STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JEFFREY WARD, Defendant-Appellant.
Case No. 10CA30
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WASHINGTON COUNTY
DATE JOURNALIZED: 3-14-11
[Cite as State v. Ward, 2011-Ohio-1261.]
ABELE, J.
APPEARANCES:
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Chandra L. Ontko, 665 Southgate Parkway, Cambridge, Ohio 43725
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Mark C. Sleeper, Marietta City Assistant Law Director, 301 Putnam Street, Marietta, Ohio 45750
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT
ABELE, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Marietta Municipal Court judgment that overruled the motion to suppress evidence filed by Jeffrey Ward, defendant below and appellee herein.
{¶ 2} Appellant raises the following assignment of error for review:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE DEFENDANT BY DENYING THE DEFENDANT‘S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.”
{¶ 3} On February 28, 2010, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Eric Knowlton
{¶ 4} After Trooper Knowlton stopped appellant‘s vehicle, the trooper smelled an odor of alcohol. The trooper subsequently charged appellant with (1) operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of
{¶ 5} On April 6, 2010, appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. Appellant asserted that the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion that he had violated
{¶ 6} On April 26, 2010, the court held a hearing to consider appellant‘s motion to suppress. Trooper Knowlton testified that on February 28, 2010: (1) he observed appellant‘s vehicle following another vehicle too closely; (2) he believed appellant‘s vehicle was following
{¶ 7} The trial court verbally overruled the motion at the end of the hearing and directed the prosecutor to prepare a written entry. Appellant then filed a motion for reconsideration and noted that the prosecution had provided him with additional videotape evidence of the traffic stop. The court granted the motion to reconsider and held a further hearing to review the videotape. After viewing the videotape, the court agreed with appellant that the video did not show appellant‘s vehicle traveling too closely, but further found that the trooper testified that he observed appellant‘s vehicle traveling too closely before he had activated his camera. Thus, although the trooper did not catch the actual violation on his camera, the court did not find the absence of video evidence to support the trooper‘s testimony significant. Instead, the court accepted the trooper‘s testimony that he observed a
{¶ 8} Appellant subsequently entered a no contest plea to the
{¶ 9} In his sole assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by overruling his motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. In particular, he asserts that the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion that appellant had violated
{¶ 11} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals against unreasonable governmental searches and seizures. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 662, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660. “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576.
{¶ 12} A traffic stop initiated by a law enforcement officer implicates the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 806, 809, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89; see, also, Brendlin v. California (2007), 551 U.S. 249, 255, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132. A traffic stop must comply with the Fourth Amendment‘s general reasonableness requirement. In Whren, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment‘s reasonable requirement is fulfilled and a law enforcement officer may constitutionally stop a vehicle‘s driver when the officer possesses probable cause to believe that the driver of the vehicle has committed a traffic violation. Id. The court stated:
“Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a seizure of ‘persons’ within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment]. * * * An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances. As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. * * *”
Id. at 809-10 (citations omitted); see, also, Bowling Green v. Godwin, 110 Ohio St.3d 58, 2006-Ohio-3563, 850 N.E.2d 698, at ¶ 11; Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12, 665 N.E.2d 1091.
{¶ 13} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “[p]robable cause is certainly a complete justification for a traffic stop,” but the court has “not held that probable cause is required.” State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, at ¶ 23. Instead, to justify a traffic stop based upon less than probable cause, an officer must be able to articulate specific facts that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the person has committed, or is committing, a crime, including a minor traffic violation. See Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; see, also, Mays at ¶ 8; Chillicothe v. Frey, 156 Ohio App.3d 296, 805 N.E.2d 551, 2004-Ohio-927, at ¶ 14; State v. Garrett, Adams App. No. 05CA802, 2005-Ohio-5155, at ¶ 10. Reasonable suspicion sufficient to conduct a stop exists if
“A traffic stop may pass constitutional muster even where the state cannot convict the driver due to a failure in meeting the burden of proof or a technical difficulty in enforcing the underlying statute or ordinance. * * * The very purpose of an investigative stop is to determine whether criminal activity is afoot. This does not require scientific certainty of a violation nor does it invalidate a stop on the basis that the subsequent investigation reveals no illegal activity is present.”
(Citations omitted).
{¶ 14} A court that must determine whether a law enforcement officer possessed a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a vehicle must examine the “totality of the circumstances.” See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu (2002), 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740. Moreover, the touchstone of a Fourth Amendment analysis is the reasonableness of the intrusion. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977), 434 U.S. 106, 108-109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331.
{¶ 15} In the case sub judice, we agree with the trial court‘s conclusion that Trooper
{¶ 16} In the case sub judice, Trooper Knowlton testified that he observed appellant traveling at approximately 55 m.p.h. and that appellant‘s vehicle was less than one car length behind the car in front of him. The trooper further explained that the general rule is that for every ten miles per hour, a driver should leave one car length between vehicles. Thus, at appellant‘s speed appellant should have left at least an approximate five car lengths between the vehicles. The evidence adduced at the hearing supports the conclusion that Trooper Knowlton possessed at least reasonable suspicion that appellant violated
{¶ 17} Therefore, based upon the clear weight of authority we reject appellant‘s argument that the trooper‘s testimony did not provide him with at least reasonable suspicion to stop appellant‘s vehicle. The officer testified that he observed appellant‘s vehicle traveling less than one car length behind another vehicle at a speed of 55 m.p.h. This observation provided the officer with a specific and articulable suspicion that appellant had violated
{¶ 18} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we hereby overrule appellant‘s
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that appellee recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Marietta Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Harsha, P.J. & Kline, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY:______________________
Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.
Notes
Id. at fn.1, quoting Atwater v. Lago Vista (2001), 532 U.S. 318, 347, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549.“Often enough, the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of the moment, and the object in implementing its command of reasonableness is to draw standards sufficiently clear and simple to be applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing months and years after an arrest or search is made. Courts attempting to strike a reasonable Fourth Amendment balance thus credit the government‘s side with an essential interest in readily administrable rules. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981) (Fourth Amendment rules ‘ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged’ and not ‘qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts‘).”