State v. GroomState v. Groom
This is the first reported appellate case presenting the issue of whether a police officer may be held criminally liable for entering and searching a residence without a search warrant pursuant to
Larry Groom was chаrged with three misdemeanors: first degree criminal trespass,
The State appealed; the supеrior court reversed the dismissal of the unlawful search charge and affirmed dismissal of the criminal trespass and official misconduct charges. Officer Groom seeks review of the portion of that superior court order remanding the unlawful search charge for trial. The State filed a cross notice for review of that portion of the order affirming dismissal of the other two counts.
In response to Officer Groom’s motion to dismiss, the State submitted an affidavit alleging the following undisputed facts:
In February 1993, Officer Groom was the police chief of thе city of Soap Lake. Shortly before midnight on the evening of February 1, Chief Groom was investigating allegations of sexual misconduct which had been made against Officer Joe'Mandoli. Hе went to Officer Mandoli’s residence where he found the officer’s patrol car with keys hanging from the gear shift. The door to the residence was unlocked, the lights were on, and a gun wаs visible. He did not enter but went back to his office and telephoned the residence. Receiving no answer, he returned in the company of Officer Tom Jones. He entered the rеsidence and, according to Officer Jones, proceeded to search the bedroom, including looking under the mattress and into the closet. He then removed police equipment and uniforms.
According to Officer Groom’s motion to dismiss, his purpose in going to Officer Mandoli’s residence was to investigate whether Officer Mandoli had committed a sexual crime. When he found the home unlocked, he became concerned for Officer Mandoli’s safety because one of the complainants had threatened retaliatiоn. He alleges he removed uniforms and equipment from the residence pursuant to his duty under a city ordinance to account for the personal property of the police department.
Unlawful Search
Officer Groom contends the superior court’s reversal of the district court’s dismissal of the unlawful search charge was error. A trial court’s dismissal of charges pursuant to
Knapstad
is proper only if, based
Officer Groom is charged with unlawful search pursuant to
It shall be unlаwful for any policeman or other peace officer to enter and search any private dwelling house or place of residence without the authority of a search warrant issued upon a complaint as by law provided.
A literal application of this statute would render criminally liable any officer who searched a residence without a warrant, regardless of whether any recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment justified the search. 1
In the context of a civil suit for violation of a plaintiffs civil right, the courts recognize an officer’s qualified immunity:
The concept of the immunity of government officers from personal liability springs from the same root considerаtions that generated the doctrine of sovereign immunity. While the latter doctrine — that the "King can do no wrong” — did not protect all government officers from personal liability, the common law soon recognized the necessity of permitting officials to perform their official functions free from the threat of suits for personal liability. This official immunity apparently rested, in its genesis, on two mutually dependent rationales: (1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.
Scheuer v. Rhodes,
The essential policy underlying the common law immunity of police officers to civil suit is that "the public interest requires decisions and action to enforce laws for the proteсtion of the public.”
Scheuer,
For purposes of a motion to dismiss under Knapstad, then, the issue is whether the State’s factual allegations are sufficient to support a factual determination Officer Groom conducted the warrantless search in bad faith. Officer Groom’s claim he entered the residence because he was alarmed for Officer Mandoli’s safety is belied by Officer Jones’s description of his actions in searching in closets and under a mattress. The State alleges Officer Groom went to Officer Mandoli’s home to speak to him about an internal investigation or to terminate his employment. Officer Groom’s actions would support an inference his purpose in searching the residence was to discover any evidence which would be useful to this investigation. The State’s allegations were sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether Officer Groom conducted the search in bad faith.
Dismissal of Other Charges
The State contends the district court erred whеn it dismissed the criminal trespass and
The concept of qualified immunity of public officials is incorporated in the definition of official misconduct "if, with intent to . . . dеprive another person of a lawful right or privilege . . . [h]e intentionally commits an unauthorized act under color of law . . ..”
Evidеnce that Officer Groom returned to his office and telephoned Officer Mandoli’s residence before returning and entering supports the inference the subsequent entry was not justifiеd by exigent circumstances or concern for Officer Mandoli’s safety. The Soap Lake ordinances requiring accountability for city property do not authorize the police chief to enter a residence without a warrant. Officer Groom has never alleged the entry was authorized by warrant. A fact finder could infer Officer Groom knew there was no lawful basis for his entering the residence. Thus, the evidence is sufficient to support finding Officer Groom knowingly entered or remained in the building unlawfully, thereby committing criminal trespass. As with the unlawful searсh charge, the circumstances would permit a trier of fact to infer Officer Groom entered the residence for the purpose of obtaining evidence relating to allegations of Officer Mandoli’s misconduct, a purpose violative of the officer’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Officer Groom’s version of the events in question asserts facts which, if believed by a jury, prоvide him with a defense. The existence of a meritorious defense is not relevant to the determination of a motion to dismiss under Knapstad.
"Prosecutors are vested with wide discretion in determining whether to charge suspects with criminal offenses. Exercise of this discretion involves consideration of factors such as the public interest as well as the strength of the case which could be proven.”
State v. Judge,
Remanded for trial on all counts.
Sweeney, C.J., and Schultheis, J., concur.
Review granted at
Notes
"For example, when premises contain persons in imminent danger of death or harm; objects likely to burn, explоde or otherwise cause harm; or information that will disclose the location of a threatened victim or the existence of such a threat, police may search thоse premises without first obtaining a warrant.”
State v. Lynd,
In the context of a civil action, qualified immunity is available unless the officer knеw or reasonably should have known the action taken would violate the constitution or the officer acted with malicious intent to cause injury or deprivation of constitutional rights.
Hocker v. Woody,