IN RE ESTATE OF CENTORBI.
No. 2010-0597
Supreme Court of Ohio
Decided May 18, 2011
129 Ohio St.3d 78, 2011-Ohio-2267
Submitted March 23, 2011
{1} In this appeal, we address the statute of limitations governing the recovery of assets from the estates of deceased Medicaid recipients.
{2} The controlling statute,
{3} Appellee Diane Nancy Fiorille is the person responsible for the estate of Josephine A. Centorbi. Fiorille asserts that the Medicaid estate-recovery program, which is administered by appellant, the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (“ODJFS“), is bound by a one-year statute of limitations in making claims against a Medicaid beneficiary‘s estate. ODJFS, however, contends that the statute sets forth two alternative limitations periods: one that limits claims to 90 days after the Medicaid estate-recovery form is received by the Medicaid estate-recovery program administrator and one that limits claims to one year after the decedent‘s death. ODJFS further contends that it can still present its claim against the Centorbi estate by relying on the 90-day statute of limitations, even though it is more than one year beyond the death of Centorbi, because it was not notified of its potential claim through a Medicaid estate-recovery reporting form. We agree with ODJFS.
Relevant Background
{5} Josephine A. Centorbi died intestate on February 12, 2007. At the time of her death, Centorbi was more than 55 years old and receiving benefits from the Medicaid program.
{6} Ten months after Centorbi‘s death, her sister, Fiorille, acting without counsel, filed an application to relieve the estate from administration. It is undisputed that when Fiorille filed the application, she did not check the box on the form that appears next to the following statement: “Decedent was fifty-five years of age or older at the time of death and was a recipient of medical assistance under Chapter 5111 of the Revised Code. Form 7.0 Notice to Administrator of Estate Recovery Program has been or will be filed.” It is also undisputed that Fiorille did not file the requisite form.
{7}
{8} ODJFS later learned that Centorbi was a deceased Medicaid beneficiary whose estate had been relieved from administration. On January 27, 2009, ODJFS filed an “application to vacate order releasing assets from administration.” The probate court magistrate denied the motion. In her decision, the magistrate wrote, “In this case, the person responsible for the estate, Diane Nancy Fiorille, indicated that no notice was required to be given to the Administrator of the Estate Recovery Program and therefore did not submit a reporting form. * * * Since no form was filed, under
Analysis
Statute of Limitations
{10} “Statutes of limitations foster important public policies: ensuring fairness to the defendant, encouraging prompt prosecution of causes of action, suppressing stale and fraudulent claims, and avoiding the inconvenience engendered by delay and by the difficulty of proving older cases.” Cundall v. U.S. Bank, 122 Ohio St.3d 188, 2009-Ohio-2523, 909 N.E.2d 1244, 122, citing O‘Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 84, 88, 4 OBR 335, 447 N.E.2d 727. Statutes of limitations are therefore valuable to the parties to a dispute, society in general, and the administration of justice.
{11} We have consistently recognized that it is the General Assembly‘s role to consider and establish limitations periods, see, e.g., Leininger v. Pioneer Natl. Latex, 115 Ohio St.3d 311, 2007-Ohio-4921, 875 N.E.2d 36, 132, and that we may not substitute our judgment for that of the legislature. Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio St.3d 56, 2009-Ohio-1970, 908 N.E.2d 401, 17. Instead, our role is to apply the legislature‘s designated limitations on causes of action.
{12} In determining how to apply a statute, “our paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute.” State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, 121. “In determining legislative intent, the court first reviews the applicable statutory language and the purpose to be accomplished.” Fisher v. Hasenjager, 116 Ohio St.3d 53, 2007-Ohio-5589, 876 N.E.2d 546, 120, quoting State ex rel. Watkins v. Eighth Dist. Court of Appeals (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 532, 535, 696 N.E.2d 1079. In doing so, we must give effect to every word and clause in the statute. Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 510, 2010-Ohio-2550, 929 N.E.2d 448, 121.
{13} A statute‘s wording “may not be restricted, constricted, qualified, narrowed, enlarged or abridged; significance and effect should, if possible, be accorded to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act.” Weaver v. Edwin Shaw Hosp., 104 Ohio St.3d 390, 2004-Ohio-6549, 819 N.E.2d 1079, 113, quoting Wachendorf v. Shaver (1948), 149 Ohio St. 231, 36 O.O. 554, 78 N.E.2d 370, paragraph five of the syllabus. “No part should be treated as superfluous unless that is manifestly required, and the court should avoid that construction which
{14} When we conclude that a statute‘s language is clear and unambiguous, we apply the statute as written, Cheap Escape Co., Inc. v. Haddox, L.L.C., 120 Ohio St.3d 493, 2008-Ohio-6323, 900 N.E.2d 601, 119, giving effect to its plain meaning. Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, paragraph two of the syllabus. This is a case in which we are presented with clear and unambiguous language.
Language of R.C. 2117.061(E)
{15} As noted previously,
{16} Pursuant to
{17} The time in which the administrator may act in presenting a claim against a beneficiary‘s estate is governed by
{18} The legislature‘s use of the word “or,” a disjunctive term, signifies the presence of alternatives. See O‘Toole v. Denihan, 118 Ohio St.3d 374, 2008-Ohio-2574, 889 N.E.2d 505, 151-52; Pizza v. Sunset Fireworks Co., Inc. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 1, 4–5, 25 OBR 1, 494 N.E.2d 1115. The General Assembly frequently uses “or” with “whichever is later” in legislation, including statutes of limitations, to indicate alternative possibilities, pursuant to which a particular claim becomes time-barred when the later of two or more designated events occurs. See, e.g.,
{19} In this case, the majority on the court of appeals concluded that the language of
{20} The court of appeals’ conclusion ignores the word “or” as well as the clause “whichever is later” in
{21} Both “or” and “whichever is later” have meaning, and that meaning is clear: the statute contains an alternative set of limitations periods. “[T]he plain meaning of the phrase ‘whichever is later’ refers to the later date of two dates.” Morris v. Haren (C.A.11, 1995), 52 F.3d 947, 949. The dissenting judge in the court of appeals in this case properly recognized that
{22} We now turn to the question of how the alternative statutes of limitations in
{23} As the probate and appellate courts recognized, the one-year postmortem period had expired by the time the administrator filed the claim. Had there been no alternative time limit, ODJFS would have been barred from pursuing its claim.
{24} But ODJFS was not barred, because the 90-day limitations period had not yet run. Indeed, unless a Medicaid estate-recovery reporting form is filed, the 90-day limitations period in
{25} To hold otherwise—as the probate court did—ignores the plain wording of
{26} The federal government mandates that states must recover certain Medicaid benefits paid to certain Medicaid recipients from the recipients’ estates. See
{27} Accordingly, we vacate the appellate court‘s judgment and remand this cause to the probate court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In so doing, we reject two collateral claims raised by Fiorille with respect to the 90-day statute of limitations set forth in
Collateral Claims
{28} First, Fiorille contends that the state has not created the Medicaid estate-recovery reporting form described in
{29} It is clear that the probate courts and ODJFS rely on Probate Form 7.0 as the Medicaid estate-recovery reporting form described in the statute. Probate Form 7.0 appears in at least one Ohio practice guide, labeled “notice of administrator of estate recovery program,” with
{30} We have reviewed Probate Form 7.0, a single-page document written in accessible language that is understandable to attorneys as well as laypeople. It simply states, “The undersigned gives notice to the Administrator of the Estate Recovery Program that the decedent was fifty-five (55) years of age or older at the time of death and has been determined to have been a recipient of medical assistance under Chapter 5111 of the Revised Code.”
{31} The sufficiency of Probate Form 7.0 and its compliance, or lack thereof, with the requirements of
{32} Fiorille also attacks the 90-day limit as a potentially open-ended period that will never close as long as notice is deferred, thereby subverting the interests of finality in the administration of estates. There is not a modicum of merit in that contention.
{33} When notice is received by the Medicaid estate-recovery program administrator, the 90-day statute of limitations is triggered. The person responsible for the estate controls the timely adjudication of any Medicaid recovery claim by filing notice. Upon doing so, it is the person responsible for the estate who ensures that any claim must be brought by the later of two dates: 90 days after notice or one year after the decedent‘s death. Thus, the statute does not encourage the estate-recovery administrator to ambush the estate years after the decedent‘s death, nor does it otherwise undermine the societal interest in efficient
{34} Finally, and most importantly, “[t]he period within which a claim must be brought * * * is a policy decision best left to the General Assembly.” Leininger, 115 Ohio St.3d 311, 2007-Ohio-4921, 875 N.E.2d 36, 132. Our decision reflects the legislative determination that ODJFS may seek recovery from an estate not later than 90 days after the date on which the estate-recovery reporting form is received, or one year after the decedent‘s death, whichever is later.
Conclusion
{35}
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O‘DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor General, Elisabeth A. Long, Deputy Solicitor, and Robert J. Byrne, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant, Ohio Department of Job and Family Services.
Kenneth S. Kabb Co., L.P.A., and Rachel A. Kabb-Effron; and James C. Bates, for appellee, Diane Nancy Fiorille.