DYKE ET AL. v. TAYLOR IMPLEMENT MANUFACTURING CO., INC.
No. 149
Supreme Court of the United States
May 20, 1968
391 U.S. 216
Argued January 18, 1968
Allen H. Carter argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Foster D. Arnett and S. Randolph Ayres.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners, Wayne Dyke, Ed McKinney, and John Blackwell, were found guilty of criminal contempt by the Chancery Court of McMinn County, Tennessee. All three were given the maximum sentence authorized by statute, 10 days in jail and a $50 fine.1 The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed,2 rejecting contentions that the convictions violated the Federal Cоnstitution because a jury trial was denied3 and because testimony concerning
In сonnection with a labor dispute, McMinn County Chancery Court issued, on January 24, 1966, an injunction against, inter alia,
“inflicting harm or damage upon the persons or property of [respondent Taylor Implement Company‘s] employеes, customers, visitors or any other persons.”
On the night of February 25, 1966, a car was seen to drive past the home of Lloyd Duckett, a nonstriking Taylor Implement employee who lived in Monroe County, which adjoins McMinn. Shots were fired from the car at or into the Duckett home. Robert Wayne Ellis, Duckett‘s son-in-law, was standing in the front yard with another son-in-law, Dale Harris; Ellis fired back at the car with a pistol, and thought his first shot hit the back of the car. Ellis informed Monroe County Sheriff Howard Kirkpatrick by telephone, and soon after, Monroe Deputy Sheriff Loyd Powers, contacted by Kirkpatrick on his radio and presumably told of the crime, spotted a suspicious car and began following it. The car raced away but was stopped by Athens, Tennessee, policemen, notified by Powers of a speeding car heading for Athens. When Powers reached the stopped car, which cоntained the three petitioners, he and the Athens policemen took them to McMinn County jail,4
Petitioners’ first claim is that the
Petitioners next contend that admission at trial, over timely objection, of evidence cоncerning the discovery of an air rifle under the seat of the car in which they were riding when arrested violated the
The search in question here is not saved by Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58 (1967), which upheld a warrantless search of a car impounded “as evidence” pur-
Automobiles, because of their mobility, may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying a warrantless search of a residence or office. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). The cases so holding have, however, alwаys insisted that the officers conducting the search have “reasonable or probable cause” to believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they bеgin their warrantless search. The record before us does not contain evidence that Sheriff Kirkpatrick, Deputy Sheriff Powers, or the officers who assisted in the search had reasonable or probable сause to believe that evidence
“All I got is just that it would be an old makе model car. Kinda old make model car.”
The record also contains no suggestion that Ellis told Sheriff Kirkpatrick, Deputy Sheriff Powers, or any other law enforcement official that he had fired at the Dodge or thаt he thought he had hit it with one bullet. As far as this record shows, Powers knew only that the car he chased was “an old make model car,” that it speeded up when he chased it, and that it contained a fresh bullet hole. The еvidence placed upon the record is insufficient to justify a conclusion that McKinney‘s car was searched with “reasonable or probable cause” to believe the search would be fruitful.
Since the search was not shown to have been based upon sufficient cause, we need not reach the question whether Carroll and Brinegar, supra, extend to a warrantless search, based upon probable cause, of an automobilе which, having been stopped originally on a highway, is parked outside a courthouse.
Because evidence was admitted without a satisfactory showing that it was obtained in compliance with the
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins, concurring.
I concur in the judgment in this case, and in that part of the Court‘s opinion dealing with the аdmission at petitioners’ trial of evidence produced by an unlawful search.
The Court holds in this case, as it said in dictum in Bloom v. Illinois, ante, p. 194, that persons charged with so-called “petty” crimes are not entitled to trial by jury. I am not as sure as the Court seems to be that this classification should be used to deprive a criminal defendant of a jury trial. See my dissenting opinion in Green v. United States, 356 U. S. 165, 193-219. The word “petty” has no exact meaning, and until it is given a better definition than that which the Court gives to it today, I do not desirе to condemn the right to trial by jury to such an uncertain fate. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U. S. 373, 384-393 (dissenting opinion). My Brother HARLAN‘S dissent in Duncan v. Louisiana, ante, p. 171, points out that whippings, even where 31 lashes were inflicted, were classified as petty crimes. And the Court here states that six months’ punishment is petty. I am loаth to hold whippings or six months’ punishment as “petty.” And here, where the offense is punishable by a $50 fine and 10 days in jail behind bars, I feel the same way. Even though there be some offenses that are “petty,” I would not hold that this offense falls in that category. See my dissenting opinion in United States v. Barnett, 376 U. S. 681, 727. Since I would reverse and remand this case for a trial by jury, I do not find it necessary to consider the other questions decided by the Court.
