State ex rel. McDonald v. Indus. Comm.State ex rel. McDonald v. Indus. Comm.
DECISION
Rendered on December 21, 2021
On brief: Graham & Graham Co., L.P.A., and Robert G. McClelland, for relator.
On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and John R. Smart, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.
On brief: Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter Co., L.P.A., David M. McCarty, Randall W. Mikes, and Jane K. Gleaves, for respondent J&J Schlaegel, Inc.
IN MANDAMUS
ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE‘S
DORRIAN, P.J.
{1} Relator Christopher R. McDonald, deceased (“decedent“), c/o Amanda Carpenter (“Carpenter“), filed this action in mandamus, seeking a writ to compel respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio (“commission“) to reverse or vacate its order finding Carpenter was ineligible for death benefits because she was not a dependent of decedent pursuant to
I. Facts and Procedural History
{2} This matter arises out of the sudden death of decedent on April 8, 2019. Decedent was killed, while in the course of and arising out of his employment with respondent J&J Schlaegel, Inc., when a trench he was working in collapsed. As relevant to this matter, decedent was survived by Carpenter, who was engaged to be married to decedent at the time of his death, and the couple‘s two minor children.
{3} An FROI-1 form signed by Carpenter on April 22, 2019 was submitted to the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC“). On April 23, 2019, Carpenter and the couple‘s two minor children filed an application for death benefits. In an affidavit in support of her application for death benefits dated April 22, 2019, Carpenter stated she had been in a committed relationship with decedent for the past 11 years and was his fiancée at the time of his death. Carpenter and decedent had two minor children together. Carpenter and decedent owned property together with joint rights of survivorship and were jointly responsible for mortgage payments on such property. Carpenter and decedent were jointly responsible for five different credit cards and payments on two vehicles. Carpenter and decedent each held life insurance policies in which the other was named as the sole beneficiary. Carpenter stated that she only worked part-time averaging approximately eight hours per week and decedent provided primary financial support for Carpenter and the couple‘s two minor children.
{4} On May 21, 2019, BWC issued an order approving death benefits for the two minor children but denying Carpenter‘s request for death benefits. On May 24, 2019, Carpenter appealed the BWC order.
{5} On June 18, 2019, a district hearing officer (“DHO“) held a hearing. On June 21, 2019, the DHO mailed an order affirming the BWC‘s order. Specifically, the DHO found the claim was allowed for death benefits and that the two minor children were wholly dependent on decedent for support and were entitled to death benefits. The DHO, however, found Carpenter did not meet the definition of wholly dependent person entitled to death benefits under
{6} On August 7, 2019, a staff hearing officer (“SHO“) held a hearing. On August 15, 2019, the SHO mailed an order vacating the DHO‘s order. The SHO found Carpenter and the two minor children were dependent on decedent at the time of death and were entitled to death benefits. The SHO found Carpenter was not entitled to the presumption of being wholly dependent on decedent for support under
{7} On September 26, 2019, the commission held a hearing. On October 30, 2019, after further review and discussion,
{8} On August 13, 2020, Carpenter filed a complaint for writ of mandamus requesting this court order the commission to reverse or vacate its October 30, 2019 order and grant death benefits to Carpenter. Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, this matter was referred to a magistrate who issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, which is appended hereto. The magistrate recommends this court deny Carpenter‘s request for a writ of mandamus.
{9} Relator has filed the following three objections to the magistrate‘s decision:
[I.] THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAD DETERMINED THAT AMANDA CARPENTER WAS NOT A “MEMBER OF THE FAMILY” ENTITLED TO DEATH BENEFITS PURSUANT TO
R.C. 4123.59(D)(2) .[II.] THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN THE ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION UPON DETERMINING THAT
R.C. 4123.59(D)(2) WAS AMBIGUOUS.[III.] THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT AMANDA CARPENTER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO DEATH BENEFITS DESPITE THE FACT THAT SHE “BEARS TO THE DECEASED EMPLOYEE THE RELATION OF SURVIVING SPOUSE” PURSUANT TO
R.C. 4123.59(D)(2) .
II. Discussion
{10} Carpenter raises three objections to the magistrate‘s decision. In her first objection, Carpenter contends the magistrate misstated the commission‘s findings with regard to Carpenter‘s status as a “member of the family” under
A. Statutory Interpretation
{11} When interpreting statutory provisions, “our paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute.” State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, Aud., 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, ¶
{12} Statutory interpretation presents a question of law subject to a de novo standard of review. Natl. Lime & Stone at ¶ 14, citing Ceccarelli v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-5681, ¶ 8; State ex rel. Peregrine Health Servs. of Columbus, LLC v. Sears, Dir., Ohio Dept. of Medicaid, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-16, 2020-Ohio-3426, ¶ 23. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that courts ” ‘must give due deference to an administrative interpretation formulated by an agency that has accumulated substantial expertise, and to which the General Assembly has delegated the responsibility of implementing the legislative command.’ ” Bernard v. Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm., 136 Ohio St.3d 264, 2013-Ohio-3121, ¶ 12, quoting Swallow v. Indus. Comm., 36 Ohio St.3d 55, 57 (1988). If the statute in question ” ‘is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency‘s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.’ ” Lang v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 134 Ohio St.3d 296, 2012-Ohio-5366, ¶ 12, quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). See Collateral Mgt. LLC v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-123, 2021-Ohio-1641, ¶ 24, citing Clark v. State Teachers Retirement Sys., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-105, 2018-Ohio-4680, ¶ 38. However, courts grant no deference to an administrative agency‘s interpretation of a statute when that interpretation conflicts with the express terms of an unambiguous statute. Employer‘s Choice Plus, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-297, 2019-Ohio-4994, ¶ 24, quoting Lang at ¶ 12.
{13}
The following persons are presumed to be wholly dependent for their support upon a deceased employee:
(1) A surviving spouse who was living with the employee at the time of death or a surviving spouse who was separated from the employee at the time of death because of the aggression of the employee;
(2) A child under the age of eighteen years, or twenty-five years if pursuing a full-time educational program while enrolled in an accredited educational institution and program, or over said age if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, upon only the one parent who is contributing more than one-half
of the support for such child and with whom the child is living at the time of the death of such parent, or for whose maintenance such parent was legally liable at the time of the parent‘s death. It is presumed that there is sufficient dependency to entitle a surviving natural parent or surviving natural parents, share and share alike, with whom the decedent was living at the time of the decedent‘s death, to a total minimum award of three thousand dollars.
The administrator may take into consideration any circumstances which, at the time of the death of the decedent, clearly indicate prospective dependency on the part of the claimant and potential support on the part of the decedent. No person shall be considered a prospective dependent unless such person is a member of the family of the deceased employee and bears to the deceased employee the relation of surviving spouse, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister. The total award for any or all prospective dependency to all such claimants, except to a natural parent or natural parents of the deceased, shall not exceed three thousand dollars to be apportioned among them as the administrator orders.
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case existing at the time of the injury resulting in the death of such employee, but no person shall be considered as dependent unless such person is a member of the family of the deceased employee, or bears to the deceased employee the relation of surviving spouse, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister.
1. The Operation Of R.C. 4123.59(D) Is Not Ambiguous
{14} At issue in the present matter is the final paragraph of
It is further found the Decedent‘s fiance, Amanda Carpenter, is not entitled to death benefits under the provisions of
R.C. 4123.59(D) , particularly including the last paragraph ofR.C. 4123.59(D)(2) . There is no presumption of dependency for Ms. Carpenter, as she and the Decedent were never married and never applied for a marriage license.A number of assertions presented by Ms. Carpenter may be accepted as true, regarding she and the Decedent living together for approximately 11 years; they were purchasing real estate together, with joint survivorship provisions and with both their names on the mortgage; both their names were on car loans and credit cards; they each owned life insurance policies naming each other the beneficiaries; they were the natural parents of the children [H.M.] and [A.M.]; and Ms. Carpenter only worked part-time so she could stay home and take care of the children. However, common law marriages have been banned in Ohio since approximately 1991, and Ms. Carpenter was not a dependent of the Decedent as a “surviving spouse” under the terms of the cited Revised Code provisions. Further, case law has not extended the language of
R.C. 4123.59(D)(2) to an unmarried person in a relationship with a decedent, such as is present in this claim. Consideration of Blair v. Keller, 16 Ohio Misc. 157, 241 N.E.2d 767 (C.P.1968), does not compel a contrary result, as the facts in that case are distinguishable.
(Oct. 10, 2019 Commission Order at 2.)
{15} Carpenter contends the final paragraph of
First is the surviving spouse who is presumed to be “wholly dependent.”
R.C. 4123.59(D)(1) . The “Spouse” is the dependent who is legally married to the decedent. Second is the child or children who are also presumed to be wholly dependent on the decedent. The child of the decedent is the natural/biological or adopted child of the decedent.R.C. 4123.59(D)(2) .The third category are members of the family of the deceased employee.
R.C. 4123.59(D)(2) , last paragraph. The third category includes mother, father, brother or sister of the decedent because they are “a member of the family of the deceased employee.” They are dependents if they were dependent on the decedent for financial support.
(Commission‘s Brief at 11-12.) Thus, the commission contends that only the listed categories in the last paragraph of
{16} To begin, it is necessary to examine the operation of the statutory provision in question. Whereas the preceding paragraphs of
{17} Crucially, the statute contains the disjunctive term “or” between the two listed categories of “member of the family” and the specifically listed relations of “surviving spouse, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister.”
{18} This is supported by the fact that in the penultimate paragraph of
{19} It is further noteworthy that the General Assembly used the term “and” when identifying the requirements for being considered a prospective dependent in the penultimate paragraph of
{20} If we were to accept the commission‘s argument in this case that under
{21} Furthermore, the General Assembly‘s use of the word “shall” in the phrase “[i]n all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case existing at the time of the injury resulting in the death of such employee,” indicates that the commission was under a mandatory obligation to complete the aforementioned determination. See Wilson v. Lawrence, 150 Ohio St.3d 368, 2017-Ohio-1410, ¶ 13, citing State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Lyons, 140 Ohio St.3d 7, 2014-Ohio-2354, ¶ 28 (stating that “we repeatedly have recognized that use of the term ‘shall’ in a statute connotes a mandatory obligation unless other language evidences a clear and unequivocal intent to the contrary“); Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 107 (1971), citing Dennison v. Dennison, 165 Ohio St. 146 (1956) (stating that “[t]he word ‘shall’ is usually interpreted to make the provision in which it is contained mandatory“).
{22} By failing to properly consider whether Carpenter established she was a dependent as a member of the family under the particular facts of this case, the commission failed to comply with the express command of
2. The Meaning of the Term “Member of the Family” Is Ambiguous
{23} Having found the commission failed to properly interpret and apply the plain text of the statute, we next consider the meaning of the term “member of the family” under
{24} The commission, in its decision denying Carpenter death benefits, never mentions the phrase “member of the family,” nor does it contain any specific interpretation or consideration of such phrase. Instead, the commission‘s decision focuses on the questions of whether there was a presumption of dependency and whether Carpenter was a dependent of decedent as a “surviving spouse.” The commission also noted that “case law has not extended the language of
{25} The commission, in its decision denying Carpenter death benefits, distinguishes Blair v. Keller, 16 Ohio Misc. 157, 241 N.E.2d 767 (June 10, 1968) (Wood County Common Pleas Court) a case construing the “member of the family.” In Blair, the court considered whether the four stepchildren of the deceased employee were “members of the family” as that term is used in
{26} As noted by the magistrate in this matter, the terms “member of the family” or “family member” have been defined in different ways in various provisions of the Ohio Revised Code. See
{27} As the term “member of the family” as used in
{28} “A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy.” State ex rel. Brown v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Elections, 142 Ohio St.3d 370, 2014-Ohio-4022, ¶ 11. Pursuant to
{29} “To show the clear legal right, relator must demonstrate that the commission abused its discretion by entering an order unsupported by some evidence in the record.” State ex rel. Hughes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 26 Ohio St.3d 71, 73 (1986). When the record contains “some evidence” to support the commission‘s factual findings, a court may not disturb the commission‘s findings in mandamus. State ex rel. Fiber-Lite Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 36 Ohio St.3d 202 (1988), syllabus. ” ‘Where a commission order is adequately explained and based on some evidence, * * * the order will not be disturbed as manifesting an abuse of discretion.’ ” State ex rel. Avalon Precision Casting Co. v. Indus. Comm., 109 Ohio St.3d 237, 2006-Ohio-2287, ¶ 9, quoting State ex rel. Mobley v. Indus. Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 579, 584 (1997).
{30} With regard to the third requirement for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary court of the law, the Supreme Court has held that “dependency issues do not invoke the basic right to participate in the workers’ compensation system and, therefore, are not appealable.” State ex rel. Liposchak v. Indus. Comm., 90 Ohio St.3d 276, 278 (2000). Furthermore, the court held that “although death benefits may be granted or denied based on dependent status as defined in
{31} With regard to the first and second requirements for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, we find Carpenter has established a clear legal right to the requested relief of vacating its October 10, 2019 order and a clear legal duty on the part of the commission to provide such relief because the commission‘s interpretation is in conflict with the clear and unequivocal command of the statute. The commission erred by giving
{32} Nevertheless, we remand the case to the commission to consider, in the first instance, whether Carpenter meets the definition of “member of the family” and if so, the extent of dependency, in whole or in part. In so doing, the commission shall interpret
III. Conclusion
{33} On review of the magistrate‘s decision, an independent review of the record, and due consideration of Carpenter‘s objections, we sustain Carpenter‘s first, second, and third objections. Accordingly, we adopt the magistrate‘s findings of fact but decline to adopt the magistrate‘s conclusions of law. We grant a limited writ of mandamus directing the commission to vacate its October 10, 2019 order and issue an order determining, consistent with law and this decision, whether under the particular facts of this case Carpenter has established that she is a member of the family pursuant to
Objections sustained; limited writ of mandamus granted.
BEATTY BLUNT and MENTEL, JJ., concur.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State ex rel. Christopher R. McDonald (Decd) c/o Amanda Carpenter (Dependent), Relator, v. Industrial Commission of Ohio et al., Respondents.
No. 20AP-386
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
MAGISTRATE‘S DECISION
Rendered on April 13, 2021
Graham & Graham Co., L.P.A., and Robert G. McClelland, for relator.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Kevin J. Reis, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter Co., LPA, David M. McCarty, Randall W. Mikes, and Jane K. Gleaves, for respondent J & J Schlaegel, Inc.
IN MANDAMUS
{34} Relator, Christopher R. McDonald, deceased (“the decedent“) c/o Amanda Carpenter (“Carpenter“), has filed this original action requesting this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio (“commission“), to vacate its order finding that Carpenter was not eligible for death benefits as being a dependent of the decedent pursuant to
Findings of Fact:
{35} 1. On April 8, 2019, the decedent, while in the course of and arising from his employment with respondent, J & J Schlaegel, Inc. (“employer“), was killed when a trench he was working in collapsed. The death claim was allowed.
{36} 2. Carpenter was engaged to the decedent at the time of his death, and the two had been in a relationship for the previous 11 years.
{37} 3. The decedent‘s death certificate indicated Carpenter was his fiancé.
{38} 4. Carpenter and the decedent had two children together: Hunter McDonald, who was born October 4, 2011, and Aubrey McDonald, who was born February 29, 2016.
{39} 5. Carpenter and the decedent jointly owned property with survivorship rights. They were jointly responsible for the mortgage.
{40} 6. Carpenter and the decedent shared joint credit cards.
{41} 7. Carpenter and the decedent were jointly responsible for two vehicle leases/loans.
{42} 8. Carpenter and the decedent each held life insurance policies that named the other as sole beneficiary.
{43} 9. The decedent earned approximately $84,000 per year. Carpenter worked approximately eight hours per week at a retail store, earning approximately $2,000 per year, and cared for the couple‘s children.
{44} 10. On April 9, 2019, an FROI-1 application was filed.
{45} 11. On April 23, 2019, Carpenter and the two minor children filed an application for death benefits.
{46} 12. On May 21, 2019, the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC“) issued an order, in which it approved
{47} 13. On May 24, 2019, Carpenter filed an appeal of the BWC order.
{48} 14. On June 18, 2019, the District Hearing Officer (“DHO“) held a hearing.
{49} 15. On June 21, 2019, the DHO issued an order, in which she found, in pertinent part, the following: the May 21, 2019, order of the BWC is affirmed; the claim is allowed for death benefits; the two children were wholly dependent on decedent for support and are entitled to death benefits; Carpenter does not meet the definition of a wholly dependent person entitled to death benefits under
{50} 16. On July 1, 2019, Carpenter filed an appeal of the DHO‘s order.
{51} 17. On August 7, 2019, the Staff Hearing Officer (“SHO“) held a hearing on Carpenter‘s appeal.
{52} 18. On August 15, 2019, the SHO issued an order, in which he found, in pertinent part, the following: the June 18, 2019, order of the DHO is vacated; Carpenter and the two children were dependent upon the decedent for support at the time of death and are entitled to weekly benefits; the May 21, 2019, BWC order is modified to the extent that Carpenter be awarded death benefits in addition to the two children; the April 9, 2019, FROI-1 application is granted; the claim for death benefits is granted; Carpenter and the decedent never married, and, thus, she is not entitled to the presumption of being wholly dependent on the decedent for support under
{53} 19. On August 28, 2019, the administrator for the BWC appealed the SHO‘s decision, and the commission accepted the appeal on September 10, 2019.
{54} 20. On September 26, 2019, a hearing was held before the full commission.
{55} 21. On October 10, 2019, the commission issued an order, in which it found, in pertinent part, the following: the BWC‘s appeal is granted and the SHO‘s order is vacated; the death claim is allowed; the two children were dependent upon the decedent for support at the time of his death; Carpenter is not entitled to death benefits under the provisions of
{56} 22. On August 13, 2020, Carpenter filed a complaint for writ of mandamus, requesting that this court vacate the commission‘s order that denied her death benefits and enter an order granting the benefits.
Conclusions of Law and Discussion:
{57} The magistrate recommends that this court deny Carpenter‘s writ of mandamus.
{58} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus, a relator must ordinarily show a clear legal right to the relief sought, a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide such relief, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). A clear legal right to a writ of mandamus exists where the relator shows that the commission abused its discretion by entering an order which is not supported by any evidence in the record. State ex rel. Elliott v. Indus. Comm., 26 Ohio St.3d 76 (1986). On the other hand, where the record contains some evidence to support the commission‘s findings, there has been no abuse of discretion and mandamus is not appropriate. State ex rel. Lewis v. Diamond Foundry Co., 29 Ohio St.3d 56 (1987). Furthermore, questions of credibility and the weight to be given evidence are clearly within the discretion of the commission as fact finder. State ex rel. Teece v. Indus. Comm., 68 Ohio St.2d 165 (1981).
{59}
The following persons are presumed to be wholly dependent for their support upon a deceased employee:
(1) A surviving spouse who was living with the employee at the time of death or a surviving spouse who was separated from the employee at the time of death because of the aggression of the employee;
(2) A child under the age of eighteen years, or twenty-five years if pursuing a full-time educational program while enrolled in an accredited educational institution and program, or over said age if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, upon only the one parent who is contributing more than one-half of the support for such child and with whom the child is living at the time of the death of such parent, or for whose maintenance such parent was legally liable at the time of the parent‘s death.
It is presumed that there is sufficient dependency to entitle a surviving natural parent or surviving natural parents, share and share alike, with whom the decedent was living at the time of the decedent‘s death, to a total minimum award of three thousand dollars.
The administrator may take into consideration any circumstances which, at the time of the death of the decedent, clearly indicate prospective dependency on the part of the claimant and potential support on the part of the decedent. No person shall be considered a prospective dependent unless such person is a member of the family of the deceased employee and bears to the deceased employee the relation of surviving spouse, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister. The total award for any or all prospective dependency to all such claimants, except to a natural parent or natural parents of the deceased, shall not exceed three thousand dollars to be apportioned among them as the administrator orders.
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case existing at the time of the injury resulting in the death of such employee, but no person shall be considered as dependent unless such person is a member of the family of the deceased employee, or bears to the deceased employee the relation of surviving spouse, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister.
{60} The court‘s primary goal of statutory construction “is to give effect to the General Assembly‘s intent.” Silver Lining Group EIC Morrow Cty. v. Ohio Dept. of Edn. Autism Scholarship Program, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-398, 2017-Ohio-7834, ¶ 34, citing State v. Banks, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-69, 2011-Ohio-4252, ¶ 13, citing State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, ¶ 11. To determine legislative intent, the court looks to and gives effect to the statutory language without deleting or inserting words. Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 39-40 (2001). The statutory language must be considered in context, and the court must construe words and phrases “according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Silver Lining Group at ¶ 34, citing Bartchy v. State Bd. of Edn., 120 Ohio St.3d 205, 2008-Ohio-4826, ¶ 16.
{61} Where the words in a statute are “’ “free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and distinctly, the
{62} In Peregrine, we explained:
Generally, where there is ambiguity, ” [a] reviewing court, in interpreting a statute, “must give due deference to an administrative interpretation formulated by an agency which has accumulated substantial expertise, and to which the legislature has delegated the responsibility of implementing the legislative command.” ’ ” Northside Amateur Boxing School Bingo Club v. Hamilton Cty. Gen. Health Dist., 184 Ohio App.3d 596, 2009-Ohio-5122, ¶ 17, 921 N.E.2d 1091 (10th Dist.), quoting In re 138 Mazal Health Care, Ltd., 117 Ohio App.3d 679, 685, 691 N.E.2d 338 (10th Dist.1997), quoting State ex rel. McLean v. Indus. Comm., 25 Ohio St.3d 90, 25 Ohio B. 141, 495 N.E.2d 370 (10th DB. 1986). Furthermore, “in order to sustain an agency‘s application of a statutory term, a reviewing court ’ “need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one.” ’ ” Id. at 685, quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S. Ct. 792, 13 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1965), superseded by statute on other grounds, quoting Unemp. Comp. Comm. of Territory of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 67 S. Ct. 245, 91 L. Ed. 136, 11 Alaska 236 (1946). In the administrative law context, unless an administrative agency‘s interpretation of a statute that it has a duty to enforce is unreasonable, it will not be reversed. Warren v. Morrison, 2017-Ohio-660, ¶ 10, 85 N.E.3d 394, citing State ex rel. Clark v. Great Lakes Constr. Co., 99 Ohio St.3d 320, 2003-Ohio-3802, ¶ 10, 791 N.E.2d 974, citing Northwestern Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 92 Ohio St.3d at 287. Thus, if the administrative agency‘s interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the underlying legislative intent, this court must defer to the agency‘s interpretation and uphold it. Id., citing Oyortey v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-431, 2012-Ohio-6204, ¶ 17, 986 N.E.2d 450.
{63} In the present matter, Carpenter argues that the commission abused its discretion when it found she was not eligible for death benefits as being wholly dependent on the decedent pursuant to
{64} In reading the plain language of the statute, Carpenter claims she is entitled to benefits as a “member of the family of the deceased employee” and as a wholly dependent person who “bears to the deceased employee the relation of surviving spouse, lineal descendent, ancestor, or brother or sister.” First, she contends she is a member of the decedent‘s family because she was in a longstanding, 11-year relationship with the decedent, they were engaged to be married, and she was living with decedent and their two minor children as a family unit. In support of her definition of “member of the family,” she relies upon the Ohio Family Trust Company Act,
{65} With regard to the second clause in the last paragraph of
{66} After a review of the language of
{67} The commission found that an unmarried partner of the decedent is not considered a “member of the family,” even if the two share financial assets and obligations, live in the same household, are engaged to be married, and share biological children. This interpretation is reasonable, given the definitions used for “member of the family” and “family member” in other legal settings are limited to legal spouses, as shown in some of the above citations. Although the magistrate finds Carpenter‘s definition is reasonable, as well, the commission‘s construction need not be the only reasonable construction in order to be applied. Carpenter has provided no evidence that the commission‘s definition is inconsistent with the legislative intent of the provision, and under such circumstances the magistrate will defer to the commission‘s interpretation of the statute it has been legislatively granted the duty to carryout and enforce.
{68} Although in the present case, Carpenter relies upon definitions for “member of the family” and “family member” from other areas of law, workers’ compensation law is a unique area of law whose boundaries are defined by statute. Lake Erie Constr. Co. v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 88AP-894 (Apr. 5, 1990). “It has its ‘own individual characteristics’ and should be interpreted ‘in the light of its own purpose, provisions, and merit.’ ” Id., quoting Young, Ohio Workmen‘s Compensation Law, 1. The purpose of the Workmen‘s Compensation Act is to protect the rights of the employee and the integrity of the State Insurance Fund. Id., citing Taylor v. Keller, 6 Ohio St.2d 9, 13 (1966). Given these unique characteristics and purposes of the workers’ compensation system, any attempt to borrow the definitions from family law, criminal law, trusts law, and insurance law should be undertaken with considerable scrutiny and care. Carpenter‘s picking and choosing definitions from other areas of law that agree with her interests in the present case is insufficient without further evidence that those selected definitions are consistent with the legislature‘s intent.
{69} Furthermore, in the present case, the commission found Blair distinguishable, as it undoubtedly is, because it addressed
{70} Nevertheless, Blair has some deficiencies. The court in Blair admitted that its analysis might be biased by the fact that the potential beneficiaries were four children. The court‘s later statement that “if [‘members of the family‘] means anything, then it certainly covers these four children,” hints at such a bias and potentially limits its persuasive value. Furthermore, given that Blair is a 52-year-old case from a common pleas court and has never been relied upon by any other court for any reason, its persuasiveness and precedential value are diminished. Here, the reasonable interpretation by the commission, the very agency legislatively tasked with determining the viability of workers’ compensation claims in Ohio, carries more weight under these circumstances.
{71} With regard to the clause “bears to the deceased employee the relation of surviving spouse,” Carpenter fails to cite any persuasive argument or authority that this court should read “bears * * * the relation of surviving spouse” as “bears * * * [a] relation [akin to a] surviving spouse.” To add such words and meaning with no indication that the clause is meant to mean anything beyond the plain, everyday definition of “the relation of surviving spouse” is beyond the bounds of statutory construction. This argument is particularly dubious because reading “akin to a” into the provision makes little sense when applied to the subsequent named relationships of lineal descendant, ancestor, brother, or sister. Furthermore, although Carpenter questions the commission‘s reference to the fact that common law marriage in Ohio has been prohibited since October 1991, the commission‘s point is well-taken. To place a non-married partner in the same position as a legal spouse and provide the same financial benefits to both would seemingly contradict the legislature‘s explicit proscription of common law marriage. Although not conclusively determinative of the issue, the commission‘s general point is, nonetheless, reasonable.
{72} Accordingly, it is the magistrate‘s recommendation that this court should deny Carpenter‘s complaint for writ of mandamus.
/S/ MAGISTRATE
THOMAS W. SCHOLL III