STATE OF MINNESOTA, Respondent, vs. Cordale Irby, Appellant.
A20-0375
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
December 15, 2021
Anderson, J.
Court of Appeals
Filed: December 15, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
________________________
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Jeffrey A. Wald, Assistant Ramsey County Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant State Public Defenders, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
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S Y L L A B U S
- The
statute that prohibits wrongfully obtaining public assistance, Minn. Stat. § 256.98, subd. 1 (2012), requires proof that a defendant acted with the “intent to defeat the purposes of” any one or more of the listed public assistance programs. - The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain appellant‘s conviction.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
ANDERSON, Justice.
This appeal requires us to interpret the language of the statute that prohibits wrongfully obtaining public assistance,
The statute prohibits certain acts or omissions committed with the “intent to defeat the purposes of” a list of nine separate public assistance programs.
FACTS
The relevant facts are not disputed. Between 2012 and 2017, Irby applied for and received over $65,000 in public assistance through the Ramsey County Community Health Services Division. Irby received Medical Assistance, as well as funds through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and the Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP). In applying for this assistance, Irby repeatedly claimed that he had neither income nor assets. He claimed his only expense was rent. To show the amount of rent he paid, Irby submitted paperwork purportedly completed and signed by his landlord, “Tom Bates.”
But the State discovered that during the time he was receiving aid, Irby had earned nearly $55,000 gambling at three separate casinos. Further investigation revealed that Irby had accounts at three separate banks. While Irby was receiving public aid, bank records show over $70,000 in deposits for these accounts. Irby also owned twelve cars. Rather than paying rent, Irby had executed a contract for deed to buy his home. After making monthly payments that sometimes exceeded $5000, Irby owned the home outright by July 2015. Irby never disclosed any of these assets in his applications for public assistance. And Irby‘s alleged landlord “Tom Bates” did not exist.
Based on this information, the State charged Irby with violating Minnesota‘s wrongfully obtaining assistance statute,
Irby appealed his conviction. He argued that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, Irby argued that the statute required the State to prove that, when he wrongfully obtained assistance, he acted with the “intent to defeat the purposes of” every one of the listed programs. The court of appeals rejected Irby‘s argument and affirmed his conviction.6 State v. Irby, 957 N.W.2d 111, 117-19 (Minn. App. 2021). We granted review.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Irby renews his argument that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. Irby first argues that, because the statute he was convicted of violating contains a list of programs joined with the word “and,” the State must prove that he acted with the intent to defeat the purpose of each and every program7 set out in that list. Irby next argues that because the State presented no evidence that he intended to defeat the purposes of, for example, the Maternal and Child Nutrition Act of 1975, the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We consider each argument in turn.
I.
We first must interpret the language of the statute that Irby was convicted of violating. A sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge based on a statutory interpretation argument is a legal question, which we review de novo. State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019). “The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”
We use the principles discussed above when assessing the reasonableness of a party‘s proposed interpretation of the language in question. For example, in State v. Strobel, we concluded that the interpretation proposed by the State was unreasonable because when the sentencing guideline provision was read as a whole, the State‘s interpretation failed to give effect to one paragraph of a statutory provision. 932 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2019) (explaining that “[u]nder the State‘s interpretation, paragraph b would do no work“). On the other hand, in State v. Mikell we concluded that, when read in the context of the statute as a whole, the language in question supported two reasonable interpretations. 960 N.W.2d 230, 241 (Minn. 2021).
When the language of a statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation it is ambiguous, in which case we try to resolve the ambiguity using the canons of construction. Id. But “when the language of a statute is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, it is unambiguous and we must apply its plain meaning.” State v. Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134, 139 (Minn. 2020). In such cases, ” ‘statutory construction is neither necessary nor permitted.’ ” Lapenotiere v. State, 916 N.W.2d 351, 357 (Minn. 2018) (quoting State v. Kelbel, 648 N.W.2d 690, 701 (Minn. 2002)).
In accordance with the principles discussed above, our analysis begins with the language of the statutory provision in question, which reads:
A person who commits any of the following acts or omissions with intent to defeat the purposes of sections 145.891 to 145.897, the MFIP program formerly codified in sections 256.031 to 256.0361, the AFDC program formerly codified in sections 256.72 to 256.871, chapter 256B, 256D, 256J, 256K, or 256L, and child care assistance programs, is guilty of theft . . .
(1) obtains or attempts to obtain, or aids or abets any person to obtain by means of a willfully false statement or representation, by intentional concealment of any material fact, or by impersonation or other fraudulent device, assistance or the continued receipt of assistance, to include child care assistance or food benefits produced according to sections 145.891 to 145.897 and MinnesotaCare services according to sections 256.9365, 256.94, and 256L.01 to 256L.15, to which the person is not entitled or assistance greater than that to which the person is entitled;
(2) knowingly aids or abets in buying or in any way disposing of the property of a recipient or applicant of assistance without the consent of the county agency; or
(3) obtains or attempts to obtain, alone or in collusion with others, the receipt of payments to which the individual is not entitled as a provider of subsidized child care, or by furnishing or concurring in a willfully false claim for child care assistance.
The arguments of the parties focus on the word “and” in the first paragraph of
five of the nine programs: The Maternal and Child Nutrition Act; the pre-1997 MFIP; the AFDC program; “child care assistance programs“; and at least one of “chapters 258B, 256D, 256J, 256K, or 256L.”
But in limited circumstances, “and” can be read in a several, that is, disjunctive, sense based on context and the specific way the word is used. Maytag Co. v. Comm‘r of Taxation, 17 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Minn. 1944); Eberle v. Miller, 212 N.W. 190, 191 (Minn. 1927), overruled in part on other grounds by Johnson v. Iverson, 222 N.W. 508 (Minn. 1928); see also Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 56 (3d ed. 2011) (acknowledging that courts “recognize that and in a given context means or“). These occasions are rare, and we presume that “and” is used in the joint sense unless the specific context of a statute unambiguously proves otherwise. If this were one of those rare occasions, as the State argues, the “and” would require a defendant to act with the “intent to defeat the purposes of” one or more of the listed programs.
Because we must consider the proposed interpretations in the context of the statute as a whole, we do not limit our analysis to a single word. Minnesota Statutes § 256.98 prohibits three distinct types of conduct, described in subdivision 1(1)–(3), when done with the requisite intent.10 The charges against Irby allege that he obtained public assistance in
a fraudulent manner in violation of subdivision 1(1) of
Irby‘s proposed interpretation of the statutory language would effectively read subdivision 1(3) out of existence because subsidized childcare providers could never have the intent required. Because Irby‘s proposed interpretation fails to give effect to all the statute‘s provisions, it is unreasonable. See Strobel, 932 N.W.2d at 309; Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 683.
By contrast, the interpretation proposed by the State gives effect to all provisions of the wrongfully obtaining assistance statute.
For all the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of the statutory language is that it requires proof that a defendant acted with the “intent to defeat the purposes of” any one or more of the public assistance programs listed in
II.
Having determined the proper interpretation of
Irby argues that the State presented insufficient evidence that he intended to defeat the programs for which he applied. Intent is a state of mind; it is frequently proven with circumstantial evidence. State v. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d 874, 890 (Minn. 2021); Reed v. State, 925 N.W.2d 11, 20 n.5 (Minn. 2019).
To prove intent, it is permissible for the jury to “infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions.” State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997). Under the two-step circumstantial evidence test, we must identify the
The circumstances proved show that Irby received aid under two of the programs listed in section 256.98: Medical Assistance under chapter 256B and the MFIP under chapter 256J. In applying for these benefits, Irby made false statements about his income and his assets. To support his applications, Irby submitted paperwork allegedly completed by a person who did not exist. Irby‘s false statements were broad and found in multiple places in each application that he filed. Irby repeated these falsities on separate applications submitted over the course of more than 5 years.
These circumstances are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. Although Irby testified that his false statements were inadvertent and he was not trying to deceive the State, “a defendant‘s statements as to his intentions are not binding on the jury if his acts demonstrated a contrary intent.” Cooper, 561 N.W.2d at 179. Irby made numerous false statements in his applications, and these statements were specific, untrue, and repeated to the point that it is not rational to believe that they were inadvertent. Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Irby acted with an intent to defeat the purposes of the aid programs for which he applied, and it is inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.
Notes
[W]ith intent to defeat the purposes of
sections 145.891 to 145.897 , the MFIP program formerly codified insections 256.031 to 256.0361 , the AFDC program formerly codified insections 256.72 to 256.871 ,chapter 256B ,256D ,256I ,256J ,256K , or256L , child care assistance programs, and emergency assistance programs undersection 256D.06 .