State v. GroomState v. Groom
The State seeks to prosecute Defendant Larry Groom for criminal trespass, official misconduct, and unlawful search without a warrant under
In 1993, Defendant was the Chief of Police for Soap Lake. On February 1, 1993, just before midnight, Defendant went to Officer Joe Mandoli‘s trailer home, 3.3 miles outside Soap Lake‘s city limits. He maintains he went to the trailer to suspend Mandoli pending investigation of a complaint that Mandoli had sexually harassed a female suspect.2 Defendant had received information that the suspect‘s husband had made threats against Mandoli. He did not have a search warrant.
Defendant maintains that when he arrived at the trailer the front sliding glass door of the trailer was ajar, the lights were on inside,
Defendant did not call for aid or assistance while at the scene. Instead, he left the trailer and the patrol car unlocked, and drove into Soap Lake to the police station where he called Mandoli‘s home, receiving no answer. He then picked up Officer Tom Jones and returned to Mandoli‘s residence. He was gone from the trailer approximately 8 to 10 minutes.
When they arrived, Defendant approached the trailer while Jones went to the patrol car. Although Defendant claims the door was still open, Jones did not notice the door open. Jones also said he did not hear Defendant express any concern about Mandoli‘s welfare. When Jones arrived at the door, Defendant had already opened the door. Jones had not heard Defendant knock or call Mandoli‘s name. Both officers entered the trailer. Defendant opened one bedroom door but did not turn on the light, enter the room, or call Mandoli. Defendant did enter the second bedroom, Mandoli‘s bedroom, and called Jones inside. He pointed out a gun in its holster under the chair next to the bed and a.22 rifle leaning up against a wall. These weapons were Mandoli‘s personal weapons. Jones did not think the position of these guns was unusual. Jones then saw Defendant look under the mattress for several seconds. Defendant found nothing, and set the mattress down. Uncomfortable with the search, Jones returned to the living room, but was called back into the bedroom where Defendant showed him a lighter. Jones left the bedroom again, but was called back again to help remove Mandoli‘s uniforms, which Jones took to the patrol car along with a police charger and a department portable radio that was on the kitchen table.
Defendant called Lieutenant Scott Stokoe to meet Defendant at Mandoli‘s home. When Stokoe arrived, he told Defendant they were not supposed to be in Mandoli‘s residence. Defendant indicated he wanted Stokoe to be a witness to removal of the uniforms and equipment. Stokoe did not hear Defendant mention any concern about Mandoli‘s welfare. Before the officers left the trailer, Defendant secured it.
On the way back to the police station, Defendant passed Mandoli. Defendant returned to Mandoli‘s residence and then took Mandoli to Soap Lake. On the way, he told Mandoli he had found the trailer open and the lights on and the patrol car unlocked, and had searched the residence. At the police station, Defendant told Mandoli about the complaint against him and the internal investigation. Mandoli was suspended.
Mandoli maintains that when he left his trailer he left the door closed, his personal gun under a magazine by his bed, and the patrol car locked. He claims that when he returned he noticed the closet door open, his gun uncovered, and some personal items such as notebooks, files, and pens missing.
Mandoli filed a complaint with the Grant County Sheriff‘s Office. On July 15, 1993, Defendant was charged with first degree criminal trespass, official misconduct, and unlawful search. He moved for dismissal pursuant to State v. Knapstad, 107 Wash.2d 346, 729 P.2d 48 (1986). The trial court granted the motion and dismissed all three counts against Defendant. On the State‘s appeal, the superior court reinstated the unlawful search count. The Court of Appeals granted both parties’ motions for discretionary review and remanded for trial on all three counts. State v. Groom, 80 Wash.App. 717, 911 P.2d 403, review granted, 129 Wash.2d 1023, 919 P.2d 600 (1996). Defendant then petitioned for discretionary review by this court, which was granted. The issues raised in the petition for review concern the unlawful search charge.
ANALYSIS
Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the State lacked sufficient evidence to prove its case. Under Knapstad, 107 Wash.2d at 356, 729 P.2d 48, such a
What facts are material depends upon the elements of the charged crime. Defendant was charged pursuant to
It shall be unlawful for any policeman or other peace officer to enter and search any private dwelling house or place of residence without the authority of a search warrant issued upon a complaint as by law provided.
Any policeman or other peace officer violating the provisions of RCW 10.79.040 shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
With respect to the “enter[ing] and search [of] private dwelling house or place of residence,”
The Court of Appeals observed that read literally, the statutes would criminalize all warrantless searches regardless of whether a search was justified by a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Groom, 80 Wash.App. at 720-21, 911 P.2d 403. Drawing from the qualified immunity of police officers from civil suit where they act in good faith in the performance of their official functions, the court held that a police officer could be liable under
The difficulty with the Court of Appeals analysis is that it overlooks prior interpretations of
Only a violation of
Additionally, there is no justification for the introduction of a good faith-bad faith inquiry into the determination of criminal liability under
The Court of Appeals injection of a “bad faith” element is unmistakably an addition to search and seizure law in this state.4 Since both the exclusionary rule and
Defendant also seems to suggest, and the Court of Appeals seemed to agree, that the knowledge of the officer is a relevant consideration. See Supp. Br. of Pet‘r at 13 (discussing qualified immunity under
Whether intent or guilty knowledge or some other mental element is an essential element of a crime is a matter to be determined by the Legislature. State v. Cleppe, 96 Wash.2d 373, 378, 635 P.2d 435 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006, 102 S.Ct. 2296, 73 L.Ed.2d 1300 (1982) (citing State v. Henker, 50 Wash.2d 809, 812, 314 P.2d 645 (1957)); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605-06, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1796-97, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994). The Legislature may create strict liability crimes. State v. Rivas, 126 Wash.2d 443, 452, 896 P.2d 57 (1995) (citing Cleppe, 96 Wash.2d at 380, 635 P.2d 435; State v. Stroh, 91 Wash.2d 580, 583-84, 588 P.2d 1182, 8 A.L.R.4th 760 (1979); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952)).
Thus, whether a statute defines a strict liability crime is a question of statutory construction focusing on legislative intent. State v. Bash, 130 Wash.2d 594, 604-05, 925 P.2d 978 (1996). The first indicator of legislative intent is the language of the particular statute. Here,
A second indicator of legislative intent is legislative history. Reading
Another factor which strongly indicates that the Legislature did not intend a mental element is the seriousness of the harm to the public. See Bash, 130 Wash.2d at 605, 925 P.2d 978. The danger of unconstitutional searches of the home simply cannot be overstated.
We conclude that there is no good or bad faith component to
We also note that however much members of this court may think that a statute should be rewritten, it is imperative that we not rewrite statutes to express what we think the law should be. We simply have no such authority. State v. Mollichi, 132 Wash.2d 80, 87, 936 P.2d 408 (1997); see Graham Thrift Group, Inc. v. Pierce Cy., Country Park, Inc., 75 Wash.App. 263, 267, 877 P.2d 228 (1994). This is true even if the results appear unduly harsh. Geschwind v. Flanagan, 121 Wash.2d 833, 841, 854 P.2d 1061 (1993).
We next turn to Defendant‘s contention that he is immune from suit because he reasonably believed his conduct was lawful under statutory obligations to protect police property and under an emergency exception to the warrant requirement. He also contends this immunity issue should be decided as a preliminary matter of law.
The cases upon which Defendant relies addressing police officer immunity are all cases involving questions of civil liability. We do not agree that the civil qualified immunity standard applies to criminal prosecutions. See O‘Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503, 94 S.Ct. 669, 679, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974); United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 744 (4th Cir.1990); United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 710-12, 65 A.L.R. Fed. 810 (11th Cir.1982); United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 1001 (D.C.Cir.1979); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1142-44 (7th Cir.1974). Further, criminal liability under the statutes may arise only where a police officer conducts an unlawful search. It makes no sense to extend qualified immunity to the only persons the Legislature intended be liable under
Defendant next contends that the Court of Appeals decision conflicts with application of
We disagree. As noted, this is the first reported case of prosecution under the statute,
Defendant also maintains that he cannot be prosecuted for unlawful search because there are no reported cases of prosecution under the statute despite its long existence. He cites no authority for this proposition, and we decline to address it. See RAP 10.3(a)(5); State v. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d 570, 610, 888 P.2d 1105, cert. denied, __ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 131, 133 L.Ed.2d 79 (1995).
Defendant next contends that
A statute is void for vagueness under the
The void for vagueness challenge is brought in this case following a pretrial Knapstad motion. Defendant contends that the facts will show that he entered Mandoli‘s residence pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. If that turns out to be the case, he entered lawfully under
We next turn to the question whether Defendant‘s Knapstad‘s motion to dismiss the unlawful search charge should have been granted. The State has alleged facts comprising a prima facie case, and therefore the motion to dismiss should not have been granted by the trial court. The State alleges that Defendant went to Mandoli‘s residence to discuss the internal investigation concerning the complaint against Mandoli. The State further alleges that rather than enter the unlocked residence and look for Mandoli, as would be appropriate if Defendant believed Mandoli‘s welfare were threatened, Defendant drove back to Soap lake and called the residence, taking some 8 to 10 minutes to do so. Further, when Defendant returned with Officer Jones, he expressed no concern about safety or Officer Mandoli‘s welfare to Jones. Nor did he express any such concern to Officer Stokoe when he arrived.
Under these circumstances alleged by the State, a trier of fact could conclude that there were no circumstances justifying Defendant‘s warrantless entry and search of the residence. The facts as the State alleges them, if proved, are sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude that Defendant unlawfully searched Mandoli‘s residence without a warrant in order to find evidence relating to the internal investigation, and took the uniforms and police equipment as part of a plan to terminate or suspend Mandoli.
While Defendant offers a different explanation of events, our role in assessing the propriety of granting a Knapstad motion does not include deciding whose version of events is correct. The issue is whether the State has sufficiently countered Defendant‘s claim that there are no material disputed facts and that the undisputed material facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt.
Finally, it is not for this court to question the wisdom of the Legislature in enacting a criminal statute, provided it is a constitutional enactment, and the Legislature may, as noted, establish strict liability crimes. While the intent of
This matter is remanded for trial on all three counts against Defendant.
SMITH, JOHNSON and ALEXANDER, JJ., concur.
DURHAM, Chief Justice, concurring.
I agree with the majority that the State has made a prima facie case on each of the crimes with which Chief Groom is charged, and that the Court of Appeals correctly remanded all charges for trial. I disagree, however, that
In determining whether the Legislature has intended to create a strict liability crime, we look to the Supreme Court for guidance.1
In Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1804, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994), the Supreme Court reversed the defendant‘s conviction for possession of an unregistered machine gun. Even though the National Firearms Act,
It is apparent that the Legislature intended to criminalize only a police officer‘s knowingly unlawful search.
Despite the plain language of the statute, however, this court has construed
Since the present case is the first published case of prosecution under
The majority‘s decision not only ignores the standard for imposing strict liability and defeats legislative intent, but also results in
Our primary duty in interpreting statutes is to carry out the intent of the Legislature.9 There is nothing to suggest that the 1921 Legislature, or any Legislature since then, intended to criminalize anything other than a police officer‘s knowingly unlawful search. Indeed, everything points to the contrary. Since there is no deterrent effect in penalizing innocent conduct, the only consequence of the majority‘s holding is the substantial public harm of forcing our police officers to weigh the risk of criminal liability against their command of search and seizure jurisprudence when deciding whether to perform a warrantless search.
I would construe
GUY, TALMADGE and DOLLIVER, JJ., concur.
SANDERS, Justice, concurring.
Were it the intent of the Legislature to simply prohibit warrantless searches I cannot imagine a clearer manifestation of that intent than
It shall be unlawful for any policeman or other peace officer to enter and search any private dwelling house or place of residence without the authority of a search warrant issued upon a complaint as by law provided.
Although correct in ultimate disposition, and specifically correct in its rejection of a good faith defense, both the majority and Chief Justice Durham‘s concurrence go to great lengths in dicta to pay lip service to the proposition that this statute does not simply prohibit all warrantless searches but rather only those warrantless searches which are also inconsonant with
The plain words of the statute set forth the elements of this crime: to convict, the defendant must (1) be a policeman or peace officer who (2) conducts a warrantless residential search. It is settled the “legislature‘s definition of the elements of the offense is usually dispositive....” McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2415, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). There is simply no third element to the crime which also requires the prosecution to prove that the warrantless residential search was also unconstitutional. When the Legislature declines to include a particular element in a statutory crime, the court must accept that determination. State v. Martell, 22 Wash. App. 415, 418-19, 591 P.2d 789 (1979) (“[W]e deem it a legislative function to define the elements of a particular crime. It would be a distortion of the judicial function for us, in the guise of statutory construction, to change a clearly expressed disjunctive element of the crime and declare it to be a conjunctive element. Courts may not modify a statute by construction.“) (citing Anderson v. City of Seattle, 78 Wash.2d 201, 471 P.2d 87 (1970)). Indeed, as the majority correctly observes,
[H]owever much members of this court may think that a statute should be rewritten, it is imperative that we not rewrite statutes to express what we think the law should be. We simply have no such authority.
Majority at 246 (citations omitted).
This court must consider the meaning and application of
The majority identifies two prior cases from this court to support the proposition that that statute does not mean what it says: State v. Thomas, 183 Wash. 643, 646, 49 P.2d 28 (1935) and State v. Smith, 50 Wash.2d 408, 314 P.2d 1024 (1957). Thomas involved the appeal of a robbery conviction wherein the accused assigned error to the introduction into evidence of a pair of socks seized coincident to a lawful arrest but without a search warrant. The court, almost in passing, stated, “The statute, of course, has no application to a search made as incident to a lawful arrest.” Thomas, 183 Wash. at 646, 49 P.2d 28. On its face Thomas involved a motion to suppress evidence utilized in a collateral proceeding against a third person, not a criminal prosecution under the subject statute. Thus Thomas involved the situation where the officer was on the premises pursuant to independent lawful authority neither search related nor dependent. The officer‘s presence in the residence at issue here, however, was not incident to a lawful arrest but was motivated solely to gather evidence against the accused.
Smith was also an exclusion of evidence case, not a criminal proceeding which arose under this statute. Smith says nothing about the statute other than simply citing it, but rather proceeds to determine the admissibility of the evidence under a federal constitutional analysis which otherwise limits the exclusionary rule to situations not involving consent or waiver.
The majority also cites three Court of Appeals decisions, none of which are binding on this court in any event: State v. Campbell, 15 Wash.App. 98, 547 P.2d 295 (1976); State v. Sanders, 8 Wash.App. 306, 506 P.2d 892 (1973); and State v. Duarte, 4 Wash.App. 825, 484 P.2d 1156, review denied, 79 Wash.2d 1006 (1971). Campbell cited the statute but contained no analysis of its application even in the context of a motion to suppress evidence constitutionally seized under the exigent emergency exception to the warrant rule. Sanders was also a suppression of evidence case which contained no discussion of
Because the statute,
RCW 10.79.040 , implementsarticle I, section 7 , and because the constitutional right secured byarticle I, section 7 is the same constitutional right secured by theFourth Amendment , we will discuss the validity of the search in terms of theFourth Amendment .
Sanders, 8 Wash.App. at 309, 506 P.2d 892 (citations omitted). Nor does Duarte shed any new light on the subject as it is a suppression case, not a proceeding under the statute per se, which simply purports to summarily follow Smith.
In sum, none of the cases identified by the majority provides precedent, much less reason, to support the majority‘s dicta that this statute does not mean exactly what it says nor do I find any reason articulated by the majority other than its appeal to inapposite authority to support the proposition that “criminal liability does not arise under
Moreover the majority‘s dicta that this statute does not mean what it says adds backhanded support to defendant‘s claim that it is therefore unconstitutionally vague. The majority‘s response that “a sufficiently specific prior judicial construction of a statute can save a statute from unconstitutional vagueness” (Majority at 247) seems curiously out of place when presented with a statute that is clear enough on its face but is rendered vague by the majority‘s evident predisposition that it should not be enforced as