‘s driveway in the course of arresting the defendant, violated the
“It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. But it is important to keep in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any evidence seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure. The problem with the ‘plain-view’ doctrine has been to identify the circumstances in which plain view
has legal significance rather than being simply the normal concomitant of any search, legal or illegal. “An example of the applicability of the ‘plain-view’ doctrine is the situation in which the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some other article of incriminating character. Cf. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 358 [(1931)]; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 465 [(1932)]; Steele v. United States, 267 U. S. 498 [(1925)]; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 571 [(1969)] (STEWART, J., concurring in result). Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate. Thus the police may inadvertently come across evidence while in ‘hot pursuit’ of a fleeing suspect. Warden v. Hayden, [387 U. S. 294 (1967)]; cf. Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 [(1924)]. And an object that comes into view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be seized without a warrant. Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. [752,] 762-763 [(1969)]. Finally, the ‘plain-view’ doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234 [(1968)]; Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U. S. 731 [(1969)]; Ker v. California, 374 U. S. [23,] 43 [(1963)]. Cf. Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206 [(1966)].
“What the ‘plain-view’ cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification—whether it be a warrant for another object,
hot pursuit, search incident to lawful аrrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused—and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the ‘plain-view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.” Id., at 465-466 (footnote omitted).
Justice Stewart then described the two limitations on the doctrine that he found implicit in its rationale: First, that “plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence,” id., at 468; and second, that “the discovery of evidence in plain view must be inadvertent.” Id., at 469.
Justice Stewart‘s analysis of the “plain-view” doctrine did not command a majority, and a plurality of the Court has since made clear that the discussion is “not a binding precedent.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730, 737 (1983) (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). Justice Harlan, who concurred in the Court‘s judgment and in its response to the dissenting opinions, 403 U. S., at 473-484, 490-493, did not join the plurality‘s discussion of the “plain-view” doctrine. See id., at 464-473. The decision nonetheless is a binding precedent. Before discussing the second limitation, which is implicated in this case, it is therefore necessary to explain why the first adequately supports the Court‘s judgment.
It is, of course, an essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate the
III
Justice Stewart concluded that the inadvertence requirement was necessary to avoid a violation of the express constitutional requirement that a valid warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. He explained:
“The rationale of the exception to the warrant requirement, as just stated, is that a plain-view seizure will not turn an initially valid (and therefore limited) search into
a ‘general’ one, while the inconvenience of procuring a warrant to cover an inadvertent discovery is great. But where the discovery is anticipated, where the police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is altogether different. The requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience whatever, or at least none which is constitutionally cognizable in a legal system that regards warrantless searches as ’per se unreasonable’ in the absence of ‘exigent circumstances.’ “If the initial intrusion is bottomed upon a warrant that fails to mention a particular object, though the police know its location and intend to seize it, then there is a violation of the express constitutional requirement of ‘Warrants... particularly describing... [the] things to be seized.‘” 403 U. S., at 469-471.
We find two flaws in this reasoning. First, evenhanded law enforcement is best achievеd by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer. The fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its seizure if the search is confined in area and duration by the terms of a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement. If the officer has knowledge approaching certainty that the item will be found, we see no reason why he or she would deliberately omit a particular description of the item to be seized from the application for a search warrant.9 Specification of the additional item could only permit the offi-
“Let us suppose officers secure a warrant to search a house for a rifle. While staying well within the range of a rifle search, they discover two photographs of the murder victim, both in plain sight in the bedroom. Assume also that the discovery of the one photograph was inadvertent but finding the other was аnticipated. The Court would permit the seizure of only one of the photographs. But in terms of the ‘minor’ peril to
Fourth Amendment values there is surely no difference between these two photographs: the interference with possession is the same in each case and the officers’ appraisal of the photograph they expected to see is no less reliable than their judgment about the other. And in both situations the actual inconvenience and danger to evidence remain identical if the officers must depart and secure a warrant.” Id., at 516.
Second, the suggestion that the inadvertence requirement is necessary to prevent the police from conducting general searches, or from converting specifiс warrants into general warrants, is not persuasive because that interest is already served by the requirements that no warrant issue unless it “particularly describ[es] the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized,” see Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79, 84 (1987); Steele v. United States No. 1, 267 U. S. 498, 503 (1925),10 and that a warrantless search be circum-
“The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe
that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab.” United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 824 (1982).
In this case, the scope of the search was not enlarged in the slightest by the omission of any reference to the weapons in the warrant. Indeed, if the three rings and other items named in the warrant had been found at the outset—or if petitioner had them in his possession and had responded to the warrant by producing them immediately—no search for weapons could have taken place. Again, JUSTICE WHITE‘S concurring and dissenting opinion in Coolidge is instructive:
“Police with a warrant for a rifle may search only places where rifles might be and must terminate the search once the rifle is found; the inadvertence rule will in no way reduce the number of places into which they may lawfully look.” 403 U. S., at 517.
As we have already suggested, by hypothesis the seizure of an object in plain view does not involve an intrusion on privacy.11 If the interest in privacy has been invaded, the violation must have occurred before the object came into plain view and there is no need for an inadvertence limitation on seizures to condemn it. The prohibition against general searches and general warrants serves primarily as a protection against unjustified intrusions on privacy. But reliance
In this case the items seized from petitioner‘s home were discovered during a lawful search authorized by a valid warrant. When they were discovered, it was immediately apparent to the officer that they constituted incriminating evidence. He had probable cause, not only to obtain a warrant to search for the stolen property, but also to believe that the weapons and handguns had been used in the crime he was investigating. The search was authorized by the warrant; the seizure was authorized by the “plain-view” doctrine. The judgment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting.
I remain convinced that Justice Stewart correctly articulated the plain-view doctrine in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). The
I
The
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
The Amendment protects two distinct interests. Thе prohibition against unreasonable searches and the requirement that a warrant “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched” protect an interest in privacy. The prohibition against unreasonable seizures and the requirement that a warrant “particularly describ[e] the . . . things to be seized” protect a possessory interest in property.1 See ante, at 133; Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730, 747 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). The
The Amendment protects these equally important interests in precisely the same manner: by requiring a neutral and detached magistrate to evaluate, before the search or seizure, the government‘s showing of probable cause and its particular description of the place to be searched and the items to be seized. Accordingly, just as a warrantless
The plain-view doctrine is an exception to the general rule that a seizure of personal property must be authorized by a warrant. As Justice Stewart explained in Coolidge, 403 U. S., at 470, we accept a warrantless seizure when an officer is lawfully in a location and inadvertently sees evidence of a crime because of “the inconvenience of procuring a warrant” to seize this newly discovered piece of evidence. But “where the discovery is anticipated, where the police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it,” the argument that procuring a warrant would be “inconvenient” loses much, if not all, of its force. Ibid. Barring an exigency, there is no reason why the police officers could not have obtained a warrant to seize this evidence before entering the premises. The rationale behind the inadvertent discovery requirement is simply that we will not excuse officers
Although joined by only three other Members of the Court, Justice Stewart‘s discussion of the inadvertent discovery requirement has become widely accepted. See Texas v. Brown, supra, at 746 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (“Whatever my view might have been when Coolidge was decided, I see no reason at this late date to imply criticism of its articulation of this exception. It has been accepted generally for over a decade“). Forty-six States and the District of Columbia2 and 12 United States Courts of Appeals3 now require plain-view seizures to be inadvertent. There has been no outcry from law enforcement officials that the inadvertent discovery requirement unduly burdens their efforts. Given that the requirement is inescapably rooted in the plain language of the
The Court posits two “flaws” in Justice Stewart‘s reasoning that it believes demonstrate the inappropriateness of the inadvertent discovery requirement. But these flaws are illusory. First, the majority explains that it can see no reason
Furthermore, there are a number of instances in which a law enforcement officer might deliberately choose to omit certain items from a warrant application even though he has probable cause to seize them, knows they are on the premises, and intends to seize them when they are discovered in plain view. For example, the warrant application process can often be time consuming, especially when the police attempt to seize a large number of items. An officer interested in conducting a search as soon as рossible might decide to save time by listing only one or two hard-to-find items, such as the stolen rings in this case, confident that he will find in plain view all of the other evidence he is looking for before he discovers the listed items. Because rings could be located almost anywhere inside or outside a house, it is unlikely that a warrant to search for and seize the rings would restrict the scope of the search. An officer might rationally find the risk of immediately discovering the items listed in the warrant—thereby forcing him to conclude the search immediately—outweighed by the time saved in the application process.
The majority also contends that, once an officer is lawfully in a house and the scope of his search is adequately circumscribed by a warrant, “no additional
II
Fortunately, this decision should have only a limited impact, for the Court is not confronted today with what lower courts have described as a “pretextual” search. See, e. g., State v. Lair, 95 Wash. 2d 706, 717-718, 630 P. 2d 427, 434 (1981) (en banc) (holding pretextual searches invalid). For example, if an officer enters a house pursuant to a warrant to search for evidence of one crime when he is really interested only in seizing evidence relating to another crime, for which he does not have a warrant, his search is “pretextual” and the fruits of that search should be suppressed. See, e. g., State v. Kelsey, 592 S. W. 2d 509 (Mo. App. 1979) (evidence suppressed because officers, who had ample opportunity to ob-
The discovery of evidence in pretextual searches is not “inadvertent” and should be suppressed for that reason. But even state courts that have rejected the inadvertent discovery requirement have held that the
III
The
APPENDIX A
STATES THAT HAVE ADOPTED THE INADVERTENT DISCOVERY REQUIREMENT
Ala. Taylor v. State, 399 So. 2d 881, 892 (Ala. 1981)
Alaska Deal v. State, 626 P. 2d 1073, 1079 (Alaska 1980)
Ariz. State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 464, 724 P. 2d 545, 550 (1986)
Ark. Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260, 263, 724 S. W. 2d 160, 162 (1987)
Colo. People v. Cummings, 706 P. 2d 766, 771 (Colo. 1985)
Conn. State v. Hamilton, 214 Conn. 692, 701, 573 A. 2d 1197, 1201 (1990)
D. C. Gant v. United States, 518 A. 2d 103, 107 (DC App. 1986)
Fla. Hurt v. State, 388 So. 2d 281, 282-283 (Fla. App. 1980), review denied, 399 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1981)
Haw. State v. Barnett, 68 Haw. 32, 35, 703 P. 2d 680, 683 (1985)
Ill. People v. Madison, 121 Ill. 2d 195, 208, 520 N. E. 2d 374, 380-381 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U. S. 907 (1988)
Ind. Clark v. State, 498 N. E. 2d 918, 921 (Ind. 1986)
Iowa State v. Emerson, 375 N. W. 2d 256, 259 (Iowa 1985)
Kan. State v. Doile, 244 Kan. 493, 497, 769 P. 2d 666, 669 (1989)
Ky. Patrick v. Commonwealth, 535 S. W. 2d 88, 89 (Ky. 1976)
La. State v. Stott, 395 So. 2d 714, 716 (La. 1981)
Me. State v. Cloutier, 544 A. 2d 1277, 1281, n. 4 (Me. 1988)
Md. Wiggins v. State, 315 Md. 232, 251-252, 554 A. 2d 356, 365 (1989)
Mass. Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 381 Mass. 319, 330-331, 409 N. E. 2d 719, 727 (1980)
Mich. People v. Dugan, 102 Mich. App. 497, 503-505, 302 N. W. 2d 209, 211-212 (1980), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 927 (1982)
Minn. State v. Buschkopf, 373 N. W. 2d 756, 768 (Minn. 1985)
Miss. Smith v. State, 419 So. 2d 563, 571 (Miss. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1047 (1983)
Mo. State v. Clark, 592 S. W. 2d 709, 713 (Mo. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 847 (1980)
Neb. State v. Hansen, 221 Neb. 103, 108-109, 375 N. W. 2d 605, 609 (1985)
Nev. Johnson v. State, 97 Nev. 621, 624, 637 P. 2d 1209, 1211 (1981)
N. H. State v. Cote, 126 N. H. 514, 525, 526, 493 A. 2d 1170, 1177-1178 (1985)
N. J. State v. Bruzzese, 94 N. J. 210, 237-238, 463 A. 2d 320, 334-335 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1030 (1984)
N. M. State v. Luna, 93 N. M. 773, 779, 606 P. 2d 183, 188 (1980)
N. Y. People v. Jackson, 41 N. Y. 2d 146, 150-151, 359 N. E. 2d 677, 681 (1976)
N. C. State v. White, 322 N. C. 770, 773, 370 S. E. 2d 390, 392 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U. S. 958 (1988)
N. D. State v. Riedinger, 374 N. W. 2d 866, 874 (N. D. 1985)
Ohio State v. Benner, 40 Ohio St. 3d 301, 308, 533 N. E. 2d 701, 709-710 (1988), cert. denied, 494 U. S. 1090 (1990)
Okla. Farmer v. State, 759 P. 2d 1031, 1033 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988)
Ore. State v. Handran, 97 Ore. App. 546, 550-551, 777 P. 2d 981, 983 (1989), review denied, 308 Ore. 405, 781 P. 2d 855 (1989)
Pa. Commonwealth v. Davidson, 389 Pa. Super. 166, 175, 566 A. 2d 897, 901 (1989)
S. C. State v. Culbreath, 300 S. C. 232, 237, 387 S. E. 2d 255, 257 (1990)
S. D. State v. Albright, 418 N. W. 2d 292, 295 (S. D. 1988)
Tenn. State v. Byerley, 635 S. W. 2d 511, 513 (Tenn. 1982)
Tex. Stoker v. State, 788 S. W. 2d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc)
Vt. State v. Dorn, 145 Vt. 606, 620-621, 496 A. 2d 451, 459-460 (1985)
Va. Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 947, 949, 275 S. E. 2d 620, 621-622 (1981)
Wash. State v. Bell, 108 Wash. 2d 193, 196, 737 P. 2d 254, 257 (1987)
W. Va. State v. Moore, 165 W. Va. 837, 852-853, 272 S. E. 2d 804, 813-814 (1980)
Wis. State v. Washington, 134 Wis. 2d 108, 119-121, 396 N. W. 2d 156, 161 (1986)
Wyo. Jessee v. State, 640 P. 2d 56, 63 (Wyo. 1982)
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS THAT HAVE ADOPTED THE INADVERTENT DISCOVERY REQUIREMENT
CA1: United States v. Caggiano, 899 F. 2d 99, 103 (1990)
CA2: United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F. 2d 12, 16 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 953 (1989)
CA4: Tarantino v. Baker, 825 F. 2d 772, 777, n. 3 (1987)
CA5: Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F. 2d 804, 826, n. 30 (1989), cert. pending, No. 89-1326
CA6: United States v. Poulos, 895 F. 2d 1113, 1121 (1990)
CA7: United States v. Perry, 815 F. 2d 1100, 1105 (1987)
CA8: United States v. Peterson, 867 F. 2d 1110, 1113 (1989)
CA9: United States v. Holzman, 871 F. 2d 1496, 1512 (1989)
CA10: Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 826 F. 2d 930, 935 (1987)
CA11: United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F. 2d 1545, 1551 (1985)
CADC: In re Search Warrant Dated July 4, 1977, for Premises at 2125 S Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., 215 U. S. App. D. C. 74, 102, 667 F. 2d 117, 145 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 926 (1982)
Notes
“If the plurality opinion in Coolidge were entitled to binding effect as precedent, we would have difficulty distinguishing its holding from the instant case, for the discovery of petitioner‘s car was no more ‘inadvertent’ than in Coolidge. However, that portion of Justice Stewart‘s plurality opinion which proposed the adoption of new restrictions to the ‘plain-view’ rule was signed by only four members of the court (Stewart, J., Douglas, J., Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.). Although concurring in the judgment, Justice Harlan declined to join in that portion of the opinion, and the four remaining justices expressly disagreed with Justice Stewart on this point.” North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d, at 307-308, 502 P. 2d, at 1308 (citations omitted).
See Appendix A, infra, at 149-152. Only three States—California, Idaho, and Utah—have rejected the inаdvertent discovery requirement. See People v. Bittaker, 48 Cal. 3d 1046, 1076, 774 P. 2d 659, 673-674 (1989), cert. pending, No. 89-6223; State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 712, 518 P. 2d 969, 974 (1974); State v. Kelly, 718 P. 2d 385, 389, n. 1 (Utah 1986). The status of the inadvertent discovery requirement in Delaware is unclear. See, e. g., Wicks v. State, 552 A. 2d 462, 465 (Del. Super. 1988).‘The
We have since applied the same rule to the arrest of a person in his home. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U. S. 91 (1990); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980).