Amoco Oil Co. v. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Release Compensation BoardAmoco Oil Co. v. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Release Compensation Board
Lead Opinion
The Court of Appeals for Sandusky County journal-ized an entry in R&R Service v. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Release Comp. Bd. that certified: “[T]his court finds that our judgment in the instant appeal [which upheld the validity of
Appellee Amoco makes three arguments as to why
It is well settled that the General Assembly cannot delegate legislative authority, but it can delegate rule-making authority to agencies. Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. (1944),
The General Assembly’s grant of authority to the Board to adopt rules to administer the Fund is found in R.C. 3737.90(B). It states:
“The board may:
U * # *
Pursuant to this broad grant of authority, the Board adopted
“(A) As a prerequisite to determining fund payment of or reimbursement for corrective action costs for an accidental release of petroleum, the director * * * shall issue a determination of eligibility for payment * * * where all of the following conditions are established:
“(1) * * * for releases which are or were reported to the fire marshal * * * on or after January 1, 1996, receipt [of a completed eligibility application] within one year from the date the release is or was required to be reported to the fire marshal * * * which has been made by a responsible person.”
Amoco argues that the one-year time limit for submitting an eligibility application is neither necessary nor appropriate becausé the eligibility criteria set out in R.C. 3737.92(D) and
It is the Director who determines whether a UST owner is eligible. See R.C. 3737.92(B)(1), incorporating R.C. 3737.92(D) by reference. One of the criteria required under the eligibility claim is that “[a]t the time that the release was first suspected or confirmed, a responsible person possessed a valid certificate of coverage * * * for the petroleum underground storage tank system from which the release occurred.” This language “for the petroleum underground storage system tank from which the release occurred” unambiguously places an obligation on the Director to determine the origin of the release. Thus, the Director is responsible for tracing a release to the leaking tank in order to make sure the release occurred from a tank with a valid certificate of coverage. R.C. 3737.92(D)(1). Tracing petroleum is a time-sensitive task that becomes more difficult with the passage of time because the petroleum diffuses, making it more difficult to trace.
Further, the Fire Marshal has no obligation to determine if a UST owner has a valid certificate of coverage from the Fund and may not obtain all the information the Director requires to determine eligibility.
Finally, even if the Fire Marshal has traced the release to the leaking tank, it does not absolve the Director of'his independent responsibility to trace the release. The Director of the Board has an independent duty to trace the release to the tank from which it emanated pursuant to R.C. 3737.92(D)(1) for the purpose of determining whether the release emanated from a tank with a valid certificate of coverage. Therefore, regardless of the Fire Marshal’s responsibilities, tracing a release to the leaking tank is a responsibility to be determined by the Director of the Board. Thus, the one-year time limit for submitting an eligibility application set out in
The one-year time limit for submitting an eligibility application also assists the Board in budgeting for the Fund. The rule addressing eligibility applications requires that owners or operators of USTs submit cost estimates of the required corrective actions.
The Court of Appeals for Montgomery County in the Amoco case held, and Amoco argues, that because the General Assembly has provided the Board authority to raise the fee assessment to tank owners and to pay claims in installments, the one-year time limit in
Similar to a substantial fee increase, the cost of financing a shortfall in the Fund by issuing a substantial amount of bonds in a short period could result in dramatically increased interest costs. This too could result in a steep increase in costs to the UST owners and operators because the Board can pass on interest costs to the UST owners/operators. The mere fact that the Board has the authority to issue bonds does not supplant the Board’s obligation to manage the Fund in an optimum manner. Budgeting is one of the tools that facilitates proper management of the Fund.
Finally, implementation of installment payments to reimburse costs for corrective action could be detrimental to the environment. Where UST owners are unable to afford to finance cleanup costs up front, they will be unable to pay cleanup contractors until they receive payments from the Fund. Where cleanup contractors require immediate payment for their services, cleanup will only occur as the money is dispensed over the installment period. Depending on the length of the cleanup, installment payments by the Board could cause cleanup to be stretched out over years. Delayed cleanup can only be detrimental to the environment.
The purpose of administrative rulemaking is to facilitate an administrative agency’s placing into effect the public policy embodied in legislation to be administered by the agency. Chambers v. St. Mary’s School (1998), 82 Ohio
Rules adopted by administrative agencies are valid and enforceable unless unreasonable or in conflict with the statutory enactment covering the same subject matter. State ex rel. DeBoe v. Indus. Comm. (1954),
Amoco argues that
Amoco argues that the one-year limitation for submitting eligibility claims violates the Board’s public policy mandate because it denies eligibility to owners or operators of USTs who otherwise meet the statutory criteria for eligibility.
The public policy of the Board is “to contribute toward one or more of the following: to preserve and protect the water resources of the state and to prevent, abate, or control the pollution of water resources, particularly ground water, for the protection and preservation of the public health, safety, convenience, and welfare, to assist in the financing of repair and replacement of petroleum underground storage tanks and to improve property damaged by any petroleum releases from those tanks, and to preserve jobs and' employment opportunities or improve the economic welfare of the people of the state.” R.C. 3737.94(A).
The Board administers the Fund primarily for the purpose of reimbursing qualified UST owners and operators for the cost of corrective actions. R.C. 3737.92(A)(3). While upholding the one-year limitation in
The One-Year Time Limit in
Thus, we hold that
Judgment affirmed in case No. 99-1780.
Judgment reversed in case No. 99-U8L
Notes
. Amoco and R&R Service submitted a joint brief asserting that
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in judgment only. I agree with the majority that
First, R.C. 3737.92 places procedural conditions on a responsible person’s eligibility for payment from the Fund. Eligibility and entitlement to payment, therefore, are not synonymous under the statute. Furthermore, R.C. 3737.90(B) expressly authorizes the Board to adopt rules that are necessary and appropriate for the administration of the Fund, and sets out a nonexhaustive list of ways it might do that. Procedural rules adopted by the Board, then, are not rendered invalid merely because they impose conditions on entitlement to payment that are not found in the statute.
Finally, the fact that the deadline may preclude some otherwise eligible persons from obtaining payment from the Fund does not render it violative of public policy, as “the [Fund’s] goal of financial responsibility for corrective action necessitated by a petroleum leak is [as] important” as the “overall purpose of * * * promoting] environmental health and safety by encouraging owners and operators to comply with environmental standards.” R&R appellate opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. The one-year limitations period at issue in this case,
Preventing stale claims and ensuring fiscally sound management are solid goals. They can be readily accomplished through lesser sanctions, such as providing a lesser percentage of total cost or placing stale claims at the end of the payment line. The total cutoff for eligibility claims effected by the one-year limitations period is the province of the General Assembly. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment in the Amoco case and reverse it in the R&R Service case, and hold that the one-year limitations period exceeds the Board’s rule-making authority. I dissent.