Ceccarelli v. LevinCeccarelli v. Levin
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a decision of the Board of Tax Apрeals (“BTA“) that affirmed an assessment against the appellant, Jack Ceccarelli, of motor-fuel-tax liabilities reported but not fully paid for April, May, June, and August 2000. Ceccarelli was assessed not as a motor-fuel dealer himself, but rather as a “responsible party” by virtue of his status as owner and president of Restructure Petroleum Marketing Services, Inc. (“RPMS“). RPMS itself had previously been assessed for the unpaid taxes, which amounted to $396,565.16. The tax commissioner found that Ceccarelli wаs a responsible party who was liable to pay the amount assessed against the corporation because he was the indirect owner and the president of RPMS.
{¶ 2} Before the BTA, Ceccarelli did not contest his status as a respоnsible party under the statute, but instead asserted that the assessment was barred because it had been issued after the statutory four-year limitation period expired. The tax commissioner argued that the limitation statute in question,
{¶ 3} On appeal, Ceccarelli again contends that the four-year limitation also applies to assessments against employees or officers of motor-fuel dealers who qualify as responsible parties. We agree, and we therefore reverse the decision of the BTA.
Facts
{¶ 4} Underlying the assessment against Ceccarelli in this case are four assessments previously issued against RPMS pertaining to motor-fuel taxes reported but not fully paid for April, May, June, and August 2000. Jack Ceccarelli was identified as corporate president of RPMS on filings with the office
{¶ 5} RPMS had belatedly filed motor-fuel-tax returns for April, May, June, and August 2000 on July 7, December 19, September 18, and December 11, 2000, respectively. The commissioner issued his assessment against Ceccarelli as a responsible party on February 24, 2005—more than four years after the tax reports had been filed.
{¶ 6} The record is sparse, but Ceccarelli has not disputed the commissioner‘s findings of fact. The commissioner found that Ceccarеlli was not only president of RPMS, but also “100% owner of Restructure, Inc., who owned 100% of RPMS.” The final determination also relied on filings and correspondence signed by Ceccarelli to establish that he “had the authority to exercise control of the corporation‘s fiscal responsibilities,” a criterion for responsible-party liability under
Analysis
{¶ 7} The third paragraph of
{¶ 8} The question is whether the four-year time limitation set forth in
R.C. 5735.35(A)(2) provides that motor-fuel-tax liabilities of responsible parties be assessed “in the manner” of assessments issued against motor-fuel dеalers, and the manner of assessment includes the four-year limitation in R.C. 5735.12(A)
{¶ 9} In Bowshier v. Limbach (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 140, 556 N.E.2d 463, we considered whether an assessment of sales tax against a responsible corporate officer was barred by the four-year limitation on sales-tax assessments set forth at
{¶ 10} As an initial matter, the commissioner points to the fact that the third paragraph of
{¶ 11} But this argument overlooks a crucial distinсtion between the motor-fuel-tax statutes and the sales-tax law.
{¶ 12} The distinction is significant because the respective code sections that address responsible-party liability provide that assessments against responsible parties should be made “in the manner provided” in the section that authorizes the making of assessments.
{¶ 13} To be sure, the commissioner can argue thаt the “manner” of making assessments does not encompass the timing of those assessments, but that argument is unavailing. “Manner” means “a mode of procedure or way of acting.” Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed.2006) 756. While time limitations may in some contexts be distinguished from other aspects of a “mode of procedure,” we see no justification for regarding the time for making an assessment as any less a part of the statutorily prescribed procedure in this context. Quite simply,
The commissioner‘s exclusive focus on R.C. 5735.12(A) is not justified, because it would accord no significance to the language of R.C. 5735.35(A)(2)
{¶ 14} The commissioner also argues that because
{¶ 15} The second paragraph of
{¶ 16} ”If any person required by this chapter to file reports and pay the taxes, interest, or additional charge levied by this chapter fails to file the report, files an incomplеte or incorrect report, or fails to remit the full amount of the tax, interest, or additional charge due for the period covered by the report, the commissioner may make an assessment against the person based upon аny information in the commissioner‘s possession.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 17} The third paragraph then sets forth the time limitation:
{¶ 18} “No assessment shall be made against any motor fuel dealer for taxes imposed by this chapter more than four years after the date on which the report on which the assessment was based was due or was filed, whichever is later.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 19} The commissioner relies on the contrast between the broad language authorizing assessments against “any person” with liabilities under the motor-fuel-tax law and the third paragraph‘s reference to “motor fuel dealer“: under this reading, the contrasting language means that the four-year limitation should not be viewed as incorporated into the manner for making assessments against responsible parties.
{¶ 20} We disagree. To adоpt the commissioner‘s proposed reading would violate the precept that we “should construe statutes to give effect to all the enacted language.” Church of God in N. Ohio v. Levin, 124 Ohio St.3d 36, 2009-Ohio-5939, 918 N.E.2d 981, ¶ 30, citing State ex rel. Bohan v. Indus. Comm. (1946), 147 Ohio St. 249, 251, 34 O.O. 151, 70 N.E.2d 888 (courts should “‘accord meaning to each word of a leglislativе [sic] enactment if it is reasonably possible to do so‘“). Namely, the commissioner‘s construction of the statutes would make a nullity out of
{¶ 21} Although we acknowledge that the contrasting language of the second and third paragraphs of
{¶ 22} Finally, we address the commissioner‘s contention that any “doubt concerning the reasonableness and lawfulness of the Commissioner‘s and the BTA‘s interpretation of
{¶ 23} Because the BTA acted unlawfully when it upheld the assessment of unpaid motor-fuel taxes against Ceccarelli, we reverse the decision of the BTA.
Decision reversed.