State ex rel. Natl. Lime & Stone Co. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (Slip Opinion)State ex rel. Natl. Lime & Stone Co. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (Slip Opinion)
Lead Opinion
*393{¶ 1} The primary issue in this case is whether a railroad that holds land within a territory proposed for annexation is an "owner" as defined in
{¶ 2} The court of appeals dismissed a complaint for a writ of mandamus filed by appellant, National Lime and Stone Company, seeking to compel appellee, the Marion County Board of Commissioners, to approve a petition for annexation. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that the railroad's property interest in the territory proposed for annexation in this case is a railroad right-of-way held in fee and that consequently, the railroad falls within the exception to the definition of "owner" set forth in
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 3} National Lime, a limestone-aggregates and industrial-minerals mining company, seeks to annex 224.257 acres of its real property in Grand Prairie Township, Marion County, Ohio, to the city of Marion under
{¶ 5} The first deed, executed in 1892, conveyed a 4.35-acre strip of land just 60 feet wide, over which one of the predecessor railroad companies had an existing track, to the predecessor railroad company and its assigns, forever. The second deed, executed in 1896, likewise conveyed to another predecessor railroad company and "its successors and assigns forever" a 75-foot-wide, 1.075-acre strip of land adjacent to the 4.35-acre parcel previously conveyed. The second deed also specified that as part of the consideration for the transfer, the railroad company agreed to construct on the conveyed real estate a spur of track, stock pens, and a scale as well as a shelter for passengers and freight.
{¶ 6} Neither deed identified the conveyed interest in the property as an easement or right-of-way or provided for a forfeiture or reversion of interests if a time came when the land was no longer used for purposes of operating a railroad. The parties do not dispute that the deeds grant a fee simple interest in the land.
{¶ 7} National Lime did not notify Norfolk of or seek its consent to the annexation petition, believing that the company fell within an exception-for railroad rights-of-way held in fee-to the definition of "owner" in
{¶ 8} The city of Marion issued a resolution approving the annexation petition. But after conducting a special meeting, the county commissioners unanimously passed a resolution objecting to the proposed annexation on two grounds. First, the commissioners found that Norfolk was an "owner" of real property in the territory proposed for annexation and that National Lime had failed to obtain the railway's signature on the annexation petition. See
{¶ 9} National Lime sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for Marion County to compel the commissioners to approve its annexation petition, arguing that Norfolk was not an owner as defined by the plain language of the statute and that its representative's signature, therefore, was not a condition for approval of the annexation petition. The court of appeals disagreed and dismissed *395the petition.
{¶ 10} This cause is now before us upon National Lime's appeal as of right.
Analysis
Statutory Interpretation
{¶ 11} For purposes of this annexation proceeding,
*407{¶ 12} National Lime contends that the term "right-of-way," as used in
{¶ 13} In contrast, the commissioners argue that the first meaning listed in a dictionary for a given term is its usual, normal, and customary meaning. Therefore, they claim that the usual, normal, and customary meaning of "right-of-way" is "a legal right of passage over another person's ground." Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/right-of-way (accessed October 26, 2017). Because Norfolk possesses a freehold estate in the land at issue rather than a right to pass over the land of another, the commissioners assert that the legislature could not have intended for Norfolk's property interest to fall within the statutory exception to the definition of ''owner.'' Consequently, the commissioners maintain that they lawfully denied the annexation petition and that the court of appeals properly dismissed National Lime's mandamus action because a representative of Norfolk-an owner of property in the territory proposed for annexation-did not sign the petition for annexation.
{¶ 14} Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Ceccarelli v. Levin ,
{¶ 15} We have previously acknowledged that the term "rights-of-way" as used in
{¶ 16} The commissioners' interpretation of the term, however, equates all rights-of-way with easements-which are *408commonly defined as "[a]n interest in land owned by another person, consisting in the right to use or control the land, or an area above or below it, for a specific limited purpose (such as to cross it for access to a public road)." Black's Law Dictionary 622 (10th Ed.2014). But
{¶ 17} The inevitable result of the commissioners' interpretation would be that any railroad that holds a fee interest in a territory proposed for annexation will be deemed to be an owner whose consent is required for the annexation to proceed. Yet the plain language of the statute demonstrates a legislative intent to exempt some railroad interests held in fee-specifically rights-of-way in fee-from the statutory definition of "owner" in such proceedings.
*397{¶ 18} Consistently with the commissioners' argument, the court of appeals held that Norfolk is an "owner" within the meaning of
{¶ 19} In Butler Twp. , we addressed whether it was "the intent of the General Assembly, as expressed within
{¶ 20} In resolving that issue, we recognized that the statutory exception for "rights-of-way held in fee, by easement, or by dedication and acceptance" was not intended to apply to all holders of such property interests. Instead, we expressed our belief that it was likely intended to apply only to rights-of-way held by political subdivisions, railroads, or utility companies-and *409that the excluded landowners in that case did not fall into any of those categories. Id. at ¶ 41. Finding that neither of the statutory interpretations advanced by the parties had "emerged as significantly more likely than the other," id. at ¶ 44, we held that the landholders who owned the property underlying the roadway in fee simple were "owners" as defined by
{¶ 21} In this case, however, Norfolk is a railroad company, and it holds both of the property interests at issue in Butler Township (i.e., the right-of-way over the land and the land itself). Therefore, Butler Township offers little guidance whether the statutory exception for railroad rights-of-way held in fee applies to the railroad's property interest in this case.
*398{¶ 22} In contrast to the statutory interpretation advanced by the commissioners and adopted by the court of appeals, the interpretation advanced by National Lime-that the strip of land upon which a railroad company constructs its roadbed is necessarily a right-of-way, whether owned in fee, taken by easement, or by dedication and acceptance-gives effect to each of the words in the statute and conforms to the technical or particular meaning of the term "right-of-way" as it is used in the railroad industry.
{¶ 23} That definition was recognized more than 125 years ago, see Joy ,
{¶ 24} Therefore, we hold that the term "right-of-way" and the phrase "railroad right-of-way held in fee" as they appear in
*410And it leaves open the possibility that a railroad's consent may still be a condition for annexation if it owns real property in a territory proposed for annexation that is used for purposes other than as a right-of-way.
*399{¶ 25} In this case, two parcels of land are at issue: one 60-foot-wide strip over which Norfolk's railroad tracks pass and a 75-foot-wide strip running parallel to that track, which the deed states was to be used for accessories including "a spur of track, stock pens, and scale, as well as a shelter for passengers and freight." Based on the foregoing, we hold that both parcels constitute a "railroad right-of-way held in fee." We also hold that Norfolk falls within the exception to the definition of "owner" set forth in
Mandamus Is Appropriate
{¶ 26} To be entitled to extraordinary relief in mandamus, National Lime must establish a clear legal right to the requested relief by demonstrating that it has satisfied all of the statutory conditions for annexation. If each of the conditions of
{¶ 27} Because the court of appeals found that Norfolk's consent to the annexation was required under
{¶ 28} National Lime's petition satisfies the requirements as to form, content, and filing set forth in
{¶ 29} Under
{¶ 30} To demonstrate that the territory proposed for annexation shares a sufficiently contiguous boundary with the city, National Lime has submitted a survey plat. The plat shows that the territory proposed for annexation is roughly the shape of a trapezoid with a perimeter of 13,781.07 feet, that the railroad track passes diagonally through the southeast corner of the territory, and that the border of the territory proposed for annexation-extending roughly from the southeastern corner of the railroad's property to the southeasternmost point of the territory proposed for annexation-shares a continuous contiguous border of approximately 1,330 feet with the city of Marion. Therefore, we find that the territory proposed for annexation shares a continuous contiguous boundary of at least 5 percent of the territory's perimeter in accordance with
{¶ 31} In addition, the plat shows that the annexation will not create an unincorporated area of the township that is completely surrounded by the territory proposed for annexation.
{¶ 32} On these facts, we find that National Lime has satisfied all the conditions for annexation identified in
Conclusion
{¶ 33} Based on the foregoing, we hold that because Norfolk owns a railroad right-of-way in fee, it falls within the exception to the definition of "owner" set forth in
Judgment reversed and writ granted.
O'Connor, C.J., and French, O'Neill, and Fischer, JJ., concur.
Kennedy, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by DeWine, J.
O'Donnell, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Concurrence Opinion
*412{¶ 34} "[I]t is the policy of the state of Ohio to encourage annexation by municipalities of adjacent territory." Middletown v. McGee ,
{¶ 35} In Ohio, the traditional method of annexation requires a number of steps before annexation is complete. See
{¶ 36} In this case, appellant, National Lime and Stone ("National Lime"), filed a petition for an expedited type-two annexation. See
{¶ 37} Norfolk Southern Railway ("Norfolk") is the fee-simple owner of two parcels of land in the territory proposed for annexation that are at the center of this dispute. One parcel, conveyed by deed in 1892, is a 4.35-acre strip of land just 60 feet wide, over which one of Norfolk's predecessor railroad companies had an existing track ("first parcel"). The other parcel, conveyed by deed four years later in 1896, is a 75-foot-wide, 1.075-acre strip of land ("second parcel") adjacent to the first parcel, upon which a length of spur of track necessary to accommodate the business of the railroad, stock pens, a scale, and a temporary shelter for passengers and freight, and later a permanent station building, if warranted, were to be constructed. In setting out the boundary lines for the second parcel, the second deed refers to the boundary line of the first parcel as the "right-of-way line."
{¶ 38} I agree with the majority that Norfolk's first parcel falls within the meaning of "railroad right-of-way" in
{¶ 39} Principles of statutory construction guide the resolution of whether Norfolk holds the second parcel of land as a "right-of-way." The statute at issue,
{¶ 40} The majority properly relies on Webster's Third New International Dictionary (2002), which recognizes that in the *413context of railroads, a "right-of-way" can be "the land occupied by a railroad for its tracks." Id. at 1956. The majority further notes that the term "right-of-way" is defined in the CSX Corporation's Railroad Dictionary , https://www.csx.com/index.cfm/about-us/company-overview/railroad-dictionary/?i=R (accessed Oct. 26, 2017) (a "right-of-way" is "[i]n the strictest sense, land or water rights necessary for the roadbed and its accessories").
{¶ 41} The deed to the second parcel provides:
*403The Columbus, Sandusky & Hocking Railroad Company, hereby agree [sic] to construct on said real estate herein conveyed, a spur track of sufficient length to accommodate the business of the Railroad Company at that point, also to construct stock pens and scale and further agree [sic] to provide a temporary shelter for passengers and freight until the business of said Railroad Company warrants the same, then said Railroad Company shall erect a permanent station building.
Because the second parcel was purchased by the railroad to build stock pens, a scale, a shelter for passengers and freight, and a permanent station building, if warranted, it is not a "right-of-way."
{¶ 42} The majority seemingly fits the second parcel into CSX's definition by finding it to be an "accessory." Majority opinion at ¶ 24. The majority's conclusion is erroneous. In CSX's definition of "right-of-way," "its" is a possessive pronoun; it is used in place of the noun "roadbed" and indicates the roadbed's possession of accessories. Consequently, only those items that are the roadbed's accessories are included within the definition of "right-of-way."
{¶ 43} "Roadbed," as used in the railroad industry, is defined as "[t]he foundation on which a track and ballast rest." CSX Corporation, Railroad Dictionary , https://www.csx.com/index.cfm/about-us/company-overview/railroad-dictionary/?i=R (accessed Oct. 26, 2017). This definition indicates that the foundation is the roadbed and the track and ballast are the roadbed's accessories-the objects or devices that augment the usefulness of the foundation; it does not include stock pens, a scale, a shelter for passengers and freight, and a permanent station building as accessories. To conclude that these items are the roadbed's accessories defies the rules of grammar and ignores technical definitions. See
Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evinced in the language of the statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose. That is what the judge must seek and effectuate * * *. [T]he purpose which a court must effectuate is not that which [the legislature] should have enacted, or would have. It is that which it did enact * * * because it may fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, even if a specific manifestation was not thought of, as is often the very reason for casting a statute in very general terms.
*404Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes ,
*414{¶ 44} Frankfurter's words are at the very core of the role of the judiciary. In designing the annexation process in
{¶ 45} While "[m]ost of us tend to be swayed by what we read[, j]udges are not superhuman. They, too, are mortals. This is why they have to be exceptionally careful in rendering decisions, which cause unintended consequences." Kapil Sibal, Circumspection, My Lords , The Indian Express (Apr. 21, 2017), http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/circumspection-my-lords-article-142-use-judicial-diktats-4621562/. Therefore, forefront in our minds should be the unintended consequences that will result from the majority's decision to apply the term "railroad right-of-way" so expansively.
{¶ 46} While I can appreciate the advantages that being annexed into the city of Marion might bring National Lime, that annexation cannot occur in violation of the General Assembly's mandates and to the detriment of Norfolk's freedom of choice regarding its own fee-simple estate. The real property conveyed by the deed for the second parcel is not a "railroad right-of-way held in fee." Upon that parcel, according to the deed, was to be built stock pens, a scale, a shelter for passengers and freight, and a permanent station building. Because the second parcel does not fall within the exceptions to a freehold estate set forth in the definition of "owner" in
DeWine, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.