State v. HairstonState v. Hairston
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether
{¶ 2} Around 1:00 a.m. on September 27, 2000, two men, one of them holding a gun, burst through the back door of Ann and Mike’s Bar, shouting at everyone to stay still. Richard Hairston, who had been seated at the bar, went behind the bar and into the kitchen.
{¶ 3} Meanwhile, the bartender opened the cash register and the two men grabbed money from there and from a tip jar and then went into the kitchen and demanded more money. The bartender testified that she had earlier removеd excess cash from the cash register and had put it in a blue bag in the kitchen. When the robbers took her into the kitchen, she noticed that the blue bag was gone. At that point, the two men left the bar.
{¶ 4} The owner of the bar then locked the rear door while the bartender locked the front door and called the police. Hairston, who could not get out because the doors had been locked, ran into the men’s restroom.
{¶ 5} Columbus police officer Dale Justice responded to the call, and the owner let him in and told him that one of the suspects was in the men’s restroom. Hairston then came out of thе restroom, and Justice ordered him to the floor, handcuffed him, and patted him down for weapons. The owner testified that as the officer lifted Hairston up, she noticed bundles of cash in Hairston’s waistband, which Justiсe retrieved and the owner identified as money that had been taken from the blue bag. In addition, the blue bag was located hidden behind the tank
{¶ 6} The Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney proceeded by information charging Hairston with aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and two counts of robbery. However, on October 6, the prosecutor dismissed those charges, anticipating a possible indictment. On October 18, 2000, the grand jury returned indictments against Hairston on the same charges, and filed them on October 25, 2000.
{¶ 7} Because of the charges in the infоrmation, Hairston’s parole officer held an on-site parole revocation hearing and revoked his parole on October 24. A summons, sent to Hairston’s home on October 27 while he remained in the county jail, came back as unserved; thereafter, on October 31, 2000, Hairston was returned to the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. When Hairston did not appear at his arraignment on November 5, the trial court issued a capias for his arrest.
{¶ 8} On June 12, 2001, the records supervisor at the Pickaway Correctional Institution delivered a detainer to Hairston advising him of the four chаrges from the October 2000 indictment. According to affidavits, Hairston believed that those charges had been dismissed, and he claims that he did not know that they had been refiled by indictment. He therefore filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that pursuant to
{¶ 9} Thе court of appeals reversed his convictions and remanded the matter with instructions to dismiss all charges against Hairston with prejudice.
{¶ 10} The cause is now before us pursuant to our acceptance of a discretionary appeal. We are called upon here to review the appellate court’s decision and to determine whether
{¶ 11} “The object of judicial investigation in the construction of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law-making body which enacted it.” Slingluff v. Weaver (1902),
{¶ 12} “But the intent of the law-makers is to be sought first of all in the language employed, and if the words be free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and distinctly, the sense of the law-making body, therе is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. The question is not what
{¶ 13} Therefore, the question for us to decide is whether
{¶ 14}
{¶ 15} “When a person has entered upon a term of imprisоnment in a correctional institution of this state, and when during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in this state any untried indictment, information, or complaint against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court in which the matter is pending, written notice of the place оf his imprisonment and a request for a final disposition to be made of the matter * * *.
{¶ 16} “* * *
{¶ 17} “The warden or superintendent having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him in writing of the source and contents of any untried indiсtment, information, or complaint against him, concerning which the warden or superintendent has knowledge, and of his right to make a request for final disposition thereof.
{¶ 18} “* * *
{¶ 19} “If the action is not brought to trial within the time provided, subject to continuance allowed pursuant to this section, no court any longer has jurisdiction thereof, the indictment, information, or complaint is void, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the аction with prejudice.”
{¶ 20} This statute is not ambiguous. Far from requiring the state to exercise reasonable diligence to locate an incarcerated defendant,
{¶ 22} Hairston, however, seeks to have us read a duty оf reasonable diligence into the statute; to accept his interpretation, “this court must read into the statute language that does not exist.” Middleburg Hts. v. Ohio Bd. of Bldg. Standards (1992),
{¶ 23} Hairston next compares
{¶ 24} Hairston’s argument is unpersuasive. Both statutes unambiguously impose the initial duty upon the defendant to trigger action on the part of the state.
{¶ 25} In its plainest language,
{¶ 26} Accordingly, we hold that
{¶ 27} We therefore reverse the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and remand the cause to that court for disposition of Hairston’s remaining assignments of error.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.