*1 court, tu filed a similar motion with this granted temporary Cantu immediate re- BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC., f/k/a
lief. the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, Petitioner,
Mandamus issues to correct a abuse discretion or the violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no ade Marilyn GLYN-JONES, Glyn- David quate remedy Packer, by appeal. Walker v. Jones, Deceased, Glyn- and Jason 839-40 The trial Jones, Respondents. clearly abused its discretion. The Tex Appellate Rules of Procedure No. D-4097. appellate extension of the timetable for parties that timely do not receive notice that Supreme Court of Texas. signed judgment trial court has them: Argued Feb. twenty days
If within judgment after the Decided June signed ... is party a civil ad- versely attorney affected it or his has
neither received the notice ... nor ac-
quired order, knowledge actual of the then respect party periods to that all the (b)(1) in subparagraph
mentioned except period filing petition for writ of begin
error shall on the that such date
party attorney or his received such notice acquired knowledge actual sign- of the
ing, whichever occurred first....
Tex.R.App.P. 5(b)(4). party Such is re-
quired prove date of notice the trial
court, and required the trial court is to hold a
hearing requested finding. and make the Tex.R.App.P. 5(b)(5) (“The shall judge trial upon the date party which the ... ac-
quired knowledge signing actual of the
judgment at the hearing conclusion finding and include this in the court’s or-
’der.”) added). (emphasis The trial court did
not do so. adequate remedy
Cantu does not have an Indeed,
by appeal. precluded Cantu
pursuing any appeal finding without she hearing argument,
seeks. Without oral
majority grants of the court relator’s motion conditionally grants to file and leave her Tex.R.App.P.
petition for writ of mandamus.
122. The clerk is directed to issue writ respondent in the event refuses to hearing, finding,
hold a make a it include
in his order.
133 prove causation. See aet. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. 6701d, court, 107C(j). The trial conse judgment in nothing quently, granted a take Bridgestone/Firestone and severed favor of from all other claims. The judgment summary judg appeals court of reversed Jr., Hartline, Edwards C. Vernon Scott G. court, ment to the trial hold and remanded Jung, petitioner. for and P. Michael ing unconstitutionally restricts Houston, respon- Barry Berger, for S. Glyn-Jones’ claim in violation of common-law dents. 640; 857 S.W.2d Open Courts Provision. 6701d, 107C(j); see Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. aet. GAMMAGE, Justice, opinion delivered the I, § art. Const. Court, PHILLIPS, Chief which HIGHTOWER, DOGGETT, Justice, and initially We must determine whether sec- SPECTOR, Justices, join. and CORNYN Glyn-Jones 107C(j) actually precludes offering her In from evidence that she used seat this case we consider whether Texas 6701d, conclude that Civil Statute article belt in this case. Because we Revised plaintiff’s precludes a cause not intend to bar use of evidence, posed a manufacturer we need not such reach seat belt and shoulder harness defective question. judg- We affirm the constitutional system. provision, pro- We hold the appeals ment court and remand to hibits use or of a nonuse seat proceedings. for further the trial court trial, belt in a civil was not intended and apply protect does not seat belt manu- general when a stat rule liability restraint facturer defective unambiguous ute is “a court should systems. or extrinsic aids not use rules construction Glyn-Jones Marilyn when her it, give the statute its to construe but should 1982 Ford Escort was struck another car. meaning.” v. common One 1985 Chevrolet Upon impact, Glyn-Jones alleges her State, (Tex.1993), 932, citing 852 S.W.2d and, result, protect Motors, Inc., 814, failed her as a she v. 660 S.W.2d Cail Service vehicle, causing about her fur- thrown Roloff, parte Ex 510 S.W.2d Glyn-Jones injury. ther sued other driv- (Tex.1974). Here, however, 913, we are er, Hamilton, John and the of Dallas for whole, presented with the statute as addition, negligence. Glyn-Jones sued of the statute. Words but mere Company, Bridgestone/Fire- Ford Motor nothing. Only a vacuum mean stone, Sales, Champion Inc. Motor as- statute can context of the remainder warranty prod- serting both breach of single provision be true liability Glyn-Jones Specifically, ucts claims. Fast Motor made clear. Merchants Cf. alleged the seat belt and shoulder harness Comm’n, Lines, v. 573 S.W.2d Inc. Railroad system, as well as the driver’s seat Bernhard, 502, (Tex.1978); Barr v. track, designed manufactured were and/or the con While a defective condition. however, clarity, normally provides here text legislature’s ambiguity about the it creates summary Bridgestone/Firestone moved primary task is to purpose. our Because Glyn-Jones judgment, contending that would intent, give we must effect to prove at trial an essential ele be unable ease to even look the words behind products liability claim.1 The ment of her provision. purpose of the determine the true that, agreed Glyn-Jones trial court 312.005; Pruden see could not introduce evidence that she was Ann. Tex.Gov’t Code Plan, Inc. v. Comm’r tial Health Care wearing her at the time fact Ins., (Tex.App. collision, Glyn-Jones unable to would be — Austin warranty judgment Glyn-Jones' Bridge- on breach granted trial earlier summary partial claims. motion stone/Firestone’s n.r.e.), citing writ ref'd penalty provided by Edwards the criminal the statute Morton, (1898). 92 Tex. S.W. 792 the failure could injured person By in a civil trial. includ- Article section 107C was enacted to (j)) ing use mandate the of seat belts and to *3 law, forge ground not to tort new in penalty a criminal failure to wear a merely preserve quo. the status Debate seat belt. The last sentence of the section House, on Tex.S.B. 500 on the Floor of states that or “[u]se nonuse of a belt is 15, 1985); Leg. (May Nancy 69th see also admissible evidence civil trial.” Tex. Casbeer, The Belt Use Seat of Defense 6701d, § 107C(j). Bridge- ART. Rev.Civ.Stat. Cases, Baylor Crashworthiness 40 L.Rev. contends this sentence was stone/Firestone 551, (1988). 564-65 intended to abolish crashworthiness actions enacted, When was a defen- against of manufacturers seat If belts. permitted dant was not to introduce evidence intend, legislature unlikely did so it seems plaintiffs aof a failure wear seat belt as that it would utilize a subsection of a traffic contributory Kerby evidence of negligence. Instead, change. statute to effect a such College, v. Abilene 503 Christian S.W.2d 526 statute, read in the context of the entire we v. Wong, Carnation Co. 516 legislature hold did not intend (Tex.1974). Carnation, S.W.2d 116 we tion necessary plaintiffs held “should not have the dam- to a cause a seat manu- belt ages mitigated them awarded to reduced injuries allegedly by facturer for caused their failure to wear available seat defective seat belt. By at enacting belts.” 516 S.W.2d 117. Although the bare words subsec belt, mandating seat isolation, (j), tion facially viewed appear to however, could have overruled Bridgestone/Firestone’s advance argument, Kerby our decision in and Carnation and we decline foster an so obvi negligence per established a basis for a se ously contrary to the intent. As plaintiff defense whenever failed to wear court stated v. Lunsford Instead, belt. added Bryan, 520, 115, 297 156 117 (j) ratify holding. Carnation’s (1957): Co., 629, Pool Ford Motor by Numerous decisions this court have es- tablished rule that courts are not not, adding The by subsec by meaning bound the literal words preclude plaintiffs seek to from statutes, the construction of but when the bringing claims manufactur purpose Legislature intent and by ers defective seat manifest a consideration of a statute belts. We find no in this state either whole, as a words will be restricted or laws, in states with similar the inter where give enlarged order to the statute the by pretation urged Bridgestone/Firestone by the law- argued, adopted.2 even much Every less makers. scholarly discussing article the vari See, Brouse, 511, e.g., Miers v. 153 Tex. mandatory ous around the laws (1954); Prudential, S.W.2d 419 626 S.W.2d country focuses on effect such laws have 827; Sproles Board Ins. Comm’rs v. defense,” on the “seat belt never even con Inc., Lines, Freight Motor templating application argued (Tex.Civ.App. Worth writ — Fort Bridgestone/Firestone. See, e.g., Nancy Cas refd); § also see Tex.Gov’t Code ANN. 312.- beer, The Use Seat Belt Defense Cases, Baylor Crashworthiness L.Rev. 551 (1988); Schwartz, Subsection was included in 107C Leonard Charles The Seat Mandatory order to make clear that Seat Belt sole Belt Us Defense Ethics, Economics, Law, age: failure to wear a seat belt is Idaho 106; 12-420; provisions 2. Other states with similar Oklahoma Stat.Ann. tit. 169.685, Code subd. include: Montana Ann. 61—13— Minnesota Stat.Ann. Cochran, Jr., logic (1988); as the conclusion demanded L.Rev. 275 Robert F. Impact dissenting opinion. principle The real New Seat Belt Issues: Defense circumstances, Belt is this: in some Bags Mandatory Seat Use work here Air words, con- Defense, plain, matter will not be on the Seat Belt how Statutes Legislature al- Damage Reduction Under Seat strued to cause result Basis of (1989); Defense, certainly most could not have intended. 73 Minn.L.Rev. 1369 Belt 271, 167 Sheppard, 140 Tex. Westenberg, Up Pay: A. Buckle Cramer v. David (1942). Emerging Safety Defense, Belt Suf S.W.2d (1986). folk U.L.Rev. 867 Justice, ENOCH, dissenting, joined by applying
The trial court erred in Texas GONZALEZ, Justice. Revised Civil article Statute *4 107C(j) to the facts of this case. We hold 6701d, article Texas Revised Civil Statute Glyn-Jones’ the that evidence of 107C(j) provides that or nonuse “[u]se in belt is admissible this civil case that in safety is of a belt not admissible evidence summary judgment against Glyn-Jones was Today, acknowledges a civil the Court trial.” granted. improperly Consequently, without actually or that said “[u]se reaching question, we af- constitutional in a safety nonuse of a belt is admissible appeals’ reversing firm the court of decision trial,” that the civil but concludes summary judgment and remand cause to really say “[u]se did not mean to nonuse proceedings. the trial court for further in a trial.” safety is not civil admissible Rather, the Court holds that HECHT, Justice, concurring. say really of a meant to that nonuse dissenting opinion The uses established I safety in a trial. belt is not admissible civil principles statutory prove, construction to respectfully dissent. think, very convincingly I that TEX.RBV.Crv. “[ajlthough the The announces that Court 6701d, § 107C(j), art. means exact- StatAnn. in iso- bare words of subsection viewed says: ly safety what it “Use or of a nonuse lation, facially appear Bridge- to advance in a belt is admissible civil trial.” One to argument, we decline stone/Firestone’s simple of these effect words is to contrary obviously foster an so against safety action the manufacturer of a at intent.” S.W.2d resulting damages belt for from a defect “[sjubsec- Court then declares that The restraining kept the belt which it from in order tion included in section 107C I occupant properly. of vehicle While be- that the sole make logic dissenting opinion lieve that the of the is the failure to wear a seat belt the criminal conclusion, points to this I with the penalty provided statute and that Legislature reasonably that Court cannot failure not be used could thought to have be intended this result. As person reasoning This is in a civil trial.” observes, Legislature that Court 107C(j), support devoid for neither section would absolve seat belt manufacturers from 107C(j) nor read context with products liability claims in a subsection of 107C, remotely suggests this con- even simply too traffic statute is much believe. it determining to avoid a result clusion. In Thus I concur in the result reached unacceptable, the Court abandons considers cannot, however, join opinion. Court. its long statutory construc- established rules of attempts justify The Court its conclusion legislation. tion and rewrites using language that the rule of construction rule, unambiguous, “If language in its The must be construed context. case, legisla sound, this must seek the intent though is useless in this 107C, plain in the and common mean nothing §in in article ture found there is or even (j) ambiguous. ing of terms used.” Sorokolit the words and makes subsection — Rhodes, S.W.2d -, - (Tex.1994); context, Section should read Motors, Inc., also, help. pretense v. Service doing so does not Coil omitted) (Tex.1983)(citations is, my view, it somehow does incredible S.W.2d (“[i]f disputed person statute is clear and unam civil trial.” 878 S.W.2d biguous!!,] logical aids extrinsic and rules of statuto Because there is no basis ry conclusion, inappropriate, surprising construction are it and the Court’s is not everyday given attempt statute should be its common does not even Court meaning”); logical Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones basis. Dist., Municipal Util. 865 S.W.2d Further, approach in the Court’s this case Inc., Drug, v. Sterling Moreno approach is in absolute contradiction to the it (Tex.1990); Republic- Sewell, took in Smith v. Interkal, Inc.,
Bank
N.A v.
691 (Tex.1993).
In the
we addressed
Smith
Today,
Beverage
section 2.02 of the Alcoholic
Code
ignores
plain
Court
and common
establishes a cause
language
providers of alcohol under certain limited
concludes
“use
nonuse
circumstances:
really
belt”
means
“nonuse
(b) Providing, selling,
serving
an alco-
belt.”
may
beverage
holic
be made the basis of a
statutory
chap-
cause of action
attempts
justify
Court
its revision
upon proof
ter ...
that:
phrases
of the statute with exalted
such as
(1)
nothing,”
“[w]ords
a vacuum mean
occurred
time the
it
*5
“[o]nly
of
of
provider
context
the remainder
apparent
was
to the
that the indi-
served,
can
of
single
sold,
statute
the true
being
provided
vidual
with
provision be made clear.”
inconsistent
legislation. Within two weeks the is- opinion,
suance of its
changed statutory language achieve R.S., Leg., result. See 73d ch.
9,§ 1993 Tex.Gen.Laws 2989. presented by this case. these addressed the issue None of states have