Richard J. Malouf, D.D.S., Petitioner, v. The State of Texas ex rels. Christine Ellis, D.D.S. and Madelayne Castillo, Respondents
No. 22-1046
Supreme Court of Texas
JUSTICE YOUNG, joined by Justice Lehrmann, dissenting.
What do robots and lawyers have in common? Maybe more than we would care to admit, but at least one answer is that only robots and lawyers could read the statute at issue the way the Court does today. The Court purports to do so in the name of textualism. But a textualist‘s obligation is to construe a statute in its context, giving it the meaning an ordinary English speaker would have given it at the time it was enacted. The Court instead imposes an implausible reading that no one would have given it when it was written. Today‘s reading at best adopts a post hoc construction of the sort that good
Specifically, the Court holds that Dr. Malouf did not violate
[a] person commits an
unlawful act if the person: . . .
(8) makes a claim under a health care program and knowingly fails to indicate the type of license and the identification number of the licensed health careprovider who actually provided the service[.]
The Court says that he did not. True, he failed to provide the identification numbers of the dentists who
How could the Court misread the statute so badly? How could it read the text that I quoted
The canons of construction are the essential tools for interpreting legal documents. But like the tools of
The result today is that Dr. Malouf walks away scot-free. Among those who will be surprised by this result is Dr. Malouf. The argument that the Court adopts is his “alternative argument,” as the Court acknowledges. See ante at 13-14. His far more modest lead argument merely asserts that there are fact questions about whether he “knowingly” listed the wrong provider, so the Court should send the case back for trial. Id. at 13. Unlike the lead argument, the “alternative” is a kill-shot—one on which he spends scant pages in both his opening and reply brief, compared to the many pages devoted to his lead argument. The Court should not have fallen for it, and I doubt that Dr. Malouf or his counsel thought that we would. But as is often said at legal conferences and when lawyers tell their war stories, one never really knows what a court will do. Today‘s decision should be added to the lore.
I respectfully dissent.
I
We all agree that this case turns on the text of the Medicaid Fraud Prevention Act. Specifically, the statute says that it is unlawful to “make[] a claim under a health care program and knowingly fail[] to indicate the type of license and the identification number of the licensed health care provider who actually provided the service.”
In my view, “and” plays its normal role of joining both prongs. The statute creates a short checklist of two things (not just one or the other) that a provider must list: the license type + the identification number. Failing to “indicate” either of them violates the statute, just like failing to put both ham and cheese on a sandwich would violate the Court‘s hypothetical deli order: “Don‘t forget to put ham and cheese on my sandwich.” Ante at 22. In our new age of artificial intelligence, I suppose that a robot waiter or a robot cook (or should I say ”and a robot cook“?) would feel justified in serving a sandwich as soon as either ham or cheese is placed between slices of bread. But a human would regard the order as incomplete and would feel no guilt in sending it back.
The conjunctive meaning of the stated statutory requirements is clear from the statute‘s text, context, and textually expressed function. But the Court insists on an arid reading that would make even a 1950s high-school English teacher blush. Treating the “and” as really meaning “or“—that the provider can list one or the other to escape any consequence—is grammatically permissible (barely), as with the concomitant sandwich in the deli. But it is not a remotely reasonable reading and gives no hint of pursuing an accurate rather than a tendentious interpretation of the statute.
A
As I read it, “and” conveys its normal grammatical meaning and plays its normal role—it imposes a joint requirement by listing two things (A and B) that a provider must indicate. But suppose for the moment that the Court would accept the dual-requirement reading if the legislature instead had used “or” in the statute. Even under the dubious assumption that “or”
“Not A, not B, and not C,” however, is logically equivalent to “not (A, B, or C).” Linguistic context thus enables us to “move back and forth between disjunctive and conjunctive propositions as long as we are mindful about negations, as well as ‘our p‘s and q‘s.‘” R.E. Houser, Logic as a Liberal Art: An Introduction to Rhetoric and Reasoning 343 (2020). Therefore, as Chief Justice Greenhill put it for the Court, we have also recognized that “there may be circumstances which call for such a construction” in which “and” is construed to mean “or,” even if we try hard to avoid those constructions. Bayou Pipeline Corp. v. R.R. Comm‘n, 568 S.W.2d 122, 125 (Tex. 1978); see also De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 573 (1956) (“the word ‘or’ is often used as a careless substitute for the word ‘and‘; that is, it is often used in phrases where ‘and’ would express the thought with greater clarity“); Bryan A. Garner, Garner‘s Modern English Usage 49 (4th ed. 2016) (”and is frequently misused for or where a singular noun, or one of two nouns, is called for“).2
Depending on its statutory context, therefore, “and” can have several meanings. Some may be the opposite of how that word normally functions; some may simply be interchangeable with the word “or.” When that happens, a court does not rewrite “and” to mean “or“—that is what it meant all along. It is basic to our language that the same word can mean different things or function in different ways, so we rely on context to discern the applicable meaning. Sometimes that meaning is so evidently clear that we barely notice. “He tapped the mouse” and “he caught the mouse” give the word “mouse” two very different meanings—although both sentences could deploy either meaning. This point is so commonplace as to be truly banal.
Particularly relevant here, “and” can be used in “a distributive (or several) sense as well as a joint sense.” Bryan A. Garner, Garner‘s Dictionary of Legal Usage 639 (3d ed. 2011) (emphasis added). The Court chooses the distributive sense: no problem unless a claimant knowingly fails to provide both his license type and his identification number. See ante at 32. Sometimes this use is the only reasonable one. Judge Willett offered this example: “‘Do
The examples and counterexamples are tiresome because they are inexhaustible. That very point, however, proves that context is what matters. The ham-sandwich example hardly stands alone. To take another, suppose a dentist (maybe even Dr. Malouf—or at least someone using his identification number) tells a patient to “brush and floss your teeth.” Or, to inject the negative, “you‘ll be paying dental bills if you forget to brush and floss your teeth.” Even simply “don‘t forget to brush and floss.” One who brushes without flossing will pay a price—gingivitis or worse—for giving the dentist‘s advice a bizarre but grammatically tolerable meaning.
I suppose that the legislature could commit itself to drafting only asyndetic statutes—avoiding conjunctions at all costs and using structure, subparts, and other language to eliminate any contrary grammatical reading. And sure, the legislature could have written this statute to more directly say what it meant.3 Greater clarity is always desirable and nearly always possible. (For judicial opinions, too—not just statutes.) But courts cannot “demand (or in truth expect) that [the legislature] draft in the most translucent way possible.” Pulsifer v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 718, 729 (2024).
Statutes end up as they do for a myriad of reasons—speed as the session comes to an end, compromise in merging House and Senate versions, desire to minimize revisions to existing laws, the fusion of competing versions of a text, human frailty, and so many others. True, such circumstances sometimes lead to an enactment
B
So if context is indispensable to determining meaning—and the Court at least says that it admits this, ante at 6, 23–27—the case should be easy. The Court‘s reading is unreasonable, and the answer to why that is so “lie[s] in considering the [statute‘s] text in its legal context.” Pulsifer, 144 S. Ct. at 731.
Context comes in many forms. Some are irrelevant, but those drawn from the text itself are certainly proper for courts to use. More to the point, we cannot smuggle in impermissible grounds just by calling something “context.” But the full text is always legitimate. When interpreting a statute to resolve another “and-or” dispute, for example, we referred to a “succeeding clause” as one way to contextualize the meaning of “and.” Bd. of Ins. Comm‘rs v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Tex., 180 S.W.2d 906, 909 (Tex. 1944). Here, the succeeding clause is this phrase: “of the licensed health care provider who actually provided the service.”
The successive phrase contextualizes how we should construe the word “and.” The statute tells a claimant to provide the license type and identification number to enable the State to know the true identity “of the licensed health care provider who actually provided the service.”
The two required data points are not substitutes but are quite notably at opposite ends of the spectrum. The license type is the most general (“dentist“); the identification number is the most granular (one specific dentist and no other). The statute is openly and expressly an anti-fraud statute, too—not just one to punish fraud, or even just to detect fraud, but to prevent it altogether. Again, Chapter 36 of the Human Resources Code is titled “Health Care Program Fraud Prevention.” So is it really plausible that the legislature is indifferent about which of two fundamentally dissimilar data points are provided? Is it
The answer, of course, is no. Both data points, after all, could be useful in various anti-fraud efforts. They could work together in individual cases as a kind of check—if a license type and identification number did not match, that would signal that something has gone awry, flagging the claim for more attention. Even taken separately, both data points could be useful in different ways. For example, given how many Medicaid claims are made, it would surely be useful to sometimes generate reports to see if there are outliers or patterns about the type of provider who performs specific kinds of treatments. If certain services are normally provided by “dental hygienists,” running reports to see when they are provided by “dentists” could help identify anomalies, which might lead to further analysis, audits, improvements, or the like. Other circumstances—especially if there is an audit—might make the license type irrelevant, but make it very important to know the individual provider. Many of these purposes would not be possible if the form includes one data point but not the other—or, perhaps worse, if the form accurately includes one but falsely includes the other.
So can anyone seriously think that the legislature just does not care if the data it demands is corrupted in this way? That the legislature only cares about getting one piece of accurate data for any individual claim, without any interest whatsoever in being able to reliably detect trends in specific practices, regions, or across the State? Reading the statute in such a way is puzzling at best.
To be clear, all we are doing is reading the statute to see what the statute contemplates. But the Court reads the statute anachronistically—it relies on a current form that is not part of the statute, and reasons backwards to conclude that this later-adopted form reached back from the future to determine the meaning of the statute. See ante at 24–25 (relying on the “Medicaid-approved claim form“).
Let me explain what is going on. The statute (which again is what matters) requires the license type and individual identification number. The statute applies to all Medicaid providers, not just dentists. As it turns out, at least for dental providers and during the time at issue, the Health and Human Services Commission could ascertain both required data points if given the “Texas Provider Identifier” number, so the then-current claim form requested only that.4 It is easy to see how
Both in the real circumstances of today and in my hypothetical, however, it remains important to accurately reflect both data points. In today‘s case, for example, the form requested only the identification number because, if listed accurately, it would accurately generate both required data points. Falsely listing the identification number guarantees that both required data points cannot be accurate. At most, as here, a false identification number might match the correct license type. (And in the dental world, it often will—“dentist” is hardly rare.) But at no point could the Commission ascertain both data points from the license type alone, no matter how a claimant provided that information. A false identification number certainly cannot generate an accurate identification number.
Yet under the Court‘s construction, a claimant may just make up the identification number, or use someone else‘s, or leave it blank—as long as he somewhere scribbles what his license type is or otherwise so indicates. Any of those actions ensure that the State will not know the identity of the person “who actually provided” the medical services—the one thing that the statute makes abundantly and expressly clear it wants. Yet the Court excludes such falsehoods from the statute‘s prohibitions, and says that all the State needs to know is that some anonymous “dentist” did the work—maybe the one whose identification number is used, maybe not. Who knows? That really narrows it down. How helpful.
The Court, in other words, says that “indicat[ing]” the “license type” is all the statute requires—form or no form. This case shows the consequences of that view. When a particular identification number embeds both data points, as with the “TPI” that the then-current form requested, see ante at 15–16, the truth about both is revealed with one accurate number. Telling a lie will often accurately generate the license type, but never the identification number. The Court thinks that the legislature is fine with the lie—that it unambiguously approved the lie.
The Court invokes statutory context to defend this remarkable conclusion in three ways: (1) that the construction that I advance is allegedly surplusage, id. at 24–25; (2) that the statute‘s use of the word
1
First, the Court argues that both the license type and the identification number of the person who actually provided the medical service are not necessary, so reading the statute to require both would “result[] in superfluity,” id. at 24, because the claim form only requires the identification number, which (if accurately supplied) necessarily provides both pieces of information, id. at 24–25.
As I have just described, I accept the point as far as it goes: an accurate identification number would supply both pieces of information. But the converse is never true. Providing just an accurate license type is to fail to provide an accurate identification number (using any mechanism other than actually providing an accurate identification number, of course—the very thing that both the form and the statute expressly request, and what the Court says can be ignored). Giving the Commission only the license type would, as here, leave the Commission in the dark about who actually performed the service—either forever or only after substantial effort and expenditure of time and resources to get at the truth.
But again, to understand what the statute means, who cares what the form requires? The form—which an agency adopted after the legislature enacted the statute—tells us nothing about the statute‘s meaning. I can imagine one scenario where the fact that the form only asks for the identification number might matter: to a dentist who accurately listed that number. If the State were to later seek to impose penalties on such a dentist for not separately listing a license type—which the form does not request and which is embedded in the identification number the provider supplies—it might well violate due-process principles. See, e.g., Mosley v. Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. Comm‘n, 593 S.W.3d 250, 262–69 (Tex. 2019) (holding that due process forbids the government from insisting even on correct legal requirements when the government has misled the regulated party about what they are). But no one is holding Dr. Malouf accountable for not separately listing the license types of the providers at his dental chains—the State seeks to hold him accountable for not listing the providers’ actual identification numbers, which both the form and the statute demand.
The Court is wrong to collapse the identification-number and license-type requirements for another reason: the legislature is perfectly free to impose overlapping requirements. Creating an account on most any website requires someone to enter a new password twice, just to make sure there was no typo; overlapping informational requirements can likewise minimize error or promote accuracy in other contexts.5 There are likely many other reasons
The real facts here prove the point. Providing an accurate identification number may turn out to satisfy both requirements—which is presumably why the form was structured as it was—but this case involves a dentist who provided an inaccurate number on thousands of claims. There is, in short, no “superfluity” here.
2
Second, the Court invokes the presumption of consistent usage—that the statute‘s disjunctive use of the word “or” in nearby provisions supports reading “and” to have a conjunctive meaning (or “distributive sense“) here. Ante at 25–27. Even assuming that the Court correctly categorizes the various uses of various conjunctions, the canon has no role to play in this case.
What is the canon? In Colorado County v. Staff, the Court described it by quoting a statute: “Stated another way, ‘words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.‘” Colorado County v. Staff, 510 S.W.3d 435, 452 (Tex. 2017) (brackets omitted) (quoting
This basis does not remotely support the Court‘s theory that provisions like § 36.002(10), which use “or” disjunctively, make its construction of the word “and” in § 36.002(8) reasonable. As far as I know, neither this Court nor the U.S. Supreme Court has ever applied the presumption of consistent usage to the word “and.” To the contrary, the Supreme Court recently noted the novelty of such an argument in this very context, rejecting the applicability of such a presumption “to words as ubiquitous and . . . sometimes context-dependent as ‘and’ and ‘or.‘” Pulsifer, 144 S. Ct. at 735.6
Understandably so: “and” and “or” are the exact opposite of words that take on a technical or particular meaning, whether
Trying to force a “consistent usage” discipline on the legislature‘s uses of conjunctions, particularly in sentences with highly complex structures, is also troubling because we know that the presumption of consistent usage “is so often disregarded,” which is why it “is particularly defeasible by context.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 171 (2012); see also S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428, 445 (Tex. 2022) (“the consistent-use canon depends heavily on context“).
Without the “defeasib[ility]” of this canon, we probably could not have the canon in the first place. The canon, after all, is an aid in reaching the meaning the legislature actually adopted, not a way for courts to punish the legislature for being less punctilious than members of this Court might (sometimes) demand. In other words, we use the canon because it makes sense. When the legislature repeatedly uses a particularized term and gives no reason to think that any of those uses bear a different meaning, it would disrespect the legislature to interpret the same word differently. The same is true in ordinary speech. Someone who says “the president” to refer to the president of the school board six times in a conversation probably is not referring to President Biden in her seventh usage—unless context shows a changed meaning (such as the seventh usage coming an hour later and after someone else starts talking about national politics).
We thus presume that a use of the same term is purposeful—that drafters use the same term to mean the same thing, just as anyone typically does in ordinary speech. But as with ordinary speech, it is just a rebuttable presumption for statutory interpretation—drafters often “use different words to denote the same concept,” so statutory context (with a little common sense sprinkled in) is essential. Scalia & Garner, supra, at 170 (emphasis added). Forcing the same term to bear the same meaning when context refutes consistent usage is just as bad as giving terms different meanings when nothing in the context suggests any such variant. This defeasibility principle applies even to specialized terms, much less to a conjunction, for goodness’ sake.7
Examples of statutes that illustrate the danger of whipping out the consistent-usage canon on conjunctions are almost endless. Here is one from the Transportation Code. Vehicles’ headlights must be turned on “(1) at nighttime; and (2) when light is insufficient or atmospheric conditions are unfavorable so that a person or vehicle on the highway is not clearly discernible at a
Here is another example. Section 48.02 of the Penal Code is titled “Prohibition of the Purchase and Sale of Human Organs.”
clear. Such a construction makes no sense, as the statutory text (enacted at the same time as the title) reflects—it punishes one who “knowingly or intentionally offers to buy, offers to sell, acquires, receives, sells, or otherwise transfers any human organ for valuable consideration.”
The larger point, of course, is that there are many contexts in which there is no real difference between “or” and “and.” Because of that linguistic truism, the legislature was not really inconsistent in any meaningful way in any of these examples, and certainly not here.
3
The Court also argues that I cannot be right because the statute does not affirmatively require two pieces of information, but instead deems “wrongful” a “fail[ure] to indicate the provider‘s identification number and license type.” Ante at 27 n.19. Semantics. The following two circumstances are not different: (1) affirmatively requiring two things to avoid punishment and (2) punishing a failure to provide only one of two things. Either way—because it is in fact just one way, written differently—the statute here requires both.
C
Part of statutory context is what the statute tells us about its role in a larger statutory scheme. “Purpose” has a bad name because of “purposivism“—the school of thought that, without any particular textual anchor, determines at a high level of generality what the “purpose” of a statute is and then forces the text to conform to that discovered purpose. See, e.g., Scalia & Garner, supra, at 19; accord Pulsifer, 144 S. Ct. at 737 (“No law pursues its purposes at all costs.“) (brackets omitted)
Put another way, a statute‘s purpose, as revealed by the text‘s plain meaning, is just another part of the statute‘s legal context. Statutorily expressed purpose can helpfully eliminate alternatives that, while grammatically possible, are deemed unreasonable because they are inconsistent with the statutory text.
Here, the statutory text reveals both a general and specific purpose, which provides essential context that requires rejecting Dr. Malouf‘s reading. Start at the top, with the title, which I have mentioned before. I wholly agree that the “title of a statutory provision cannot override the plain meaning of the underlying text,” but “a title can at least ‘inform the inquiry into the Legislature‘s intent.‘” Brown v. City of Houston, 660 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. 2023) (quoting TIC Energy & Chem., Inc. v. Martin, 498 S.W.3d 68, 75 (Tex. 2016)). The heading to Chapter 36 of the Human Resources Code was recently amended to read: “Health Care Program Fraud Prevention.” Act of May 16, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., S.B. 745, § 2. It was similar as originally enacted: “AN ACT relating to the prevention of Medicaid fraud.” Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 824, H.B. 2523. The legislature‘s overarching motive is pretty obvious: to avoid squandering limited resources, it wants to pay only valid claims, including for treatments performed only by those licensed under the Medicaid scheme. The State does not want to pay for unauthorized medical services, and to that end has chosen to minimize the number of fraudulent claims by making it easier to detect fraud and by penalizing claimants who make fraudulent claims or claims that violate the anti-fraud requirements.
The claim-reporting requirements—and the heavy consequences of violating them—are part of the effort to “prevent” fraud. Knowing the identity “of the licensed health care provider who actually provided the service” is one of the legislature‘s specifically enumerated means of accomplishing that end.
This reading fundamentally—and, I must say, rather obviously—botches the
The Court‘s reading of this fraud-prevention statute is one that makes fraud easier. The statute‘s textually derived purpose confirms yet again that the only reasonable way to construe the statute is to require claimants to provide both pieces of information (which, in this context, is achieved by giving an accurate identification number, but is not achieved by giving only an accurate license type).
The Court recasts the statutory purpose as “preventing fraudulent harm to the Medicaid program.” Ante at 32. As long as the fraud does not disrupt the State‘s ability “to properly process claims and distribute the appropriate amount of funds to the provider,” the statutory purpose is to not punish those who make false claims. Id.
This argument fails for at least two reasons. First, even accepting the Court‘s formulation, the “harm” to the State extends beyond paying unauthorized claims. The State is harmed because it lacks the information that it needs to investigate whether a claim is authorized in the first place. If all the State knows is that some anonymous dentist did the work, it will either pay up despite being in the dark or have to determine (1) who actually performed the services and (2) whether the claim is otherwise authorized. When that inefficient and costly process is multiplied by the millions of Texans enrolled in Medicaid, it is easy to see why the legislature demanded information to enable cost-effective and efficient ways to verify claims or detect patterns of noncompliance.9 So even if the State ultimately determines that a particular claim is authorized, incomplete or false information necessarily harms its ability “to properly process claims.”
Second, and more fundamentally, it is quite dangerous to suggest that some lies are no big deal. Even if the procedures were authorized, providing false information about them is a big deal, and not only because of the indirect costs that such false information imposes. Yes, the parties have stipulated that properly qualified dentists performed the procedures in this case. If one conceives of the harm as limited to the delta between what the State actually paid and what it would have paid had the forms told the truth, then the lies may have been “harmless.” But we are not talking about tort or contract damages. The lie here is a violation of an important regulatory-enforcement law that requires accuracy for different reasons.
Securities laws enforced by the government provide a useful analogy. When Congress passed the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, it “empower[ed] the courts to enjoin any practice which operates ‘as a fraud or deceit,‘” but did not “intend[] to require proof of . . . actual injury to clients.” SEC v. Cap. Gains Rsch. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192 (1963). Similarly, the Securities Act of 1933 “makes unlawful the making of untrue statements of material fact or the omissions of such a fact.” United States v. Tallant, 547 F.2d 1291, 1296 (5th Cir. 1977). It is the making of the untrue statement that is unlawful, “not the occurrence of a dollar loss as a result of the actions, statements, or omissions.” Id. Put another way, “a violation of the Securities Act is [not] a result-oriented crime.” Cook v. State, 824 S.W.2d 634, 638 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991), pet. ref‘d, 828 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (per curiam). At least for government enforcement, securities laws protect the integrity of the markets—they do not just target actual financial losses caused by a lack of integrity.
Likewise, the State legitimately demands that the Medicaid-reimbursement system be one of integrity. The statute does not just target general government “fraud“—it requires compliance with specific anti-fraud and fraud-prevention requirements.10 Remarkably, however, intentional lies to the government that are material to its management of a massive and expensive program turn out to be of no great importance to the Court, which holds that § 36.002(8) was designed only to target those who ultimately receive more money than they would have received if they had told the truth. (And even this standard seems insufficient to support the Court‘s judgment, because at least some of the false information supplied on the forms was apparently written to obtain money more quickly than would have been possible if the correct information had been supplied—for example, when the actual providers did not yet even have an identification number.)
* * *
Remember that all of this comes just because of the Court‘s root canal of the word “and.” The foregoing reasons explain why, as a matter of statutory construction, it is wrong for the Court to have interpreted the word as it did.
That my reading of the statute aligns with the State‘s does not mean that I think the statute cannot be abused. Maybe it was abused here. Dr. Malouf‘s strongest point is not his argument that the statute does not even really care about knowing the “actual” provider. Nor is it his contention that the lies he told on 1,842 false claim forms did not really harm the State. His strongest point is instead that because all the procedures would have been authorized and paid for, the State is using the law as a sledgehammer against a gnat.
The Court‘s solution is every bit as excessive. The meaning of “and” cannot turn on a collateral matter like whether the total penalty for these false claims was $1,000 or $16 million. The words of a statute mean what they mean. Giving this statute an excessively parsimonious reading does not fix enforcement proceedings that are excessively grasping. The law has other and better ways to solve that sort of problem—assuming it is one here—without rewriting a statute. Being over-penalized raises potential claims under our due-course clause or, perhaps most clearly, under the provision of our Constitution promising that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted.”
Dr. Malouf, however, has not invoked these constitutional protections. The Court should not find a backdoor way to give him aid or comfort when he refuses to knock at the front door.11
One might also argue that the State‘s construction harshly penalizes claimants who inadvertently provide the wrong license type or identification number via “unintentional technical, clerical, or administrative errors.”
State
The legislature struck a careful balance between two competing objectives: enacting strong protections against fraud while simultaneously excluding honest mistakes from the statute‘s reach. The Court‘s approach disrupts that balance, departing from the fundamental principle that courts “enforce a statute as written, and avoid construing individual provisions of a statute in isolation from the statute as a whole.” Hlavinka v. HSC Pipeline P‘ship, LLC, 650 S.W.3d 483, 491 (Tex. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).
D
The Court also indulges in substantial dicta concerning the rule of lenity—dicta because, amazingly, the Court holds that the only reasonable interpretation of the statute is the one that I have shown to be utterly unreasonable, ante at 33, and with only one reasonable interpretation, there is no work for the rule of lenity to perform. I would not apply the rule of lenity either—because the only reasonable reading reaches the result contrary to the Court‘s. But if the Court insists on addressing the rule of lenity, it should at least do so accurately. It is fortunate that all that discussion, see ante at 7–13, 33, is dicta.13
The Court is mostly right in stating that, in cases of ambiguity, the rule of lenity requires courts to construe penal statutes narrowly and in favor of the accused. I also agree that the rule of lenity is not relevant absent ambiguity. But not just any ambiguity will do; after all, “most statutes are ambiguous to some degree.” Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998).
To the contrary, courts across the country, including this Court, apply the rule of lenity only in extreme cases. The U.S. Supreme “Court has repeatedly emphasized that a court must find not just ambiguity but ‘grievous ambiguity’ before resorting to the rule of lenity.” Shular v. United States, 589 U.S. 154, 167 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In other words, “the rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, structure, history, and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute . . . such that the Court must simply guess as to what [the legislature] intended.” Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have likewise said that the rule applies only when there is “grave doubt as to the intention of the legislature.” Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Dwyer, 19 S.W. 470, 471 (Tex. 1892) (emphasis added).14
405 F.3d 360, 371 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Words like “grave,” “grievous,” and “insoluble“—repeated in case after case, court after court, century after century—do some real work. The rule of lenity is not a special gift to one side of the case—a sort of strict-scrutiny of penal-law construction. It is a “break glass in case of ambiguity,” an absolute last resort when nothing else helps—not context, not the canons, not history and tradition, not statutory history. The rule of lenity means that if it would truly be a coin flip, we do not flip the coin but instead give the call to the defendant.
But even if there were some ambiguity here, it is not remotely a “grave,” “grievous,” or “insoluble” ambiguity that escapes meaning. No coin-flipping needed. To the contrary, the text, structure, and purpose of this statute resolve the question. I hope that the lower courts do not draw from the Court‘s dicta today that the rule of lenity is suddenly a vibrant force ready to slay statutory requirements that are otherwise clear.
* * *
“[T]extualists believe that meaning is a function of the way speakers use language in particular circumstances.” John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2457 (2003). Courts must construe statutes with the knowledge that “words mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were written.” Scalia & Garner, supra, at 16. So “it is a fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) (quoting Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993)). This includes statutory context and purpose, the latter of which “must be derived from the text, not from extrinsic sources such as legislative history or an assumption about the legal drafter‘s desires.” Scalia & Garner, supra, at 56.
The Court does not follow these principles today. Its “textualism” ignores the statutory context and expressed purposes underlying the Medicaid Fraud Prevention Act‘s language. The rule of lenity has no role to play here, both because the statute is not ambiguous and because, even if it were, it would not be triggered as a first impulse.
But if the Court is right and I am wrong, then buckle up. As I show next, if this statute means what the Court says, then a huge host of statutes do not mean what anyone has thought they meant.
II
The foregoing reasons are sufficient in and of themselves to merit my dissent. But the Court‘s approach to statutory construction is also problematic because of multiple Texas and federal laws that use the terms “and” and “or” interchangeably.15 I mention those statutes for two
reasons. First, their mere existence proves the point that I have made above—that these conjunctions are often used in such a transposable way. Statutes must therefore be read within their context, which always “includes common sense.” Morath v. Lampasas Indep. Sch. Dist., 686 S.W.3d 725, 738 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2379 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring)). Second, these statutes’ existence amplifies the threat of today‘s decision—if this statute can be treated as the Court does, what is next? I hope, instead, that today is a one-off, and that the Court returns to the older tradition of relying on text within context, “includ[ing] common sense.”
Chapter 312 of the Texas Health and Safety Code applies to agreements with a “medical and dental unit.”
Consider also Chapter 65 of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Code, which “governs the taking, possession, and sale of alligators.”
The Court also departs from the reasoning used by courts around the country. Just this term, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that courts should resolve ambiguity “by reviewing text in context.” Pulsifer, 144 S. Ct. at 726. The Court rejected Pulsifer‘s interpretation not because it was grammatically impermissible, but because it would “make[] a hash of the scheme Congress devised.” Id. at 735. Or, as this Court recently described Pulsifer, “requiring A, B, and C, each, provides a safety valve for otherwise stricter sentences, while requiring only one or two of the three would allow more violent criminals to be released sooner and seriously rupture the sentencing system.” Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. IDEXX Labs., Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2024 WL 2983170, *5 (Tex. June 14, 2024). Yet here, the Court embraces a construction that ruptures the statutory scheme by insisting on a dubious definition of “and” even though only the State‘s interpretation is consistent with the statutory protection against Medicaid fraud. It is hard to read these two opinions from our Court issued one week apart and make sense of them both.
Likewise, state supreme courts across the country refer to statutory context and common sense when giving meaning to conjunctions. See People v. Allen, 968 N.W.2d 532, 538 n.16 (Mich. 2021) (holding that “the context mandates a disjunctive reading of ‘and‘” because a conjunctive construction would have created a result inconsistent with the rest of the statutory scheme); State v. Irby, 967 N.W.2d 389, 395 (Minn. 2021) (“in limited circumstances, ‘and’ can be read in a several, that is, disjunctive, sense based on context and the specific way the word is used“). We should too.
* * *
The legislature can fix the specific error the Court makes today. It could amend the statute to use different language to affirmatively and expressly require both the license type and the identification number (or whatever else it may want). But how can the legislature solve the larger problem that the Court has created—a problem, as the foregoing discussion reflects, that permeates every part of our statutory law? If the judiciary is now going to read laws that are as clear in their scope as this one to mean something quite different than what they say, the legislature will not only have to scrub all new legislation, but will also have to race to check all the existing laws. Perhaps a review of legislation is no terrible thing—but to force the legislature to go on Conjunction Patrol at the cost of other legislative priorities seems to be a questionable way to treat a coordinate branch.
Because I disagree with the Court‘s articulation of the law and its result—a conjunction
Evan A. Young
Justice
OPINION FILED: June 21, 2024
Notes
The Court mistakes my point. I agree that courts are not in the business of correcting drafting errors (at least those that are not scrivener‘s errors, see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 134-35 (2012)). But this statute contains no drafting (or scrivener‘s) error. As drafted, it means that a provider must indicate both the license type and the actual provider‘s identification number. As I explain below, the word “and” (like many words) can mean different things in different contexts, and in this context, the Court‘s reading is unreasonable. In other words, I hardly propose to (improperly) “fix” some substantive legislative “mistake,” but instead to (properly) apply the statute as the legislature wrote it, in light of its statutory context and the statute‘s textually expressed function.
Regardless of all that, I doubt that the alternate phrasing would “fix” the legislature‘s supposed “mistake.” If the statute replaced “and” with “or,” the parties would still be before us. The State would argue that a knowing failure to provide either the license type or the identification number violates the statute. Dr. Malouf would argue that “or” gives claimants a choice: so long as the claimant provides the license type or the identification number, there is no violation. We would still have to resolve the question if the legislature made the single wording switch. See Pulsifer, 144 S. Ct. at 729 (“[W]e doubt that substituting ‘or’ for ‘and’ would have delivered us from interpretive controversy.“).
The record indicates, however, that the claim form in use during the relevant timeframe for this litigation (2007–2010) was “dental specific.” And in the current Texas Medicaid Provider Procedures Manual, dentists participating in the THSteps program are required to submit an ADA Dental Claim Form. Tex. Health & Hum. Servs., Texas Medicaid Provider Procedures Manual: Vol. 1, Section 6: Claims Filing (2024). By submitting a “dental specific” form, one could argue that the claimant impliedly indicated the license type as “dental.” Would that be enough for the Court?
The point, though, is that the Court‘s holding would apply with equal force if the form included two boxes: one for the identification number and one for the license type. As it happens, the current claim form appears to ask for both. The Texas Medicaid Provider Procedures Manual requires a dental claimant to submit a unique provider identifier number and a taxonomy code for all paper claims. Id. “A taxonomy code is a unique 10-character code that designates [a medical provider‘s] classification and specialization.” Find Your Taxonomy Code, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, https://www.cms.gov/medicare/enrollment-renewal/providers-suppliers/health-care-taxonomy (last visited June 18, 2024). In other words, the taxonomy code is a unique number that identifies a provider‘s license type. The manual then states why the claim form requires a taxonomy code in addition to the provider‘s identifier number: the former is “used to crosswalk the [provider‘s unique identifier number] to the billing provider.” Tex. Health & Hum. Servs., Texas Medicaid Provider Procedures Manual, supra.
But good news, dentists: the Court has now dispensed with this requirement, despite how sensible and useful it likely is.
After all, unlike private plaintiffs, the government does not need to establish an actionable injury to bring an enforcement action; the violation of law is itself sufficient. See, e.g., Universal Brands, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 546 F.2d 30, 34 (5th Cir. 1977) (“A mere showing by the private plaintiff of a violation of the anti-trust laws has no actionable significance because, while in a government action there need be established only an antitrust violation, a private litigant ‘must not only show the violation of the antitrust laws, but show also the impact of the violations upon him.‘” (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Credit Bureau Reps., Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., 476 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1973))).
I would mostly affirm on this ground, too. Dr. Malouf testified that he generally did not know that his clinic was providing false information. This testimony is probably enough to create a fact issue as to Dr. Malouf‘s mental state—i.e., whether he genuinely did not know that his clinic was filing false claim forms. As to others, he testified that he knew his clinic was providing the wrong identification number, but thought that it was doing so based on prior approval from Texas Medicaid. In other words, Dr. Malouf admits to knowingly making false claims—he just thought that his conduct was excused. The statute, however, does not require “specific intent to commit an unlawful act under Section 36.002 . . . to show that a person acted ‘knowingly.‘”
With respect to the first batch of claim forms (those where Dr. Malouf allegedly did not know that his clinic was filing false claim forms), therefore, I would reverse and remand for the trial court to determine which (if any) forms qualify for the first batch and, as to those forms, let a factfinder evaluate the credibility of Dr. Malouf‘s general denial. As to the second batch of claim forms (those where Dr. Malouf knowingly lied but believed he had the right to do so), I would affirm the judgment below that renders judgment for the State. I disagree with the Court as to both batches, and thus must dissent in the entirety of the judgment.
“Cherry-pick[ed]” or otherwise, it is hardly an incorrect statement of Texas law. Unsurprisingly, this Court runs a bit low on cases specifically addressing what level of ambiguity is required to justify applying the rule of lenity—we construe penal statutes quite infrequently compared to other courts. Those that do regularly construe such statutes, however, apply the rule of lenity only in cases of grave ambiguity. I would not purport to chart a different course—and especially not in a case where the Court itself admits that the rule of lenity plays no role regardless of the level of ambiguity at issue.
William Shakespeare, King Lear act 1, sc. 1, l. 88–91 (emphasis added).To thee and thine hereditary ever
Remain this ample third of our fair kingdom;
No less in space, validity, and pleasure,
Than that conferr‘d on Goneril.
The Texas Pattern Jury Charges also use “and” when “or” could do. For example, in deciding whether a nuisance is temporary, a jury must determine if the injury is “such that any anticipated recurrence would be only occasional, irregular, intermittent, and not reasonably predictable.” Comm. on Pattern Jury Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas Pattern Jury Charges: General Negligence, Intentional Personal Torts & Workers’ Compensation PJC 12.4 (2022) (emphasis added). Under the Court‘s reasoning today, a temporary nuisance must be all of those adjectives, even though all need not be found. See Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 272 (Tex. 2004) (holding that a nuisance is “temporary if it is ‘occasional, intermittent or recurrent‘” (emphasis added) (quoting Bayouth v. Lion Oil Co., 671 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. 1984))); see also Huynh v. Blanchard, — S.W.3d —, 2024 WL 2869423, *18 (Tex. June 7, 2024) (noting a jury‘s finding that a “nuisance [was] ‘occasional, irregular, [and] intermittent‘“).
Our very own rules of procedure use “and” when context (and this Court‘s routine practice) shows that it means “or.” See
